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THE RETURN OF CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM
LOGAN EVERETT SAWYER liit
ABSTRACT
The return of federalism to a prominent and hotly contested place in
constitutional jurisprudence is one of the most important legal developments of the last half-century. But this Article argues that current explanations for the return of constitutional federalism are flawed in ways that
distort our understanding of constitutional development and impoverish
current debates over the judicial protection of state authority. Conventional jurisprudential approaches cannot explain why the Court in the
1970s began to turn away from long-established doctrinal principles and
a decades-old theoretical justification for deference on federalism questions. Political approaches cannot explain why that shift originated with
Justices associated with the political left.
This Article offers an explanation for the return of federalism to
prominence in our constitutional law that ignores neither the Court's
unique institutional norms nor the importance of political change outside
the Court. Through a close examination of the first decision since the
New Deal to invalidate an exercise of Congress's commerce power on
federalism grounds-the 1976 decision in National League of Cities v.
Usery-it shows how durable changes in American government and
politics undermined the dominant jurisprudential justification for deference on federalism questions. As the consensus surrounding the political
safeguards of federalism collapsed, the debate over constitutional federalism returned. By portraying constitutional development as a result of
the interaction of jurisprudential norms and political change, this approach casts light on contemporary efforts to generate constitutional
change and current debates over the value of constitutional federalism.

t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to thank
Dan Coenen, Harlan Cohen, Anna di Robilant, Dan Ernst, Gerry Leonard, Bill Marshall, Tim Meyer,
Cynthia Nicoletti, Lori Ringhand, Laura Phillips Sawyer, David Seipp, Christian Turner, Sasha
Volokh, and the participants at the University of Georgia School of Law-Emory Law School Summer Roundtable and Boston University School of Law's Elizabeth Battelle Clark Legal History
Workshop. Chuck McCurdy's generosity and insight require special mention. This Article would not
have been possible without them.
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INTRODUCTION

In the four decades following Carter v. Carter Coal Co.' in 1936,
the Supreme Court did not strike down a single exercise of Congress's
commerce power on federalism grounds. 2 The Court repeatedly and by
wide margins upheld national regulation of what had been considered
local economic and social issues: wage payments to local factory workers, wheat production on a family farm, and choice of customers in a

1. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
2. Harry N. Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 619, 624 n.20 (1978).
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mom-and-pop restaurant.3 This nearly uniform support for judicial deference to Congress on federalism questions clearly ended in 1976 with the
decision in National League of Cities v. Usery.4 There, a narrow fiveJustice majority invalidated an extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act
to state and local governments on the grounds that principles of federalism prohibited Congress from using its commerce power to impair the
ability of states "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions." 5 That particular doctrine was abandoned less
than a decade later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,6 but, as Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor predicted in their Garcia dissents, NationalLeague of Cities marked the return of constitutional federalism. 7 In the nearly four decades since National League of Cities, there has been continuous and often fierce debate on the Court and in
the law reviews over the Court's proper role in protecting federalism.
Last year's decision in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius (NFIB)8 is only the most recent example. 9
The return of constitutional federalism is recognized as one of the
most significant developments in constitutional law in the last forty
years,' 0 yet-as I argue below-a close examination of the decision that
sparked that development indicates that conventional explanations for it
are not just inadequate, but inadequate in ways that distort our understanding of constitutional development and impoverish current debates
over the future of constitutional federalism. Those explanations either
emerge from normative legal analysis or focus tightly on the role of con-

3.
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942). These decisions
were unanimous or by convincing majorities.
4.
426 U.S. 833, 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
5.
Id.at 852.
6.
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
7.
Id. at 579 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 580 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
8.
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
9.
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (striking down parts of
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that
Article I of the U.S. Constitution does not allow Congress to subject nonconsenting states to private
suits); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (striking down the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 as an over-extension of congressional commerce power). The Court also used federalism arguments to justify striking down exercises of other
kinds of congressional authority, including statutes justified by Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
authority. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577-78 (2012); Bd. of
Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360-61 (2001) (striking down part of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 as an encroachment into states' sovereign immunity); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67 (2000) (affirming states' sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment); Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging
into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Businesses
v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1,47-50 (2013).
10.
See Daniel J.Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1051-52 (2000).
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servative politics." The vast normative literature that debates whether
the "judicial safeguards of federalism" are properly inferred from the
Constitution includes claims that constitutional federalism returned because of insights into the proper interpretation of the relevant legal materials. 12 Opposed to these jurisprudential perspectives are political approaches, which emphasize either the politics of the Justices or the role
the Court plays as a part of a larger political movement. On this view,
constitutional federalism returned because it was effective camouflage
for the efforts of some Justices to promote business interests and other
conservative ends, 3 or because the political success of the "New Right"
gave a series of Republican presidents the opportunity to appoint Justices
who shared their party's opposition to federal power.14
Placing National League of Cities in its political and doctrinal context indicates, however, that neither of these approaches can convincingly explain the return of constitutional federalism. Jurisprudential explanations cannot explain why the majority in National League of Cities
rejected a long-established theoretical justification for judicial deference
to Congress and overturned a forty-year-old precedent that had been recently reaffirmed. Political explanations are unconvincing because the
debate over constitutional federalism emerged before the New Right
seized political power with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and
11.
Minority explanations for the revival of constitutional federalism include Vicki Jackson's
claim that the Court's primary concern was Congress's laxity in considering constitutional constraints in Vicki C. Jackson, Federalismand the Court: Congress as the Audience?, 574 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145, 145-55 (2001), and that the decisions are aimed at protecting the
docket of the federal courts in Ann Althouse, Inside the Federalism Cases: Concern About the
FederalCourts, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 134-37, 142 (2001).
12.
John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1311,
1323 (1997) [hereinafter Yon, JudicialSafeguards]; see, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 241-43 (1980); Larry D. Kramer, Puttingthe PoliticsBack into the PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 216-17 (2000); D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism Redtx: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 794 (1982); John 0. McGinnis, Continuity and Coherence in the
Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 875, 883-84 (2003); John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudenceof Social Discovery, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 485,
511 (2002); Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in
Perspective, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 87 (1981); John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and Federalism, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 197, 197 (1998) [hereinafter Yoo, Judicial Review]; Timothy Meyer,
Comment, Federalism and Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, and the
New Federalism,95 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 887-88 (2007).
13.
See, e.g., Herman Schwartz, The States' Rights Assault on FederalAuthority, in THE
REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 155, 155-60, 162-63, 165-67 (Herman
Schwartz ed., 2002); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
FederalismDecisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002).
14.
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 158-60 (2007); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The
Courts, Federalism,and the Federal Constitution 1920-2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
LAW IN AMERICA: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER (1920-) 127, 160-65 (Michael Grossberg
& Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008); J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Rehnquist Court
and the Political Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 233 (2004). For a description of the
New Right, see Kim Phillips-Fein, Conservatism:A State of the Field,98 J. AM. HIST. 723, 724-27
(2011).
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originated with Justices who cannot be characterized as conservatives,
including Hugo Black and William 0. Douglas, two paragons of New
Deal liberalism and stalwarts of the Warren Court.
Reconnecting National League of Cities to its jurisprudential and
political context also provides an opportunity to present a new explanation for the return of constitutional federalism, one that tries to reveal the
interaction of jurisprudential norms and political developments rather
than reduce one to the other. In what follows, I argue that the return of
constitutional federalism was caused by structural changes in American
government and durable shifts in political debate that undermined a near
uniform consensus that what was best known as the political safeguards
of federalism thesis accurately described American government.15 As
that broad consensus crumbled, some close observers of the federal system rejected the political safeguards thesis's conclusion that broad judicial deference to Congress on federalism issues should be the norm. One
such observer was Justice Lewis Powell, who then played a central role
in pushing the Court to conclude that doctrinal tensions, which had existed in the Court's federalism jurisprudence for four decades, were a sufficient justification for striking down 16Congress's exercise of its commerce
power in NationalLeague of Cities.
I make this argument in four parts. The first part argues that traditional legal materials do little to explain the majority's opinion in National League of Cities (NLC), which rejected a doctrinal principle that
had been established for forty years, an admittedly controlling precedent
less than a decade old, and a theoretical justification for judicial deference on federalism questions-the political safeguards thesis-that had
driven commerce clause jurisprudence for decades. I conclude that any
solely jurisprudential explanation for NLC will be insufficient.
Part II argues that the political explanations for the return of constitutional federalism are not convincing either. Admittedly, every vote in
the five to four majority came from a Republican appointee, four of those
votes came from recent appointees of Richard Nixon, and the opinion
17
was written by Nixon's third appointment, then-Justice Rehnquist.
However, that evidence is insufficient because concerns with limiting
federal power emerged on the Supreme Court before Nixon's four appointments arrived and were expressed by Justices who cannot be characterized as supporters of Nixon, the New Right, or conservative politics
more broadly. Most important are Hugo Black's opinions in Younger v.
Harris18 in 1971 and Oregon v. Mitchell 19 in 1970, which protected the
15.
Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The R6le of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 556-58 (1954).
16.
See infra Part IV.B.
17.
The majority in NLC was composed of Powell (Nixon, 1972), Rehnquist (Nixon, 1972),
Blackmun (Nixon, 1970), Burger (Nixon, 1969), and Stewart (Eisenhower, 1958).
18.
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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autonomy of state courts and state legislatures on the basis of "Our Federalism, ' 20 and William 0. Douglas's 1968 dissent in Maryland v.
Wirtz,2' which argued that the Court should strike down an exercise of
Congress's commerce power on federalism grounds and blazed the doctrinal path the majority followed in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery.22
Part III begins to provide an alternative explanation of NLC by
showing how structural changes in American government and durable
shifts in the political debate undermined the near-universal faith in the
political safeguards thesis. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, close
observers of American government agreed that the political safeguards of
federalism were producing effective, democratic governance. They saw a
federal system characterized by shared authority that was both responding to majority will and helping the nation respond effectively to the
challenges of the time, most importantly in the field of civil rights. By
the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, that consensus had collapsed.
The causes of that collapse included significant reforms in state government, systemic changes in federal elections, and the administrative dysfunction produced by some of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs. Of at least equal importance were durable changes in the political
debate caused by the reorientation of the fight for civil rights from de
jure to de facto segregation and Southern state governments' belated
decision to oppose the lawless violence of racist segregationists. The
convulsions caused by Vietnam and Watergate also contributed. As a
result of these changes, a variety of observers concluded that the political
safeguards did not, in fact, produce a democratic and effective distribution of authority between state and federal governments. Some of those
observers then concluded that a judicial role in protecting the states was
appropriate.
By examining the internal dynamics that produced the Court's decision in National League of Cities, Part IV argues that the same developments that convinced some close observers of the federal system that the
political safeguards of federalism were insufficient also convinced the
Court. Central to that argument is revealing the central role Justice Louis
Powell played in the Court's decision-making process and his rejection
of the political safeguards thesis. "One can argue" Powell wrote justifying his vote in National League of Cities, "that the states can 'trust' Congress not to go so far," but the statute at issue in the case disproved the
claim: "the political muscle of organized labor outweighed" the opposition of "virtually every state and city in the nation" and "what appeared
19.
400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970).
20.
See, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 44; see also Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 315 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting).
21.
392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting), overruled by Nat'l League of Cities v.

Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
22. 426 U.S. at 851-55.
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to be overwhelming local political views to the contrary. ' 23 Part IV further undermines political approaches by establishing that the replacement
of Democratic appointee William 0. Douglas with Republican appointee
John Paul Stevens in 1975 at least changed a 6-3 vote to re-establish
constitutional federalism into a 5-4 vote, and very nearly led to the opposite outcome: a 5-4 vote to reject constitutional federalism.
Part V summarizes my causal claim and contrasts it with other explanations for NLC and the return of constitutional federalism. A conclusion briefly considers the implications of this history for our understanding of constitutional change and contemporary debates over constitutional federalism. It argues this integrative explanation for the return of constitutional federalism is important because it provides a case study of
constitutional change that neither ignores the Court's unique institutional
norms nor the importance of political change outside the Court. It also
undermines the suggestion that constitutional federalism is inherently
conservative and that the contemporary partisan divide on those issues is
thus inevitable and permanent. This Article thus provides indirect but
important support for the efforts of scholars investigating how federalism
can advance interests typically associated with the political left, which
can only enrich the ongoing debate over the value of federalism in government and constitutional law.
I. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES IN JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT

By placing the opinions in NLC in doctrinal and jurisprudential context, this part has two goals. The first is to establish that the political
safeguards thesis had for decades generated a consensus on the Court
that judicial deference to Congress on federalism questions was appropriate. The second is to challenge the implicit claims made in the vast
normative literature on constitutional federalism that the Court's renewed
concern with protecting state autonomy resulted from an improved understanding-or a new misunderstanding--of traditional legal sources. 24
As important as that literature is for some purposes, it does not provide a
convincing way to explain why the debate over constitutional federalism
returned in NLC. In addition to doubt that such approaches can answer

23.
Conference Notes, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., National League of Cities v. Usery, No.
74-878, at 70. (Mar. 4, 1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law)
[hereinafter Powell Papers].
24. CHOPER, supra note 12, at 175; Kramer, supra note 12, at 216-17; La Pierre, supra note
12, at 794-95; Yoo, Judicial Safeguards, supra note 12, at 1323; see also Frank 1. Michelman,
States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1165-66 (1977); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Searchfor a
JudiciallyEnforceable Federalism,83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 856 (1999); Nagel, supra note 12, at 8788; Laurence H. Tribe, UnravelingNational League of Cities: The New Federalism andAffirmative
Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1067-70 (1977); Yoo, Judicial

Review, supra note 12, at 197; Meyer, supra note 12, at 887-88.
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what is an inherently historical question, 25 there is evidence that makes
such a claim difficult. Although there was some doctrinal support for the
decision in NLC in the tension between the Court's treatment of Congress's taxing power and its commerce power, that tension had existed
for forty years without the Court feeling it needed to be resolved. In addition, the opinion had to overturn a forty-year-old precedent that had been
relied upon only eight years earlier and reject a theoretical justification
for deference-the political safeguards thesis-that had driven commerce clause doctrine for decades.
A. National League in DoctrinalContext
National League of Cities arose from amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). The original FLSA established a national
minimum wage, mandated "time and a half' for overtime in many industries, and outlawed child labor. 26 But until 1966, the FLSA applied only
to employees of private businesses. It did not regulate employees of the
federal government, of state governments, or of state-controlled entities
like state hospitals. In 1966, Congress began to chip away at this distinction by extending the FLSA to cover employees of state-run hospitals,
some state educational institutions, and state and local transit authorities. 27 Following the 7-2 decision to uphold the 1966 Amendments in
Marylandv. Wirtz,28 Congress passed another set of amendments in 1974
that extended the FLSA to all state and local employees. 29 President Nixon vetoed those amendments. His veto message primarily argued that the
amendments would create inflation by raising the minimum wage too
quickly, but also briefly mentioned that the law had been opposed by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and was "an unwarranted interference with State prerogatives., 30 He later signed the
extensions after Congress passed a second bill with veto-proof majorities.31
The National League of Cities, the National Governor's Conference, twenty states, and four cities sought to enjoin the application of the
25.

See Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism

Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 480 (2001) (discussing shortcomings of jurisprudential explanations);
see also PURCELL, supra note 14, at 158-59 (arguing that the text and history of the Constitution are
insufficient to generate such insights on their own).
26.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 212 (1934 & Supp. IV 1938); see
also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1941).
27. Those 1966 Amendments to the FLSA were upheld in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,
185-88 (1968), overruled by Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), discussed infra
pp. 240-41.
28.
Id.

29.

Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, S.2747, 93d Cong. § 6(a)(2) (1974).

30.
Richard Nixon, The President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.R.
7935 Without His Approval (Sept. 6, 1973), 9 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

1060, 1061 (1973).
31.
Brief for Appellants at *83, Nat 1 League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833 (No. 74-878), 1974 WL
175976, at *83.
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1974 Amendments to states and local governments because the amendments violated federalism principles. 32 Plaintiffs did not deny that the
amendments regulated commerce. Throughout the litigation they and
everyone else accepted that the amendments regulated an activity that
affected interstate commerce and that identical regulations of private
parties were clearly constitutional.33 The issues plaintiffs asked the Court
to resolve were whether principles of federalism recognized by the Tenth
Amendment and other provisions of the Constitution limited Congress's
authority to use its commerce power to regulate the behavior of states
and, if so, whether the 1974 Amendments violated those limits. 34 In other
words, did the 1974 Amendments violate any immunity the states had
against Congress's commerce power implied by the Constitution's federal system?
The doctrine controlling the answer to those questions was decades
old. The most relevant decision was United States v. California,35 decid36
ed in 1936. In California, the Court considered whether the Federal
Safety Appliance Act could be constitutionally applied to a railroad run
by the State of California not for profit. 37 Arguing by analogy from intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine developed in the late nineteenth
century, the State of California argued that the same principles of federalism that prevented the federal government from taxing instrumentalities of state governments also prevented the federal government from
using its commerce power to regulate states when the state was performing a public function in its sovereign capacity. 38 Whenever states were
acting in a governmental capacity, California argued, principles of federalism meant they were immune from regulation by Congress's
commerce
39
power just as they would be immune from its taxing power.
Justice Stone's opinion for a unanimous Court was not helpful to
the plaintiffs' cause. In fact, it rejected their primary argument outright.
"The analogy of the constitutional immunity of state instrumentalities
from federal taxation, on which respondent relies," he concluded, "is not
illuminating., 40 Intergovernmental tax immunity "is implied from the
nature of our federal system ' 41 while, for reasons he did not explain,

32.
Id. at *82-83.
33.
See, e.g., id. at *41; Brief for Appellees at *17-18, Nat'l League of Cities v. Dunlop, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(Nos. 74-878, 74-879), 1975 WL 173790, at*17-18.
34.
Brief for Appellants, supra note 31, at *52-54.
35.
297 U.S. 175 (1936), overruled by Garcia,469 U.S. 528.
36.
Id. at 183-84.
37.
Id. at 183.

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.
41.

Id. at 184.
Id
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"there is42 no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce."
But an opening remained for plaintiffs because the difference between the Court's treatment of Congress's commerce and taxing powers
remained unexplained, even after the Court altered its intergovernmental
tax immunity doctrine in the second decision that framed the dispute in
NLC, the 1946 decision in New York v. United States.43 At issue in New
York was a two-cents-per-gallon federal tax on the production of soft
drinks. 44 The State of New York, which had taken control of Saratoga
Springs to address private overuse of the springs and was selling mineral
water in order to fund the resort and spa, joined forty-five other states to
argue that states should be immune from the tax. 45 Although a badly fractured Court could not agree on the governing doctrinal rule, every Justice
agreed that the sovereignty of the states required the Court to limit Congress's taxing power. 46
Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court rejected the traditional
nineteenth century rule in part because "social complexities" made the
rule unworkable 47 and in part because, anticipating Herbert Wechsler's
political safeguards argument, "the States share in the legislative process
by which a tax of general applicability is laid. '' 48 He instead supported a
non-discrimination rule, which required only that the tax treat the states
like it treated private parties. 49 This rule, Frankfurter argued, retained
sufficient protection for state sovereignty because "[t]here are . . . State
activities and State-owned property that .... inherently constitute a class

by themselves. Only0 a State can own a Statehouse; only a State can get
5
income by taxing."
Justice Stone wrote separately to argue for a rule more protective of
the states. 5' "[A] federal tax which is not discriminatory as to the subject
matter," he argued, "may nevertheless so affect the State, merely because
it is a State that is being taxed, as to interfere unduly with the State's

42.
43.
44.

Id. at 185.
326 U.S. 572, 582-83 (1946).
Id. at 573-74.

45.

Id. at 575.

46.
Id. at 574-75 (plurality opinion); id. at 586 (Stone, J., concurring); id at 591 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). The rule was applied in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905),
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), Ohio v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 360, 371 (1934), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, and Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S.
214, 227 (1934), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528. In a badly fractured decision, the entire Court

rejected the existing doctrinal rule, which allowed federal taxation of "proprietary" State activityactivity in which a private business might participate-but not federal taxation of "traditional" state
government activities. New York, 326 U.S. at 574, 583.
47.
New York, 326 U.S. at 576.
48.
Id. at 577.
49.
Id.
at 582-84.
50. Id. at 582.
51.
Id. at 587 (Stone, J., concurring).

2014]

THE RETURN OF CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM

231

performance of its sovereign functions of government. ' '52 A better approach, Stone suggested, was case-by-case balancing aimed at protecting
both federal and state governments' taxing powers while allowing each
53
government to function with a minimum of interference.
"The prob54
formula."
a
by
lem," he wrote, "is not one to be solved
Justice Douglas's dissent went even farther by suggesting that the
Tenth Amendment prohibited the federal government from taxing any
state activity at all. Frankfurter's non-discrimination rule, he wrote, "disregards the Tenth Amendment, places the sovereign States on the same
plane as private citizens, and makes the sovereign States pay the federal
government for the privilege of exercising the powers of sovereignty
guaranteed them by the Constitution. 55 Every Justice in New York thus
recognized a role for the judiciary in protecting the autonomy and sovereignty of the States from the federal taxing power.
The decision, as a result, gave plaintiffs in NLC something to work
with. The different treatment of Congress's taxing and commerce power
was clear, but a principled explanation for it was not. 56 Nothing in the
constitutional text that granted Congress its commerce or taxing power
suggested they should be treated differently by the Court, and both were
enumerated in Article I, Section Eight of the Constitution.5 7 The truth of
McCulloch v. Maryland's58 famous aphorism that the power to tax is the
power to destroy was dubious in the twentieth century 59 and, even if the
power to tax remained the power to destroy, the expansion of the commerce power from the 1940s to the 1960s made the commerce power
look just as threatening to state sovereignty. 60
This tension between the Court's tax and commerce powers jurisprudence provided the doctrinal justification for Justice Rehnquist's ruling in NLC that the 1974 Amendments to the FLSA violated the Constitution. Rehnquist did not deny that the 1974 Amendments were regulations of interstate commerce. It was established, he wrote, "beyond peradventure," that Congress could regulate wages and hours using its
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
at 589-90.
Id. at 589.

55.
Id. at 596 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
56.
In Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1946), the Court held that the War Power ought
to be treated like the commerce power. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 198 (1968), overruled by
Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 54344 (1975), supported the distinction between the tax and commerce power, but none of those decisions provided clear reasons. They are discussed below. See infra notes 124-31, 295 331, and
accompanying text.

57.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
58.
17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819).
59. See, e.g., Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits."),
overruled in part by Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
60. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
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commerce power. 6' But he nevertheless ruled that principles of federalism implicit in the structure of the Constitution prevented the federal
government
from interfering with the integrity and function of state gov62
ernment.
Not surprisingly, the primary authority he offered for this decision
was New York v. United States. Justice Stone's opinion in New York,
Rehnquist argued, indicated that Congress could not use its taxing power
to interfere with the integrity and function of state governments.6 3
Rehnquist then argued there was no justification for treating the taxing
and commerce powers differently. 64 Finally, he held that the 1974
Amendments interfered with the autonomy of the states because setting
the terms of employment was an attribute of state sovereignty that was
"essential to [the] separate and independent existence" of the states.65
Both the minimum wage and overtime requirements limited important
66
policy decisions of the states and thus needed to be struck down.
B. National League of Cities and the PoliticalSafeguards Thesis
As the foregoing discussion indicates, there was some doctrinal
support for the Court's decision in NLC, but case law certainly did not
require the result. In fact, as both the tone and substance of Justice Brennan's opinion indicated, NLC was a clear departure from the Court's
Commerce Clause doctrine. Despite the support it found in the tension
between the Court's treatment of Congress's taxing and commerce powers, Rehnquist's opinion had to overrule California and Maryland v.
Wirtz-a 1968 decision that had explicitly continued California's approach to the commerce power-and distinguish Fry v. UnitedStates67a decision from the previous term that also seemed to support California.68

Justice Brennan's dissent pointed out these problems and added a
pragmatic critique as well. 69 However, he reserved special vitriol for the
majority's rejection of a theoretical justification for deference to Congress that had driven Commerce Clause doctrine for decades: the politi-

61.
Nat 7 League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 840.
62.
Id. at 842-43.
63.
Id. at 843-44.
64. Id. at 843.
65.
Id. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
66. Id.
at 851-52.
67. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
68.
Id. at 879 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Fry is discussed in detail in Part IV. See infra notes
295-331 and accompanying text.
69. That doctrinal tests based on a judicial determination of what activities were "essential" to
state government were unworkable, Brennan argued, had been recognized at least since Justice
Stone's opinion in New York in 1946. Id. at 864. Asking courts to determine whether an activity was
"integral" to the function of state government, as the majority proposed, was no better. Id. at 871.
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cal safeguards thesis. The majority decision, he wrote, was a "patent
usurpation of the role reserved for the political process. 7 °
Since at least 1942, when it helped convince Justice Robert Jackson
to adopt the "aggregation principle" in Wickard v. Filburn,71 the idea that
the Court should defer to Congress on federalism issues because Congress had political incentives to provide the appropriate respect for the
72
states had been central to the Court's treatment of the commerce power.
But the argument was systematized and given its name by Herbert
Wechsler in one of the most cited law review articles of all time: his
1954 PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism.73
There, Wechsler famously argued that judicial protection of the autonomy of states was unnecessary, unwise, and inconsistent with the
founders' design and a proper understanding of the judicial role.74 The
Constitution, he argued, did not depend on the Supreme Court's enforcement of the enumeration of powers and the Tenth Amendment to
protect federalism. 75 It wisely provided other protections to state autonomy. The states, he pointed out, kept their own independent basis of authority and their own administrative machinery. 76 But even more importantly, they helped select the leadership of the national government.77
Those "political safeguards of federalism" sufficed to ensure the proper
protection of state autonomy.
In advancing that argument, Wechsler emphasized that, even after
the Seventeenth Amendment, states had enormous influence over senators and thus over national policy. In 1950, he pointed out, filibuster
rules would permit seventeen states with a total combined population less
than the state of New York to stifle any bill. 78 And, of course, the power
to stop legislation was a powerful tool in negotiations that the states
could use to ensure fair, or even more than fair, treatment by the national
government.
The House also gave the states significant influence over the national government. The Constitution allows states to control the shape of
congressional districts-which, in 1954, did not need to be of equal population-as well as determine who could vote for Congress by tying
qualifications for congressional elections to the criteria for the lowest

70.
Id.at 858.
71.
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
72.
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 221-24 (1998).
73. Wechsler, supra note 15, at 545-47.

74.

See Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? CongressionalResponses to

Supreme CourtDecisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB. LAW. 301, 304-07 (1988).
75.
Wechsler, supranote 15, at 545-46.
76.
Id. at 543-44.

77.

Id.at 552-53.

78.

Id. at 547.
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house of the state legislature. 79 Thus, state legislatures, controlled by
state parties, could use literacy tests, poll taxes, gerrymandering, or other
methods to ensure that their interests and autonomy were respected. 80
Even the President, the most national of federal positions, was responsive to the power of the states. The Constitution itself specified that
state legislatures would determine the manner of selecting presidential
electors. More practically, the Electoral College focused presidential
candidates on a limited number of close states, which provided the people and the political parties of those states influence over the President.
Thus, at least some states and some state parties would have the authority
to influence the President on questions of state autonomy.
Wechsler's arguments for political safeguards as the appropriate
way to draw the line between state and federal power convinced so many
because it fit neatly with every major justification for judicial review. 8'
For pragmatists, Wechsler's argument freed the national government
from foolish legalisms. When it was necessary to prevent problems like
destructive, "race to the bottom" interstate competition, the national government with the input of the States could institute a single national rule.
When local control was better, national involvement could be avoided. It
was this insight that convinced pragmatist Robert Jackson to support the
"aggregation principle" of Wickard v. Filburn despite his concern that it
would remove Court oversight of the reach of Congress's commerce
82
power.
For patrons of judicial restraint, the political safeguards approach
was welcome because it minimized the invalidation of democratically
passed laws. Felix Frankfurter-a leading supporter of deferenceadopted a version of what became Wechsler's argument in New York v.
United States, where he justified his new rule for intergovernmental tax
immunity by noting that "the States share 83in the legislative process by
which a tax of general applicability is laid.,
For political process theorists who drew on Chief Justice Stone's
famous footnote four in Carolene Products,84 aggressive judicial protec-

79.
Id at 548-49.
80.
Id.at 549-52.
81.
Charles W. McCurdy, Remarks at the Robert Cross Memorial Lecture (2011) (transcript
on file with author).
82.
CUSHMAN, supra note 72, at 224 (recounting Justice Jackson's struggle with Wickard and
hisultimate adoption on political safeguards grounds); see also NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE
BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR's GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 123-25 (2010) (identifying
Robert Jackson as a pragmatist). Justice Stone recognized similar pragmatic reasons in Helvering v.
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), an intergovernmental tax immunity decision. The political process,
he argued, "provides a readier and more adaptable means than any.., courts can afford, for securing
accommodation of the competing demands for national revenue, on the one hand, and for reasonable
scope for the independence of state action, on the other." id.at 416.
83.
326 U.S. 572, 577 (1946).

84.

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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tion of rights was necessary only when the political process or the rights
of discrete and insular minorities were being threatened. States, Wechsler
argued, in effect, were not a discrete and insular minority and had ample
opportunities to exercise political power. Stone advanced what later became Wechsler's argument in Helvering v. Gerhardt85 in 1938. He rejected claims that states should have the same immunity to federal taxation that the federal government had to state taxation on the grounds that
"the people of all the states have created the national government and are
represented in Congress., 8 6 "Through that representation," he continued,
"they exercise the national taxing power. The very fact that when they
are exercising it they are taxing themselves serves to guard against its
abuse through
the possibility of resort to the usual processes of political
87
action.,
For those concerned with the intentions of the founders, Wechsler
pointed out his idea wasn't really his, it was James Madison's. He quoted
a letter Madison wrote that listed three ways the states would be protected from the national government: (1) the role of the state and the people
of the states in the election of the Senate and the House; (2) the role of
the states and the people of the states in the election of the President; and
(3) the ability of the House and Senate to impeach and remove executive
officers. 88 Madison, Wechsler noted, did not mention the Court at all. 89
Wechsler's argument provided clear support for Congress's aggressive uses of the commerce power in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which the
Court upheld in Heart of Atlanta Motel 9 and Katzenbach v. McClung.9 1
And its abandonment incensed Brennan in NLC. 92 In addition to calling
the decision a usurpation of authority that should reside with the political
process, Brennan specifically cited Wechsler. "Judicial restraint in this
area," he wrote,
merely recognizes that the political branches of our Government are
structured to protect the interests of the States... and that the States
are fully able to protect their own interests in the premises. Congress
is constituted of representatives in both the Senate and House Elected
from the States.... Judicial redistribution of powers granted the National Government by the terms of the Constitution violates the fundamental tenet of our federalism that the extent of federal interven85.
86.

304 U.S. 405 (1938).
Id at 416.

87.

Id.

88.
Wechsler, supra note 15, at 558-59.
89.
Wechsler's argument was broadly accepted by legal academics, too. See, e.g., CHARLEs L.
BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 (1969); Paul A. Freund,
Umpiring the Federal System, in FEDERALISM: MATURE AND EMERGENT 159, 163 (Arthur W.
MacMahon ed., 1955).
90.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
91.
379 U.S. 294, 298 (1964).
92.
Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 876 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonia Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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tion into the States' affairs in the exercise of delegated powers shall
be determined by the States'93exercise of political power through their
representatives in Congress.
Brennan continued by arguing that contemporary practice supported
Wechsler's predictions. 94 The "enormous . . . political power" of the
states, he wrote, was not accurately reflected in the potential $1 billion
cost of the FLSA amendments.95 More important was the $60.5 billion
the states received from the federal government. 96 States, he wrote, were
complaining of the costs of the FLSA amendments on police and fire
departments, but the federal government was providing $716 million of
assistance to such entities.97 The states were complaining about the problems the amendments created for summer jobs for students, but the federal government was already providing $400 million for such jobs98
enough for 670,000 students to work for state or local government.
It seems clear, given these arguments, that while the majority's position was not without support in traditional legal materials, that support
was far from decisive. In fact, given the broad support for the political
safeguards thesis and the decisions in California and Wirtz, it seems
more reasonable to view NLC as a substantial change in approach made
in spite of existing legal materials. But regardless of whether NLC is
understood as a correct or incorrect interpretation of existing legal materials, the important point for the purposes of this Article is that an analysis of traditional legal materials cannot explain the decision because
those materials cannot explain why the tension between the Court's
commerce and taxing power doctrines that had existed for forty years
became unbearable only in 1976. No change to the constitutional text can
explain it. Nor can changes to related doctrinal structures. Rather, some
other factor must explain why Rehnquist and four other Justices in the
NLC majority decided to ignore the implications of the political safeguards thesis and resolve the doctrinal tension in favor of state sovereignty in 1976.
1I. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES IN POLITICAL CONTEXT

Some scholars who share my doubts that traditional legal materials
can explain the return of constitutional federalism have looked for alternative explanations. Almost all found a single cause: conservative politics. 99 They certainly do not agree on every issue.1°° Some have argued
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 876-77 (emphasis added) (citing Wechsler, supra note 15).

96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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See, e.g., John Dinan, The Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decision, 41 PUBLIUS 158, 158-

Id.
Id. at 878.

67 (2011).
100.

See generally id.
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that constitutional federalism returned because it has been a useful way
for conservative Justices to camouflage their efforts to advance a conservative policy agenda.10' Others have argued that view is at least incomplete because they believe the Court's federalism decisions have
generally, but not always, advanced conservative political goals. 0 2 But
they too see politics as the crucial cause, arguing that constitutional federalism returned because the rise of the New Right allowed Republican
presidents to appoint Justices who shared their party's long established
ideological opposition to federal power. 0 3 Keith Whittington's identification of larger social, political, and intellectual structures that influenced federalism doctrine points towards a different kind of explanation,
but even he indicates those structural changes mattered because they
provided opportunities conservative Justices needed to advance their own
political preferences.' ° 4 This part continues examining NLC in its historical context to argue conservative politics cannot effectively explain the
return of the debate over constitutional federalism that became clear in
NLC.
None of this is to suggest that a political explanation for NLC cannot find significant support from the historical record. There is, in fact,
substantial evidence. The case was decided after Richard Nixon made
four Supreme Court appointments, every vote in the majority came from
a Republican appointee,, and the majority opinion was written by President Nixon's third appointment, then-Justice Rehnquist, who undoubtedly had conservative political preferences. 05 Furthermore, the majority's
concern with protecting state autonomy had some similarities to Nixon's
"New Federalism" policy. Nixon even vetoed the 1974 Amendments in
part on federalism grounds. More broadly, because the opinion limits
congressional authority, it can be seen to reflect the New Right's opposition to federal authority specifically and government authority in general.
Nevertheless, other evidence indicates that viewing conservative
politics as the cause of the return of constitutional federalism is incomplete, if not misleading. Two Republican appointees dissented in NLCJustices Brennan and Stevens-and Justice Brennan wrote the impassioned dissent. Other factors are also hard to explain using a purely political model of doctrinal development. First, although Nixon initially vetoed the 1974 Amendments, he later signed them, and his brief mention
101.

See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 13, at 155, 166-67; Fallon, supranote 13, at 449-94.

102.
PURCELL, supra note 14, at 158-59; Pickerill & Clayton, supra note 14, at 236-43; Purcell, supra note 14, at 127 74.
PURCELL, supra note 14, at 158-59; Pickerill & Clayton, supra note 14, at 236-43; Pur103.
cell, supra note 14, at 127-74.
Whittington, supra note 25; Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The
104.
Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483 (1998); Dinan,

supranote 99, at 162; see also Scheiber, supra note 2, at 624 n.20. I further explore Whittington's
arguments in Part V. See infra notes 391 94 and accompanying text.
105.

SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 4-5 (1989).
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of federalism in his veto message suggests it was an afterthought.'0 6 It is

clear in any case that Nixon did not share the New Right's antipathy to
government power in general and federal power in particular. 10 7 It is hard
to understand how the New Right's political preferences could influence
the Court when the movement had not yet seized political power. Second, and perhaps most damning to explanations focused solely on conservative politics, the return of constitutional federalism began before
either Nixon or Reagan appointed any Justices and originated with Justices who cannot be described as conservatives. The remainder of this
part considers those two points in more detail.
A. PresidentNixon, the New Right, andFederalism
Although federalism rhetoric and policy played an important role in
Nixon's administration, his federalism policies were not, like those of the
New Right and President Reagan, aimed at undermining federal and
governmental power. Nixon's New Federalism agenda aimed to rationalize intergovernmental relations to make regulation more effective. Thus,
in areas where state and local governments had special competencecommunity development, education, and job training-the Nixon administration sought to decentralize real control of federal programs. 10 8 His
General Revenue Sharing Program, the centerpiece of his New Federalism agenda, for example, aimed to replace many narrow federal "categorical" grants 0 to
states and localities with fewer large, virtually unre9
grants.'
stricted
But Nixon was also clearly willing to exercise federal power when
he believed it was the most effective tool. He campaigned to create a
federal minimum-income program to replace the existing welfare program."0 He aggressively expanded federal environmental regulation by
helping to pass the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air
Act, and the Clean Water Act, all of -which placed significant new regulatory requirements on the private sector and the states."' He instituted the
first national speed limit in response to the OPEC oil embargo by threatening to cut off all federal highway aid to any state that failed to comply
with the national standard, 1 2 and his 1970 Economic Stabilization Act
allowed the President to stabilize wages and salaries by, among other

106. Richard Nixon, The President'sMessage to the House of Representatives Returning H.R.
7935 Without His Approval (Sept. 6, 1973), 9 Wkly. Compilation Presidential Documents 1060
(1973).
107.
Whittington, supra note 25, at 504 ("Nixon always had an uneasy relationship with the
'[Niew [R]ight' and its ideological concerns.").
108.
TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 20-21 (1998).
109.
Id.
110.
ld. at 30-31.
111.
Id.at 89-90.
112.
ld. at 91.

2014]

THE RETURN OF CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM

239

13
things, denying pay raises to both public and private sector employees.
Nixon clearly did not share the New Right's opposition to federal power.
NLC thus seems unlikely to be a reflection of the policy preferences of
the New Right because the New Right was not yet in power. And Nixon's pragmatism is
the antithesis of NLC's focus on "traditional govern'' 14
mental functions."

B. Hugo Black, William Douglas, and the Return of ConstitutionalFederalism
Also damaging to the political approach is that the return of constitutional federalism began before Nixon made his Supreme Court appointments and emerged, in part, from Democratic appointees. NLC was
the first time the Court struck down a regulation of interstate commerce
on federalism grounds since 1936, but it was not alone in supporting
judicial protection of state sovereignty in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Oregon v. Mitchell in 1970, Younger v. Harrisin 1971, and Marylandv.
Wirtz in 1968 all evinced that concern in varying degrees. These cases
were decided before Nixon made all his appointments and included opinions written by Justices Douglas and Black-stalwarts of the Warren
Court and appointees of Franklin Roosevelt who are difficult, if not impossible,5 to consider conservatives or representatives of the New
Right. 1
In Oregon v. Mitchell the State of Oregon challenged two amendments to the Voting Rights Act: one that enfranchised eighteen-year-olds
in federal elections, the other that enfranchised eighteen-year-olds in
state elections."l 6 Given the Warren Court's willingness to reshape state
political structures entirely on its own in Reynolds v. Sims 117 just six
years earlier, one might expect Oregon v. Mitchell to have been an easy
case. Certainly four Justices believed that the case was straightforward,
but the case produced a fractured decision. Douglas, Marshall, Brennan,
and White voted to uphold both provisions. Justice Harlan's historical
investigations led him to join Justice Stewart, Burger, and Blackmun in
voting to strike both down. Black's vote was thus decisive, and he returned a split decision: voting to uphold the federal provision, but to
strike down the provision regulating state elections. 1

113.
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (1970) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1904(a) (1970)).
114. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro.Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
115. There are other examples as well. See, e.g., Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth
Amendment and the New Federalism,89 HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1873-78 (1976).
116. 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970).
117. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
118.

Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 118.
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Black argued that the Tenth Amendment and the values of federalism protected state elections from federal regulation. "[T]he Constitution," he wrote,
was ...

intended to preserve to the States the power that even the

Colonies had to establish and maintain their own separate and independent governments, except insofar as the Constitution itself commands otherwise. My Brother Harlan has persuasively demonstrated
that the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for
themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections.' 19
The Civil War Amendments on which Congress relied, Black argued,
provided broad but not unlimited authority. The Fourteenth Amendment
was not "intended to strip the States of their power to govern themselves
or to convert our national government of enumerated powers into a central government of unrestrained authority over every inch of the whole
0
2

Nation."'

Black showed a similar concern with federalism in Younger v. Harris in 1971. His opinion for the Court established a new abstention doctrine on the basis of a history of deference to state court criminal proceedings, the need to protect the role of the jury, and a concern with duplicative legal proceedings. 12' But the decision was also supported by an
even more vital consideration:
[T]he notion of 'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions,
a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union
of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions
are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as 'Our Federalism,' and one familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is
bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of
'Our Federalism.' The concept does not mean blind deference to
'States' Rights' any more than it means centralization of control over
every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The
Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent
is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments, and in which the National
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways
that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the
States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, 'Our Federal-

119.

Id.at 124-25 (footnote omitted).

120.

Id at 128.

121.

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971).
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ism,' born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occu22
pies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its future.'
Neither Younger v. Harris nor Oregon v. Mitchell concerned a conflict between Congress's commerce power and state sovereignty. The
Court did address that issue in Maryland v. Wirtz and Justice Douglas's
dissent anticipated the arguments Rehnquist would make in NLC. 123
Wirtz addressed the 1966 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act that extended the Act's coverage to employees of hospitals and other
entities run by the States. 24 As the plaintiffs did in NLC, Maryland and
twenty-seven other states argued that the law was unconstitutional as
applied to the states because it interfered with sovereign state functions. 125 Justice Harlan's majority opinion rejected the argument, as Justice Brennan would in NLC, because he believed it was based on the disand had previously been rejected in
credited ideas of dual federalism
26
1
California.
v.
States
United
Douglas played Rehnquist to Harlan's Brennan. His dissent, joined
by Justice Stewart, countered that the different treatment Congress's
commerce and taxing powers received under Californiaand New York v.
United States was unjustified. The federal government, he argued, could
destroy the autonomy of the states with the commerce power as well as
the taxing power.12 7 Like the taxing power, "[t]he exercise of the commerce power may also destroy state sovereignty,"'' 28 especially after
Wickard and Katzenbach clarified its breadth. Cases like California
should be differentiated from New York and the tax immunity cases not
because California was a commerce clause case and New York a taxing
power case, but because the interference with State autonomy was meaningful in New York (and Wirtz) and limited in California: "It is one thing
to force a State to purchase safety equipment for its railroad [as the law
at issue in Californiadid] and another to force it either to spend several
million more dollars on hospitals and schools or substantially reduce
services in these areas."' 1 9 Ultimately, Douglas recommended a balancing rule: "Whether, in a given case, a particular commerce power regula30
tion by Congress of state activity is permissible depends on the facts."'

122. Id. at 44-45.
123. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968), overruled by Nat'l League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
124. Id. at 186-87.
125. Id. at 187.
126. Id.at 197 (referencing United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
127.
Id.
at 204-05 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
at 204.
at 203.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 205.
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In Wirtz, he found those facts constituted a sufficient threat to3 state sovereignty to justify striking down the 1966 FLSA amendments.' '
Justice Douglas cannot be accurately characterized as either a conservative or a supporter of the New Right. He was a principle architect of
both the New Deal

32

and the Warren Court's rights revolution.

33

He

was so unpopular among Republicans that some had called for his impeachment. 134 Given Justice Douglas's support, it is clear conservative
politics cannot be a complete explanation for the return of constitutional
federalism.
III. THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS THESIS AND THE CHANGING DEBATE
OVER CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM

If the conventional explanations are unconvincing, how can the return of constitutional federalism in NLC be explained? This part argues
that the decision resulted from a series of developments that undermined
broadly shared faith in the primary justification for judicial deference on35
federalism questions: Wechsler's PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism.1
Wechsler was far from alone in arguing the political process itself was
the best way to properly divide authority between federal and state governments. Almost every close observer of American government believed that real governing authority was shared between different levels
of government and that that authority was distributed through a fair,
democratic process. The leading voices were further convinced that the
sharing of authority helped the system respond effectively to the challenges of the time. These views were so widely accepted because they
were supported by a particular set of historical circumstances, the most
important of which was the federal government's campaign against de
jure segregation sparked by Brown v. Board of Education.136 Those circumstances simultaneously emphasized both the political power of the
states and the benefits of expanding federal authority. They made
Wechsler's arguments against judicial review of federalism issues appear
clearly correct.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, those circumstances
had changed and the debate over the appropriate role for judicial review
of federalism issues changed with them. Among those changes were the
growing administrative dysfunction produced by some of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs, the increasing competence of state governments, the shift of the fight for civil rights from de jure segregation
into more broadly, though less intensely, contested issues of de facto
131.
132.

Id. at 204-05.
EDWIN P. HOYT, WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS: A BIOGRAPHY 69-72 (1979).

133.
134.
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segregation, the growing power of national interest groups, and the belated turn of Southern state governments against racist violence. Observers
began to doubt that the sharing of functions between state and federal
governments was evidence of the sharing of real governing authority.
They began to question whether the political process was fairly and effectively distributing governing functions. Those doubts, in turn, undermined faith in the political safeguards thesis and ultimately led to the
return of constitutional federalism in NLC.
A. The PoliticalSafeguards Thesis at Its Zenith
The political safeguards thesis at its zenith was more than an article.
By the early 1960s it was a set of arguments elaborated by a variety of
close observers of the federal system that had grown substantially beyond Wechsler's pithy critique of judicial review of federalism questions. The research those observers produced led to some disagreement,
but its primary effect was to produce new arguments that gave
Wechsler's ultimate conclusions nearly universal acceptance. It was hard
to find disagreement that American government was a system of shared
authority distributed through fair, democratic means. And most leading
voices saw it as an effective tool for solving the problems of the time.
Observers of American federalism had long understood that the
constitutional revolution generated by FDR's appointments to the Supreme Court transformed the American federal system.' 37 But until the
mid-1950s, the study of federalism continued to focus on formal constitutional analysis. 138 After the mid-1950s, scholars increasingly turned
their attention to the actual operation of the federal system.' 39 These
scholars, wrote Morton Grodzins, a leader in the movement,' were concerned not with
formal, or constitutional, power relationships.., but with social reality; not with the sporadic umpiring of the courts but with the day-today pattern of who does what under whose influence; not with the
theoretical locus of supreme powers but with the actual extent of the

See, e.g., GEORGE C. S. BENSON, THE NEW CENTRALIZATION: A STUDY OF
137.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES ix-x (1941); JANE PERRY CLARK,
THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM ix-x (1938); EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME
COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY xxi xxv (1934).
Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Process: Historicaland ContemporaryAnaly138.

sis ofthe American System, 14 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 663, 688-89 (1980).
Martin Diamond, On the Relationship of Federalism and Decentralization, in
139.
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 72, 73 (Daniel J. Elazar et al.
eds., 1969) ("[There is a] general contemporary unwillingness to accept what are deemed to be
formal, legalistic, mechanistic notions of the American [federal] system and an insistence upon the

importance of what are held to be the underlying political realities .... ").
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sharing of decision-making in legislation and administration between
the central, state, and local governments.141
42
Wechsler's political safeguard thesis was part of that movement.
His article examined constitutional text and history, but its real bite came
from how smoothly he integrated those considerations with an analysis
of the political power that states exercised due to their role in the national
government. 43 Other scholars soon strengthened Wechsler's claims by
exploring how constitutional guarantees interacted with the structure of
American political parties. 14 With that refinement, Wechsler's conclusion that the political process was the most democratic, effective, and
thus legitimate way to distribute authority between federal and state governments became a near universally accepted principle.

The leading voices in the study of American government agreed
that the American federal system shared important governmental functions. As Grodzins famously put it, American intergovernmental relations did not resemble a "three-layer cake" in which power was divided
145
between state, local, and federal governments, but a "marble cake."'
"Functions are not neatly parceled out among the many governments,"
he wrote. 46 "They are shared functions. It is difficult to find any governmental activity which does not involve all three of the so-called 'levels' of the federal system."' 14 7 Even government functions traditionally
associated with local control-functions like education and law enforcement-were, these observers explained, really shared functions. 48 Federal aid in the 1950s, for example, provided school lunches, trained
teachers, built school buildings, and supported testing programs.149 Local
law enforcement provided local knowledge and manpower to support
federal investigations, while the federal government provided training,
expertise, and access to information like the FBI's fingerprint database. 5 0

141.

MORTON GRODZINs, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE

UNITED STATES 254 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966).
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Observers identified federal grants-in-aid as both the best example
1 51
of and most important pathway for this kind of sharing of functions.
Though they were created earlier, grants-in-aid had grown consistently
since the New Deal. 152 In total dollars, they expanded from around $1.6
billion in 1948 to almost $7 billion by 1960.153 Most were "categorical
grants" that provided federal dollars for specific state activities. These
grants had a profound effect on the relationship of the federal govemment and the states, 54 but even though the money came from Washington, these observers believed grants-in-aid encouraged cooperative problem solving. Grants-in-aid, Grodzins wrote, "have supplied a cooperative
155
method for achieving results that might never have been achieved."'
As Grodzins's statement suggests, there was broad agreement that
the sharing of government functions demonstrated that real governing
authority was shared between state, local, and federal governments. 156
"The sharing of functions is, in fact, the sharing of power," wrote
Grodzins. 157 William Riker agreed. States cannot control national decisions, the nation cannot control state decisions, and a standoff was the
result. 158 Daniel Elazar-a student of Grodzins-even denied that the
American federalist system was "decentralized."'1 59 That term, he argued,
implied there was a central authority that chose to distribute authority to
the periphery. But in America, governing functions were distributed
through the complex interaction of the center and the periphery, each of
which had their own bases of authority.' America, he argued, thus
ought to be described as a "noncentralized" system. 161
In explaining the reasons for this shared authority, no one pointed to
the doctrinal limits developed by the Supreme Court. Such limits were
universally agreed to be moribund. 162 Most observers-though not
151.
Id. at 60 ("[G]rant-in-aid programs . . . have been the foremost forces to bring about
planned national-state collaboration."). See generally DEIL S. WRIGHT, FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID:
PERSPECTIVES AND ALTERNATIVES (1968); Grodzins, supra note 145, at 266.
152.
See generally V.O. KEY, JR., THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL GRANTS TO THE STATES
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153.
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all163-accepted
Wechsler's arguments that the Constitution protected
the authority of the states to influence the federal government.' 64 They
agreed that state legislatures shaped the preferences of their state's congressional delegation through their power to apportion Congressional
districts.'65 And state control over federal elections provided a way for
the states to influence their national representatives, thus providing a "de
' 66
facto bulwark against overextension of federal authority."'
But these observers emphasized the importance of informal institutional structures. Congress's institutional tradition of distributing committee chairmanships by seniority rather than merit or loyalty to party
leadership left current and aspiring chairmen able to focus on local rather
than national issues. 167 State and local lobbying alliances provided another way for states to influence national policy,1 68 and state administrative
officers could influence federal authority through their contacts with
Washington officials. 169 And all agreed that the primary reason governing authority was shared between state and federal governments was the
70
American system of political parties.1
American political parties, these observers noted, were not unified,
programmatic parties like their European counterparts. They were largely
undisciplined coalitions of state parties with limited ability to influence
their membership. 171 "[T]he real centers of party organization, finance,
and power," Daniel Elazar wrote, "are at the state and local levels.' 7 2
This "lack of party solidarity," argued Grodzins, "fundamentally establishes the marble cake of shared functions that characterizes the American federal system."' 173 William Riker and David Truman agreed. 174 And
they saw no reason to expect that to change. 175
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States, they also believed, could then use Congress's oversight function to influence the federal bureaucracy. 176 Congressmen worked consistently to help local interests influence administrative action. Congressional staff did this work "with great care, knowing that their congressman's performance in that area is often likely to influence more voters
than his actions on remote national issues. '177 Grodzins believed this
oversight was "constant, effective, and institutionalized,"
and "almost
78
uniformly exercised in behalf of local interests."'
The vision of shared functions and governing authority advanced by
these observers did not, however, blind them to the increasing role the
federal government was playing in governing American society. 179 They
noted the steady increases in federal grants-in-aid, as well as Warren
Court's decisions. The Court limited state autonomy with its criminal
justice, incorporation, and desegregation decisions, as well as its expansion of First Amendment protection in the areas of libel, obscenity, and
church-state issues. 18° Its decisions upholding civil rights legislation,
expanding federal administrative preemption, and extending the reach of
the Commerce Clause simultaneously increased federal authority.' 8' The
Court was, William Riker wrote, "a major force for centralization."'82
Increased federal authority did not suggest to these scholars that the
83
political safeguards thesis was wrong. Some minimized these changes,
but most were unconcerned because they believed increases in federal
authority were democratic and functional responses to the challenges of
the time. They took this perspective whether they found American federalism itself a useful or harmful institution as a whole. 84 Growing federal
power, Grodzins claimed, was a result of technological developments
that were knitting the nation closer and closer together and "the demands
176.
ELAZAR, supra note 159, at 144-45; Kenneth E. Gray, Congressional Interference in
Administration,in COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note
138, at 521,521-23.
177.
ELAZAR, supranote 159, at 145.
178.
GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 260.
179.
RIKER, supra note 158, at 81.
180.
Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An American Tradition:
Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 227, 279 (1996).
181.
Id.at 260, 279.
182.
RIKER, supra note 158, at 102.
183.
ELAZAR, supra note 159, at 54 (making similar claims); RIKER, supra note 158, at 81
(arguing that federal power had grown, but state power had as well, if not as much). See generally
DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP: INTERGOVERNMENTAL CO-OPERATION IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1962); GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 17-57 (making

historical claims that these changes were not important because American federalism had always
been characterized by functional, negotiated sharing of power); Elazar, supra note 147; Grodzins,
supranote 145.
184.
William Riker made clear his opposition to American Federalism: "The main beneficiary
throughout American history has been the Southern whites, who have been given the freedom to
oppress Negros ....The judgment to be passed on federalism in the United States is therefore a
judgment on the values of segregation and racial oppression." RIKER, supra note 158, at 152 53.
Grodzins, Elazar, and others were much more supportive. See, e.g., COOPERATION AND CONFLICT:
READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 139, at 6, 65.
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of the citizenry."' 85 William Riker attributed it to a decline in "state nationalism" caused by increased mobility, a growing common culture, and
patriotism generated by war.1 86 Elazar and others argued it was an inevitable response to increasing calls for government activity in a situation
government's taxing authorities were more robust and
where the federal
187
responsive.

Many also believed federalism made American government more
democratic. 188 The system, with its divided and overlapping authorities,
admitted Grodzins, is one of "chaos" which "flaunts virtually all tenets of
legislative responsibility and administrative effectiveness. It appears always to be wasteful of manpower and money. At times it threatens the
very democracy it is established to maintain. But," he concluded, "it
works, it works-and sometimes with beauty."' 189 A large part of this
success was federalism's tendency to promote democratic values by
making it easier for different groups to influence the government. 190
B. The Zenith of the PoliticalSafeguards Thesis in Context
Faith that the American federal system was characterized by shared
authority and was responding productively and democratically to the
challenges of the time was supported by the politics of the 1950s and
early 1960s. The most important support was the progress of the fight
against de jure segregation in the South.1 9' The failure of the states to
GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 319. The "expansion of the central government," Grodzins
185.
argued,
has been produced by the dangers of the twentieth century . . . [and even] [w]ar items
aside, the free votes of a free people have sustained federal programs in such areas as
public welfare, highways, airports, hospitals and public health, agriculture, schools, and
housing and urban redevelopment .... The plain fact is that large population groups are
better represented in the constituencies of the President and Congress than they are in the
constituencies of governors and state legislatures.
Id. at 318.
186.
RIKER, supra note 158, at 105-08.
187.
ELAZAR, supra note 159, at 62 63; WALTER W. HELLER, NEW DIMENSIONS OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 128-29 (1967). Heller was the leader of the Council of Economic Advisors.
Id. at 15.
GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 14-15; Grodzins, supra note 145, at 265-66.
188.
189.
GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 7; see also id. at 14-16; RIKER, supra note 158, at 147;
Grodzins, supra note 145, at 282.
190.
Anderson, supra note 168, at 117-20. Evidence that these feelings of confidence in the
federal system were shared outside academia is in the U.S. COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE CONGRESS, H.R. DOC. No.
198, at 2-6 (1955). Tasked by President Eisenhower with identifying programs that could be more
effectively returned to state governance, the Commission spent years of study to "identify only two
programs-vocational education and municipal waste treatment." Purcell, supra note 14, at 147.
191.
RIKER, supra note 158, at 142, 155 (identifying the question of "whether or not the national decision" regarding citizen rights for African-Americans as "the chief question of public
morals," and arguing that "if in the United States one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove
of federalism"); Introduction to Robert S. Rankin, The Impact of Civil Rights upon TwentiethCentury Federalism, in COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra
note 139, at 580, 580 ("[C]ivil rights has accounted for much of the recent general tension in our
nation.... [and] is one of the few issues in the United States that is intrinsically a problem of federalism."); Robert S. Rankin, The Impact of Civil Rights upon Twentieth-Century Federalism, in
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protect peaceful protestors, civil rights workers, and even AfricanAmericans not directly involved in the movement from violence, or to
effectively prosecute the offenders, confirmed for many that state governments were undemocratic and either unable or unwilling to perform
even the most basic task of protecting their citizens from lawless violence. Simultaneously, the effectiveness with which Southern states resisted even direct orders from the federal government demonstrated that
they retained significant authority in the federal system. Those two observations made the ongoing shift in authority from state governments to
the federal government seem a functional response to the most pressing
challenges of the time. The claims of the political safeguard thesis appeared borne out in every particular.
1. Undemocratic and Incompetent States
It is clear that the failure of Southern state governments to protect
African-Americans and supporters of the civil rights movement from
violence confirmed doubts that close observers of American federalism
already shared about the competence of state governments. General concerns with the competence of state governments were evident in the
1950s in a variety of sources. The Kestnbaum Commission argued that
pressures for centralization came in part from weaknesses in state government. 192 V.0. Key agreed, further pointing out that state governments
across the nation gerrymandered their electoral districts in ways that undermined democratic principles.1 93 State governments were widely recognized to be heavily gerrymandered to favor not just white but also rural interests. 194 Observers also noted the significant weaknesses in state
administrative capacity.' 95 Most state legislatures met only every other
year, and both state legislatures and executives often lacked access to
meaningful administrative expertise. 96 Robert Rankin, a political science
professor and Chairman of the Civil Rights Commission,' 97 wrote,
"[S]tates .. . are to a great degree responsible for citizens turning to the
federal government for action and relief . . . [P]eople have demanded
' 98
services and protection, and the states have refused to give them."'

COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 139, at 581, 581-

84.
192.
193.

GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 317.
Id.

194.

Id.at 213-20 ("[U]nderrepresentation" accounts for a disadvantage in states legislatures,

Grodzins argued, though consistent with his sanguine view of American federalism, he also argued
that the role of the cities in electing the governor, their lobbying authority, and their ability to build
coalitions with some rural interests made the problems less than they might appear.).
195.
See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, I FISCAL BALANCE

36-44 (1967).
Id.at 43-44.
Introduction to Rankin, supranote 191, at 580, 580.
Rankin, supra note 191, at 591.
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The abject failure of the Southern state governments to challenge
racist violence powerfully reinforced doubts about the competence and
fairness of state governments. The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Educationin 1954 sparked an epidemic of violence in the South
against African-Americans and proponents of civil rights that went largely unopposed, unpunished, and unprosecuted. In many cases, it was even
supported by Southern state governments.1 99 Between 1955 and 1959
there were "210 recorded incidents of [racial] intimidation" related to
tensions sparked by Brown v. Board, ranging from Klan rallies to death
threats, and 225 incidents of anti-civil rights violence, including six
murders, twenty-nine assaults with firearms, and forty-four beatings. z °
Between 1955 and 1958, "ninety southern homes suffered damage from
anti-civil rights violence, [including] sixty from explosives, fifteen from
gunfire, [and] eight from arson. '0 1 Over the same period, mob violence
threatened seventeen towns and cities. 02
Riots and other violent responses to civil rights protests were a
common occurrence. Martin Luther King's home was dynamited in 1956
during Montgomery civil rights protests.20 3 An attempt to integrate the
University of Mississippi in 1962 resulted in bloody rioting. 2°4 Two years
later, the Mississippi Freedom Summer led to what historian Michal
Belknap called "a summer of rampant terrorism ' 20 5 that included the
deaths of three civil rights workers, the shooting of at least four other
persons, fifty-two beatings, and the burning of thirteen black churches. 0 6
The Southern Christian Leadership Council's campaign against racism in
Birmingham, Alabama sparked remarkable violence, including reports of
20 7
twenty bombings, shootings, and beatings in seven months.
What is more, these acts of violence regularly went unpunished, and
often even unprosecuted. An all-white jury famously acquitted the murderers of Emmett Till, and such jury nullification was not uncommon. 208
Between 1955 and 1957 "southern juries freed the white defendants" in
thirteen of "fourteen widely publicized" civil rights cases. 2 09 Often perpetrators were not even indicted and sometimes Southern law enforcement
even supported the violence. The riots resulting from attempts to integrate the University of Mississippi were themselves sparked by the Mis199.
MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH 27 (1987).
200.
Id.at 28-29.
201.
Id. at 29.
202.
Id.
203.
Id. at 53.
204.
Id.at 89-91.

205.
206.
207.

Id.
at 135.
Id.
at 138.
Id. at 99.

208.
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 424-25 (2004).
209.
BELKNAP, supra note 199, at 32.
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sissippi governor urging state officials and the public to defy the courtordered integration. 10 Michael Belknap has claimed that during the violence sparked by the Mississippi Freedom Summer, most of the rural
sheriffs believed that their primary job "was to control Negroes, not to
protect them from white attackers. '' 211 Mississippi prosecutors collaborated with their sheriffs by failing to prosecute offenders, and all-white
212
juries acted as a backstop for the few prosecutions that were brought.
Mississippi was a leading site of violence, but its support of racist
violence was hardly rare. In Birmingham in 1963, violence against civil
rights protestors was not just permitted but even inflicted by Bull Con213
nor's all-white police force. A Miami assistant police chief made clear
his officers would not help protect African-American children as they
began the court-ordered integration of public schools: "If they ask for
trouble, they needn't come to us for guards. 214
This violence and the failure of Southern state governments to respond effectively convinced many that states were failing at their most
basic tasks of protecting the rights of their citizens and enforcing public
order. One result was calls for federal legislation designed to force the
states to carry out their responsibilities or to transfer those responsibilities to the federal government. 2 15 Michael Klarman has shown how violence like the police dogs, fire hoses, and nightsticks Bull Connor's officers used on peaceful protestors in Birmingham contributed to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other civil rights legislation that
extended federal power into traditional state functions. 21 6 Similarly, the
failure of Mississippi to effectively punish-or in many circumstances
even prosecute-the violence sparked by the Mississippi Freedom Summer led to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which gave federal
prosecutors the legal authority they needed to prosecute that kind of racist violence. 217
2. Powerful and Influential States
While perceptions of the states as anti-democratic and incompetent
supported the political safeguards thesis by suggesting that the growth of
federal power was both functional and democratic, the South's success in
using popular protest, state governmental institutions, and their federal
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.at 89-91.
Id.at 138-39.
Id. at 140.
KLARMAN, supra note 208, at 434.
BELKNAP, supra note 199, at 33 (quoting Benjamin Muse, Confidential Memorandum on
Law Enforcement in Miami-Conversation with Assistant Chief of Police 1. J. Youell, Folder 75-0158-38, SRCC) (internal quotation marks omitted).
215.
BELKNAP, supra note 199, at 97-100; see also KLARMAN, supra note 208, at 436.
216.
Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J.
AM. HIST. 81, 82-83 (1994); see also BELKNAP, supra note 199, at 99-100; KLARMAN, supra note
208, at 435-36.
217.
BELKNAP, supra note 199, at 99-101, 139-42, 237-38.
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representatives to resist even direct federal orders provided proof that
218
American government was not dominated by national institutions.
"Despite constant reaffirmations by the federal courts in the past two
decades," wrote Daniel Elazar, "and despite presidential willingness to
intervene with force where the states allow [the civil rights of AfricanAmericans] to be publicly suppressed by force, the entire question of
the states to
Negro rights remains greatly dependent on the willingness 21of
9
policy.
national
with,
complying
aid in carrying out, or in
3. Functional Federalism
A third support for the political safeguards thesis was the progress,
however slow and halting, of the Civil Rights Movement, which was
220
Morton Grodzins
seen as evidence that the federal system worked.
as the problem
problem"
"Negro
the
summarized this argument. He saw
22
of de jure segregation in the South, ' and recognized that federalism had
helped create it by giving southern states the power to slow national action. 222 But he still saw progress, which led him to keep faith with federalism.223 He admitted one reason for progress was the "sheer force of
public opinion," pushed by the decision in Brown v. Board and the Cold
War.2 24 But federalism, he argued, was another. It made AfricanAmericans in Northern and Midwestern cities a crucial voting bloc that
could push presidents and non-Southern elected officials towards reform. 225 "Integration of Negros," he concluded, "everywhere in law and
many places in social life, will be achieved, I believe, in a relatively short
to overcome the barritime, [by] utilizing the possibilities of federalism
22 6
supported.,
previously
had
system
ers a federal
C. Changing Contexts
The circumstances that supported the near universal faith in the political safeguards thesis, however, had changed by the early 1970s. Rising faith in state governance as a result of their belated concern with rac218.
219.

GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 297-98.
ELAZAR, supra note 159, at 5-6.

220. GRODZINS, supra note 141; Elazar, supra note 147, at 167-70. Grodzins, for example,
described school desegregation as an example of a conflict so fundamental that only a "demonstration of strength on one side or another" could solve it, but also saw it as reaching the correct solution
because "the view of the whole nation must prevail" on such basic conflicts. Grodzins, supra note
145, at 278.
GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 292-93 (describing the "Negro problem" as a problem of
221.
African-Americans being denied "the vote and the equal use of publicly supported facilities, especially schools, but also ... public transportation, libraries, parks, and swimming pools," rights they
had already won in the North).
222. Id. at 292-94.
ld.at 301.
223.
224. Id. at 301-03.
Id. at 294-95, 295 n.j (providing an Editor's Note discussing the "civil rights break225.
through of 1964 which brought a total collapse of the Southerner's veto power over civil rights
legislation in Congress" for excellent evidence of this change).
Id at 306.
226.
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ist violence combined with rising concerns about federal dysfunction to
convince many that the rapidly accelerating growth in federal authority
was unlikely to be the result of a fair, democratic process. Simultaneously, a decline in the political influence of state political parties and a rise
in the power of national interest groups offered a way to explain what
many saw as unproductive increases in federal power. Together these
developments undermined faith that the political safeguards thesis was
an accurate description of American government. That conclusion, in
turn, led to new support for judicial intervention.
1. Expanding Federal Authority
Though growth in federal authority was a consistent theme of the
twentieth century, observers perceived a clear acceleration in the mid- to
late-1960s. Through the 1950s domestic spending remained equally balanced between the states and the federal government, a place it had
reached after a slow and steady increase from the federal government's
227
The 1960s, on the other hand, saw explosive
20% share in 1929.
growth in federal domestic spending. The number of grants-in-aid rose
from 132 in 1960 to 379 in 1968.228 Total federal aid to the states rose
from "$7 billion in 1960 to $24 billion in 1970.,,229 As a result, the percentage of state budgets provided by the federal government increased by
almost 35%.230
The scope of federal power expanded as well. The New Deal increased federal authority, but focused on national economic regulation
and social insurance. 231 The Great Society, on the other hand, went much
further by combining professional services, social sciences, and federal
232
authority to address a variety of social problems.
It promoted "racial
integration in housing and education," challenged sex discrimination, and
instituted education, community development, and anti-poverty programs. 233 Through funding decisions or traditional regulations, the federal government began regulating an enormous number of activities that
had been traditionally considered local: "elementary and secondary education, local law enforcement, libraries," fire control, environmental pro234
tection, and antipoverty programs.

227. TIMOTHY CONLAN, NEW FEDERALISM: INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM FROM NIXON TO
REAGAN 5 (1988).
228.
Id.at6.
229.
Id.
230.

Id.

231.
Id.at9.
232.
CONLAN, supra note 108, at 8;see also Samuel H. Beer, The Adoption of General Revenue Sharing: A Case Study in Public Sector Politics, in 24 PUB. POL'Y 127, 160 (Lawrence D.
Brown et al. eds., 1976).
233.
CONLAN, supra note 227, at 9.

234.

Id. at 6.
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James Sundquist's analysis for the Brookings Institution in 1969
was a typical reaction. "In the nineteen-sixties," he wrote, "the American
federal system entered a new phase. ' 35 Congress asserted national authority "in a wide range of governmental functions that until then had
been the province, exclusively or predominantly, of state and local governments. ' 36 This "massive federal intervention in community affairs
came in some of the most sacrosanct of all the traditional preserves of
state and local authority," including "education[,] . . .local law enforce-

ment[,].. . manpower training and area economic development,..,
mass
237
transportation, water systems, and sewage treatment plants."
This was far more than a simple change in who paid. Dramatic alterations in the size and character of "federal grant-in-aid programs" had
caused a "transformation of the federal system," Sundquist wrote.238 Earlier grant-in-aid programs helped states address what were seen as local
issues. As a result, federal review focused on ensuring efficiency, and
"[p]olicy making [authority] ...remained where it resided before the

functions were assisted., 23 9 But the grants of the 1960s addressed national issues and "[a]chievement of a nationalobjective requires close federal control over the content of the program. ' ' 240 The result was "new patterns of relationships" between
levels of government. 24 1 Other scholars
242
saw similar developments.
2. Growing Concerns with Federal Dysfunction
Close observers of the federal system-including many who a decade earlier had been remarkably sanguine about American federalismalso became concerned that those increases in federal authority were
producing fragmentation, disorganization, and inefficiency.2 43 The Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations was a bipartisan commission of congressmen, state officials, private citizens, and federal bureaucrats created in 1959 to recommend improvements to the federal
235.
JAMES L. SUNDQUIST WITH DAVID W. DAVIS, MAKING FEDERALISM WORK: A STUDY OF
PROGRAM COORDINATION AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL I (1969).

236. Id.
237. Id.
238.
Id.
239. Id.
at 3.
240. Id. at 4-6.
241.
Id.
at1.
242.
Daniel Elazar argued in 1973 that the growth of project grants in the 1960s-grants which
states and localities had to apply for rather than simply receive conditioned on following federal
guidelines "transferred the decision as to who would get what from the normal federal-state channels to Washington." Daniel J. Elazar, Cursed by Bigness or Toward a Post-TechnocraticFederal-

ism, 3 PUBLIUS 239, 281 (1973). Michael Reagan believed these changes were so significant that
their emergence explained why Morton Grodzins, who died in 1964 "just
before the explosive proliferation of grant programs, particularly those of a project nature," had misunderstood the nature of
the federal system. MICHAEL D. REAGAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM 161 (1972); see also Bruce K.
MacLaury, Foreword to GEORGE F. BREAK, FINANCING GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM vii

(1980).
243.

CONLAN, supra note 108, at 6-7.
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system. 244 The General Accounting Office and Lynden Johnson's Bureau
of the Budget agreed. The Bureau of the Budget found that the "complexity and fragmentation of federal grant programs . . . creates major

problems of administration for both the federal government and local
governments and inhibits
the
of a unified approach to the
•
--- development
,,245
solution of community problems.
Daniel Elazar saw a federal bureaucracy that had become so unwieldy it was beyond the control of the President. 246 Even Democratic politicians like Senator Edmund Muskie of
Maine and LBJ's budget director began to question the ability247
of federal
bureaucrats to oversee local plans and support decentralization.
These concerns gained strength from other sources. Vietnam, stagflation, and Watergate decreased faith in all levels of government, but
damaged the federal government most severely. 248 The shift of federal
regulation into more broadly controversial topics was also damaging. In
the 1950s and early 1960s, the most obvious extensions of federal power
were aimed at de jure segregation and massive resistance in the South.
Though many Southerners clearly opposed federal authority, the violence
of fire hoses and police dogs made clear for others the need for federal
intervention. But after the mid-1960s federal intervention turned towards
de facto segregation, most visibly the use of busing to address school
segregation. That issue was a complicated one for many and created new
doubts about the effectiveness of expanding federal power. "The controversy over busing," wrote one commentator, "shows perfectly the difficulties to be encountered, once the first step is taken down the road of
adding flesh to the constitutional bones of federalism. 249
3. Democratic and Competent States
Doubts about federal competence rose in tandem with faith in the
competence of state government. An important reason for the improvements in state government was, ironically, federal intervention. The Warren Court's apportionment decisions made woefully gerrymandered state
legislatures more responsive to the popular will, 250 while its criminal
procedure decisions removed some of the state executives' worst excess244.
What Is ACIR?, Archive, U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL.,
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Default.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
245.
CONLAN, supra note 108, at 7 (omission in original) (quoting ADVISORY COMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, IMPROVING FEDERAL GRANTS MANAGEMENT:
THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANT SYSTEM-AN ASSESSMENT AND PROPOSED POLICIES 11-12 (1977))

(internal quotation mark omitted).
246.
Elazar, supra note 242, at 281.
247.
CONLAN, supra note 108, at 7.
248.
See TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE (1993); JOHN ROBERT
GREENE, AMERICA IN THE SIXTIES 135 (2010); KIM MCQUAID, THE ANXIOUS YEARS: AMERICA IN
THE VIETNAM-WATERGATE ERA, 319-20 (1989); Jerald G. Bachman & M. Kent Jennings, The
Impact of Vietnam on Trust in Government, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 141, 141 (1975).

249.
250.

Richard H. Leach, Federalism:A Battery of Questions, 3 PUBLIUS 11, 22 (1973).
Mavis Mann Reeves, The States as Polities: Reformed, Reinvigorated, Resourceful, 509

ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 83, 86-87 (1990); Whittington, supra note 104, at 521.
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es. 251 The requirements of administering federal grant programs also encouraged states to improve their administrative capacities.252 Other developments included
states instituting annual rather than semiannual leg253
islative sessions.
But more important to growing faith in state government was the
belated decision of the Southern state governments to prosecute the racist
violence. The Civil Rights Act of 1968 gave the federal government new
tools to prosecute racist violence, but the law went largely unused because growing fears of a breakdown of law and order led Southern states
to begin prosecuting and convicting perpetrators of that violence. 4 In
stark contrast to the 1950s and early 1960s, Southern authorities charged
132 members of the KKK with "378 felonies and serious misdemeanors"
between March 1967 and March 1969. 255 And Southern juries often returned convictions. 25 6 "By September 1973 the New York Times was able
to report the 'virtual disappearance' . . . of unpunished [racist violence in
the South]. 25 7

4. Weak States and Special Interests
As doubts rose that the accelerating shift of governing authority to
Washington was a functional response to the challenges of the time,
changes in national politics offered a way to explain why the shift was
continuing: the collapse of the political power of the states and the rising
influence of national interest groups. Many observers saw how television
and the age of mass campaigns had increased the influence of national
interest groups. They also regularly noted the growing evidence that state
political parties were losing influence over the national government in
response to developments in state politics and the structure of Congress
itself. The structures most people had identified as the central political
safeguards of federalism, in other words, were eroding.
Federal action in the 1960s may have made state governments more
competent, but it also reduced the ability of state political parties to influence their federal representatives. The Warren Court apportionment
decisions made it more difficult to use gerrymandering to shape the preferences of a state congressional delegation,258 as did the 1965 Voting

251.

MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 96-97 (1998).

252.

Samuel H. Beer, The Modernization of American Federalism, 3 PUBLIUS 49, 83 (1973);

Reeves, supra note 250, at 85; Whittington, supra note 104, at 521.
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Reeves, supra note 250, at 88; Purcell, supra note 14, at 156-57.
supranote 199, at 237-42.
Id.at 234.
Id.at 235.
Id. at 232.
BELKNAP,

258.
GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL
POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 40-41 (1966); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and
Reapportionment,in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970S 57,61 (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 197 1).
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Rights Act and the prohibition of poll taxes and literacy tests. 2 59 Reforms
in Congress had a similar impact. The Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970 ended the era when powerful committee chairmen appointed by
seniority could bend the legislative agenda to the interests of their local
constituents with impunity. 260 Those changes became clear in 1974 when
the senior chairs of the Agriculture, Armed Services, and Banking Com261
Committee chairmen learned to be much more
mittees were deposed.
responsive to the party caucus, which reduced the influence of the state
party.

262

The decline of state parties made them less able to mobilize voters
and further undermined their influence. "[O]ur parties," wrote Samuel
Beer, "have entered a state of decline., 263 Increases in ticket-splitting,
rising numbers of independents, and related changes were "abundantly in
evidence.",264 As television advertising became critical to political campaigns, fundraising increased in importance relative to party action and
legislators quickly found that national interest groups-the AARP, the
NRA, the Sierra Club, the AFL-CIO, and the Chamber of Commercecould more easily contribute money.265 As a result, those national constituencies and their national interests gained salience. As the state parties lost influence over their representatives, their ability to use congressional oversight to influence the federal bureaucracy declined as well.266
The impression of limited congressional control over the bureaucracy
was strengthened by growing concerns with "iron triangles" in which
congressmen had to share influence with interest groups and state and
federal administrators.267
D. The Consensus Fractures
These developments led many to re-evaluate their belief that the
American federal system was one characterized by shared governing
authority. 268 Not everyone changed their mind, 269 certainly. But many
259.
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-56 (1966) (upholding the suspension of literacy tests); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (prohibiting poll taxes).
CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITrEES IN CONGRESS 35 (3d ed.
260.

1997).
261.
262.

Id. at 38.
Id.

263.
264.

Beer, supra note 252, at 94.
Id.

265.

See Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79

COLUM. L. REV. 847, 862-65 (1979).
266. Id.
267.
268.

See generally HAROLD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITION AND POWER 271-77 (1 st ed. 1970).
See Robert J. Pranger, The Decline of the American National Government, 3 PUBLIUS 97,

115 (1973) ("Until recently a profound nationalistic enthusiasm was widespread in the United States.
Today there is a much more reserved attitude toward the nation, especially among educated people.
Why? Some have blamed the Vietnam War or a more general technocratic organization that has
produced citizen alienation and powerlessness. Another explanation might be that the national center
can no longer generate nationalistic enthusiasm because it no longer operates as a center for the
nation as a whole.").
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became convinced that states did not have the governing authority the
political safeguards thesis predicted they should. By 1973, Michael
Reagan, who was a proponent of greater nationalization, 270 was persuaded Grodzins and others had badly misunderstood the way the American
federal system functioned. They had, he argued, "confused sharing of
functions with sharing of power.",271 The system he saw was so clearly
not a system of shared governing authority-even if it was a system of
shared administration-that it needed a new name. "Cooperative" and
"creative" federalism were not accurate descriptions. 2 "[P]ermissive
federalism," Reagan suggested, was more accurate because states exercised real authority only with the permission of the federal government.27327What
real power states had was vestigial, and effectively mean4
ingless.

A strong indication of the effect changed circumstances had on faith
in the political safeguards thesis was the changed perspective of Daniel
Elazar, a strong proponent of Morton Grodzin's sharing approach in the
early 1960s. By the early 1970s, Elazar believed, with Reagan, that the
sharing of functions did not indicate the sharing of real power. 275 It was
possible, said Elazar, in the 1960s and 70s to "confuse all kinds of federal-state-local interaction with 'cooperation' whether the interaction involved federal coercion or not., 276 He ultimately rejected Grodzins' sharing hypothesis. "When Grodzins wrote" in the 1950s, he claimed,
there were still substantial constitutional and other kinds of barriers
(including party, which he emphasized) to centralization of power in
Washington, whether for its direct exercise or for the sake of decentralization along presumably more rational lines. Today, those barriers have by and large disappeared. Powers can be transferred to
Washington in one way or another and, once transferred, are leading
to token decentralization that becomes, in reality, the greater
exercise
277
of those powers by a newly enhanced national government.
Theodore Lowi's thought followed a similar line. His 1969 The End
of Liberalism saw a lack of centralized control as the hallmark of American government but by 1978 emphasized the power and importance of a

269.
JAMES A. MAXWELL & J. RICHARD ARONSON,
GOVERNMENTS 252-53 (3d ed. 1977).
270.
REAGAN, supra note 242, at 53.
271.
Id. at 161.
272.
Id. at 163 (internal quotation mark omitted).
273.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
274.
Id. at 13.
275.
Elazar, supra note 242, at 244.
276.
Id.at 245.
277.
Id.at 243.

FINANCING

STATE

AND LOCAL

2014]

THE RETURN OF CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM

259

central national state. 278 Others-even those who supported that centralization-noted similar trends.279
A 1973 symposium on the state of the American federal system is
another indicator. 280 An animating question of the conference was
whether "rather clearly definable limitations on federal and state action"
had been removed and whether "our present mechanisms for making
policy constitutionally and/or prudentially satisfactory in order to maintain our federal system[.] ' 28I Martin Landau had a clear answer to the
first issue: "It is plain to see, however, that the nationalization.., of authority has all but stripped the states of their independence.... And there
classical federal relaof the ,,,282
is little doubt today that any of the residues
,,
tionship can be set aside by the national government.
To conclude that the political process no longer protected state autonomy did not require one to believe that state autonomy needed judicial protection. Many observers who saw a decline in the real governing
authority of the states neither supported decentralization nor called for a

return of constitutional federalism. 283 Michael Reagan, most notably,
remained opposed to constitutional federalism and even decentralization,
as did other prominent voices, including William Riker and, later, Jesse
Choper.2 8
The decline of what had been seen as the most important of the political safeguards of federalism nevertheless explained to some why the
American government was transferring authority away from increasingly
competent states to the increasingly incompetent federal government.
And as doubts about the political safeguards thesis grew, so did calls for
the return of constitutional federalism.

278.

Scheiber, supra note 138, at 673 (citing THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 26

(1969)); Theodore J. Lowi, Europeanization of America? From United States to United State, in
NATIONALIZING GOVERNMENT: PUBLIC POLICIES IN AMERICA 15, 18 (Theodore J. Lowi & Alan
Stone eds., 1978).
279. Scheiber, supra note 138, at 673 (citing Martin Landau, Baker v. Carr and the Ghost of
Federalism,in EMPIRICAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY 131, 137 (Charles Cnudde & D.E. Neubauer eds.,

1969); Henry Abraham, Effectiveness of Governmental Operations,426 ANNALS 81, 94 (1976)).
Daniel J. Elazar, First Principles,3 PUBLIUS 1, 1 (1973).
280.
Id. at 7.
281.
Martin Landau, Federalism, Redundancy and System Reliability, 3 PUBLIUS 173, 191-92
282.
(1973).
283.
Richard Leach argued in 1973 that the judiciary was too involved in questions of federalism because it limited the authority of the states and encouraged less judicial involvement. Leach,
supra note 249, at 23. Though even he admitted that one "judicial review has a merit" in that it can
correct the overreach by Congress and the executive. Id. "The police power was not delegated to
Congress .... [Als a part of the reservoir of state power, it permits a great deal of flexibility at the
state level in the development of government policy," a flexibility Leach believes Congress and the
President are eliminating, a shift antithetical to the goals of the founders and good government. Id. at
23-25.
284.
REAGAN, supra note 242, at 52-53; RIKER, supra note 158, at 155; Jesse H. Choper, The
Scope of National Power Vis-6- Vis the States: The Dispensabilityof JudicialReview, 86 YALE L.J.
1552, 1555 (1977).
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In the legal academy, scholars like Alexander Bickel and Phillip
Kurland, most notably, began to complain about excessive nationaliza285
Bickel's The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress criticized
tion.
the Warren Court for failing to defer to the democratically elected
branches of both nation and states.s 6 Kurland made similar claims in
1970 in Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court and spoke sorrowfully of the elimination of federalism elsewhere.287 In Storm over the
States, Democratic presidential candidate Terry Sanford argued a "new
federalism" was necessary to free all levels of government from the special interests.288
Other observers went a step beyond critique and urged the judiciary
to rediscover constitutional federalism. One of the animating questions of
the 1973 conference on the state of American federalism was, "Should
we consider placing an increased emphasis upon constitutional barriers ...?,289 Martin Diamond called for a return to the doctrine of enumerated powers. 290 Daniel Elazar, too, supported such a move. The
founders, he wrote, had "wisely noted" that "the preservation of constitutional barriers is necessary ... [g]iven the nature of men and the problems of maintaining restraint under political pressure.,, 29 , He thus concluded that "the re-establishment of constitutional restraints in areas other than2 those linked with the Bill of Rights should be a high priority matter.

, 29

IV. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES AND THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS
THESIS INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT

The internal papers of the Supreme Court indicate that the same
changes that led observers of the federal system outside the Court to lose
faith in the political safeguards thesis had the same effect on the Justices
inside the Court. Those changes framed the arguments made by the National League of Cities and supporting amici. They also convinced Justice Lewis Powell, who saw his doubts about the theory epitomized in
NLC and then played the central role in building the coalition that, for the
first time in forty years, struck down an exercise of Congress's commerce power on federalism grounds.
285.
286.

Scheiber, supra note 138, at 666, 674 n.8.

ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 173-81 (1970);
see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 120-21 (1975); Edward A. Purcell,
Jr., Alexander M. Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 521, 546

(1976).
287.
PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 96-97
(1970); see also PHILIP B. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1978); Philip B.
Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 DUKE L.J. 619, 621 (1968).
288.

TERRY SANFORD, STORM OVER THE STATES 207-12 (1967).

289. Elazar, supra note 280, at 7.
290.
Martin Diamond, The Forgotten Doctrine of Enumerated Powers, 6 PUBLIUS 187, 188,
193 (1976).
291.
Elazar, supra note 242, at 252.
292. Id. at 253.
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A. Fry v. United States: Laying the Groundwork
Powell's interest in NLC and his central role in building a coalition
willing to revive constitutional federalism are revealed by the debate
inside the Court over Fry v. United States, a case from the previous term
that was decided in the midst of arguments over NLC. Fry concerned a
federalism challenge to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (ESA).2 93
The ESA aimed to slow runaway inflation by empowering a presidentially appointed Pay Board to deny wage increases by both public and private employers. 294 Ohio brought suit claiming the law could not be constitutionally applied to the states. 95 The Tenth Amendment and the structure of the Constitution, it argued, did not allow Congress to interfere
with "sovereign state functions," which included the authority
to set
296
wages for at least some of the employees covered by the statute.
From the outside, the Court seemed to have few problems rejecting
Ohio's claim. Justice Marshall's brief opinion for seven Justices held that
the case was controlled by Marylandv. Wirtz, which "reiterated the principle that States are not immune from all federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause merely because of their sovereign status. ' 297 Justice
Douglas concurred on the grounds that the appeal was moot since the
ESA had expired by the time the Court considered the case. 298 Justice
Rehnquist's long dissent,299 which anticipated much of his majority opinion in NLC, seemed both an outlier and, in retrospect, evidence of his
leadership on federalism issues.
Internal documents, however, tell a different story about the leading
voice on the Court and how difficult Fry was to decide. From the start
there was interest in reconsidering judicial limits to the commerce power
in Fry. Justices Rehnquist, Douglas, Stewart, and Powell provided the
four votes for certiorari .3° Rehnquist's dissent made his interest clear.3 °'
Justices Douglas and Stewart likely voted for certiorari so they could
consider reversing Wirtz, in which they had both dissented seven years
earlier. 302 Distinguishing Wirtz certainly seemed difficult to the writer of
the certiorari memo, who thought the government would win "hands
down" if Wirtz were not overruled.30 3 Justice Powell's notes indicate he

293.
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1975).
294.
Id.
at 548.
295.
Id. at 547.
296. Id.
297.
Id.
at 548.
298.
Id.
at 549 (Douglas, J., concurring).
299. Id.
at 557-58 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
300. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Fry Certiorari Vote Sheet, in Powell Papers, supra note 23.
301.
Fry, 421 U.S. at 557-58 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
302.
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) overruled by Nat'l
League ofClties v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
303.
Pierce O'Donnell, Certiorari Memorandum (Dec. 31, 1974), in Powell Papers, supra note
23; Preliminary Memorandum for February 15, 1974 Certiorari Conference 5 (Jan. 29, 1974), in THE
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was ready to consider placing limits on Congress. "If [the] Commerce
Clause," he wrote, "allows [the] Fed[eral] [g]ov[ernment] to fix state
salaries, there's not much left to [f]ederalism. Will state taxes & charges
' 3° 4
The Fry case, he insisted, needed to
for municipal services be next?
30 5
be discussed at conference.
That interest ebbed following oral argument. At the initial conference, no one voted to invalidate the ESA and the opinion was assigned to
Justice Marshall.3 °6 But the breadth of Justice Marshall's first draft and
Justice Powell's interest in the opportunity to re-establish constitutional
federalism in NLC nearly cost Marshall his majority.
Marshall's first circulated draft was far more deferential to Congress than his final opinion. The draft asserted that Wirtz had confirmed
United States v. California's holding that the sovereign governmental
functions of states were just as amenable to regulation under the Commerce Clause as their proprietary functions. 30 7 As a result, the ESA,
which everyone admitted was a regulation of interstate commerce, was
clearly constitutional as applied to the states.30 8 Justices White, Stewart,
and Blackmun quickly offered to join the opinion. 30 9 Burger asked only
for minor changes.31 °
Powell, however, challenged Marshall's interpretation of Wirtz in
order to keep the Court's options open for NLC. In a memo circulated to
the Court, he asked Marshall to narrow his draft to focus on the temporary, emergency nature of the ESA.311 More importantly, he asked him to
remove his discussion of the line between "proprietary" and "governmental" state functions. 312 Wirtz's discussion of that issue, Powell argued, was merely dicta and removing it would "leave[] open the possibility of distinguishing Wirtz in National League of Cities," as had been
discussed at the last conference. 31 3 If Marshall was unwilling to change
PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN (on file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter BLACKMUN
PAPERS].
304.
Pierce O'Donnell, Preliminary Memorandum (Jan. 29, 1974), in Powell Papers, supra
note 23 (handwritten note of Justice Powell).
305.
Id.
306.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Fry Certiorari Vote Sheet, in Powell Papers, supra note 23.
307.
Justice Thurgood Marshall, Third Draft, Fry v. United States 2 (Mar. 25, 1975), in THE
PAPERS OF WILLIAM J. BRENNAN (on file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter BRENNAN
PAPERS].
308.
Id at 8.
309.
See Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 9, 1975),
in Powell Papers, supra note 23; Letter from Justice Byron White to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan.
6, 1975), in Powell Papers, supra note 23; Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice Thurgood
Marshall (Jan. 6, 1975), in THE PAPERS OF THURGOOD MARSHALL (on file with the Library of
Congress) [hereinafter MARSHALL PAPERS].
310.
Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 8, 1975),
in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 309.
311.
Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Thurgood Marshall 2 (Jan. 14, 1975), in
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 309.
312.
Id.
313.
Id.
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the opinion,
Powell concluded, he would have to write a separate concur314
rence.
Powell's note nearly cost Marshall his majority. Justices Rehnquist
and Blackmun quickly offered their support for the changes. 315 Rehnquist
even wrote that he might have to dissent, something that he seems to
have considered only after reading Powell's note.316 Marshall believed
Powell had coordinated the challenge to his opinion with Justice
Blackmun, and was furious. 317 His curt reply to Powell, which Blackmun
believed offensive, did not help.31 8 Fry, Marshall's memo insisted, had
been "cut to the bone" and was "as narrow a holding as I can imagine.'319 It was not the breadth of his Fry draft that suggested NLC was
being prejudged, 32Marshall
continued, it was Powell's suggestion that the
draft be changed. °
Things only got worse for Marshall after his note. The next day,
Rehnquist committed to dissent. 32 ' In February, Douglas circulated his
brief concurrence urging dismissal.3 22 In March, Powell circulated a brief
concurrence that made clear his belief that state sovereignty set some
limits on Congress's commerce power. 323 When Blackmun saw Powell's
concurrence, he formally withdrew his joinder to Marshall's opinion and
joined Powell. 324 Burger soon offered to join Powell as well. 325 Given
Stewart's decision to join Douglas in dissent in Wirtz, Marshall had every reason to worry about losing him to Powell as well.
As his 9-0 majority opinion careened towards becoming a concurrence for just three Justices, Marshall agreed to Powell's changes. He
removed the discussion of the proprietary-governmental distinction and
integrated much of Powell's circulated concurrence.326 Though he was
314. Id.
315.
Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 15, 1975), in
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 309; Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Thurgood
Marshall (Jan. 14, 1975) in MARSHALL PAPERS, supranote 309.
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prepared to publish his original opinion if he picked up no new votes, it
was unnecessary. 327 His changes were sufficient to bring everyone but
Rehnquist back on board.328 With the briefing in NLC already underway,
however, it was clear Fry was only the beginning. There seemed a clear
to re-establish
possibility that Powell could find as many as six votes
329
constitutional federalism under the right circumstances.
B. Localism, JudicialReview, and Lewis Powell
Powell's interest in federalism questions is easy to understand. His
biographer John Jefferies describes his long-standing belief in the importance of local government, local community, and especially neighborhood schools.330 "He venerated the traditional connectedness of home,
church, and school[, and] ... feared the rootlessness, the anonymity, the
impersonality of life in modern cities." 331 In his opinions, these concerns
revealed themselves most clearly in his evaluation of court-ordered busing as a tool to achieve racial integration. 332 For Powell, Jefferies wrote,
"the neighborhood school[s] epitomized the values of community, of
belonging, of cooperation [and] . . . common endeavor for the.public
good., 333 And he generally opposed busing because it undermined those
values. 334 He supported deference to state and local control in other circumstances, too. His majority opinion in San Antonio v. Rodriguez335 _a
class action suit by poor schoolchildren challenging a property-tax-based
school financing system on equal protection grounds-protected the flex336
ibility of the local school boards Powell had once been a member of.
"The ultimate wisdom," he wrote,

327.
Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justices William 0. Brennan, Potter
Stewart, and Byron White (Mar. 25, 1975), in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 309; Letter from
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Apr. 8, 1975), in MARSHALL PAPERS,
supra note 309.
328.
Note for File from Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Apr. 8, 1975), in BLACKMUN PAPERS,
supra note 303 ("Now [Justice Marshall] has come around and, hopefully, should have a 7 to 2 vote
with [Justice Rehnquist] dissenting and [Justice Douglas] preferring to dismiss.").
329.
Powell led the charge to limit Fry; Burger and Blackmun supported him; Rehnquist dissented in Fry; and Stewart and Douglas dissented in Wirtz.
330.
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 285 (1994).
331.
Id. at 296-97. In a speech to the American Bar Association, Powell lamented the increasing disconnection between citizens and the "[t]eachers, parents, neighbor[hood]s, ministers, employers," who were the "personal authorities [that] once gave direction to our lives." Id. at 297 (alteration
in original) (quoting Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Prayer Breakfast Speech to the American Bar
Association (Aug. 13, 1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Those relationships, Powell said,
"were something larger than ourselves, but never so large as to be remote, impersonal, or indifferent.
We gain[] from them an inner strength, a sense of belonging, as well as of responsibility to others."
Id. (quoting Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Prayer Breakfast Speech to the American Bar Association
(Aug. 13, 1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
332.
Id. at 296-97.
333.
Id. at 297.
334.
Id. at 285; see, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189, 246 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Id. at 58-59.
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[of] these and related problems of education is not likely to be divined for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate
the[se] issues. In such circumstances, the judiciary is well advised to
refrain from interposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research
337
and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions ....
"We are unwilling," Powell continued, "to assume for ourselves a level
of wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars, and educational authorities in 50 [s]tates. 338
There was a crucial difference between a case like San Antonio and
NLC, however. Both certainly activated Powell's concern for local government and local community. But in cases like San Antonio, Powell's
concern with local community was reinforced by his concern with judicial deference to the political branches. Protecting local autonomy in
NLC would require him to invalidate a law passed by Congress. It would
require, in other words, the very kind of judicial activism that was also a
central concern of Justice Powell. 339 That concern would have been acute
in NLC because invalidating the law would require overturning a fortyyear-old precedent affirmed only eight years earlier.
C. The PoliticalSafeguards Thesis in National League of Cities
Despite those concerns, Powell believed NLC required the return of
constitutional federalism. "This is the one we've been waiting for," wrote
Penny Clark, Powell's clerk for the arguments in Fry and the briefing in
NLC. 340 And memoranda from inside the Court indicate that he believed
it was the one he had been waiting for because it embodied his doubts
about the political safeguards thesis.341
Certainly the changes that influenced the growing skepticism of observers of the federal system outside the Court were also apparent to
Powell and his colleagues. Improvements in state government, the rising
power of interest groups, and growing federal administrative dysfunction
had been issues of public comment since the 1960s. Those issues were
raised by academic and public discussions of LBJ's "Creative Federalism" agenda, 342 the Intergovernmental Relations Committee chaired by
337.
338.

Id.at 43.
Id.at 55. Powell's majority opinion in Warth v. Seldin adopted a similar approach in

denying standing to a challenge by citizens to the zoning decisions of the town of Penfield, which
they claimed excluded low-income people in violation of federal constitutional and statutory rights.
422 U.S. 490, 493 (1975). Ruling otherwise, Powell wrote, would call upon courts to decide questions "other governmental institutions may be more competent to address." Id at 500.
339.
JEFFRIES, supra note 330, at 273.
340.
Letter from Penny Clark to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Jan. 24, 1975), in Powell Papers,
supra note 23.
341.
Memorandum for Conference from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Apr. 17, 1975), in Powell
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342.
See generally CREATIVE FEDERALISM (Donald E. Nicoll ed., 1967).
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Senator Edmund Muskie,3 43 the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations, 344 and Richard Nixon's New Federalism agenda. 345 To
give just a few examples: in 1967 the New York Times covered former
North Carolina Governor Terry Sanford's critique of the federal system,
Storm over the States;346 in 1970, the Washington Post discussed James
Sundquist's Making Federalism Work, a clear example of changing
views on American federalism discussed in Section 11; 347 and in 1972,
Washington Post editorialist David Broder discussed the Advisory
Committee on Intergovernmental Relations and its recognition of the
sharp increase in "political, popular and academic discussion[s] of American federalism. 348
The success of Southern state governments in prosecuting the violence of white supremacists would have been even clearer, and perhaps
even more important to Powell who had served on the Richmond School
Board following Brown and was, wrote his biographer, "genuinely and
passionately opposed to massive resistance ' 349 and "plainly appalled by
the threat to the rule of law" it created. 350 Those changes, in other words,
would have made Powell and his colleagues doubt that the political safeguards thesis accurately described the system of American federalism,
just as they had for many observers outside the Court.
The doubts Justice Powell and his colleagues had about the political
safeguards thesis would have been strengthened by the briefs in NLC.
The National League of Cities and supporting amici made careful doctrinal arguments, but they also fanned doubts about the political safeguards
thesis with empirical assertions that would have been unconvincing two
decades earlier. Federal regulations were inflexible, undemocratic, and
ineffective in contrast to flexible, democratic, and effective state govern-

343.
Creative Federalism Part I: The Federal Level: Hearing on S. 3509 and S.J. Res. 187
Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Comm. on Gov't Operations, 89th
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ance. The 1974 FLSA Amendments, they implied,
were passed only be351
cause of the power of national interest groups.
Criticism of the FLSA amendments as inflexible and ineffective
was woven throughout the briefs. The law created "rigid nation-wide
uniform rules" and "centralize[d] power in [the Secretary of Labor] to
impose high cost, rigid, nation-wide uniformity, wiping out small cost
arrangements developed by experience to meet unique State and local
needs." 352 They caused "chaos," "conflict," "confusion, '' 353 "duplication,
uncertainty, litigation, and damage to fiscal integrity" of the states. 354 To
understand the law, states, counties, and cities had to wade through "691
pages of a volume of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations," 85%
of which did not apply to them at all because they were written to regulate private industry. 355 The federal government, the briefs complained,
"does not possess all the knowledge, wisdom, fairness and reasonableness" about the best terms of employment for state employees. 35 6 In fact,
the evidence was to the contrary. The Department of Labor's Wages and
Hours Division, which was slated to oversee wage rules for the states,
had already been criticized for "acting to retard progress and diversity
in
357
employees."
local
and
State
and
Federal
both
of
scheduling
flexible
Even worse, the rules were unnecessary. "[T]his centralization," argued the briefs, "is not mandated to wipe out substandard labor conditions as such conditions do not exist among State[] and local Governments. They pay fair and reasonable salaries, fix reasonable hours and
have civil service, public sector collective bargaining and other laws
insuring that their employees [receive] . . .fair treatment., 358 And Congress knew it. It had "ample and competent evidence that extension of
the Act to State and local Government employees was . .. unnecessary.,359 The act was so irrational that even the lawyers for the government could cite "no evil of substance that the
Act will cure ...[or] any
360
wrong of substance that the Act will right."
Perhaps worst of all, the law was undemocratic. Under the FLSA,
wage decisions would be "a policy decision of the Labor Department
mandated without the consideration of one elected official and without

351.
352.
353.
354.
Garcia v.
*4.
355.
356.

See Brief for Appellants, supra note 31, at * 18-24.
Id. at *32, *42, *44.
Id. at *32.
Reply Brief at *4,Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (No. 74-878), 1975 WL 173803, at
Brief for Appellants, supranote 31, at *49.
Id.at *56-57.

357.
358.
359.

Id.at *88.
Id. at *44.
Id at *83.

360.

Reply Brief, supra note 354, at *3.
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the approval of one constituent." 361 State and local control, in contrast,
provided "'ballot box control' [of] . .. the extent and nature of State and
,,362
In sum, the law was a "nullification of the
City Government services.
363
People's power." It shifted power from the "People in each State" who
had exercised "ballot box control upon the services they need" to federal
bureaucrats and courts. 364 Henceforth, wages would be set by "Congress,
the Secretary of Labor, or the Federal Courts
free from ballot box control
365
by the People in the States and Cities."
Why was such an unproductive act passed when "[t]he history of
State and local Government in this Nation has been one of flexibility,
adaptation to change, and experimentation"? 366 The briefs offered a simple answer: the political power of labor unions. The only supporters of
the act mentioned by the brief were five major unions-the AFL-CIO,
SEIU, AFSCME, International Association of Fire Fighters, and International Conference of Police Associations-while it was opposed by
"[g]overnments at all levels," including the National League of Cities,
the U.S. Conference of Mayors, twenty-nine individual cities, both of
President Nixon's Secretaries of Labor, and even the President himself,
all of whom had argued that the extension of the Act was unnecessary.367
These arguments convinced Powell that NLC embodied his doubts
about the political safeguards. A memorandum he prepared before the
final discussions and vote in the case discussed the doctrinal complexities raised by the case, but more importantly it made clear why he believed an appropriate doctrine would limit Congress's commerce power:
his rejection of the political safeguards thesis. The facts of the case before him, he believed, demonstrated the theory's weakness. "One can
argue," he wrote, "that the states can 'trust' Congress not to go so far" as
to eliminate the right of the States to make their own personnel decisions. 368 "But," he continued,
the duty of this Court is to apply constitutional principle rather than
trust to legislative forbearance. The extension of FLSA to the states
in 1974 is an example. Judging by the briefs in this case, virtually
every state and city in the nation opposes this legislation. The National Governors Conference and the National League of Cities are
parties. Two members of the Cabinet testified against the 1974
361.
Supplemental Brief for Appellants on Reargument at *50, Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(No. 74-878), 1976 WL 181531, at *50.
362. Brief for Appellants, supra note 31, at * 113.
363. Reply Brief, supra note 354, at *26.
364. Id.
at *25.
365.
Id.
366. Brief for Appellants, supra note 31, at *82.
367. Id.
at *18-21.
368. Notes for Use at Conference by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Mar. 4, 1976), in Powell
Papers, supra note 23.
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Amendment and the President vetoed it. Yet, the political muscle of
organized labor outweighed what
appeared to be overwhelming local
3 69
political views to the contrary.
Powell, in short, believed NLC embodied the argument against the political safeguards thesis: the power of national interest groups overcame
expert opinion and the overwhelming views of state and local governments to muscle a dysfunctional law through Congress. And that conclusion helped him convince his colleagues to invalidate an exercise of
Congress's commerce power on federalism grounds for the first time in
four decades.
D. National League of Cities Decided
Powell's plans for NLC, however, were scrambled and nearly derailed when William Douglas's stroke led to the appointment of John
Paul Stevens. Douglas suffered his stroke on January 1, 1975, after the
initial briefing but before oral arguments in NLC.370 In recognition of his
absence and diminished capacity, his colleagues postponed decision in
any case that might turn on Douglas's vote. 371 The result was two oral
arguments and two votes in NLC: the first with Justice Douglas formally
on the Court, the second after Republican Gerald Ford had appointed
Stevens to Douglas's seat. These votes indicate that replacing a Democratic with a Republican appointee
almost ended the return of constitu372
tional federalism before it began.
Douglas's stroke kept him from the first conference, but the vote
was four to three with one abstention. Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, and
Blackmun voted to reverse on the grounds that Wirtz could be distinguished.373 Brennan, White, and Marshall voted to affirm on the grounds
that it could not.374 Justice Stewart was undecided. Wirtz, he believed,
could not be distinguished, and though he had earlier dissented in Wirtz,
he was unwilling to provide the fifth vote to overrule it. 375 As a result of
the agreement to postpone any decision in which Douglas's vote would
be determinative, Stewart's position-perhaps intentionally-required
reargument.

369.
Notes for Use at Conference by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Mar. 4, 1976), in Powell
Papers, supra note 23.
370.
HOYT, supra note 132, at 159.
371.
See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTI ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME

COURT 358 (1979).
372. See Conference Voting Sheet from the Supreme Court Conference on National League of
Cities v. Dunlop (Apr. 18, 1975), in Powell Papers, supra note 23; Letter from the Supreme Court
Conference on National League of Cities v. Dunlop (Mar. 5, 1976), in Powell Papers, supra note 23.
373. See Conference Voting Sheet from the Supreme Court Conference on National League of
Cities v. Dunlop (Apr. 18, 1975), in Powell Papers, supra note 23.

374. See Conference Voting Sheet from the Supreme Court Conference on National League of
Cities v. Dunlop (Apr. 18, 1975), in Powell Papers, supra note 23.
375.
Id.
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We, of course, cannot be sure, but Douglas's dissent in Wirtz and
his decision to concur in Fry strongly suggests he would have voted to
invalidate the 1974 amendments in NLC. If he did stand by his Wirtz
dissent, Stewart would have joined him as he did in Wirtz and constitutional federalism would have returned to the Supreme Court in a 6-3
decision joined-or perhaps written-by a Roosevelt appointee and
leader of the Warren Court.
But Douglas never had the chance to vote, and at the second conference his Republican replacement Stevens voted to uphold the law. 376 Had
Justice Stewart kept his earlier pledge not to be the fifth vote to overturn
Wirtz, the final vote in NLC would have been a 5-4 to uphold the law.
Replacing a Democratic with a Republican appointee thus nearly stopped
the return of constitutional federalism in its tracks. Stewart, however, for
unclear reasons, changed his plans, voted with Powell, and for the first
time since the New Deal the Court struck down an exercise of Congress's commerce power on federalism grounds, 5-4.
V. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, THE RETURN OF CONSTITUTIONAL
FEDERALISM, AND THE CAUSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

This Article has used an historical examination of NLC to challenge
existing explanations for the return of constitutional federalism and offer
an alternative. That alternative seeks to reveal the interaction between
jurisprudential norms and political change rather than reduce legal argument to political preference or vice versa. I also hope it can provide a
case study in the processes of constitutional development and cast new
light on contemporary debates over constitutional federalism. But before
turning to those implications, it may be useful to clarify my causal claim
and differentiate it from competing explanations.
I have argued that the best way to explain the return of constitutional federalism begins by recognizing that the structural changes to American government and durable changes in political debate that occurred in
the late 1960s and early 1970s undermined broadly shared faith in political safeguards thesis. Those structural changes in government made state
governments look more competent and the federal government look less
competent. They also emphasized the growing power of national interest
groups in contrast to the declining influence of states and localities. The
durable changes in American politics included, most importantly, the end
of the Southern states' acceptance, and even support, of the lawless violence of white supremacists. When combined with the belief that there
was an accelerating shift of real governing authority from the states to
the federal government, these changes created widespread doubt that the
political safeguards thesis was an accurate description of the American
federal system. Because the political safeguards thesis was the principle
376.

Id.
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justification for judicial deference on federalism questions, doubts about
its accuracy led some to conclude that the judiciary should protect the
autonomy of state governments.
Most important among those who came to doubt the accuracy of the
political safeguards thesis was Justice Lewis Powell, who saw his doubts
about the political safeguards thesis embodied in the passage of the statute challenged in NLC. He thus concluded that the existing tension between the Court's commerce and tax power doctrines was a sufficient
justification for invalidating an exercise of Congress's commerce power
on federalism grounds for the first time in four decades. Four of his colleagues agreed, joined an opinion that rejected Justice Brennan's paean
to the political safeguards thesis, and inaugurated the return of constitutional federalism.
This explanation does not deny that developments beyond the judicial process caused the return of constitutional federalism. In fact, I have
argued that such changes were the proximate cause of the decision in
NLC and the return of federalism to a central place in debates in the
courts and the law reviews. Mine is not a formalist or strictly "internalists" explanation.377 But I also believe this examination indicates that the
return of constitutional federalism cannot be explained without considering the specialized language of doctrinal analysis and conceptual structures of constitutional theory that Justices use to justify their decisions.
Most importantly, such approaches cannot explain why the return of constitutional federalism originated with Justices Black and Douglas, or why
the replacement of a Democratic appointee with a Republican appointee
almost prevented the return of constitutional
federalism. This is not a
378
fully "externalist" explanation, either.
It is instead an attempt to answer calls for an approach to legal
change that integrates internal aspects of the judicial process with external influences. 37 9 It argues that the decision in NLC-and the return of
constitutional federalism more broadly-are best explained by considering how developments outside the Court were filtered through the conceptual structures of legal analysis. Justice Powell and the other members
of the Court, in other words, did respond to political change. But they did
not respond the same way non-judicial political actors would have. They
did not evaluate the social and political implications of the case before
them, then measure those implications against their political preferences.
And they were more than pawns controlled by larger political move377.
G. Edward White, Constitutional Change and the New Deal: The Internalist/Externalist
Debate, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1094, 1095 (2005) (defining "internalists"' and "externalists' under-

standings of legal change).
378.
379.

See id.
See, e.g., id. at 1115; Paul Frymer, Law and American PoliticalDevelopment, 33 LAW &

SOC. INQUIRY 779, 793 (2008); Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: PostBehavioralistApproaches to JudicialPolitics,25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601,607 (2000).
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ments like the New Right. Rather, they responded to the changed political environment as judges-as individuals operating in an institutional
context and with a personal identity that made the language of doctrinal
analysis and constitutional theory important determinants of their decisions. They abandoned a posture of near-complete deference to Congress
on federalism issues because they concluded that the established legal
justification for that deference was unconvincing in light of the circumstances they saw around them.
This explanation for the return of constitutional federalism has most
in common with those offered by Keith Whittington and Edward Purcell,
but important differences remain, especially regarding the role of the
political safeguards thesis. Purcell has explored the causes of the return
of constitutional federalism in broad examinations that span nearly all of
the twentieth century.380 That work recognizes that structural changes in
American government played a role in the return of constitutional federalism 38 ' and identified associations between it and jurisprudential developments, including originalism and economic approaches to legal analysis. 3 2 He has also explicitly recognized that jurisprudential ideas or doctrinal structures could shape debates over constitutional federalism in
383
His analysis is thus more textured than a simple
some circumstances.
political explanation. But a central thrust of Purcell's work on the return
of constitutional federalism has been to emphasize the challenges of explaining those developments in purely legal terms and the central importance of judges' personal values. 384 That focus, together with the
broad scope of his work, have produced explanations for both NLC itself
and the return of constitutional federalism generally that strongly emphasize the role of political preferences. 38 5 Debates over the political safeguards thesis are largely a sideshow.386 Thus, despite the caveats he provided, I think it fair to characterize his approach as inconsistent with the
explanation I offer.
My primary difference with Whittington lies in our methods, which,
though they are in many ways complementary, nevertheless produce an
important disagreement over the role of the political safeguards thesis.
Whittington's goal, like mine, is to bridge the gap between internalist

380.

See PURCELL, supra note 14; Purcell, supra note 14.

381. See PURCELL, supra note 14, at 178-79, 179 n.95 (citing Whittington, supra note 104).
382. See id.
at 179-81, 183-84; Purcell, supra note 14, at 161.
383. See PURCELL, supra note 14, at 190.
384. Id.
at 8-9.
385. See Purcell, supra note 14, at 161-63. He characterized National League of Cities in
largely political terms: as an attempt by the Burger Court "to strike directly at the New Deal legacy
by reviving the Tenth Amendment." Id. at 163. "Although it employed the rhetoric of federalism,"
he continued, "the Burger Court seemed increasingly committed to a substantively conservative
political agenda, especially after the appointment of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in 1981." Id.at
162.
386.

See PURCELL, supranote 14, at 158-59.
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and externalist perspectives. 387 We also see similar causes driving the
return of constitutional federalism. We both emphasize the importance of
durable changes in American politics, society, and jurisprudence, 388 and
we identify many of the same changes: declining faith in federal expertise,3 rising faith in state governments, 39 and changes in racial politics. 391 But the broad scope of Whittington's analysis, which covers decades of changes in multiple doctrinal areas, limits his ability to show how
those external changes interacted with the internalist norms of the legal
process. Ultimately, his primary evidence that the political, social, and
intellectual changes he identified actually caused the return of constitutional federalism is the reasonable "common sense" relationship between
them. But without more direct evidence of the very interactions between
internal and external whose importance he is trying to show, his work
can be interpreted to indicate, as he recognizes, that the developments he
identified were important because they changed the political preferences
of judges who then simply instituted those preferences. 392 His investigation of the interaction between external and internal factors in federalism
doctrine is thus more suggestive than conclusive.
My focus on a single case, on the other hand, has allowed me to try
to trace the linkages between external changes and internalist structures.
Through a close examination of debates inside and outside of the Court, I
have tried to accomplish two things: (1) show that a specific set of
changes to American government and politics caused the return of constitutional federalism, and (2) explain why those changes in particularrather than many other changes in American politics and society that
occurred during the same time-were important. My conclusion is that
those changes mattered because they undermined the widely shared faith
in the political safeguards thesis, which had been the nearly universally
accepted justification for judicial deference on federalism issues. The
result, I argued, was the return of constitutional federalism. One thus
cannot explain the return of constitutional federalism without understanding the role played by the political safeguard thesis. In many ways,
that makes my approach and Whittington's complementary. While his
work indicates that many of the factors I identify had salience in the
1990s and beyond, my analysis indicates that some of the associations
Whittington identified were important causes of the return of constitutional federalism.

387.
See Whittington, supranote 25, at 484.
388.
Id. at 485; see Whittington, supra note 104, at 483-84.
389.
See Whittington, supranote 25, at 498; Whittington, supra note 104, at 515-16.
390.
Whittington, supra note 25, at 499, 502; Whittington, supra note 104, at 520-22.
391.
See Whittington, supranote 25, at 494.
392.
"It is possible that the Justices have considered such features of modem American life and
have developed a policy preference for devolution. They may act directly on that policy preference."
Whittington, supranote 25, at 500.
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But I do differ from Whittington-and others-in identifying the
political safeguards thesis as the jurisprudential structure most important
to the return of constitutional federalism. The concern of Whittington, as
well as Purcell and others, with current federalism doctrines, rather than
the return of the debate over constitutional federalism more broadly, led
them to see originalism and law and economics as the intellectual developments most important to the return of constitutional federalism. I find,
however, little evidence they played an important role in NLC. That indicates that while originalism and law and economics have shaped the contours of contemporary federalism doctrines in important ways, they did
not play a primary role in bringing the debate over federalism back to the
courts and the law reviews. Distinguishing of the causes most important
to the return of constitutional federalism from the causes most important
to the shape of contemporary federalism doctrines is, as I briefly discuss
below, of significant importance to contemporary debates over federalism. It suggests that a form of constitutional federalism quite different
from the one we have now-one neither based on law and economics
and originalism nor led by Justices associated with conservatism-could
have emerged, and still might.
CONCLUSION

This integrative approach I have described seems to me the best
way to explain the return of constitutional federalism in NLC, but I also
hope that this Article can help today's close observers of the federal system understand-and even improve-the contemporary debate over the
value of constitutional federalism. There are several ways it might contribute. Certainly, this explanation suggests that there is little reason to
expect the debate over constitutional federalism to end anytime soon.
Most of the factors that undermined faith in the political safeguards of
federalism in the 1960s and 1970s have only accelerated since then. 393 As
a result, even a brief perusal of the legal literature confirms what Justice
Breyer himself suggested in the oral arguments over the Affordable Care
Act: there is widespread but not universal doubt that the political safeguards of federalism provide a sufficient mechanism to limit federal
power. 394 This continued doubt may help explain the limits the Court
placed on the spending power in NFIB v. Sebelius,395 as well as the in393.
See, e.g., Kaden, supra note 265, at 867; Kramer, supra note 12, at 223-27; Saikrishna B.
Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-BasedFederalism Theories, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 1459, 1487 (2001).
394.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 75, Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S.
Ct. 1618 (2012) (No. 11-398) ("And, of course, the greatest limiting principle of all, which not too
many accept, so I'm not going to emphasize that, is the limiting principle derived from the fact that
members of Congress are elected from States and that 95 percent of the law of the United States is
State law. That is a principle though enforced by the legislature."); see, e.g., Prakash & Yoo, supra
note 393, at 1461; Kramer, supra note 12, at 234; Lee, supra note 74, at 333-40.
395.
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012); see Huberfeld, supra
note 9, at 46.
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creasing interest in the ways federalism can advance interests traditionally associated with the political left.
I also hope this explanation for the return of constitutional federalism can help produce a more robust normative debate over the value of
constitutional federalism by undermining the assumption that it will inevitably be a tool to advance conservative values. By arguing that the
return of constitutional federalism has been and remains a simple product
of conservative politics, the political explanations for the return of constitutional federalism subtly but powerfully suggest that constitutional
federalism is inherently conservative. That assumption in turn threatens
to impoverish contemporary debates over the proper role of constitutional federalism by discouraging ongoing efforts to identify ways that federalism could advance the interests typically associated with the political
left by scholars like Heather Gerken, Robert Schapiro, and others. 396 By
focusing on the importance of structural changes and developing jurisprudential norms, I hope this Article can remove the weight of the past
from that debate and encourage discussions about constitutional federalism that are further enriched by contributions from scholars concerned
with issues typically associated with the left.
Finally, I hope that this integrative approach to understanding doctrinal change provides a case study that can provide some guidance to
those seeking constitutional change of any kind. Taken to its extreme, the
intemalist perspective suggests that constitutional change is generated by
improved legal arguments, while the externalist perspective suggests that
improved legal argument is irrelevant. Politics, not legal argument, this
perspective suggests, is the path to constitutional change. The perspective offered here indicates that both politics and legal argument play a
role in generating constitutional change. It thus supports the insights of
scholars who have argued that meaningful changes in today's political
system are not likely to come from electoral mobilization alone. Instead,
with policy increasingly made in institutions like courts and bureaucracies that are governed by particular sets of professional norms and that
are relatively insulated from electoral politics, meaningful change in-

396.
See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 9 (2010); Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 DEMOCRACY 37, 37
(2012); Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, 3 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 33, 33 (2009); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91
IOWA L. REV. 243, 272 (2005); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessingthe Benefits of Dynamic Federalismin
EnvironmentalLaw, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 182 (2006). Lawrence Tribe and Frank Michelman began
exploring such possibilities in their critique and interpretation of National League of Cities itself.
Tribe, for example, argued that the decision could be read to support judicial protection of states in
order to ensure that those states provide constitutionally required minimum government services. See
Tribe, supranote 24, at 1075-76; Michelman, supra note 24, at 1173.
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creasingly requires electoral mobilization
in conjunction with new ideas,
397
new arguments, and new perspectives.
This Article examines the past, but I hope its most important effects
will be on the future. My primary goal is to provide a better explanation
for one of the most important developments in modem constitutional
law: the return of constitutional federalism. But I do so in hopes of freeing contemporary analysis from understandings of the past that are inaccurate and unhelpful. The past provides few clear answers. But understanding the past more accurately can clear the road to a better future.

397.
STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 3 (2008).

ALL THAT HEAVEN WILL ALLOW: A STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE COEXISTENCE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
AND GAY MATRIMONIAL BANS
DEIRDRE

M. BOWENt

ABSTRACT

This Article offers the first analysis to date of national data evaluating whether defense of marriage acts (mini or super-DOMAs) preserve
and stabilize the family. After finding that they do not-just as same-sex
marriage does not appear to destabilize families-the Article analyzes
what variables are, in fact, associated with family stability. Specifically,
those variables are: families below the poverty line; men and women
married three or more times; religiosity; percent conservative versus liberal in a state; disposable income; percent with a bachelor's degree; and
median age of first marriage. States that are more likely to have enacted a
DOMA are also more likely to have high divorce or never-married rates.
And in turn, these same states are more likely to include poor families, in
which people marry young, are highly religious, and are politically conservative.
Next, the Article applies the sociological concepts of moral entrepreneurism and moral panic, defined, respectively, as the practice of political groups labeling certain behavior as deviant, and the refraining of a
social phenomenon in moral terms to create an exaggerated sense of fear.
These concepts serve as the theoretical explanation for mini-DOMAs'
continued entrenchment, even in the face of the U.S. Supreme Court's
Windsor decision that struck down Section 3 of the federal DOMA. Finally, the Article offers pragmatic recommendations for achieving family
stability in light of mini-DOMAs' inability to succeed in this goal.

t Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. Many people deserve
thanks for their contributions to this Article: Professor Richard Delgado for his inspiration; Professors Jane Stover and Holning Lau for reading an earlier version of the Article. The Emerging Family
Law Scholars for their guidance at the incubator stage; my outstanding research assistants Sarah
Albertson, Stacie Naczelnik, Valerie Queseda, Peter Rudolf, and Carl Schremp; and my co-number
cruncher, Hayley A.B. Pippin.
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ALL THAT HEAVEN WILL ALLOW
INTRODUCTION

Gareth used to prefer funerals to weddings. He said it was easier to
get enthusiastic about a ceremony one had an outside chance of
eventually being involved in.
-Four Weddings and a Funeral

1

The evolving definition of marriage terrifies a lot of people.2 Yet,
for centuries, its meaning has constantly evolved. 3 Broadening the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples is just the latest iteration.
Within the past year,4 the United States Supreme Court struck down Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act5 (DOMA), thus allowing
legally married same-sex couples to receive all the same benefits as
straight couples.6 Specifically at issue in Section 3 was an overarching
federal definition of marriage as a "legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." 7
The case rose on appeal from the Second Circuit, which determined
that the statute contained an unconstitutional provision. 8 The Court of
Appeals applied an equal protection analysis, defining gays and lesbians

1. FOUR WEDDINGS AND A FUNERAL (PolyGram Filmed Entertainment 1994).
2.
For a recent example, one needs to look no further than the violent response to the passage
of a same-sex marriage law in France. Mark Memmott, Violent Protests in ParisAfter Same-Sex
Marriage Law Passes, TWO-WAY: BREAKING NEWS FROM NPR (Apr. 24, 2013, 8:04 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/04/24/178765718/violent-protests-in-paris-after-samesex-marriage-law-passes.
3.
See generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: How LOVE CONQUERED
MARRIAGE 5-9 (2006) (arguing that love as the motivation for marriage actually weakened the
institution).
4.
The research for this Article is current as of February 5, 2014.
5. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at I
U.S.C. § 7 (2012)), invalidatedby United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
6.
Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2683-84, 2696. However, at the time of this analysis, it is unclear
which benefits from the over 1000 federal laws DOMA affected are transportable across state lines
into states that do not recognize same-sex marriage. President Obama's administration is currently
working to clarify these laws. Jeremy W. Peters, FederalCourt Speaks, but Couples Still Face State
Legal Patchwork, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2013, at A22.
7.
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidatedby United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
8.
On December 7, 2012, the United States Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of
certiorari for the Second Circuit cases combined under Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d
Cir. 2012), cert.granted, 133 S.Ct. 786 (2012). In addition, the Court heard California's Proposition
8 case, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacatedsub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013). However, before the Supreme Court decided Windsor and Hollingsworth,
the First Circuit ruled that DOMA was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Massachusetts v.
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 10-11, 13, 15 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013). Prior to this ruling, other U.S. district courts had ruled
on the constitutionality of DOMA. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294,
347 (D. Conn. 2012). The trial court in Windsor granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The trial court declined to hold that the plaintiffs deserved heightened scrutiny as a suspect
class, but did hold that DOMA's articulated goals do not pass even the most deferential rational
basis review. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 401-02, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding
a state's interests behind DOMA not based in reality and thus plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted), aff'd, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), afftd, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
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as a quasi-suspect class, to determine that the Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Group (BLAG) could offer no legitimate reason for DOMA's enactment. 9 The Supreme Court declined to speak to equal protection, but
instead applied a federalism and an animus analysis.'0 It concluded that
the motivations behind the enactment of DOMA were hostile to a politically unpopular group." Ultimately, the Court held that by injuring
same-sex married couples, Section 3 of DOMA violated the Fifth
Amendment.12 Justice Scalia's scathing and colorful dissent3 proclaimed
that such an analysis invites a challenge to all state DOMAs.
Yet, like the supporters of the federal DOMA, supporters of state
DOMAs consistently assert that a DOMA is needed to "protect" our society-to strengthen and protect traditional marriage, the cornerstone of
civilization.14 In other words, banning same-sex marriage protects traditional marriage.
Does DOMA really protect the institution of marriage? This Article
offers an empirical investigation of that question and concludes that
15
DOMAs provide no measurable benefit to the protection of families.
This conclusion raises the question whether a state DOMA could even
pass a "rational basis plus" standard, 16 much less the animus standard,
9.
Windsor, 699 F.3d at 176, 185.
10. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. Animus herein refers to a legislative objective, but the
"desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify disparate treatment of that group." Id.
(quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
11.
See id.
12.
Id.
at 2696.
13.
See id at 2709-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on a case
that challenged the constitutionality of California's state DOMA amendment. However, the Court
declined to hear the case and remanded it back to the Ninth Circuit for dismissal because the petitioners did not have standing. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659. Mini-DOMA refers to those statutes that states enacted mirroring the federal DOMA statute. Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriagesand Civil Unions: A Handbookfor Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143,
2165-94 (2005).
14. See, e.g., Bishops' Committee for Defense of MarriageDisappointedover DOMA Ruling,
U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS (June 1, 2012), available at http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/12096.cfm (quoting Bishop Cordileone, who declared, "The federal appeals court in Boston did a grave
injustice yesterday by striking down that part of the Defense of Marriage Act that reasonably recognizes the reality that marriage is the union of one man and one woman. DOMA is part of our nation's long-established body of law rooted in the true meaning of marriage. Hopefully, this unjust
ruling will be overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, for the benefit of our nation's children, and our
nation as a whole." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Karla Dial, 1st Circuit Declares Part of
Federal
Marriage
Law
Unconstitutional, CITIZENLINK
(May
3 I,
2012),
http://www.citizenlink.com/2012/05/31/I st-circuit-declares-part-of-federal-marriage-lawunconstitutional/ (quoting Alliance Defense Fund Legal Counsel Dale Schowengerdt, who said,
"Society should protect and strengthen marriage, not undermine it. The federal Defense of Marriage
Act provides that type of protection, and we trust the U.S. Supreme Court will reverse the 1st Circuit's erroneous decision." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
15.
1 use the phrases "at-risk families" and "families-in-crisis" interchangeably to refer to the
rhetoric employed around the weakening family structure-i.e, family formation without marriage or
family cycles that include divorce and perhaps remarriage and perhaps divorce again.
16. "Rational basis plus" loosely refers to a fourth standard of review for laws challenged on
equal protection or due process grounds. Rather than offering the traditional deference to the state's
argument that that the alleged discrimination in the law serves a governmental interest, the courts
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that at least one federal district court has applied. 17 And, if future DOMA
challengers adopt "animus" as a legal theory, this Article offers support
for the notion that some level of hostility towards gay and lesbian couples may have inspired at least some of the enactors of state DOMAs.
Most importantly, the "DOMA as protectorate" discourse serves
certain constituencies' interests quite effectively. 8 The reason why is
fully explored in this Article because, in light of the Windsor decision,
the discourse will remain a vibrant part of the same-sex marriage debate
for some time to come.
Next, the Article examines another question: If DOMA is so clearly
not associated with strengthening family (and marriage)-yet poverty,
education, and economic opportunities clearly are-why, then, does
DOMA carry the political and legal traction that it does? Understanding
this analysis is crucial in the face of the Court's decision and analysis.
The federal DOMA is no longer applicable in states permitting same-sex
marriage, yet the progeny of the federal DOMA are thriving in thirty-two
states. 19 The broadening definition of marriage and the evolution of family will remain in the forefront of our national, legal, political, and cultural consciousness. Thus, understanding how and why state DOMAs candemand a more searching explanation of the government interest. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 631-35 (1996).
17.
Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 334-35 (D. Conn. 2012). In
addition, the First Circuit court engaged in a novel analytical approach to determine that a demonstrated connection was missing between DOMA's treatment of same-sex couples and its goal of
strengthening the bonds and benefits of marriage. The First Circuit rejected the heightened-scrutiny
standard in favor of what it coined a "more careful assessment" than that offered by "conventional
rational basis review." Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 11 (1 st
Cir. 2012). Indeed, only certain types of rationales with a certain level of "force" are acceptable
under this "rational basis plus" standard of review. Id.at 8. However, applying the "rational basis
plus" standard of review, the First Circuit decided that DOMA's articulated goal was unacceptable.
Id.at 15.
18.
1 posit that those who possess socio-economic political power benefit from focusing
attention on DOMA as the key method of saving families in crisis. The discourse distracts from the
stark reality that the lack of investment in the resources needed for these families contradicts with
the concentration of wealth that the political elite have always enjoyed. Moreover, it distracts from
the divestiture in social structures that would support not only families subsisting on the margins but
also the dissipating lower middle class who used to make up the "settled working class." See JOAN
C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER 155-56,

165 (2010).
This Article explores why, in spite of empirical evidence to the contrary, DOMA holds
such an attraction to the very families who would most benefit from a radical shift in family policy
rather than the empty shell of legislation written in the name of protecting families. See, e.g., Press
Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Seattle, City FormallyJoins Effort to Challenge Constitutionality of Federal "Defense of Marriage Act" (July 10, 2012), available at
http://mayormcginn.seattle.gov/city-joins-effort-to-challenge-federal-defense-of-marriage-act/
("More fundamentally, we are joining large and small, public and private entities across the country
that recognize that DOMA serves no good purpose it just forces employers to treat valued employees unfairly, by denying them equality in important family resources such as COBRA, Social Security benefits and pensions." (quoting City Attorney Pete Holmes) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
19.
See generally State-Level Marriage Equality, MARRIAGE EQUALITY USA (Jan. 6, 2014),
http://www.marriageequality.org/sites/defaut/files/National %2OMap%20 %2320 %20 %2806-Jan2014%29.pdf (providing a map showing states still unwilling to fully accept marriage equality).
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not offer a salve to the notion of the family "in crisis" is a focal point of
the Article. In addition, the Article offers some novel recommendations
for moving beyond the distraction that DOMAs appear to create, to allow
for family stability regardless of whether or not states permit same-sex
marriage.
When Congress passed DOMA, one of four reasons advanced for
DOMA's necessity was to defend and nurture the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage. 20 Indeed, the congressional report stated:
Certainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and
necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth,
fit to take rank as one of the co-ordinate States of the Union, than that
which seeks to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as
consisting in and springingfrom the union for life of one man and
one woman in the holy state of matrimony; the sure foundation of all
that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that
reverent morality which is the source
of all beneficent progress in so2
cial and political improvement. 1

Congress went on to preempt the argument that the institution of marriage was already under attack by divorce when it proclaimed that samesex marriage was an inherently flawed social experiment. 22 To permit the
practice would further devalue an institution already reeling from nofault divorce, the sexual revolution, and out-of-wedlock births. 23 Ultimately, Congress asserted in this report that the time had come
to "re' 24
build a family culture based on enduring marital relationships.
And certainly, one of the key rationales that BLAG offered in
Windsor to support DOMA emphasizes this idea of rebuilding the family
20.
H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 12 (1996).
21.
Id.
(emphasis added) (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885)).
22. Id.
at 15; see also David J. Herzig, DOMA and Diffusion Theory: Ending Animus Legislation Through a Rational Basis Approach, 44 AKRON L. REV. 621, 656 n.244 (2011). "[N]o society
that has lived through the transition to homosexuality and the perversion which it lives and what it
brought forth." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 142 CONG. REC. H7444 (daily ed. July 1I,1996)
(statement of Rep. Tom Coburn)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The very foundations of our
society are in danger of being burned. The flames of hedonism, the flames of narcissism, the flames
of self-centered morality are licking at the very foundations of our society .. " Id. (omission in
original) (quoting 142 CONG. REC. H7482 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bob Barr))
(internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Brief for Attorney General, Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint and in Support of Commonwealth's
Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 698 F.
Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv- II156-JLT), 2010 WL 581804 ("Members of Congress
repeatedly condemned homosexuality in the floor debates surrounding DOMA's passage, calling
[the practice] 'immoral,' 'based on perversion,' [(quoting 142 CONG. REC. H7444 (daily ed. July II,
1996) (statement of Rep. Coburn))] 'unnatural,' [(quoting 142 CONG. REC. H7494 (daily ed. July 12,
1996) (statement of Rep. Smith))] 'depraved,' and 'an attack upon God's principles.' [(quoting 142
CONG. REC. H7486 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Buyer))]").
23.
H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 15 (1996).
24. Id; see also 142 CONG. REC. 22334 (Sept. 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms)
(arguing that DOMA "will safeguard the sacred institutions of marriage and the family from those
who seek to destroy them and who are willing to tear apart America's moral fabric in the process").

2014]

ALL THATHEAVEN WILL ALLOW

using the institution of traditional marriage.25 During oral arguments, the
topic of whether children are best raised in a stable heterosexual marriage was front and center for Justice Kennedy, the swing vote, and the
author of the opinion.26 And, frustrated with the intractable cultural and
philosophical problem, the Court noted that the Perry v. Schwarzenegger
district court found that "[p]ermitting same-sex couples to marry will not
affect the number of opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit,
have children outside of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex marriages. ,,27 But, what the Court ultimately considered,
among other things, is the idea that a diversity of governance requires the
federal government to respect states' choices regarding marriage28
including the choice to allow same-sex marriage.
The Supreme Court has in the last fifty years demanded "closer
scrutiny of government action touching upon minority group interests
and of federal action in areas of traditional state concern., 29 And indeed,
the Court's language in the Windsor opinion makes quite clear that while
it offers considerably broad deference to the states to define marriage as
they see fit, each state's motivation behind the definition may not necessarily be beyond constitutional reproach.3 ° In signaling so, the Court has
fueled the debate about mini-DOMAs' actual ability to preserve family
stability and marriage for the foreseeable future.3 1
The Supreme Court DOMA ruling has substantial historical and social significance. 32 As observed above, the federal DOMA's demise offers less immediate relief for those gay and lesbian families who wish to
wed, but who reside in states with statutes or constitutional amendments
barring same-sex marriage. Many of those states' mini-DOMAs currently remain intact. 33 Given that twenty-nine states have statutes barring
25.
See Reply Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the
United States House of Representatives at 12-15, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307).
26. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 93, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307).
27.
Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2718 n.7 (citing Perry v.Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp. 2d 921,
972 (N.D. Cal, 2010), finding of fact
number 55). See also Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2012) ("DOMA does not ...explain how denying benefits to
same-sex couples will reinforce heterosexual marriage.").
28.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691.
29.
U.S. Dep "t
of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d at 16.
30.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
31.
Recall, mini-DOMAs are state versions of the federal DOMA. See supra note 13.
32. See Daniel Fisher, DOMA Is Dead. So Where Does That Leave Gay Couples?, FORBES
(Mar. 28, 2013, 11:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/03/28/doma-is-dead-sowhere-does-that-leave-gay-couples/.
33.
William Saletan, Gay Bells in Bondage: Most Americans Now Support Gay Marriage.But
They Can't Legalize It, Thanks to the Voters of 2004, SLATE (June 28, 2011, 8:58 AM),

http://www.slate.com/articles/news andpolitics/framegame/2011/06/gaybells in bondage.html.
But see Anna Staver, Same-Sex MarriageAmendment in Ohio Gets Green Light, HUFFINGTON POST

(Apr. 3, 2012, 6:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/03/same-sex-marriageamendment-ohio n_1400714.html?ncid=edlinkusaolpOO000009 (explaining that Ohio may vote to
overturn its 2004 Constitutional Amendment banning same-sex marriage).
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same-sex marriage and twenty-nine states have constitutional amendments that prohibit the practice, 34 it is a worthy exercise to explore
whether these states have reaped
the benefits that they hoped to achieve
35
by enacting mini-DOMAs.
The empirical analysis reveals two conclusions. First, states that enacted a mini-DOMA did so for virtually the same reasons as the federal
government. Second, mini-DOMAs do not appear to be achieving their
articulated goals. Moreover, it appears that states that possess DOMA
statutes or constitutional amendments also espouse greater rates of religiosity, experience larger rates of poverty, divorce, and out-of-wedlock
births, in addition to experiencing lower educational rates and marriage
36
rates.
Thus, this Article discusses three issues: first, the methodology and
results of the empirical research; second, a theory as to why the articulated mini-DOMA goals of family stability may persist despite the miniDOMAs' inability to meet those goals; and third, recommendations on
how we, as a country of states, can coexist with an evolving definition of
marriage and family, while developing and executing
an effective policy
37
that supports all of these conceptions of family.
I. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

Soon after DOMA went into effect, states began enacting miniDOMAs,3 8 either by statute or state constitutional amendment, and sometimes both. 39 However, not all states adopted their own version of
34. See infra note 39. A notable example, Hawaii's Constitution's Second Amendment did
not ban same-sex marriage. Rather, it gave the legislature the authority to define marriage as it sees
fit. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 1998) (permitting the Hawaii Legislature to authorize
same-sex marriage by passing the Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013, S.B. 1, 27th Leg., 2d Spec.
Sess. (Haw. 2013)). Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013, § 572-x (2013).
35.
The First Circuit opinion did not address Section 2 of DOMA, which frees states that ban
same-sex marriage from having to recognize same-sex marriages performed in states that do license
homosexual matrimony. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 6 (1st
Cir. 2012).
36. This empirical analysis is discussed in detail infra Part .C D.
37.
1do not review the history and background of DOMA, which have been explored in depth
elsewhere. See generally Julia Halloran McLaughlin, DOMA and the Constitutional Coming out of
Same-Sex Marriage, 24 Wis. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 145, 146-54 (2009); Barbara A. Robb, The
Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act in the Wake ofRomer v. Evans, 32 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 263,286-93 (1997); Scott Titshaw, A Modest Proposal to Deport the Children of Gay Citizens,
& Etc.: Immigration Law, the Defense of Marriage Act and the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 25
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 446-73 (2011).

38. Mini-DOMAs preserve the word "marriage" to one man and one woman, "but not necessarily the attributes of civil marriage," while super-DOMAs restrict terminology and deny all forms
of relationship recognition, i.e. civil unions, domestic partnerships, and reciprocal benefits, to samesex couples. Daniel R. Pinello, Location, Location, Location: Same-Sex Relationship Rights by State,
LAW TRENDS & NEWS: PRAC. AREA NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass'n), Fall 2009, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/law-trends_news-Practice area e newsletter h
ome/blfeat5.html.
39. At the time of this analysis, thirty-three states have mini-DOMA legislation through their
constitution or statutory law; many states overlap and have both statutory and constitutional miniDOMAs. See State-Level MarriageEquality,supra note 19.

2014]

ALL THAT HEAVEN WILL ALLOW

At the time of this study, twenty-nine states have constitutional mini-DOMAs. See ALA.
CONST. art. 1, § 36.03 (ratified 2012); ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25 (approved 1998); ARIZ. CONST.
art. XXX, § I (approved 2008); ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § I (approved 2004); COLO. CONST. art. 11,
§ 31 (added 2006); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (added 2008); GA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (ratified 2004);
IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28 (added and ratified 2006); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16 (added 2005); KY.
CONST. § 233a (adopted 2004); LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (added 2004); MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25
(ratified 2004), held unconstitutionalby DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 12-CV-10285, 2014 WL 1100794
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014); MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263A (added 2004); MO. CONST. art. 1, § 33
(adopted 2004); MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7 (approved 2004); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (adopted
2000); NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (added 2002) (proposed legislation to amend enrolled (S.J.R. 13,
77th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013))); N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6 (approved 2012); N.D. CONST. art. XI, §
28 (approved 2004); OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (adopted 2004); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35 (adopted 2004); OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a (added 2004); S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15 (effective 2007); S.D.
CONST. art. XXI, § 9 (approved 2006); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18 (approved 2006); TEX. CONST.

art. I, § 32 (adopted 2005), held unconstitutionalby De Leon v. Perry, No. SA-13-CA-00982-OLG,
2014 WL 715741 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014) (proposed legislation to repeal introduced (H.J.R. 11,
83rd Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2013))); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (adopted 2004), held unconstitutional
by Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013); VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (effective
2007), held unconstitutionalby Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13cv395, 2014 WL 561978 (E.D. Va. Feb.
13, 2014); WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13 (created 2007) (proposed legislation to repeal introduced
(S.J.R. 74, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014))). Four of those states currently afford partial marriage
rights to same-sex couples: Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, and Wisconsin. See State-Level Marriage
Equality, supranote 19.
At the time of this analysis, twenty-nine states have statutory mini-DOMAs. See ALA.
CODE § 30-1-19 (2013) (effective 1998); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.05.011, 25.05.013 (2013) (effective
1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-101, 25-112 (2013) (effective 1996) (proposed legislation to
amend introduced (S.B. 1165, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz 2013))); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109
(2013) (effective 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2013) (amended 2000); FLA. STAT. §
741.212 (2013) (effective 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2013) (effective 1996); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 32-201 (2013) (effective 1996); IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (2013) (added 1997); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 23-2501 (2013) (effective 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402.005, 402.020, 402.040,
402.045 (West 2013) (effective 1998); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (2013) (amended 1999); MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 551.271, 551.272 (2013) (effective 1996) (proposed legislation to amend introduced (H.B. 4909, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2013))); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (2013) (approved 1997); MO. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (2013) (amended 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401
(2013) (amended 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2013) (effective 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 1403-01, 14-03-08 (2013) (effective 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(A) (West 2013) (effective 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3.1 (2013) (effective 1997); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1704 (2013)
(effective 1996) (proposed legislation to amend introduced (H.B. 1686, 197th Gen. Assemb. (Pa.
2013-2014))); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-10 (2013) (effective 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-1-1,
25-1-38 (2013) (effective 1996 and 2000, respectively); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2013) (effective 1996); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.001, 6.204 (2013) (effective 1997 and 2003, respectively)
(proposed legislation to repeal introduced (H.B. 20, 83rd Leg., 2d Sess. (Tex. 2013))); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 30-1-2, 30-1-4.1 (West 2013) (effective 1999 and 2004, respectively); VA. CODE ANN. 99
20-45.2, 20-45.3 (2013) (effective 1997 and 2004, respectively); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-603 (2013)
(effective 2001); WIS. STAT. §§ 765.001(2), 765.01 (2013) (effective 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 201-101 (2013) (effective 1977) (proposed legislation redefining marriage introduced (H.B. 169, 62d
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013))). Despite their statutory mini-DOMAs, Colorado and Wisconsion
afford partial marriage rights to same-sex couples. See State-Level Marriage Equality,supra note 19.
Recently, in Kitchen v. Herbert, Utah's constitutional and statutory mini-DOMAs were
held unconstitutional. 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013). However, the United States Supreme
Court granted a stay on the recognition of same-sex marriages in the state. Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S.
Ct. 893 (mem.) (2014).
In November 2012, mini-DOMAs in Maine, Maryland, and Washington were usurped by
popular referenda legalizing same-sex marriage. See generally A Festive Mood in Maine as SameSex MarriageBecomes Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2012, at A20; Ashley Fantz, Washington Voters
Pass Same-Sex Marriage, CNN Projects, CNN POLITICS (Nov. 9, 2012, 15:21 EST),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/09/us/washington-passes-same-sex-marriage/index.html;
Associated,
Press, Many Weddings as Gay Marriage Becomes Legal in Md., USA TODAY (Jan. 1, 2013, 17:41
EST),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/01/same-sex-marriagemaryland/1801917/.
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DOMA, i.e. a mini- or super-DOMA, 40 and in the wake of the federal
legislation, some states chose to find some parallel version of marriage in
the form of civil unions4 or domestic partnerships instead.42 Furthermore, a select few states, initially through court action, later by voter
referenda, came to permit same-sex marriage or at least recognize samesex marriages performed in other states even though, at one time, the
state may have enacted a mini-DOMA.43 Thus, differing state reactions

Prior to November 2012's vote, Maine, Maryland, and Washington had the following
statutory DOMAs in place: ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 701(5) (1997) (repealed 2012); MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (West 1984) (repealed 2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (1998)
(repealed 2012). But see S.B. 241, 430th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012) (Civil Marriage
Protection Act defines marriage as between "two individuals," rather than between "a man and a
woman" as previously stated, effective Oct. 1, 2012).
40.
For example, Colorado recognizes civil unions between same-sex partners. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-15-102 (West 2013). To date, the following states have not enacted mini-DOMA
legislation: Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and the District of Colombia.
41.
Up through 2013, only two states, New Mexico and Rhode Island, recognized out-of-state
same-sex marriages. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-4 (West 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-8 (2013).
42.
Nevada and Oregon provide the equivalent of state-level spousal rights to same-sex couples in the form of domestic partnerships. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 122A.100, 122A.200 (West
2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.305 (West 2013). Washington voters approved same-sex marriage, but the state legislature recognized that marriage may still be impracticable for some couples.
http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/pdf/FLHBDomesticPartnershipEdition.pdf In response,
Washington continues to recognize domestic partnerships. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.010 (2013)
(effective until June 30, 2014) (to be replaced by Referendum Measure No. 74, approved Nov. 6,
2012)). Wisconsin provides limited spousal rights to same-sex couples in the form of domestic
partnerships. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 770.05 (West 2013); Maureen McCollum, State Supreme Court to
Hear Challenge to Domestic Partnership Law, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 21, 2013, 12:05 PM),
http://news.wpr.org/post/wi-supreme-court-hear-challenge-domestic-partnership-law (listing some of
the limited benefits granted to domestic partnerships including "hospital visitation rights, inheritance
access, and family medical leave").
43.
At the time of this analysis, the following states and jurisdictions issue marriage licenses
(or an equivalent status) to same-sex couples: California, see Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013) (holding that the appellants, opponents of same-sex marriage, did not have standing to challenge the ruling that Proposition 8 violated the California Constitution)); Connecticut, see Kerrigan
v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that laws restricting civil marriage
to heterosexual couples violated same-sex couples' state constitutional equal protection rights);
Delaware, Civil Marriage Equality and Religious Freedom Act of 2013, Del. H.B. 75 (2013) (enacted); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 46-401 (2010); Hawaii, S.B. 1, 27th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess.
(Haw. 2013) (effective Dec. 2, 2013); Illinois, S.B. 10, 98th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013)
(effective June 14, 2014); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 701 (2013); Maryland, Civil Marriage
Protection Act, H.B. 438, 430th Sess, (Md. 2012); Massachusetts, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (ruling that allowing only heterosexual couples to marry is
unconstitutional); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (2013) (effective Aug. 1, 2013); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2013) (effective Jan. 1, 2010); New Jersey, Garden State
Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036 (N.J. 2013); New Mexico, Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013)
(affirming marriage equality in the state, which had never expressly prohibited or allowed same-sex
marriage); New York, N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2013) (effective July 24, 2011);
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-1 (2013) (effective Aug. I, 2013); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 8 (2013-14) (amended 2009); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.10 (2013) (approved
2012).
In response to stagnant legislatures, voters began turning to referenda legalizing same-sex
marriage. State referenda passed by narrow margins on the November 2012 ballot in Maine (51.5%
approve Question 1), Maryland (52.4% approve Question 6), and Washington (53.7% approve
Referendum
74).
Marriage
and
Family
on
the
Ballot,
BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Marriage and family on the ballot (last modified Mar. 25,
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to the conundrum of how to respond to same-sex marriage allows for a
statistical analysis of how a state's mini-DOMA legislation may have
affected the culture of marriage and divorce in the United States. 44 The
analysis is rather simple. Changes in marriage and divorce trends as well
as marriage rates and divorce rates are compared before and after an enactment of a mini- or super-DOMA, and changes in marriage and divorce
trends and rates are compared between states that enacted DOMAs and
those that permit same-sex marriage. But before arriving at that analysis,
it is important to identify whether DOMA states employed the same reasoning as Congress did when it enacted the federal DOMA.
A. Context Analysis
The first question that the research addresses is what reasons did
states pronounce as the basis for the need to enact a mini-DOMA through
statute or constitutional amendment? To answer this query, I analyzed
each state's legislative history, statutory language, and media content,
looking for themes surrounding the passage of mini-DOMA legislation.4 5
I also examined variations based on date of enactment, geographical location, and whether a state passed a statute (a mini-DOMA) followed by
a constitutional amendment (a super-DOMA). 4 6 I then compared the results with the reasons articulated in Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of

44.
The theory behind the analysis is that while federal legislation may have some effect on a
state's cultural consciousness, a state's decision to enact a mini-DOMA would play a greater role in
expressing the cultural values and desires of that state's collective conscience and perhaps influence
marital behavior. Likewise, a state's close proximity to other states that have taken action may
influence state behavior. Some states respond in kind to a neighboring state, or one in close proximity. For example, Massachusetts's neighboring states-Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and
New York-followed suit in permitting same-sex marriage. Maine initially attempted to follow suit,
but a referendum quickly overturned the legislation. See An Act to End Discrimination in Civil
Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, L.D. 1020, 124th Me. St. Leg. (2009); Department of the
Sec'y of State, State of Me., November 3, 2009 General Election Tabulations, ME. BUREAU CORPS.,
ELECTIONS & COMMISSIONS, http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2009/referendumbycounty.html

(last visited Apr. 12, 2014). Three years later, Maine voters approved same-sex marriage by approving Question 1. An Act to Allow Marriage Licenses for Same-Sex Couples and Protect Religious
Freedom, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 650 et seq. New Hampshire debated overturning its licensing
of same-sex marriage. H.B. 437, 162d Sess. (2011). That bill was voted down 211-116 on March 21,
2012. Michael K. Lavers, N.H. Lawmakers Reject Marriage Equality Repeal Bill, EDGE BOSTON,
MASSACHUSE-17S
(Mar.
21,
2012),

http://www.edgeboston.com/news/national/news/131180/nh-lawmakers reject marriage equalityr
epeal bill.
On the other hand, soon after Washington, D.C., permitted same-sex marriage, Maryland
followed suit by recognizing out-of-jurisdiction marriages. Mark Morgan, Editorial, Maryland's
Attorney General Strikes a Blow Against Discrimination with Opinion that Same-Sex Marriages

Legal Elsewhere Should Be Recognized, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 25, 2010, at 12A. Two years later,
Maryland would allow same-sex marriage with the Civil Marriage Act of 2012, but within months a
ballot referendum was certified for November to overturn the legislation. George P. Matysek, Jr.,
Leaders Pledge to Overturn Same-Sex Marriage, CATH. REV. (Feb. 23, 2012), available at
http://www.catholicreview.org/article/news/local-news/leaders-pledge-to-overtum-same-sexmarriage.
45.

See generally KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS

METHODOLOGY (2d ed. 2004); infra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
46.
See Pinello, supra note 38.
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Health and Human Services explaining the federal DOMA. 47 Specifically, the court observed that "[T]he Committee briefly discusses four of the
governmental interests advanced by this legislation: (1) defending and
nurturing the institution of traditional, heterosexual marriage; (2) defending traditional notions of morality; (3) protecting state sovereignty and
democratic self-governance; and (4) preserving scarce government re' 48
sources.
Three key themes emerge from the content analysis regarding motivations for a state's DOMA passage. The first is that the long-held traditions and definition of marriage need protection to thrive.4 9 The second is
that children need to be protected and/or raised in an optimal environment. 50 The third is that "activist"' 5' or "new age, 52 or "liberal ' 53 judges
47.
682 F.3d 1,9-15 (lst Cir. 2012).
48.
Id. at 14 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 12 (1996)).
49.
Many proponents fall back on this premise: loosening the definition of marriage will
cause the collapse of society. For example, Scott Moody, an economist, believes that "the devaluation of marriage through same-sex marriage will eventually ensure a population in New Hampshire
where the shrinking, younger generation will no longer be able to support the state's economy."
Amanda Beland, Foster's Editorial Board: Economist Says Gay Marriage Undermines State's
Fiscal Stability,
FOSTER'S
DAILY
DEMOCRAT,
Jan.
18,
2012,
available at
http://www.fosters.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20120118/GJNEWS 01/701189932. But empirical research to date on the effects of same-sex marriage suggests otherwise. See, e.g., M.V. LEE
BADGET', WHEN GAY PEOPLE GET MARRIED: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN SOCIETIES LEGALIZE SAMESEX MARRIAGE 202-06 (2009) (concluding, post-statistical analysis, that not much changes in heterosexual marriage and divorce behavior in societies that recognize same-sex marriage, and in fact,
attitudes about the irrelevancy of marriage have little to do with legalization of same-sex marriage).
The Williams Institute's research on the economic effects of permitting same-sex unions suggests an
economic boon to those states' economies. For example, Iowa added over half a million dollars in
additional tax revenue with the legalization of same-sex marriage in 2009. The Williams Inst., Extending
Marriage
Rights
to
SameSex Couples in Iowa Boosted the State and Local Economy by $12 Million, UCLA SCH. L. (Dec. 7,
2011), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/press-releases/marriage-rights-samesex-couples-iowa-boosted-economy/. While some "suggest[] we learn from history, saying every
single society who has weakened marriage or even eased divorce all came crumbling down," ConstitutionalAmendment Re Marriage:Comm. Minutes on SJR 42 Before the S. Judiciary, 1997-98 Leg.
(Alaska Mar. 9, 1998) (statement of Tom Gordy, Chairman, Christian Coalition) [hereinafter
Gordy],
available
at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get-single-minute.asp?session=20&begline=O I39&end line=07
52&time=1335&date=19980309&comm=JUD&house=S, the research suggests that economic and
social policies are associated with the long term weakening of the family, not the introduction of
same-sex marriage. See, e.g., June Carbone, What Does Bristol Palin Have to Do with Same-Sex
Marriage?,45 U.S.F. L. REV. 313, 317 (2010) (arguing that research demonstrates family instability
can be attributed to lack of economic opportunities, particularly based on social class); Holning Lau,
Would a ConstitutionalAmendment Protect and Promote Marriage in North Carolina?An Analysis
of Data from 2000 to 2009, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV. DE Novo 173, 186 (2012) (arguing that marriage amendments appear to have no effect on increasing marriage rates or decreasing divorces rates;
conversely, allowing same-sex marriage does not increase divorce rates nor decrease marriage rates).
50.
A rich literature addresses this theme. Remarkably, most of the articles used to demonstrate the allegedly damaging effects of same-sex parenting do not contain new empirical data, but
rather are summaries of the flaws of articles that suggest same-sex parenting does not harm children.
See generally MAGGIE GALLAGHER & JOSHUA K. BAKER, INST. FOR MARRIAGE AND PUB. POLICY,
DO MOTHERS AND FATHERS MATTER? THE SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE ON MARRIAGE AND CHILD
WELL-BEING,
IMAPP
POLICY
BRIEF
(Feb.
27,
2004),
available
at
http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/MothersFathersMatter.pdf (arguing that while same-sex parentage studies are scant, overwhelming evidence exists that children raised in a "natural" family made
up of opposite-sex biological parents fare far better than any other family form); ROBERT LERNER &
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ALTHEA K. NAGAI, MARRIAGE LAW PROJECT, No BASIS: WHAT THE STUDIES DON'T TELL Us

ABOUT SAME-SEX PARENTING 3-10 (Jan. 2001), available at http://protectmarriage.com/wp-

content/uploads/2012/11 /nobasis.pdf (finding the research is too flawed to draw meaningful conclusions); MARK MATOUSEK, THE BOY HE LEFT BEHIND: A MAN'S SEARCH FOR HIS LOST FATHER 24-

25 (2000) (used as support for the assertion that male children harmed when raised by lesbians);
KRISTIN ANDERSON MOORE ET AL., CHILD TRENDS, MARRIAGE FROM A CHILD'S PERSPECTIVE:

How DOES FAMILY STRUCTURE AFFECT CHILDREN, AND WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT? (June

2002), available at http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/MarriageRB602.pdf
(summarizing data and concluding two-parent biological households are best); MARY PARKE, CTR.
FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, ARE MARRIED PARENTS REALLY BE'ITER FOR CHILDREN? WHAT
RESEARCH SAYS ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY STRUCTURE ON CHILD WELL-BEING (May 2003),

available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publicationsstates/files/0086.pdf, DAVID POPENOE,
LIFE WITHOUT FATHER: COMPELLING NEW EVIDENCE THAT FATHERHOOD AND MARRIAGE ARE
INDISPENSABLE FOR THE GOOD OF CHILDREN AND SOCIETY 52-78 (1996) (children are harmed
when not raised in a household with one father and one mother); GLENN T. STANTON, FOCUS ON THE
FAMILY, ARE THE KIDS REALLY ALL RIGHT? WHAT RESEARCH REALLY SAYS ABOUT PARENTS

CHILDREN NEED (June 2010), available at http://www.focusonthefamily.com/about us/focusfindings/parenting/are-the-kids-really-all-right.aspx (arguing that studies concluding that same-sex
parenting does not harm children are flawed). Diane Sawyer interviewed Rosie O'Donnell, who was
crusading to legalize homosexual adoption in Florida in 2002. During the interview, O'Donnell
"admitted that her adopted son, Parker, who was being raised by Rosie and her female partner, had
expressed a desire for a dad." Alysse ElHage, FAMILY N.C., Why Gender Matters to Parenting: All
Families Are Not Created Equal 3 (quoting the interview Primetime Thursday: Rosie O'Donnell, In
Her Own Words (ABC News television broadcast Mar. 14, 2002) (observing that many homosexual
activists disregard the child's desire for opposite-sex parents, dismissing them as childish whims,
societal pressures, or something to get over)), available at http://www.ncfamily.org/FNC/l 104SIGenderMatters.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2014); Mark Regnerus, How Different Are the Adult Children of Parents Who Have Same-Sex Relationships? Findings from the New Family Structures
Study, 41 SOC. SCI. RES. 752 (2012) (concluding, among other things, that children who had a parent
who engaged in a same-sex relationship at some point in the child's life did not thrive as well as
children whose parents did not have such affairs). However, Regnerus's study received a firestorm
of criticism. William Saletan, Back in the Gay: Does a New Study Indict Gay Parenthood or Make a
Case
for
Gay
Marriage?,
SLATE
(June
I1,
2012,
9:08
AM),
http://www.slate.com/artices/health and science/human nature/2012/06/new familystructures st
udyis gay parenthood bad or is gay marriage good .html (pointing out the flawed classification system, which ultimately reveals that broken homes, not gay parenting, harm children). The
Regnerus study received such a degree of criticism that the author was the subject of an inquiry at
the University of Texas. However, the university determined that no investigation was in order. Alan
Price, University of Texas at Austin Completes Inquiry into Allegations ofScientific Misconduct, U.
TEX.
AUSTIN
(Aug.
29,
2012),
http://www.utexas.edu/news/2012/08/29/regnerusscientificmisconduct inquiry completed/.
51.
See, for example, Florida. In 2008 voters passed Amendment 2 when proponents were
particularly concerned with recent judicial activism in Massachusetts and California usurping the
will of the people. Yes on 2: Fact Sheet, YES2MARRIAGE.ORG (2008), http://ccpcfl.orgNoterGuides/2008/2008MarriageAmend2.pdf ("[A]ctivist judges have re-written marriage laws and ignored the will of the people by legalizing same[-]sex marriages."); Jennifer Mooney Piedra, Florida's Amendment 2 Marriage Vote: Are Domestic Partners at Risk?, MIAMI HERALD,
http://miamiherald.typepad.com/gaysouthflorida/2008/l 0/floridas-amendm.html (voters worried
existing state law would be overturned by a judge). See also Alabama, where voters approved a June
2006 constitutional amendment by 81 % of the vote. Michael Foust, Ala. Becomes 20th State to Pass
Marriage
Amendment,
BAPTIST
PRESS
(June
7,
2006),
http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=23414 ("Judicial activism has put us in the posture of preemptive strikes to build a firewall around the state of Alabama." (quoting Michael Ciamarra) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
52. See, for example, Kentucky Representative Sheldon Baugh who sponsored his state's
DOMA and said same-sex marriage "flies in the face of what's served mankind for 1,000 years." Jan
Garrett, The Debate over Same Sex Marriage: A Discussion of Martha Barette's Letter (Oct. 2000)
(unpublished manuscript) (quoting PARK CITY DAILY NEWS (Mar. 21, 1998)) (internal quotation
marks omitted), available at htp://www.wku.edu/-jan.garrett/ssm.htm. He also noted that "[i]f we
change that law, then what's to say we have to have an age limit, or not have multiple partners, or
(limit marriage) to human beings." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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from out of state should not control state laws regarding traditions. Certainly sub-themes emerge under each of these categories, but most remarkable is the consistency of message over the last decade and a half
when states began enacting DOMA legislation and passing constitutional
amendments.
The central force behind protecting the definition of marriage is the
notion that marriage is central to the foundation of society. 54 Because
marriage is grounded in biblical origins, 55 redefining it is to fly in the
face of religious liberty and morality.56 The second subtheme revolves
around institutional consequences.57 If marriage is redefined around
53.
See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, Georgia Voters to Decide Gay-Marriage Issue in Fall, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at A14 ("We cannot let judges in Boston, or officials in San Francisco, define
marriage for the people of Georgia." (statement of Rep. Bill Hembree) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Lauretta Marigny, Letter to the Editor, Consider Gay Marriage Ramifications,
BISMARCK
TRIB.
(July
5,
2004,
7:00
PM),
available
at
http://bismarcktribune.com/news/opinion/mailbag/consider-gay-mariageramifications/article 0986ab8a-520c-550a-86f7-d8a77f5a72f9.html (explaining that senators are
reluctant to support a federal marriage amendment because "one ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court
could make same-sex marriages legal in all 50 states").
54.
See Gordy, supra note 49; Jeremy Jay Greenup, Identity as Politics, Politics as Identity:
An Anthropological Examination of the Political Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage 39-42 (Jan. 12,
2006)
(unpublished
M.A.
thesis,
Georgia
State
University),
available at
http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/anthro theses/10/.
55.
E.g., BILL BRADBURY, OR. SEC'Y OF STATE, VOTERS' PAMPHLET: STATE OF OREGON
GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 2, 2004, at 80 (2004) [hereinafter OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET],
available at http://oregonvotes.org/doc/history/nov22004/guide/vpvoll.pdf (citing to God's creation
of the institution of marriage, "God's purpose," and Biblical citation to Romans 1:18-32). However,
note that that Jeff Brown, a Georgia State Representative, voted for DOMA because he believed that
the historical and biblical definition of marriage is under attack. He argued for a federal constitutional amendment that would better stymie activist judges. Press Release, Jeff Brown, Ga. House of
Representatives, Defense of Marriage (Feb. 27, 2004) (on file with author) (admitting he "would be
remis[s] if [he] didn't admit that a major erosion of the institution of marriage is due to nearly 50%
of heterosexual couples" who divorce).
56. Some evolution has occurred in the use of religious or moral discourse. Initially, the
discourse focused on the immorality of homosexuality. However, as that argument appears to lose
traction over time as public opinion sways favorably towards same-sex marriage, opponents of
same-sex marriage have successfully adopted the religious freedom argument, which has been an
effective discourse tool in other arenas. See, e.g., Seth Forman, Op-Ed., Five Arguments Against Gay
Marriage.Society Must Bracefor Corrosive Change, DAILY NEWS (June 23, 2011,4:00 AM),
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-06-23/news/2971073 1_gay-marriage-traditional-marriagegay-advocates (explaining that proponents of the sanctity of traditional marriage must face the risk
that they may be seen by future generations in the same light as those who opposed desegregation);
see also Tovia Smith, Same-Sex Marriage May Hinge on Supreme Court, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Jan.
24, 2012, 4:12 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/24/145473719/same-sex-marriage-may-hinge-onsupreme-court. See generally OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET, supranote 55 (demonstrating that some
supporters of Measure 36 argued that Oregon should not be the only place in America that allows
gay marriage).
57.
See Marigny, supra note 53 (arguing that same-sex marriage will cause health insurance
costs to skyrocket because of new dependents that would be added, which could overburden the
system). According to opponents of same-sex marriage, one consequence of same-sex marriage is
the societal cost of sending a message that heterosexual parents are irrelevant. "'It's the societal
message that same-sex marriage sends-that children do not need a mother and a father,' says Kevin
Smith, executive director of New Hampshire's Cornerstone Policy Research." Kathryn Perry, The
Cost of Gay Marriage-In Dollars and Cents, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 27, 2009),
http://www.csmonitorcom/USA/Society/2009/0527/p02s07-ussc.html.
See generally OREGON
VOTERS' PAMPHLET, supra note 55 (relaying that many opponents of same-sex marriage argued that
it would negatively affect institutions and societal values).
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something other than heterogeneous norms, the institution will weaken,
creating social instability. 58 In essence, the "family" in its idealized version must be preserved through heterosexual marriage.59 Implicit in this
concern is the fear that, if unchecked, homosexuality will spread.60
With respect to marriage and children, the most consistent refrain is
that marriage creates the optimal environment in which to raise children. 61 Research is sometimes cited that concludes that the outcomes for
children are most favorable for offspring raised in a two-parent (opposite-sex, biological) household.62 Courts and legislatures have adopted
this premise and call it a legitimate government interest. 63 However, the
sub-contextual inference is that children need protection from homosexual parents. 64 Therefore, the concern is not about providing children with
an optimal environment per se, but rather that children will be harmed if
two people of the same-sex raise them. Again, research is said to demonstrate that children nurtured in same-sex households experience negative
consequences compared with children living in married, heterosexual
58.
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113(a) (2013) (effective 1996) ("Tennessee's marriage licensing laws reinforce, carry forward, and make explicit the long-standing public policy of
this state to recognize the family as essential to social and economic order and the common good and
as the fundamental building block of our society.").
59. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (discussing Congress's desire
to preserve the notions of traditional heterosexual marriage and family). Gay marriage will likely
change the notion of traditional marriage. Forman, supra note 56 ("[E]ven gay activists admit they
are seeking to change the marriage ideal ....
It may be old-fashioned to believe women are still
necessary to domesticate sexually predatory men. But most social arrangements in which men operate without attachment to women are deeply dysfunctional."). Voter pamphlets contain different
flavors of this same point. "For marriage to flourish in our culture, it must be protected from redefinition; for if marriage can mean anything, it will mean nothing." South Carolina Marriage
Amendment, No SAME SEX MARRIAGE, http://nosamesexmarriage.com/marriage/SCmarr.php (last
visited Apr. 12, 2014). And it takes a mother and a father to raise healthy children. Id.; see also
OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET, supra note 55, at 79 (needing to protect traditional marriage because
marriage is a "building block" of society).
60. Marigny, supra note 53 (threatening a significant increase in the percentage of American
culture to identify as homosexual).
61.
OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET, supra note 55, at 81 (arguing that the breakdown of marriage hurts children, that same-sex marriage challenges the notion of gender roles within the family,
and that changing the importance of gender and the family would be bad). See also Lofton v. Sec'y
of Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815-20 (holding that though 'exemplary' gay
foster parents formed a 'deeply loving,' and 'interdependent' relationship with their foster children,
they held no constitutional right to adoption as a same-sex family structure was not an 'optimal'
placement).
62. See sources cited supranote 50.
63.
"[C]ountless statistics and research attest to the fact that when marriage becomes less
important because it is expanded beyond its traditional definition to include other arrangements, that
untoward consequences such as greater out-of-wedlock births occur." Brief for Intervenor-Appellant
at 53, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 102204, 10-2207, 10-2214) (alteration in original) (quoting 150 Cong. Rec. 15074 (2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
64. The American College of Pediatricians disagrees with the district court's assertion that "a
consensus has developed among the medical, psychological, and social welfare communities that
children raised by gay and lesbian parents are just as likely to be well-adjusted as those raised by
heterosexual parents." Brief of Amicus Curiae, American College of Pediatricians in Support of
Defendants-Appellants at 2, Massachusetts, 682 F.3d I (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214) (quoting
Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388 (D. Mass. 2010)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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households. 65 This harming-the-child theme goes further, though. The
reasoning goes that children exposed to gay parents may come to think
that homosexuality is normal. Second, children may be forced to learn
about it in school. 66 Finally, children may experiment with homosexuality and become homosexuals themselves.6 7
A final recurrent strain has to do with fear of activist judges. States
started adopting DOMAs in two main waves. The first wave was a response to the Supreme Court of Hawaii's 1993 decision 68 that led to a
surge of challenges to the practice of barring same-sex marriage. 69 The
second wave came in reaction to, Goodridge,the Massachusetts Supreme
Court decision in 2003.70 The states expressed deep concern that judges,
not citizens, would define foundational cultural norms surrounding mar-

65.
See supra note 50; see, e.g., Forman, supra note 56 ("[C]hildren living in gay homes...
live[] absent a relationship with at least one biological parent."). In fact, much debate arises around
this question. The First Circuit chose not to engage in resolving this dispute from a legal standpoint
because, as the court observed, same-sex couples are free to create families whether they are married
or not. U.S. Dep "tof Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d at 14; see also Pedersen v. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 340-41 (D. Conn. 2012) (noting that "DOMA bears no rational relationship to the purported goal of ensuring that children are reared by opposite-sex parents" because
DOMA cannot prevent same-sex couples from raising children (citing U.S. Dep "t of Health and
Human Servs., 682 F.3d at 14)).
66. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 56 (fearing that courts will impose a duty on schools to
teach moral equivalency between homosexual and heterosexual relationships with no obligation to
let parents opt out); Marigny, supra note 53 ("Textbooks will be required to show families with two
mothers or fathers as they now depict the traditional family."). Similarly, proponents of Montana's
CI-96 (DOMA Amendment) proclaim, "[W]e could lose the freedom to teach our children as we
wish." BOB BROWN, MONT. SEC'Y OF STATE, 2004 VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET 23 (2004),
available at http://sos.mt.gov/elections/archives/2000s/2004NVP2004.pdf, see also Dara Kam, If
Amendment 2 Fails, Backers Say Kids Will Be Led in 'Gay Lifestyle,' PALM BEACH POST (Oct. 22,
2008),
available
at
http://pridetb.homestead.com/lOlfAmendment2FailsBackersSayKidsWillBeLedlnGayLifestylel 022-08PBPost.htm ("Failing to ban gay marriage in the state constitution could result in the indoctrination of schoolchildren into a gay lifestyle."); LA Schools to Teach LGBT Curriculum in AntiBullying Effort, CBS L.A. (Sept. 14, 2011, 10:56 PM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2011/09/14/laschools-to-teach-lgbt-curriculum-in-anti-bullying-effort/ ("Students in the Los Angeles Unified
school district may soon be taught 'age-appropriate' curriculum promoting positive images of homosexuals and their contributions to society.").
67. E g., Marigny, supra note 53 ("If we stamp the lifestyle with approval by sanctioning
same-sex marriage, many more young people will be experimenting with homosexuality and end up
as part of that subculture.").
68.
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993).
69. E.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d at 6 & nn.l-2.
70. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the
state may not "deny the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two
individuals of the same sex who wish to many"). Many states responded to the Massachusetts decision by enacting mini-DOMA constitutional amendments in 2004, including Arkansas, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, and Utah. State Policies on Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RES. CENTER (July 9, 2009),
http://www.pewforum.org/2009/07/09/state-policies-on-same-sex-marriage/.
Likewise, in 2005,
Kansas and Texas followed suit with their own amendments. Id. In 2006, Alabama, Colorado, Idaho,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin enacted amendments. Id. Arizona, California, and Florida passed amendments in 2008. Id. In May 2012, North Carolina approved
its own constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. Campbell Robertson, Ban on Gay Marriage Passesin North Carolina,N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2012, at A15.
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riage.71 Judges could easily rely on little understood, seemingly esoteric
legal principles to destroy a centuries-old foundational institution that
goes to the root of civilization.
These concerns varied in intensity depending on geographical location. For example, some citizens in Southern states may be more likely to
express the desired goals using language that, at times, comes across as
homophobic. 72 Moreover, this same geographical area includes some
individuals who may rely on the discourse of "God's law" as the overriding principle for defining marriage.73 Finally, a fascinating articulation of
the need for marriage occurred in North Carolina, 74 (but the same may
also hold true for South Carolina) 75 where heterosexual marriage func71.
See supra notes 51-53 (discussing judges as "activists," "new age," and "liberal"); Brian
Tashman, Conservatives Decry 'Bizarre' Ruling Finding DOMA Unconstitutional, Lament 'East
Coast Liberal Freak Show,' RIGHT WING WATCH (May 31, 2012, 4:11 PM),
http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/conservatives-decry-bizarre-ruling-doma-unconstitutional.
For example, proponents of Michigan Proposal 04-2 to ban same-sex marriage "believe that amending the [state] Constitution is necessary to avert a judicial interpretation of law allowing same-sex
marriage, as occurred last year in Massachusetts." PATRICK AFFHOLTER, SENATE FISCAL AGENCY,
NOVEMBER

2004

BALLOT

PROPOSAL

04-2,

at

3

(2004),

available

at

http://www.senate.michigan.gov/sfa/publications%5Cballotprops%5Cproposa1O4-2.pdf.
Furthermore, in 2010, Iowa voters removed three Iowa Supreme Court Justices who voted to allow samesex marriage in the state. Peter Hardin, In Iowa, Threats to Impeach Judges Are Renewed, GAVEL
GRAB (June 14, 2012), http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=37494.
72.
Two principal traditionalist arguments against same-sex marriage are the polygamy slippery-slope and the contagious-promiscuity arguments. The first is epitomized by Texas Rep. Warren
Chisum. He said, "It's important not to enter into a social experiment that would change the definition of family. There's a short step from homosexual marriage to polygamy." Sandra Zaragoza,
Business Wary over Prop 2, DALLAS BUS. J. (Oct. 23, 2005, 23:00 CDT) (internal quotation marks
omitted), http://www.bizjoumals.com/dallas/stories/2005/lO/ 2 4 /storyl.html?page=all. The second
suggests that gay men are more promiscuous than lesbians and straight individuals. Gay male couples will, therefore, be more promiscuous than other couples. As a result, the non-monogamous
behavior of gay male couples will, by notorious example, weaken the monogamous commitment of
married heterosexual couples, which will eventually destabilize traditional marriage. Dale Carpenter,
The Traditionalist Case-The Contagious-PromiscuityArgument, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 2,
2005,
4:43
PM),
http://www.volokh.com/archives/archive 2005 10 302005 11 05.shtml#l 130971386; see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2) (2013) (effective 1997)
(Mississippi codified marriage between persons of the same gender as void under a section titled
"Incestuous Marriages Void"). Cf WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (1998) (titling the section "Marriage Contract -Void Marriages").
73.
See Press Release, supra note 55. Similarly, Harold Auxier, a Kentucky voter, said, "It's
God's law that woman was made for man and man for woman-not man for man and woman for
woman." Kentucky Voters Approve Same-Sex Marriage Ban Amendment, USA TODAY (Nov. 3,
2004,
2:26 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/vote2004/2004-11-02-kyinitiative-gay-marriage x.htm.
74. Alliance Defense Fund claims that a DOMA amendment in North Carolina will help
encourage a decline in domestic violence in the state. Brian Tashman, ADF: 'North CarolinaMarriage Amendment Will Help Promote' the Decline of Domestic Violence, RIGHT WING WATCH (May
8, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/adf-north-carolina-amendment-onedomestic-violence.
75.
In fact, it turns out South Carolina's women may be in need of protection too. In the past
ten years, South Carolina has ranked in the top ten states for the highest rate of women murdered by
men. VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF 2011 HOMICIDE

DATA
5,
18
(2013)
[hereinafter
2011
HOMICIDE
DATA],
available at
http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw20l3.pdf. In 2009, South Carolina ranked 7th in the United States
for female homicides by male offenders with 90% of the women murdered by someone they knew.
VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF 2009 HOMICIDE DATA 22
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tions as a way to contain male aggression and sexuality. Thus, not only
children, but also women find protection through marriage.
The cultural framing around the need for DOMAs is significant in
the urgency expressed regarding the integrity of the family and the role
homosexuality appears to play in threatening the ideal notion of the family. Part II of this Article discusses this point in more detail. Regardless of
how the states express their DOMA goals, these goals mirror the goals
stated in Massachusetts76 and in the petitioner's brief in Windsor.77 Thus,
the assertion that passage of these statutes and amendments is associated
with the articulated, desired goals demands interrogation.
B. Analysis of State DOMAs
This next section considers whether states' passage of a DOMA
statute, a constitutional amendment, or both, correlated with the goal of
strengthening marriage compared with states that did not enact such legislation. 78 In other words, did DOMAs increase marriage and decrease
divorce over time in states that
enacted the legislation compared with
79
states that shunned DOMAs?
To examine this correlation, I operationalized the goal of family
stability/marital strength by measuring the year-over-year marriage and
divorce rates from 1999 through 2010.80 The slope, or average rate of
change, is calculated for the years prior to adoption of a state's DOMA

(2011), http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw201 I.pdf. In 2010, South Carolina ranked 2nd for homicides committed against females. VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN
ANALYSIS OF 2010 HOMICIDE DATA 6, 17 (2012), http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw20l2.pdf. In
2011, South Carolina ranked first in the nation. 2011 HOMICIDE DATA, supra, at 15. Indeed, "South
Carolina Attorney General Alan Wilson identified domestic violence as the number one crime issue
in the state. According to the State Attorney General's website, more than 36,000 victims report a
domestic violence incident to law enforcement statewide." Anomaly, Domestic Violence Is the
Number One Crime Issue in S.C., Nikki Haley Vetoes Funding, Calls It a "Distraction,"
FREAKOUTNATION (July 10, 2012), available at http://freakoutnation.com/2012/07/10/domesticviolence-is-the-number-one-crime-issue-in-s-c-nikki-haley-vetoes-funding-cals-it-a-distraction/.
76.
See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 14-15 (1st Cir.

2012).
77.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, Windsor v. United States, No. 12-63,
2012 WL 2904038 (July 16, 2012).
78.
One study examined the negative externalities, or effect, on the institution of heterosexual
marriage in states that allowed same-sex marriage with the effects on those states that did not, finding no statistically significant difference in outcomes. Laura Langbein & Mark A. Yost, Jr., SameSex Marriageand Negative Externalities, 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 292, 293 (2009). However, this study has
been criticized because of operationalization errors, coding errors, and statistical power errors.
Douglas W. Allen, Let's Slow Down: Comments on Same-Sex Marriage and Negative Externalities
(Dec. 9, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=1722764.
79.
This analysis is based on the state of the law at the time for which the data was collected:
1999-2010.

80. These years are used because they represent the decade in which the vast majority of
DOMA amendments passed. The end year, 2010, is the most recent year for which data is available.
The start year, 1999, is the first year for which continuous year-over-year data is available.
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amendment and the years after the passage of the DOMA amendment for
both marriage and divorce. 81
The key independent variable in the study was whether a state had
amended its constitution to define marriage as between a man and a
woman, i.e., to ban same-sex marriage. 82 States that had enacted both a
statute banning same-sex marriage and a constitutional amendment to the
same effect or states that had passed a constitutional amendment, but did
not enact a statute83 during the time for which marriage and divorce rates
were available were included in this category and coded as "0."8 4 Under
the rationale behind DOMA, the institution of marriage would be least
vulnerable in these states because its citizenry has clarified the definition
of marriage in its constitution--clearly expressing the state's values regarding this bedrock social structure.
On the other hand, states that did not have a constitutional amendment at the time that I collected the data, but rather had enacted a statute
banning same-sex marriage during the period in question 86 were included
as a separate category coded as ,1.,87 These states' marital vulnerability
might be considered slightly higher under the DOMA rationale because
these statutes were open to constitutional challenges. Thus, the citizenry

81.
"Slope" is the statistical term that refers to the average rate of change for the period of
years measured and analyzed. It is the central measurement of a trend model. LINDA L. REMY ET AL.,
UCSF FAMILY HEALTH OUTCOMES PROJECT, Do WE HAVE A LINEAR TREND? A BEGINNER'S
APPROACH TO ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN COMMUNITY HEALTH INDICATORS 3 (2005), available at

http://familymedicine.medschool.ucsf.edu/fhop/docs/pdf/mcah/trend 13b.pdf.
82.
Recall that a state constitutional amendment defining marriage in this way is termed a
"super-DOMA." See supra note 38 and text accompanying note 46.
83.
Four states--California, Nebraska, Nevada, and Oregon-responded to either the Hawaii
Supreme Court decision or the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision by directly amending their
constitutions. See supra note 39.
84. For example, California passed its amendment in 2008. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (2008).
However, a federal district court ruled that it was unconstitutional in 2010. Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Thus, for purposes of this analysis, California is treated as
having a super-DOMA. The challenge in categorizing states with evolving legislation or legal precedent is determining how long the state held a particular status such that the citizenry would have
time to experience a cultural shift in light of the legal changes to marriage definitions.
85.
Recall that marriage was open to attack if procreation was perceived as acceptable outside
of marriage or open to interpretation by judges. See supra notes 51-53 and 70.
86. Two states fall into this category: Washington and Maryland. The Washington State
Legislature overturned its 1998 statute banning gay marriage by enacting a statute permitting samesex marriage in early February 2012. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (2013); S.B. 6239, 62d Leg.,
2012 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/201I12/Pdf/Bills/Senate%2OBills/6239.pdf. The law was to take effect June 7th, 2012, but the decision
was stayed by Referendum 74 on the November 6, 2012, ballot. Proposed Referendum Measures2012, WASH. SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/referendum.aspx?y=2012

(last visited Apr. 13, 2014). Therefore, Washington State is included in the statutory-ban group for
purposes of this analysis. Maryland is similarly situated for this analysis. See H.B. 438, 2012 Leg.,
430th Sess. (Md. 2012); 2012 General Election Ballot Questions, MD. ST. BOARD ELECTIONS,
Question 6, http://www.elections.state.md.us/elections/2012/ballotquestions.html (last visited Apr.
13, 2014). For information on the state of the law in these jurisdictions as of February 5, 2014, see
supra note 39.
87. Recall that a statute banning same-sex marriage is referred to as a mini-DOMA. See supra
note 38 and the text accompanying note 46.
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may not have had rock-solid confidence around the meaning of marriage
as an institution in these states because "activist" judges could have overturned the statutory definition, resulting in a more fluid definition of marriage. 8
Finally, those states that had no statute or amendment banning
same-sex marriage were coded as "2." This coding structure allowed me
to hypothesize that the institution of marriage, according to the DOMA
rationale, would be weakest and most vulnerable to attack in these states.
The citizenry either had not collectively expressed a codified position
regarding the definition of marriage, or it had determined that a broader
definition of marriage, which includes same-sex couples, is appropriate-again at the time that I collected the data.
The analysis incorporated a number of control variables. Variables
known to affect marital stability are: median age of first marriage, percent of state's population with a bachelor's degree, median disposable
income, and percent of population living below the poverty line. 89 Four
other variables were included in the analysis because they are likely to
influence a state's view of marriage or to reflect the current state of marital stability there: percent of males and percent of females married three
or more times; percent of population who view religion as an important
part of daily life; percent of single-parent households; and the conservative-advantage points 90 over liberals in the state. 9' Finally, the variable of
state recognition of alternative legal relationships (i.e. domestic partnerships) was added to the analysis. 92 Other variables initially included in
the analysis were foreclosure rates and unemployment rates. However, in
this study, these variables appeared to have no effect on the marriage and
93
divorce trends.

88.
89.

See supra note 51.
See generally NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL

(2010).
90. "Conservative-advantage points" refers to the number of conservative voters greater than
the number of liberal voters in a state. For example, if a state had 45% conservative voters and 30%
liberal voters, the conservative advantage would be 15 points.
91.
Data for these variables were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, with exception of
religiosity and conservative-advantage points, which came from Gallup polls. American Community
Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/data documentation/data main/
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE

(last visited May 21, 2014); Frank Newport, State of the States: Importance of Religion, GALLUP

(Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 114022/state-states-importance-religion.aspx#1 (religiosity);
State
of
the
States,
GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 25066/StateStates.aspx?ref=-interactive (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (interactive map, select "Conservative advantage" metric).
92. The state of the law involving same-sex marriage is constantly evolving. Thus, the data
relied on the state of the law between 1999-2010. Much has changed since then. For example, some
states, like Washington, did not permit same-sex marriage at the time of this analysis, but provided
rights very similar to marital rights through domestic partnerships. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE §
35.21.980 (2009). See generally supra note 42 (enumerating states offering comparable rights).
Other states allow for similar rights by providing for civil unions. Supra note 40.
93.
These results are consistent with the other analysis addressing the statistical link between
economy and divorce. Philip N. Cohen, Recession and Divorce in the United States, 2008-2011

2014]

ALL THAT HEAVEN WILL ALLOW

1. Results
The first hypothesis is that those states that have both constitutional
amendments and statutes, or just constitutional amendments, would be
associated with the greatest decline in divorce rates. 94 Following this
logic, by comparison, those states that had just a DOMA statute might
not experience as radical a decline in their divorce rates. Finally, those
states without a DOMA statute or amendment would have likely had the
lowest decline in divorce. 95 The same hypothesis applies for patterns of
marriage but in the converse. In DOMA-amendment or amendment-plusstatute states, one might expect to see the greatest increases in marriage
rates, followed by lesser increases in DOMA-statute or no-DOMA states.

(Md. Population Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 008, 2014), available at
http://papers.ccpr.ucia.edu/papers/PWP-MPRC-2012-008/PWP-MPRC-2012-008.pdf
(concluding
that unemployment rates had no effect on the odds of divorce, and while foreclosure rates were
positively associated with divorce, the correlation was not statistically significant); see also Jeff
Grabmeier, Marital Separations an Alternative to Divorce for Poor Couples, OHIO ST. U. RES.
NEWS (Aug. 13, 2012), http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/maritalsep.htm (concluding that other
factors-such as a racial or ethnic minority status, family income, family education, and the presence of young children-are predictive of long-term separation). But, the public discussion emerging
from media suggests that the economy is a substantial cause for declines in divorce rates. Lisa Belkin, Postponing Divorce in a Down Market, N.Y. TIMES MOTHERLODE (Mar. 23, 2010, 10:47 AM),
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/postponing-divorce-in-a-down-market
(discussing
the affordability of divorce and how hardships imposed by excessive debt may postpone separation);
Carol Mithers, What to Do When You Can't Afford a Divorce, 0, OPRAH MAG. (May 2009), available at http://www.oprah.com/relationships/What-to-Do-When-You-Cant-Afford-a-Divorce.
94.
States with both constitutional amendments and statutes banning same-sex marriage at the
time of this study were Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, and Virginia. States with a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage at the
time of this study, but having no matching statute, were Oregon and Wisconsin. See, e.g., OR. REV.
STAT. § 106.010 (enacted 1975) (defining marriage as "a civil contract entered into in person by
males at least 17 years of age and females at least 17 years of age"). But see OR. REV. STAT. §
106.020 (enacted 1989) (prohibiting certain marriages but not expressly prohibiting same-sex marriages). States with statutes banning same-sex marriage at the time of this study, but with no constitutional provisions, were Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Wyoming, Maryland, and Washington. The Maryland and Washington legislatures passed bills in
February 2012 permitting same-sex marriage, but the legislation was stayed pending referendums in
November in both states. See supra note 86. States that did not ban same-sex marriage by either
statute or constitutional amendment at the time of this study were New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New Mexico. New
Jersey's governor, Governor Christie, vetoed the February 2012 same-sex marriage bill, and the
matter was stayed pending a public referendum on the November 2012 ballot. Kate Zernike, Christie
Keeps His Promise to Veto Gay MarriageBill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2012, at A 19. New Mexico law
made no mention of same-sex marriage at the time of this study. New Mexico, FREEDOM TO MARRY,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/entry/c/new-mexico (last visited June 12, 2014) ("New Mexico's laws do not explicitly allow or prohibit marriage for same-sex couples."). In 2007, 2008, and
2010, New Mexico state legislators introduced bills to allow same-sex marriage. Id. Each was either
defeated or died. Id. Alternatively, in 2008, a bill was introduced to prohibit same-sex marriage, but
it failed as well. The District of Columbia also did not have laws banning same-sex marriage at the
time of this study. See note 39 for the state of the law as of February 5, 2014.
95.
To create a meaningful "before" and "after" comparison to the states that enacted constitutional amendments, states with or without a statute had their marriage and divorce trends grouped
between 1999-2004 and 2005 2010.
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To engage in this analysis, I conducted four separate statistical examinations. The first series looked at a comparison in the trends of marriage before and after DOMA enactment for the group of states that
passed a DOMA amendment compared with those that did not.9 6 The
next analysis explored the average marriage rates in the years before and
after DOMA passage for both groups of states. 97 The third examination
of data explored any statistically significant differences that may have
emerged in the divorce trends for either group of states. An exploration
of any statistically significant differences in the average divorce rates in
the years prior to and after DOMA ratification between the DOMA and
non-DOMA states concluded the analysis. At this point in the Article, it
is important to note that during the years captured for the analysis, regardless of the state, both marriage and divorce rates were on the decline
everywhere. 98 The question becomes: by how much?
To begin, I calculated the slopes for each state. 99 Next, I conducted
a paired-samples-means-t-test analysisl°° using the Statistical Package
for the Social Sciences (SPSS). This analysis revealed whether a statistically significant difference for the average decline in marriage and divorce trends marked the two time periods. The first period captures the
years before the enactment of the amendments for both the DOMA and
non-DOMA states, 0 1 and the second period captures the years after the
passage of DOMA amendments regardless of whether the states enacted
an amendment. The results showed that, for either category of state, the
96.
Trend analysis provides the most accurate measure of change in marriage or divorce in a
particular state or group of states. However, it does not reveal the number of people in the state that
engage in the behavior.
97.
Rates provide standardized measurements of divorce or marriage in a particular state or
group of states based on a population unit over a given period of time. Rates measure how much of a
state's population engages in the particular behavior.
98.
National Vital Statistics System: National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage divorce_tables.htm

(last visited June 12, 2014).
99.
Alaska and Nebraska are excluded from both the marriage and divorce analysis because
they enacted amendments in 1998 and 2000, respectively. ALASKA CONST. art. 1,§ 25 (approved
1998); NEB. CONST. art. 1,§ 29 (adopted 2000). Thus, the data available do not allow for meaningful
review of trends in those states. Further, Oklahoma does not have marriage and divorce data available prior to 2004, so it is not included in the marriage trends. Likewise, California has no divorce
data available; Georgia has no divorce data after 2003; Hawaii only provided divorce data through
2002; Indiana has no divorce data; Louisiana has virtually no divorce data available; and Minnesota
has no divorce data after 2004. Therefore, these states are excluded or partially excluded from the
analysis. Each state's slope was analyzed for linearity. The following states revealed curvilinear
trends: Washington D.C., Massachusetts, and Montana. By curvilinear, we mean that the trends do
not follow a straight path consistently increasing or decreasing over time. Instead, the data shows
trends that are more circular in which the rates increase and decrease unevenly.
100.
A paired-sample t-test is used in "before-after" studies, comparing the population means
of two correlated samples to determine whether a significant difference exists between the average
values of the same measurement taken under two varying conditions. See, e.g., FREDERICK J.
GRAVE'TrER & LARRY B. WALLNAU, STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 353-56 (8th ed.
2009).
101.
Recall that the non-DOMA states' marriage and divorce trends are divided similarly to the
time trends in the DOMA states in order for the former states to act as a control-or as a comparison
group-with the DOMA states. See supra note 95.
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marriage rate consistently declined throughout the pre- and postamendment time periods. Moreover, the average difference in decline
before and after an amendment passage was not statistically signifi02
cant. 1
Another way of considering this outcome is to look at the average
rate of marriage for the time before and after the amendments' passage. 0 3 The mean rate of marriage gives a sense of how many people
were likely to marry in a particular type of state--either a DOMA or
non-DOMA state for our purposes. Prior to the passage of DOMA
amendments, the average marriage rate in DOMA states was 7.83 per
1000 people. 1°4 In non-DOMA states, the rate was 8.67 per 1000 people.
Even though the rate of marriage declined for both groups after a DOMA
amendment enactment, the average marriage rate remained lower in
DOMA states than in non-DOMA states. In DOMA states, the marriage
rate was 6.96 per 1000 people compared to 7.93 per 1000 people in nonDOMA states. These different average rates, though quite small, were
statistically significant for both pre- and post-DOMA ratification.
Thus, two important points emerge. First, the data analysis reveals
that non-DOMA states included a population of individuals who, on average, are slightly more likely to marry than their counterparts in DOMA
states. Second, the trend of declining marriage was present in both categories of states, but it was not statistically significant from the trend prior

102.
Statistical significance is an assessment indicating the likelihood that the results obtained
reflect a pattern or occurred due to chance. See, e.g., JEREMY MILES & PHILIP BANYARD,
UNDERSTANDING AND USING STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY: A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION 86-88
(2007). Statistical significance most likely did not emerge for the pre- and post-DOMA enactment
for either of these groups of states because the trend was consistently downward for the ten-year
period measured. No major historical events occurred that have had measurable effects on the states
as groups. Although one would have expected that the Great Recession would have affected marriage and divorce trends, it does not appear to have done so. See Cohen, supra note 93. However, an
individualized analysis of each state reveals that certain states, with the passage of laws that permit
same-sex marriage, experience a sharp uptick in their marriage rates. However, this new marriage
rate does not sustain itself. The question of whether this uptick affects divorce rates remains an open
question. A five-year delay between marriage and divorce trends is expected given the mean number
of years (five) that must pass before a marriage is likely to end in divorce. Steve Doughty, The FiveYear Itch: Crisis Pointfor the Modern Marriage Is Arriving Sooner, DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Oct. 29,
2007, at 25 (discussing a study by the Max Planck Institute). Massachusetts is the one state that does
provide enough data for a preliminary examination. Indeed, the results show that after a consistent
(and low) divorce rate in the time period between 2004 and 2009, a sharp increase in the divorce rate
began in 2010-five years after the steep hike in marriage rates. See Appendix A.
103.
The average rate does not measure the change or trend year over year, but rather defines
the average number of people per one thousand people in the population who married in the state
during a particular time period.
104.
Nevada is excluded from the mean marriage-rate analysis because it is a significant outlier
that disproportionately increases the marriage rate for DOMA states. Please note that the data presented in the charts is for the different permutations of DOMA options. However, the data discussed
in the text combines the DOMA statute-only states with non-DOMA states in order to isolate the
states with constitutional amendments and compare them to states that did not respond so definitively to banning same-sex marriage. The idea was also to create sample sizes that might create enough
statistical power to find statistical significance.
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to the passage of DOMA amendments.10 5 In other words, people in the
United States, generally, were increasingly less likely to get married during the time that the analysis was conducted regardless of whether a giv6
en state had a DOMA amendment.'
TABLE ONE
MARRIAGE RATES AND TRENDS FOR

DOMA AND NON-DOMA

Rate/1000 in the pop

STATES

Avg. Decline
n

DOMA amendment and statute
DOMA
statute
only
No DOMA

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

8.50

7.59

-0.358

-0.256

26

13.13

10.58

-0.053

-0.223

12

7.01

6.46

-0.076

-0.134

7

On the other hand, the divorce-rate trend also declined for both
groups, but the average rate of decline in the time period before DOMA
versus the time period after DOMA is statistically significant for both
groups. In other words, both groups experienced a lesser decline in divorce rates in the years after the political discourse and enactments of
DOMA amendments. Thus, regardless of whether or not a state enacted
an amendment or a statute barring same-sex marriage, fewer of its citizens chose to divorce. However, the reduced decline can most likely be
attributed to fewer marriages occurring during this same time period.' 07
Adding context to this trend data, the mean divorce rates for the
DOMA and non-DOMA states reveal that the mean rate of divorce was
slightly lower after the passage of DOMA for both groups. However,
these differences are not statistically significant from the average rates of
divorce for either group prior to DOMAs' passages. Nonetheless, on
average, citizens of non-DOMA states tend to get divorced less than individuals living in states that have DOMA amendments. Specifically,
prior to DOMA's passage, the average rate of divorce in DOMA states
was 4.1 compared to 3.72 in non-DOMA states. After the enactment of
105.
These points are important in exploring why DOMA could not solve the perceived issue
of declining marriage rates. The next section offers an explanation of why DOMA is irrelevant to
shoring up the institution of marriage, particularly for those states that do possess legislation barring
same-sex marriage. See infra Part I.
106.
Data on national divorce rates is still only available through 2010. Marriageand Divorce,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/divorce.htm
(last updated Nov. 21, 2013).
107.
Note the lower mean rate of marriage during this period. See supra Table 1.
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DOMA amendments, the average divorce rate dropped to 3.78 in DOMA
states and 3.34 in non-DOMA states. Thus, one can conclude that, while
less divorce occurs in non-DOMA states, both types of states experienced a statistically significant rate of change in divorce after the passage
of DOMA regardless of whether the state has the amendment. Simply
put, the decline in divorce slowed in the years after DOMA for both
types of states, and an incredibly small difference in divorce rates existed
between the two types of states.
TABLE Two
DIVORCE RATES AND TRENDS FOR DOMA AND

Rate/100l

pop.

NON-DOMA STATES

Avg. Decline
N

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

DOMA amendment and statute
DOMA statute
only

4.08

3.82

-0.125

-0.001*

24

3.92

3.49

-0.096

-0.004*

12

NoDOMA

3.99

3.62

-0.036

-0.041"

6

*Statistically significant at p=0.05
The more compelling question, though, was whether the mean difference in the trend of decline for divorce and marriage in the two time
periods, pre- and post-DOMA amendment passage, was statistically different between the two groups of states: those that enacted an amendment
or statute, and those that did not. The next analysis sought to identify
whether states that passed DOMAs experienced greater marriage rates
and reduced divorce rates compared to those states that remained
DOMA-free.
Again, using SPSS, I conducted an independent-sample-mean-t-test
to determine whether statistically significant differences marked DOMA
and non-DOMA states for pre- and post-DOMA marriage trends and preand post-DOMA divorce trends.' 0 8 Recall, the hypothesis was that the
DOMA impacts marriage and divorce rates differently in DOMA states
and non-DOMA states, as discussed supra. The second hypothesis pre108. An independent-sample mean t-test compares two independent groups to determine
whether the average measurement for a particular characteristic differs between two groups. Statistics

Workshops:

Tests

of

Means,

WADSWORTH

CENGAGE

LEARNING

(2005),

http://www.wadsworth.com/psychology-d/templates/student-resources/workshops/stat-workshp/test
_means/testmeans 15.html. I used the Welch-Satterthwaite equation to perform the t-test because
the sample sizes differ and the samples possess unequal variances (a measure of dispersion, represented as the average squared distance between the sample's mean and each data-point in the sample).
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dicted that the average rate of decline for divorce would be greatest in
those states that passed an amendment compared with those states that
passed only a statute or nothing at all. The results demonstrated otherwise.
Table Three indicates that no statistically significant difference separated the DOMA and non-DOMA states in the divorce and marriage
trends prior to enactment of DOMA legislation. The average rate of decline of marriage was greater for the DOMA states than the non-DOMA
states prior to the enactment of any amendments, -.25 and -.22 respectively.10 9 And for divorce trends, the analysis revealed that DOMA states
actually had a greater rate of decline compared with non-DOMA states, .1 versus -.09, respectively. 10° These extremely slight differences were
not surprising and do not rise to the level of statistical significance or
substantive significance. Instead, the results established a baseline that
prior to DOMA-amendment passage, and the significant publicity associated with it, states of each category were behaving fundamentally similarly with regard to family formation and dissolution-i.e. fewer marriages and fewer divorces.
TABLE THREE
COMPARISON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE TRENDS BETWEEN DOMA AND
NON-DOMA STATES PRIOR TO AMENDMENT PASSAGE

Marriage Trend

DOMA
Non-DOMA

-0.22
-0.25

Divorce Trend

n

-0.1
-0.09

31
19

But the key question is: What happened after DOMA's enactment?
No statistically significant difference marked the two groups of states
after the passage of DOMA. The average decline in marriage or divorce
after DOMA does not differ in any statistically meaningful way between
those states that adopted an amendment and those that did not. PostDOMA, the decline in marriage was greaterfor DOMA states than nonDOMA states, -.26 versus -.12. Moreover, the falling divorce rates were

109.
While all measurements discussed infra represent average or mean rates of decline, for
ease of reading, the text uses the shorthand "decline" to represent this measurement.
110.
However, despite a trend of lesser decline in divorce rates prior to DOMA amendment
ratifications for non-DOMA states, these states, on average, began with lower divorce rates than
DOMA states. It is important not to confuse the average divorce and marriage rates with the average
rate of change in the divorce and marriage rates. Put another way, DOMA states, prior to the passage
of DOMA amendments, had a greater rate of decline in divorce than non-DOMA states, but these
states also have lower marriage rates and greater divorce rates than non-DOMA states. Accordingly,
DOMA states start from a place of greater marital instability than non-DOMA states. See infra Part
ID. 1.
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greater in non-DOMA states than DOMA states, -.011 and -.008, respectively.
It was perhaps surprising that DOMA states, after the passage of a
DOMA, appear to have a slower rate of decline in divorce and an increased rate of decline in marriage compared to non-DOMA states. Put
another way, non-DOMA states showed a smaller decrease in marriage
rates and a greater decrease in divorce rates compared with states that
passed DOMA legislation. However, these results were not statistically
significant; however, they were of some social significance: the results
suggested some intriguing evolution around the institution of marriage in
DOMA states. Specifically, these states, compared with non-DOMA
states, already had lower marriage rates, which appeared to be declining
further, while also possessing higher divorce rates. Thus, the data suggested that the institution of marriage might be slightly more vulnerable
in DOMA states." 1
While no statistically significant differences emerged between the
two groups of states in the analysis, the substantive differences are worth
noting. Post-DOMA, the decline of marriage varied quite a bit between
the two groups of states. While in all other areas the trends were negligible, the average drop in marriages post-DOMA enactment for DOMA
states was more than double that of non-DOMA states. Certainly, the
results should be read with caution, but they do raise some skepticism
about the power of DOMAs to create family stability. Put simply, DOMAs did not appear to be associated with increased marriages, and for
those marriages that did occur, DOMA did not reduce the risk of divorce.
TABLE FOUR
COMPARISON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE TRENDS BETWEEN DOMA AND
NON-DOMA STATES AFTER AMENDMENT PASSAGE

DOMA
Non-DOMA

Marriage Trend
-0.26

Divorce Trend
-0.008

-0.12

-0.011

n
31
19

This preliminary1 12 analysis suggested that DOMA is not statistically associated with increases in marriage rates or decreases in divorce

1I1.
See infra Part lI.C-D (discussing this study's results regarding marriage and divorce rates
and trends).
112.
I use the word "preliminary" because this trend data contains a maximum of ten years of
analysis. More data is always ideal to truly capture whether trends are emerging. See Langbein &
Yost, supranote 78, at 306-07.
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rates. 13 In other words, the analysis did not appear to support either hypothesis. Specifically, DOMA does not appear relevant to the narrative
of why marriage plays an increasingly less visible role in family formation in the United States, particularly in DOMA states.'14
Such a conclusion raises another question, however. If DOMA
amendments or statutes are possibly irrelevant to the institution of marriage, what does appear to be associated with predicting marriage and
divorce rates and trend changes in states?.. 5
C. MarriageTrends

We begin with marriage. Prior to the passage of DOMA, three variables predicted, with statistical significance,' 16 a state's marriage trend.' 7
First, the percent of families living below the poverty line had a moderate correlation (-.47) with the declining marriage trend such that the
greater the number of families living in poverty, the greater the decline in
a state's marriage rate." 8 In other words, those living in poverty were
increasingly less likely to marry than their counterparts with greater resources. Similarly, with a correlation of -.36, the greater the proportion
of people in a state who said that religion plays an important role in daily
life, the greater the reduction in the state's marriage rate. Thus, more
religiosity in a state's population tended to mean fewer marriages. Finally, a correlation of -.35 existed between children living in a single-parent
household and the variable, marriage trends. In other words, the greater

113.
Given how large the standard deviations were for each group of slopes, and the relatively
small but inflexible sample size, achieving enough statistical power to find statistical significance
would be incredibly challenging. I ran alternative analyses eliminating outliers in an attempt to
decrease the standard deviation and increase the chance of detecting an effect should one exist. But
even under the most conservative testing, the sample size must also decrease to accommodate eliminating outliers. Thus, the more compelling story is one of substantive significance rather than statistical significance. "Statistical power" refers to the possibility of making a Type 11error, in which we
conclude that no difference exists between the means of the two groups when one does. Social
science, by convention, recommends no more than a .2 chance of this occurring. WILLIAM M. K.
TROCHIM & JAMES P. DONNELLY, RESEARCH METHODS KNOWLEDGE BASE 256-60 (3d ed. 2007).
114.

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS OLD:

1960 TO PRESENT (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabCHI.xls.
115.
This question is noteworthy because, while the rates of change do not appear to be statistically significant before and after DOMA enactments for DOMA states over non-DOMA states, the
average marriage rates are statistically significant. Marriage seems to be a more robust institution in
states that do not have DOMA laws.
116. For each correlation in this section p < .01.
117.
A full description of correlations of all of these variables appears in Appendix C.
118.
"Correlation" refers to the strength of an association between two variables. The coefficient ranges from zero to one, with zero representing no correlation and one representing a perfect
positive correlation. DAVID STOCKBURGER, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS: CONCEPTS, MODELS, AND

APPLICATIONS 158 (2d ed. 2001). Correlations in the .4 to .7 range are considered moderate to
strong. See B. BURT GERSTMAN, SAN JOSE STATE UNIV., STATPRIMER 14: CORRELATION, at 14.5,
available at http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/gerstman/StatPrimer/correlation.pdf"
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the proportion of children living in single parent households in a state,
119
the greater the decline in marriage in that state.
However, a much richer profile of marriage can be developed by
examining other characteristics that are associated with the variables
which are also correlated with the marriage-decline trend and marriage
rates generally. For example, the percent of families living below the
poverty line is significantly associated with the number of males and
females living in the state who have been married three or more times;
the percent who say religion is an important part of daily life; and the
number of single-parent households. In each of these relationships, the
correlation was positive. In other words, those with families who live
below the poverty line are more likely to have married three or more
times, to view religion as important to daily life, and to live in a singleparent household with children.
Conversely, a negative correlation linked the variable percent of
families living below the poverty line with two other variablesdisposable income and the percent of the population-with a bachelor's
degree. Thus, the greater the median disposable income in the state and
the greater the percent of the population in the state with a bachelor's
degree, the fewer the percent of families living below the poverty line.
Not surprisingly, an extremely strong correlation existed between median
disposable income and percent of population with a bachelor's degree.
The next variable, religion as an important part of daily life, shares
statistically significant correlations with other traits that flesh out the
profile of why certain states have lower or higher declining marriage
trends. The median age of marriage for men and women in a state, the
median disposable income, and the percent of the population with a
bachelor's degree were all negatively related with the percent of the population who view religion as an important part of daily life. Conversely, a
positive connection emerged between religion as an important part of
daily life and the percent of men and women married three or more
times, and the percent of conservatives over liberals living in a state.
Thus, an individual who views religion as an important part of daily
life was more likely to have married three or more times, to identify as
conservative, to have married young, to have little disposable income or
to be living below the poverty line, and is unlikely to have a college degree.

119.
It might appear that single-parent households are an obvious consequence of the decision
not to marry or to marry and then divorce. However, out-of-wedlock births play a significant role in
access to and stability of marriage in a number of important ways. An out-of-wedlock birth significantly decreases the chances of ever marrying. Births prior to marriage significantly increase the
odds that a marriage will end earlier than births that occur after marriage. CASEY E. COPEN ET AL.,
NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, FIRST MARRIAGES IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM THE
2006-2010 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 7 8 (2012).
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An analysis of the data after the passage of DOMA revealed almost
identical results. Poverty rates and proportion of single-parent households in a state best predict how rapidly the rate of marriage declines in a
state. The only variable that was no longer directly associated with postDOMA marriage trends was religion as an important part of daily life.
However, that particular variable strongly mediates 120 every other variable in the profile. Therefore, we can conclude that the passage of state
DOMA amendments had no measurable association with stemming the
decline of marriage, but, in fact, other variables most certainly did.
D. Divorce
The divorce-trend analysis revealed almost identical patterns to
those for marriage. Pre-DOMA divorce was negatively correlated with
the proportion of the population with families living in poverty or in sin2
gle-parent households. These associations are moderate, -.4 for both. 1
As with the marriage analysis, the same variables exhibited an indirect
relationship with divorce, which were mediated through the poverty and
single-parent household variables. Thus, states with a higher percentage
of individuals who have a bachelor's degree also have a higher percentage of individuals with a larger amount of disposable income, who marry
at a later age, who are less likely to marry three or more times, who are
less likely to be politically conservative, and who are less likely to believe religion is an important part of daily life. And, in turn, these states
had fewer families living in poverty and children living in single-parent
households.
States that meet this profile had lower divorce rates even though the
average trend in the decline of divorce is not statistically significantly
different from those states that had a larger portion of their population
without a college degree, with less disposable income, who marry
young, 122 who view religion as an important part of daily life, who marry
three or more times, and who are more likely to be conservative.123 Stated simply, both types of states were experiencing a decreasing divorce
trend (and continue to do so); but overall, impoverished states had fewer
marriages, but more divorces than those states with greater resources.

120. "Mediates" is a statistical term of art that means one variable is not directly associated
with another, but may affect a third variable through its association with the second one. Reuben M.
Baron & David A. Kenny, The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological
Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.

PSYCHOL. 1173, 1176 (1986).
121.
Importance of religion no longer has a direct relationship with divorce trends. However, it
has an indirect relationship with the two key variables as well as the other mediated variables.
122.
"Young" refers to an age of marriage below the national median for age of first marriage.
123.
Recall that achieving statistical significance with a small sample that includes very large
standard deviations is virtually impossible when the possible effects are marginal to begin with, but
the analysis does reveal what is statistically significantly associated with marriage and divorce trends
as discussed above. See supranote 113.
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1. Discussion
The analysis suggests that DOMA states did not fare any better than
non-DOMA states in terms of the strengthening of the "bonds and benefits to society of heterosexual marriage."' 124 In fact, the analysis offers an
alternative theory. In this study, DOMA states tended to have lower marriage rates, larger declines in the trend towards marriage, 125 and greater
divorce rates. Moreover, the decrease in the relevancy of marriage and
the greater divorce rates in DOMA states for those individuals who actually were married (and remarry) seem to be directly related with poverty
and indirectly related with educational and economic opportunities.
These results raise the following question: If DOMA is so clearly
not associated with the strength of marriage-yet poverty, education, and
economic opportunities clearly are-why then, does DOMA carry the
political and legal traction that it does as a response to the concern
around family instability? 126 The next section attempts to address this
question with a moral entrepreneurism theoretical model.
II. THE ENDURING ATTRACTION OF DOMA
A. Moral Entrepreneurism
Howard Becker developed the idea that the construction and application of deviance labels (in the case at hand, homosexuals demanding
access to marriage) is a moral enterprise. 127 Individuals draw on power
and resources from social structures and cultural institutions to create the
abstract notion of something or someone as deviant. 128 Those who define
certain behaviors or characteristics as deviant are known as moral entrepreneurs. 129 Relying on interest groups, moral entrepreneurs engage in a
multistep process to label a group or behavior as deviant because of the
moral entrepreneurs' fear, distrust, or suspicion of this group. 130 The
stages include generating awareness and moral conversion.'31
124. Massachusetts v.U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1,14-15 (1st Cir. 2012)
(articulating the goals of enacting DOMA).
125. Recall that trend analysis looks at average changes in the rates of marriage from one year
to the next over a specific time period. Rate analysis looks at one period of time. See supra notes 96
and 103.
126.
See, e.g., Patrick H. Caddell & Douglas E. Schoen, Romney, Obama Must Address Crisis
EDT),
Families,
POLITICO
(June
12,
2012,
21:27
of
U.S.
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77338.html (arguing that the hidden election issue is the
crisis of the family and the serious implications that arise from it, which both parties and candidates
are ignoring, as well as other cultural institutions, and expressing the key concern that only 52% of
the U.S. population is married-the lowest rate ever recorded in the census).
127.

HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 162-63

(1963).
128.
PATRICIA A. ADLER & PETER ADLER, CONSTRUCTIONS OF DEVIANCE: SOCIAL POWER,
CONTEXT, AND INTERACTION 149 (7th ed. 2012).

129.
130.

Id.
Id.at 150.

131.

Id. at 150-52.
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Moral entrepreneurs define a problem and create public consciousness of it by generating danger messages.132 In the present case, the problem is the perceived weakening of the institution of marriage and family,
which are supposedly embattled. The danger message is that marriage is
under attack by an already well-defined deviant group-homosexualswho wish to further undermine
matrimony's meaning as a union between
33
opposite-sex individuals.
To increase the credibility of their claims, moral entrepreneurs engage experts with specific knowledge of the social problem to package
and present facts via media outlets in an attempt to show that the social
problem's origins are highly influenced by another social issue.' 34 Here,
the social problem is the vulnerability of marriage as a central institution
35

of the family, and the connected social issue is homosexual couples.'

With regard to the assault on marriage by same-sex couples, a multitude of social science studies 36 employed by a host of statistic-touting
experts 137 showing the rise in incidence of divorce, decline in marriage,
132.
Id.
133.
Observe, though, that the social ills defined as attacking the institution of marriage all
implicate women. Recall, the federal DOMA legislation was prefaced with language that stated to
the effect that, to permit same-sex marriage "would further devalue an institution already reeling
from no-fault divorce, the sexual revolution, and out-of-wedlock births." See supra note 23 and
accompanying text. After all, the National Association of Women Lawyers drafted legislation to
promote no-fault divorce. SELMA MOIDEL SMITH, STANFORD U., WOMEN'S LEGAL HIST., A
CENTURY OF ACHIEVEMENT:

THE CENTENNIAL

OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN

LAWYERS (1998), available at http://wlh.law,stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/201 1/01/smith-acentury-of-achievement.pdf; see Sharon Johnson, No-Fault Divorce: 10 Years Later, Some Virtues,
Some Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1979, at A22. Women were the key drivers behind the sexual
revolution. See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963); MARGARET SANGER,
WHAT EVERY GIRL SHOULD KNOW (1916). Finally, women seem to be blamed for the rise in out-ofwedlock births. See generally Isabel Sawhill, 20 Years Later, It Turns out Dan Quayle Was Right
About Murphy Brown and Unmarried Moms, WASH. POST OPINIONS (May 25, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/20-years-later-it-tums-out-dan-quayle-was-right-aboutmurphy-brown-and-unmarried-moms/2012/05/25/gJQAsNCJqU story.html (the author, a Brookings
Institute Fellow, arguing that Dan Quayle was correct in criticizing women for raising children
without the father present and calling it just another "lifestyle choice").
134. ADLER & ADLER, supranote 128, at 150-51.
135.
In support of his animus analysis, Justice Kennedy cited to the following passages from
DOMA's legislative history: "The effort to redefine 'marriage' to extend to homosexual couples is a
truly radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the institution of marriage." United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 12-13 (1996)) (internal
quotation mark omitted). "The House concluded that DOMA expresses 'both moral disapproval of
homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality."' Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 16 (1996)).
136. See, e.g., Mark R. Schneider, In Defense of Marriage: Preserving Marriage in a Postmodern Culture, 17 TRINITY L. REV. 125, 142, 151 (2011); Lynn D. Wardle, The Boundaries of
Belonging: Allegiance, Purpose and the Definition of Marriage, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 287, 308-09
(2011).
137. For example, Brian Brown, President of the National Organization for Marriage, Tony
Perkins, President of the Family Research Council, Dale Showengerdt, legal counsel for the Alliance
Defense Fund, and Jim Daly, President of Focus on the Family, all hold themselves out as experts on
the issue. See, e.g.,
Brian Brown, NOM Blog, NAT'L ORG. FOR MARRIAGE,
http://www.nomblog.com/ (last visited June 12, 2014); FRC Staff. Tony Perkins: President, FAM.
RES. COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=by03h27 (last visited June 12, 2014); Why Protect
Marriage: The Key to Understanding the Fight for Marriage, CENTER FOR ARIZ. POL'Y (July 29,
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increase in adultery, etc. 38 to bring about a moral conversion.' 39 A few
key ingredients make conversion particularly effective. First is the linkage of the social ill-the decline of the married family-with a "dangerous class,""4° homosexuals desiring same-sex marriage.' 14 The next ingredient is what Reinarman refers to as "A Kernel of Truth.' ' 42 The perceived social ill has some basis of truth to it. Specifically, marriage rates
had been declining and the divorce rate did rise in the two decades preceding the moral entrepreneurs' perceived need to respond to "families in
43
crisis" in the early 1990s.1
Also, the media play a key role in the "routinization of caricature."' 44 In other words, episodic events appear as epidemic; additionally,
worst-case scenarios appear as typical ones, which dramatize the social
problem. 145 Applying this concept here, we need to look no further than
the context analysis described in the prior section, which outlines the
146
discourse behind the rationales for passing a state DOMA amendment.
The most recent state to pass a DOMA amendment, North Carolina, provides two good examples of these techniques. 147 First, an issue policy
brief asserted that in same-sex-marriage states, teachers are required to
teach homosexuality to elementary school children as part of a set cur-

2011), http://blog.azpolicy.org/marriage-family/why-protect-marriage-the-key-to-understanding-thefight-for-marriage/;
Jim Daly,
Messages from
Our President, FOCUS
ON
FAM.,
http://www.focusonthefamily.com/about us/profiles/jim daly/messages.aspx (last visited June 12,
2014).
138.
See, e.g., Brief for U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants-Appellants at 16-2 1, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d
1 (1st Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214), 2011 WL 494356.
139.
ADLER & ADLER, supranote 128, at 152.
140.
CRAIG REINARMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DRUG SCARES (1994), reprinted in
CONSTRUCTIONS OF DEVIANCE: SOCIAL POWER, CONTEXT, AND INTERACTION 159, 165 (Patricia A.
Adler & Peter Adler eds., 7th ed. 2012). Although Reinarman has developed a theory related to drug
scares, I assert that this model has equal application to the same-sex marriage issue.
141.
Reinarman observes that drug scares are about the use of a drug by particular groups of
people who are typically already perceived by powerful groups as some kind of threat. Id. (citing
TROY DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY: LAW, DRUGS, AND MORAL JUDGMENT (1970)).
Reinarman observes that Prohibition was motivated by the alcohol usage of immigrant, Catholic,
working-class drinkers, not alcohol consumption generally. Id. Likewise, drug laws in California
came about not because of opiate usage by the masses, but because of Chinese opium dens. Id.
Finally, the drug war of the 1980s emerged not when college kids started snorting cocaine, but when
crack cocaine could be linked to lower class African-Americans. Id. In each instance, the social
problem is linked to a group perceived as a threat. Id.
142.
Id.at163.
143.
COONTZ, supranote 3, at 263 (pointing out that by the end of the 1970s, the divorce rate's
effect was exacerbated by alternatives to marriage and the radical reduction in remarriages, generally); Amitai Etzioni, The Family: Is It Obsolete?, 14 J. CURRENT SOC. ISSUES 4 (1977) (asserting that
if the divorce rate continued at its current pace, not one American family would remain intact by the
1990s).
144.
REINARMAN, supra note 140, at 163 (emphasis omitted).
145.
Id.
146.
See supra Part L.A for a detailed discussion of the content and language employed in the
media to rationalize the passage of DOMA amendments.
147.
N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6 (approved 2012).
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riculum.148 However, this assertion relied on one extreme example for
support. 149 Second, the policy brief alleged that religious leaders have
been jailed for speaking out against homosexuality. 50 For support, the
5
brief cites to a general assertion that this jailing occurs in Canada.' 1
What is particularly compelling with this technique is the idea that a vulnerable population is at risk, and the effects of the social problem are
spreading to that population. 52 In the instant case, children are at risk if
same-sex marriage is allowed. 153 Not just54children of same-sex couples,
mind you, but all children are threatened. 1
The final ingredient in this moral enterprise is scapegoating. Scapegoating blames the effects of a social problem on a particular group who
are only tangentially related to the social ill. 55 Moreover, these effects
148.
"In states where same-sex 'marriage' is legal, such as Massachusetts, children are taught
in school that homosexuality is normal, and that same-sex unions are the legal and moral equivalent
of traditional marriage." N.C. FAMILY POLICY COUNCIL, THE MARRIAGE PROTECTION
AMENDMENT: TEN REASONS WHY LEGISLATORS SHOULD LET THE PEOPLE VOTE 4, available at

http://ncfamily.org/issuebriefs/1 10301 -IB-MarProtAmdt.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
149.
The brief states:
For example, a lesbian teacher in Massachusetts, who teaches sex education to 8th graders, told National Public Radio (NPR) that she answers students' questions about homosexuality using a chart listing different sexual activities, and then asks them whether two
people of the same sex can engage in those activities. She told NPR she asks students,
"Can a woman and a woman have vaginal intercourse, and they will all say no. And I'll
say, 'Hold it. Of course, they can. They can use a sex toy."' She also said her response to
any challenges from parents would be, "Give me a break. It's legal now."
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
For example, Richard McCorkle and Terance Miethe noted in their study on the response
to gangs through moral panics that attention to the alleged problem grew rapidly when the media
reported the "apparent movement of gang activity ... from the traditionally 'troubled' neighborhoods to recreation centers, theaters, and public schools across the city." Richard C. McCorkle &
Terance D. Miethe, The Political and OrganizationalResponse to Gangs: An Examination of a
"Moral Panic" in Nevada, 15 JUST. Q. 41, 48 (1998). The authors also observed that attention
increased once again when an outbreak of high school violence was attributed to gang movement
from the street to high school campuses. Id. at 49-50. Finally, a school shooting in a high school
cafeteria was described by police as a "gang-related slaying," although such conclusion was never
confirmed. Id.
at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153.
Sarah Wildman, Children Speakfor Same-Sex Marriage,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at El
(discussing the debate over the effects of same-sex marriage on children and referencing the following position shared by same-sex marriage opponents: "'The real question is whether same-sex relationships benefit children to the same extent that living with a married mother and father does, and
we believe they do not,' said Peter S. Sprigg, senior fellow for policy studies at the Family Research
Council, the conservative Christian organization. 'Children do best when raised by their own biological mother and father who are committed to one another in a lifelong marriage."'); see supra Part
L.A (detailing the ways in which children will be harmed by same-sex marriage according to DOMA
proponents).

154.
Creating this illusion is crucial because, according to Erich Goode and Nachman BenYehuda, disproportionality, or the degree that the public focuses concern on the problem-here,
same-sex marriage as the cause of family disintegration-to the exclusion of far more damaging
(and realistic) sources of the crisis, such as poverty, access to education, and stable employment,
determines the viability of the moral panic. ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL
PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE 36 (1994).

155.
A closely related term refers to scapegoats as "folk devils" because their behaviors are
deemed selfish and harmful to society. Id. at 29. It becomes paramount to neutralize their actions so
society can return to normal. Id.
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usually precede the alleged causal connection between the social problem and the identified deviant group. 156 Reinarman argues that scapegoating may be the most essential element of the process because "it
gives great explanatory power and thus broader resonance to claims
about the horrors of [the social problem].' ' 57 Scapegoating same-sex
families is equally cogent in the DOMA campaign.
B. Moral Panics
Blaming homosexual couples as the source of the United States'
ongoing family crisis was particularly effective because the social problem was acutely ripe for a moral panic.158 The public was predisposed to
believe the notion that the "family in crisis" had hit epidemic proportions, especially when infamous or noteworthy individuals declared it
so. 59 In turn, legislators responded to the moral panic with the rapid en-

156.
Volatility is also a crucial ingredient. The issue seems to erupt suddenly. Same-sex marriage as the cause of family crisis erupted suddenly when the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision
striking down legislation that barred same-sex couples from marrying. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44 (Haw. 1993). While the issue of family in crisis had always had political attraction, the redefining
of marriage by a court to include same-sex couples gave it new life. Recall that during the 1992
Clinton campaign, families were in crisis because of "welfare queens." Clarence Page, Romney's
Welfare Queen, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 12, 2012, at 25. Another interesting example comes from Great
Britain. In 1968, Mary Bell, at the age of 11, killed two toddlers. Ann Bradley, A Morality Playfor
Our Times, 63 LIVING MARXISM 10, 13 (1994). In contrast, when in the early 1990s two boys killed
a toddler, a moral panic ensued because the act was emblematic of the decline of British society. Id
at 10. The result was a series of legislative enactments to solve the problem of children murdering
children. David Smith & Kiyoko Sueda, The Killing of Children by Children as a Symptom of National Crisis: Reactions in Britain and Japan,8 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 5 (2008), available at
http://www.sagepub.com/lawrencestudy/articles/intro/Smith.pdf. And, as is the case with DOMA
and same-sex marriage, evidence that the enacted solutions would solve the "crisis" was irrelevant.
157.
REINARMAN, supra note 140, at 165.
158.
"Moral panic" refers to a situation in which public fears and state response greatly exaggerate the alleged threat attributed to the target group. The concept emerged from studies Stanley
Cohen conducted in Britain in the 1960s on the "Mods and Rockers." Cohen characterized a moral
panic as a situation where a social ill or group of persons is identified as a "threat to societal values
and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the
moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, [and] politicians ... " McCorkle & Miethe, supra
note 152, at 43 (quoting STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF
MOUDS AND ROCKERS 9 (1972)).
159.
For example, Dr. James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family, asserted in 2004, at the
height of DOMA amendment campaigns, that:
The legalization of homosexual marriage will quickly destroy the traditional family.
... [W]hen the state sanctions homosexual relationships and gives them its blessing, the
younger generation becomes confused about sexual identity and quickly loses its understanding of lifelong commitments, emotional bonding, sexual purity, [and] the role of
children in a family ....
JAMES DOBSON, MARRIAGE UNDER FIRE: WHY WE MUST WIN THIS BATTLE 47 (2004). Judson
Phillips, founder of the Tea Party Nation, was quoted in an article as declaring that:
[M]arriage equality for gays and lesbians is part of the "east coast liberal freak show"
bent on ruining America ....

While there are many religious and moral arguments that can be made about this, the
simple fact is for the last sixty years or so[,] the left has been attacking the basic family
unit. The end result of this has been the creation of poverty where none existed before. It
has been the creation of an under class, bom and raised in poverty, unlikely to escape
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actment of DOMA at the federal level with individual states quickly following suit.
Moral panics can play a crucial role for those possessing political,
economic, or religious power.16 Often, the creation of such a panic can
distract from a more intractable social issue. For example, when Britain
was suffering from a severe recession in the 1970s, the ruling class created a moral panic around street crime to distract the public from the country's declining economic situation. "By exploiting the public's fear of
crime, the ruling class shifted the focus from an ailing British economy
to street muggings, thereby protecting their own economic interests
.... 1 Similarly, one might argue that emphasizing same-sex marriage
as the cause of what ails the American family served the power elite. It
diverted attention away from the glaring reality of economic policies that
benefited 62the power elite at the expense of particular types of American
families. 1
Most fascinating is the framing that the conservative family policy
groups employ to implicate what has occurred over the last few decades
as an "American Experiment."' 163 Indeed, even one of the attorneys arguing against the legalization of same-sex marriage before the Supreme
Court invoked the term. 64 The Institute for American Values observes
that a clear dividing line demarcates marital access and stability between

poverty and encouraged to engage in the same behaviors that landed their parents in poverty.
Tashman, supra note 71 (quoting Judson Phillips in a statement to Tea Party Nation members on
May 31, 2012).
160. Often these power roles work in tandem. For example, many politicians hold political
power along with a significant largesse and use this power to express unabashed religious viewsGeorge W. Bush, Mitt Romney, and Sarah Palin, to name a few. Indeed, the most successful moral
crusaders are those in the upper strata of society. Research conducted on the pro-life movement and
anti-pomography revealed that the crusaders originated in the lower class, thus explaining their
limited success-until recently-to have these issues refrained as legally unacceptable. Justin L.
Tuggle & Malcolm D. Holmes, Blowing Smoke: Status Politics and the Shasta County Smoking Ban,
18 DEVIANT BEHAV. 77, 79 (1997).

161.

McCorkle & Miethe, supra note 152, at 44 (citing STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE

CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND ORDER (1978)). Moral Panics certainly take on a

phenomenological life of their own, but beforehand individuals or groups carefully put the key
ingredients in place.
162.
Professor Carbone observes that "[t]he family crisis is tied to a changing economy; yet
that economy is largely invisible in the moral-values debate." Carbone, supra note 49, at 355. She
goes on to note that "[same-sex marriage bans] simply serve to keep anxiety about the American
family alive without doing anything to address the country's real needs. A genuine family agenda
would take the initiative in addressing the country's changing economic circumstances, starting with
employment." Id. at 356.
163.

UNIV. OF VA. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS: THE NEW

MIDDLE AMERICA 15 (W. Bradford Wilcox & Elizabeth Marquardt eds., 2010), available at
http://stateofourunions.org/2010/SOOU2010.pdf. But see Carbone, supra note 49, at 356 (arguing
that the ability to marry and stay married is defined by educational attainment and class).
164.
Steven T. Dennis & John Gramlich, 12 Best Gay Marriage Moments at the Supreme
Court,
ROLL
CALL
(Mar.
26,
2013,
4:22
PM),
http://www.rollcall.com/news/2_best gaymarriagemoments at the supreme court-223456I .html.
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the classes. 165 However, the dividing line has clearly shifted in the last
few decades such that the middle class now find themselves shut out at
the proverbial church door. The "most consequential marriage trend of
our time concerns the broad center of our society, where marriage, that
iconic middle-class institution, is floundering."' 66 The report couches the
lack of access to marriage as a "retreat" 167-perhaps unintentionallysuggesting that the middle class made a conscious decision to try out
what it would be like to not marry for a generation or so.
Conversely, marriage stability has remained consistently strong for
the last four decades amongst the educated upper class and upper-middle
class.168 Thus, one might be tempted to conclude that DOMA was especially needed in those states that lacked educational and economic resources to stave off the impending attack on a set of marriages already
weakened and becoming increasingly rarified. Taken to its logical conclusion, the argument might go like this: of course states with higher
educated populations, with more income, and with delayed age of first
marriage could withstand same-sex marriages amongst its population.
These are not the types of states with the most marriages at risk.
Therein lies the appeal of the moral panic to the family in crisis
question. 169 Status politics play out an efficient and effective one-two

165.
The institution's report, in combination with another one it authored, The Revolution in
Parenthood: The Emerging Global Clash Between Adult Rights and Children's Needs, is emblematic of moral entrepreneurs effectively creating a moral panic. See generally UNIV. OF VA. NAT'L
MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 163; ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE
REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD: THE EMERGING GLOBAL CLASH BETWEEN ADULT RIGHTS AND
CHILDREN'S NEEDS (2006), available at http://www.americanvalues.org/search/item.php?id=48. In
fact, these reports could serve as a textbook for how to create a moral panic around family crisis.
They contain the requisite academic experts explaining how middle America's attitudes and behavior do not serve them well, as such attitudes seek to adopt a "'soul mate' model of marriage" over
the "older 'institutional' model of marriage." UNIV. OF VA. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note
163, at 28. Marquardt discounts studies demonstrating that same-sex marriage is not harmful.
MARQUARDT, supra, at 19-22. Moreover, Marquardt devotes a significant portion of her report to
establishing that a vulnerable population exists when she writes, "[I]n both the sciences and in the
voices of children we learn that biology does matter." Id. at 21. She discusses the safety of children-and the risks of stepparents who lack biological connection to children in the household. Id. at
20. She then equates these violent stepparents with same-sex parents. Id.at 21-22. However, citing
recent developments in artificial reproduction that involve creating eggs and sperm from stem cells,
she cautions, "The technique raises the possibility that gay couples will be able to have biological
children." Id. at 27 (quoting Maxine Firth, Stem Cell Babies Could Have Single Parent, N.Z.
HERALD, June 21, 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Seemingly, same-sex couples cannot
win. They are unacceptable parents without both having a biological connection to the child, and
frankly, unfit parents because, as selfish folk devils, they view "human lives as fit for laboratory
experimentation for the benefit of others." Id.at 27 28.
166.
UNIV. OF VA. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 163, at ix.
167.
Id.at 15.
168. Id.at 16.
169.
Moral panics allow for selective application of the scapegoat to the social ill according to
where it conveniently fits to support the narrative being offered. Power is central to this enterprise.
[L]aws... are a product of political action by moral entrepreneurial interest groups that
are connected to society's power base....
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punch. First, the power elite can define certain kinds of families as lacking in social mores, i.e. poor and middle class single-parent families,
while at the same time, implicating other kinds of families as exacerbating the first social ill, i.e. same-sex families. Second, the condemnation
of both groups "symbolically enhances the status of the abstinent through
the degradation of the participatory.' 70 In other words, the power elite
legitimizes its superior moral value and superior position in the social
stratification through such discourse. In the case of same-sex couples'
demand for marriage, moral entrepreneurs engaged in "coercive reform" 17'1 because these couples were "viewed as intractably denying the
moral and status superiority of the [political-economic-religious elites']
symbolic-moral universe."172 And, at the same time, this "reform" distracted families who were experiencing their own massive instability
from examining the cause of their own plight.
Thus, a fair conclusion to draw might be that same-sex couples' desire to marry has little to do with the current state of marginalized families and perhaps has much to do with a carefully crafted moral panic for
political expediency. 73 In other words, DOMA could very well be a byproduct of a fallacy.
The next query becomes, then, given the variables associated with
marital instability and given DOMA's apparent ineffective role in promoting marital stability (and its possible demise), how should society
respond to the middle class's weakened marital state?
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Given that marriage, as an institution, has become a less viable option, especially for the middle and lower classes, one may be tempted to
lay blame at their feet. The nature of this blame may come in a variety of
forms. These forms are discussed below, followed by my recommendations for solving the effects of the middle class's weakened marital state.
A. MoralFailure
One approach might be to adopt the reasoning of the conservative
elite-both within the academy and political arenas-that middle and

... [T]hose positioned closer to the center of society, holding the greater social, econom-

ic, political, and moral resources, can turn the force of the deviant stigma onto others less
fortunately placed.
ADLER & ADLER, supra note 128, at 155-56.
170.
Tuggle & Holmes, supra note 160, at 79.
171.
Id."Coercive reform" refers to the enactment and enforcement of laws to force a particular group to comply with moral views espoused by the moral entrepreneur. Id.at 79-80.
172.
Id.
173.
Admittedly, I do not have direct evidence that pro-DOMA interest groups developed a
purposeful strategy to create a moral panic, but rather, I infer from the discourse that theoretically, it
appears this sociological phenomenon emerged.
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lower classes do not act consistently with their best interests. 174 For instance, the National Marriage Project and Institute for American Values
diagnose the problem as follows: Marriage has eroded in the middle class
because "moderately educated Americans are markedly less likely than
are highly educated Americans to embrace the bourgeois values and virtues." 175 To put it bluntly, the report explains that lower middle class
individuals are less likely to engage in self-control, delayed gratification,
and hard work. 176 These virtues, the report claims, are the key to accessing a college education, and in turn, adopting an appropriate life planning
sequence-"education, work, marriage, and childbearing" in that or77
der. 1
The culpability of the "shiftless" 178 certainly has its appealparticularly when academics or politicians can point to the models of
marriage that are appropriate for one social class, but not the other. The
State of the Union report observes that while a "soul mate" model of
marriage may work for upper class Americans, middle class Americans
must abide by the "traditional" model of marriage in which "poor and
Middle Americans of a generation or two ago would have . . . been
markedly more likely to get and stay married, even if they did not have
much money or a consistently good relationship." 179 According to the
174.
Ronald Reagan often played up the concept of the "welfare queen" in his stump speeches
during his 1976 election bid to describe women who were scamming the government to obtain
benefits and services for themselves and their children instead of working for pay. See 'Welfare
Queen' Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1976, at 51. While Reagan is

often credited for coining the term "welfare queen", this is likely apocryphal as no actual record
exists of Reagan's use of the term. In actuality, the inventor of the term seems to be Linda Taylor at
"the Chicago Tribune, not the GOP politician." Josh Levin, The Welfare Queen, SLATE (Dec. 19,

2013,
12:41
AM),
http://www.slate.comarticles/news and_politics/history/201 3/12/linda taylor welfare-queen ronal
d reagan made her a notorious american villain.html.
175.

UNIV. OF VA. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supranote 163, at 34.

176.
177.
178.
slaves as

Id.
Id.
"Shiftless" is a term that came about during the slavery era to describe African-American
lazy, unambitious, and slow, but it currently has wider application to poor people. See

David

Pilgrim,

The

Coon

Caricature,

FERRIS

ST.

U.

(Oct.

2000),

http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/coon/ (last updated 2012).
179. UNIV. OF VA. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 163, at 38-39. The soul mate model
of marriage is couple-centered, demanding "emotional intimacy" and "shared consumption" with the
"happiness of both spouses" as central to its survival. Id. at 38. Conversely, the traditional model of
marriage focuses on "parenthood, economic cooperation, and emotional intimacy in a permanent
union." Id.at 38. However, consider Stephanie Coontz's assessment of marriages and families from
a generation or two ago, when the conservative elite would wax on about the ideal approach for
middle America. "Not only was the 1950s family a new invention; it was also a historical fluke,
based on a unique and temporary conjuncture of economic, social, and political factors." STEPHANIE
COONTz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 28, 30-39
(1992). Coontz observed that, in reality, families during this period were characterized as one or both
partners experiencing daily misery; families hiding the sexual or physical abuse that occurred within
the family from the outside world; women who had been pushed out of the workforce became alienated wives and mothers. The media's depiction of the 1950s American family ignored the poor
communities and minorities, who continued to face brutal discrimination. The period consisted of a
consistent heightened number of teen pregnancies, which resulted in marriage, as well as high rates
of prescription drug and alcohol abuse. Id. at 29-39. Moreover, while the American Values Institute
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Institute for American Values, the poor and middle classes don't have the
economic resources
needed to succeed in an emotionally intensive soul8
mate union.' 0
This analysis suggests shades of the 1965 Moynihan Report, in
which then Assistant Secretary of Labor, Daniel Moynihan, concluded
that the pathology of the African-American community had its origins in
the destabilized "Negro" family.' 8 1 The report has since been criticized
for its failure to examine all the data on black families available at the
time, and in particular, for its failure to acknowledge the adaptive strategies that family formation will take in response to destabilized institutions, especially the economy.1 82 Similarly, here, one might conclude that
a destabilized family is a consequence, not a cause-no more than
same83
sex marriage would be a cause-of weakened social structures.1
Another explanation of middle class families' plight is the cultural
class-warfare syndrome as expressed in volumes such as What's the Matter with Kansas?Is4 Under this model, middle class Americans are at fault
185
for their circumstances because they vote against their own interests.
Frank observes that we have a "French Revolution in reverse. 1 8 6 The
wealthy elite, politically conservative establishment developed a highly
effective discourse he calls "latte libel."'' 87 Instead of focusing on policy

criticizes the soul mate model as valuing consumption, Coontz points out that the "traditional family" of the 1950s was defined by consumer consumption. See id. at 27-29.
180.
UNIV. OF VA. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 163, at 38-40.
181.
THE

See generally DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY:
CASE
FOR
NATIONAL
ACTION
(1965),
available
at

http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/webid-meynihan.htm.
182.
Herbert J. Gans, The Moynihan Report and Its Aftermaths: A CriticalAnalysis, 8 DuBoIS
REV. 315, 318-20 (2011) (arguing that the report lacked the positivism required for such analysis to
have a meaningful effect).
183.
In the early part of the twentieth century, sociologists Robert Park and Ernest Burgess
developed the Concentric Zone theory. See ROBERT E. PARK ET AL., THE CITY 50-55 (1925). The

theory explains that competition for resources means that certain land areas with limited social
structures will lead to adaptations by individuals living in those areas subject to the same ecological
pressures. See id. at 63-66. Thus, the idea that individuals develop characteristics in response to the
environment and resources available to them is not a new one.
184.
See generally THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? How
CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA (2004). Although culture as an expression of class

has long been debated by sociologists, Frank's book describes how the political mapping of the 2000
election brought the intersection of politics and class warfare into sharp relief as mediated through
culture. For an earlier discussion of the cultural class-warfare syndrome, see MICHAEL
HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 14-17 (1962). The idea of
culture as an expression of class has captured the imagination of family law scholars more recently.
See generally CAHN & CARBONE, supranote 89; WILLIAMS, supranote 18.
185.
Recent data, however, suggests otherwise. A report released by the PEW Foundation
reveals that 50% of its respondents who stated that they were middle class identified as Democrats,
compared to 39% who identified as Republicans. PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE
LOST DECADE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: FEWER, POORER, GLOOMIER 6 (2012), available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/08/pew-social-trends-lost-decade-of-the-middleclass.pdf.
186.
FRANK, supranote 184, at 8.

187.

Id. at 16-17.
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as the framework for voting in political parties, the economic and political powerhouses shifted politics into a cultural class war. ss
In this cultural war, middle class Americans were duped into creating a backlash against their own economic interests based on judgments
about liberal elitism that comes from the coastal regions of the United
States-the cars they drive, the food they eat, the clothes they wear, the
music they listen to, the places where they vacation, the churches they do
not attend, etc. 189 The net result, according to Thomas Frank, is that:
Here is a movement whose response to the power structure is to make
the rich even richer; whose answer to the inexorable degradation of
working-class life is to lash out angrily at labor unions and liberal
workplace-safety programs; whose solution to the rise of ignorance
19
in America is to pull the rug out from under public education. 0
But Frank and those of his persuasion cast blame more broadly.
91
They point to the liberal, political, and economic elite as culpable too.'
Frank argues that the Left made an inexcusable error in refusing to talk
about class; in attempting to reframe itself as a party friendly to business;
92
and abandoning the issues that made the Democratic party appealing.'
The Left has engendered a deep-seated bitterness in middle-America that
93
is aimed at the once progressive platform of the Democratic party.'
Joan Williams goes further: "A precondition for permanent political
change is a changed relationship between the white working-class and
the reform-minded elite. It is disheartening that .. .the upper-middle
class remains supremely uninterested in rethinking its relationship with
the Missing Middle."' 194 Thus, these authors argue that the liberal elite
drove middle class Americans away with their condescension and intellectual analysis, and into the hands of the Republican Party, which was
willing to embrace their anger-or more accurately, manipulate it for
95
political gain.
The result is that the nation has economic and family policies that
have led to a high level of inequality. To be sure, the last thirty years has
seen the distance grow between the social classes.' 96 But during the Great
Recession and subsequent recovery, in 2010 alone, the top 1% of America's most wealthy gained 93% of the additional income created in the

188.
189.

See id.
at 5-6.
See id.
at 16-20.

190.
191.
192.

Id.at 7.
Id.at 242-48.

193.

Id.
Id.at 8-9, 176-77.

194.
WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 211.
195. See id.at212.
196. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: How TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 2-3 (2012).
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United States. 197 During this same year, the ratio of pay between a typical
worker (a person lucky enough to have a job) and a CEO's annual compensation was one to 243.198 Put another way, the top 1% had an average
annual income of $1.3 million while the bottom 20% earned an average
of $17,800 annually-and that was before the recession hit.' 99 It seems
implausible to maintain that such incredible economic injustice does not
hurt the stability of the family.
A recent study released by the PEW Foundation catalogues the
losses experienced by the middle class. Of the 1,287 adults surveyed for
the study, 85% stated that it was more difficult to maintain a standard of
living than a decade ago. 200 For the first time since World War II, income
has declined across all income tiers except the very top. 20 ' The size of the
middle class has actually shrunk over each of the last four decades. 2 02 For
the upper class, the period has proved lucrative. Their incomes rose from
29% to 46% of the nation's pie.20 3 For the middle class, four decades
2 05
24
ago, their income made up 62% of the share. 0 Now, it is only 45%.
The lower class has remained relatively stable in its minimal share of the
nations' income- 10% in 1971, 9% in 2011.206
Wealth remains a crucial, yet elusive safety net for any family.
Wealth provides access to resources in times of economic hardships, but
even more so, it offers economic opportunities. However, wealth has
plummeted for middle- and lower-class families-specifically, by 28%
for the middle class and 45% for the lower class over the last four decades. 207 Once again, if you were lucky enough to be born in the upper
class, your opportunities improved substantially. Upper-class families
acquired a greater portion of the nation's wealth during this same time
period.2 °8
B. The Elusive TraditionalFamily
A frequent refrain in the conservative party is a return to the traditional family values of the 1950s-with images of Leave it to Beaver reruns fresh in our collective memories. 2 9 Nostalgic stories of low divorce
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.

200.

TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 185, at 166.

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
Id.
Kevin Noble Maillard, The Myth of the Traditional Family, Contribution to The Opinion

Pages: Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES, http:lwww.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012104124/are-

family-values-outdated/the-myth-of-the-traditional-family (last updated Aug. 9, 2012, 11:35 AM).
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rates, high marriage rates, high fertility rates, and economic growthwith the largest movement of poor people into the middle class-all certainly have resonance and appeal. However, the family of the 1950s was
not the last vestige of a long tradition of the stable American family. 21° It
was a new and rare phenomenon born of massive economic growth
spurred on by housing starts and consumer spending-particularly for
household furnishings and appliances.2 1 '
Even more so, the traditional family of the 1950s was the invention
of American economic and family policy. Keith Olson observes that the
GI Bill was one of the most successful social programs ever created, at
least for whites. 1 2 Veterans received free college tuition, a stipend, and
extra money if they had a family.21 3 No loans, just grants. Mortgages
were available at very low rates. 214 A rewritten tax code provided advantages to married couples.21 5 Such policies created the middle class,
and in turn, the possibility of family stability.
Economic stability did not create the cultural phenomena of the nostalgic "traditional" two-parent, male breadwinner, female home-maker
family. The media did.216 However, the recommendation that we provide
economic and educational opportunities to create economic stability is an
obvious one that Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz analyzes forcefully. 217 Nevertheless, the ability to createfamily stability means discarding

210.
ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR ERA
13-14 (2008) ("[The 1950s family] was not ... the last gasp of 'traditional' family life with roots
deep in the past. Rather, it was the first wholehearted effort to create a home that would fulfill virtually all its members' personal needs .... ").
211.
See Keith W. Olson, The G. 1. Bill and Higher Education: Success and Surprise, 25 AM.
Q. 596 (1973) (discussing the implementation of the GI Bill as an anti-depression measure);
COONTZ, supranote 179, at 24-25.
212.
Olson, supranote 211, at 610; COONTZ, supra note 179, at 223.
213.
Olson, supranote 211, at 610 n. 18; COONTz, supra note 179, at 223.
214.
See COONTZ, supranote 179, at 223.
215.
Id. at 223-24. See generally MADELEINE M. KUNIN, THE NEW FEMINIST AGENDA:
DEFINING THE NEXT REVOLUTION FOR WOMEN, WORK, AND FAMILY 23-24 (2012); STIGLITZ, supra
note 196, at4 5.
216.
COONTZ, supra note 3, at 229-32.
217.
Educational opportunities should be carefully assessed to match the growth areas in the
economy. For example, regulation of for-profit educational institutions is essential for the protection
of lower and middle classes seeking access to higher education-an area where they are frequently
shut out. Stiglitz cites data showing that 74% of students in the nation's most selective colleges
come from the top quartile of income earnings, while only 9% come from the bottom half of the
country's income earners. STIGLITZ, supra note 196, at 19. The effects of inequality for a child are
pervasive. In fact, a child born in an environment with few resources will find it difficult to ever
move out of poverty. Id. at 17-20. Recent data reveals that the middle class, who used to believe that
the American Dream was achievable, are increasingly alienated from the notion that working hard is
all it takes. TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 185, at 5. Finally, education cannot be the salve to childhood
poverty and family instability. Research shows that the predominant growth area for jobs in the
United States in the next decade will be in the service industry-low-paying jobs like home health
workers or social service providers, as well as business services. Richard Henderson, Industry Employment and Output Projections to 2020, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 65, 65-69 (Jan. 2012), available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2012/01/art4fill.pdf. Therefore, policy must address ways for lowincome families to garner support other than through wage income.
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a singular notion
of a family model 21 8 that thrived for only one decade in
219
our history.
To be sure, a two-parent household offers certain economic advantages. 220 These advantages, however, can be mirrored in a national
economic policy without necessarily demanding a two-parent household
model. Thus, other family structures can receive these benefits. 221 It is
clear from the analysis above that, regardless of one's educational or
222
economic resources, marriage and fertility rates are both declining.
America can be a hostile place to raise a child. As of December 2011,
57% of the nation's children are living in low income or poor households.223 The United States exhibits the "highest child poverty rate in the
developed world., 224 Unlike our European neighbors, we seem to focus
on marriage, not children.225 In a nation where "[p]oor kids who succeed
academically are less likely to graduate from college than richer kids
who do worse in school, 226 and where we know education strengthens
family stability, a new moral panic demands addressing the causes, not
the symptoms, of family crisis. Thus, this last section of the paper shifts
the focus from marriage and divorce rates to child outcomes. The analysis above suggests that marriage and divorce play an increasingly less
visible role in family formation and stability. Thus, concentrating on a
child's quality of life is likely to create a setting that will increase family
stability.
C. Possible Solutions
1. Reformulate Resources with Children in Mind
As Stiglitz observes, this country virtually eradicated poverty for
the elderly through social programs like Social Security and Medicare. 227
The decision to do nothing to eradicate child poverty should be viewed
228
as political as well as moral.
I argue that refocusing on children's access to resources will go a long way toward creating family stability,
218.
Indeed, the trend of marriage continues to decline, especially amongst the least educated.
Richard Fry, No Reversal in Decline of Marriage, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov. 20, 2012),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/201 2/11/20/no-reversal-in-decline-of-marriage/#src=prc-newsletter.
219.
See COONTZ, supra note 3, at 229, 243-44.
220.
See Wendy D. Manning & Susan Brown, Children's Economic Well-Being in Married
and CohabitatingParentFamilies,68 J. MARRIAGE& FAM. 345, 351 (2006).
221.
In fact, families with three or more parents exist and may receive legal recognition in
California. Ian Lovett, Measure Opens Door to 3 Parents, or More, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012, at
A9.
222.
JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS Sys., BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2010,
at 1 (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr6l/nvsr61 01.pdf; see id. at Table

I.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

KUNIN, supra note 215, at 223.
Id at I1.
ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND 15-16 (2010).
STIGLITZ, supranote 196, at 19.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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while undermining the scapegoating arguments229behind DOMA. Research
reveals that Americans strongly value fairness.
The discourse of fairness must enter the family-in-crisis discussion.230 Other countries have chosen to create a wealth distribution system that still allows for rewards, but reduces the amount of inequality
present in society, particularly by focusing on investing in resources for
children. 231 In doing so, the Left must respect, if not adopt, the morality
discourse with which the Right has become adept. It must re-engage
middle- and lower-class America-where the most destabilized families
are found.232

229. Id. at 153-54.
230. The idea of tax dollars going to assist other adults who we perceive as making life decisions that we would not creates cognitive dissonance for some when it comes to the notion of fairness. See, e.g., Myth-The Rich Don't Pay Their Fair Share, CONST. CONSERVATISM,
http://constitutionalconservative.wordpress.com/myth-the-rich-dont-pay-their-fair-share/ (last visited
Apr. 13, 2014).
231.
For example, policies in Australia, the UK, France, and Brazil are known for reducing
inequality. See, e.g., KUNIN, supra note 215, at 34-35, 44-55, 225-30; STIGLITZ, supra note 196, at
5,18-19,21-23.
232. The empirical data show that religion plays a central role for these families experiencing
destabilization. Thus, refraining the family crisis as one involving a moral crisis around fairness,
greed, and hypocrisy can capture the imagination of these families. The Left is inclined to eschew
religion, as the data here reveals, but social justice for families is a moral theme. Moreover, the Left
must also be mindful of recent research demonstrating that cognitive functioning may play a significant role in political attitude, and thus should focus on finding common ground rather than demanding "conversion" of position. See, e.g., Michael D. Dodd et al., The Political Left Rolls with the
Good and the Political Right Confronts the Bad: Connecting Physiology and Cognition to Preferences,

367

PHIL.

TRANSACTIONS

ROYAL

Soc'Y

B

640,

640

(2012),

available at

http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/367/1589/640.full.pdf (finding that left-leaning individuals prefer pleasing images while right-leaning individuals prefer unpleasant images); Scott
Eidelman et al., Low-Effort Thought Promotes Political Conservatism, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 808, 808-09, 815, 817 (2012) ("[P]olitical conservatism is promoted when people
rely on low-effort thinking. When effortful, deliberate responding is disrupted or disengaged,
thought processes become quick and efficient; these conditions promote conservative ideology....
[L]ow-effort thought might promote political conservatism because its concepts are easier to process, and processing fluency increases attitude endorsement.... Four studies support our assertion
that low-effort thinking promotes political conservatism.... Our findings suggest that conservative
ways of thinking are basic, normal, and perhaps natural." (citation omitted)); Peter K. Hatemi et al.,
Genetic and Environmental Transmission of PoliticalAttitudes over a Life Time, 71 J. POL. 1141,

1141 (2009) ("[A]t the point of early adulthood (in the early 20s), for those who left their parental
home, there is evidence of a sizeable genetic influence on political attitudes which remains stable
throughout adult life."); Erik G. Helzer & David A. Pizarro, Dirty Liberals! Reminders of Physical
Cleanliness Influence Moral and Political Attitudes, 22 PSYCHOL. Scl. 517, 517 (2011)
("[R]eminders of physical purity influence specific moral judgments regarding behaviors in the
sexual domain as well as broad political attitudes."); Ryota Kanai et al., PoliticalOrientationsAre
Correlatedwith Brain Structure in Young Adults, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY 677, 677-79 (2011) (finding that left-leaning individuals are more tolerant of uncertainty while conservatives have greater
sensitivity to fear as demonstrated in different parts of the brain); Natalie J. Shook & Russell H.
Fazio, Political Ideology, Exploration of Novel Stimuli, and Attitude Formation, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 995, 995-96 (2009) (stating that, compared to liberals, conservatives
are less open to new experiences and learn better from negative stimuli than positive stimuli); Jacob
M. Vigil, PoliticalLeanings Vary with FacialExpression Processingand PsychosocialFunctioning,
13 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 547, 552 (2010) ("Republican sympathizers were more
likely to interpret the faces as signaling a threatening expression ... as compared to Democrat sympathizers ....Group differences were also found for dominance perceptions, . . . whereby Republi-

can sympathizers were more likely to perceive the faces as expressing dominant emotions

.

.

.

than
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One way to re-engage the middle class is to discuss the value of
human life. Rather than pour political energy into birth control and abortion (both important and necessary social policies-but also potentially
alienating issues amongst the religious middle class), we should focus on
the need to invest in children from the start. Recall, this study shows a
strong correlation between DOMA states and its citizens reporting conservatism and religion as an important part of daily life.233 Thus, a discussion of policy reform must reframe the discussion in such a way that
is respectful to the religious and moral views of the middle class; for
example, prioritize prenatal and early childhood care.
By adopting a "trickle up" policy, money invested in children can
mitigate some of the weak income levels of their parents. 234 And how do
we pay for these investments? Revise the tax code to address the massive
and growing economic injustice in this country. Government may not be
able to dictate the ratio of pay between worker and CEO, but government
can redistribute resources and income through tax policy. 235 The earned
income tax credit is one of the most effective tax policies to benefit families.236
One highly effective investment is supporting low-income parents
in developing strong relationships with their children. Research demonwere Democrat sympathizers .... "); Darren M. Schreiber et al., Red Brain, Blue Brain: Evaluative
Processes Differ in Democrats and Republicans 2-3 (2009) (unpublished APSA Toronto meeting
paper), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1451867 ("[Ilt appears in
our experiment that Republican participants, when making a risky choice, are predominantly externally oriented, reacting to the fear-related processes with a tangible potential external consequence.
In comparison, risky decisions made by Democratic participants appear to be associated with monitoring how the selection of a risky response might feel internally."); Kevin B. Smith et al., Disgust
Sensitivity and the Neurophysiology of Left-Right PoliticalOrientations, PLOS ONE (Oct. 19, 2011),
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371 %2Fjournal.pone.0025552
("[I]ndividuals
with marked involuntary physiological responses to disgusting images [measured by change in mean
skin conductance], such as of a man eating a large mouthful of writhing worms, are more likely to
self-identify as conservative and, especially, to oppose gay marriage than are individuals with more
muted physiological responses to the same images.").
233.
See supraPart I.C.
234.
This Article offers a couple of the multitude of policies that will need addressing. Welfare
reform, for example, demands significant attention if poor children are to gain access to resources
that mirror children in two-parent households. Greg Kaufmann, This Week in Poverty: The Invisibles
in
Mississippi
and
the
US,
NATION
(Sept.
28,
2012,
09:01
EST),
http://www.thenation.com/blog/170222/week-poverty-invisibles-mississippi-and-us#. Social security
reform represents another area that significantly impacts poor children. Christopher R. Tamborini et
al., A Profile of Social Security Child Beneficiaries and Their Families: Sociodemographic and
Economic Characteristics, 71 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 1, 1, 11 (2011), available at
http:/lwww.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v7I nl/v71 np1 .html.
235.
A report by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities identified some actions that could
improve the lives of the poor and reduce inequality. First among them was reforming state tax policy
to make it progressive rather than regressive. ELIZABETH MCNICHOL ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY PRIORITIES, ECON. POLICY INST., PULLING APART: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF
INCOME TRENDS 10, 52-54 (2012), available at http:/lwww.cbpp.org/files/1 1-15-12sfp.pdf.
Next, improve unemployment insurance and raise and index the minimum wage. Id at 10, 49-51.
236.
CHUCK MARR & CHYE-CHING HUANG, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT PROMOTES WORK, ENCOURAGES CHILDREN'S SUCCESS AT SCHOOL,
RESEARCH FINDS 1-2 (2014), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-26-12tax.pdf.
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strates that the characteristics necessary for a child's success in life are
not based on genetics, but on brain chemistry.237 Children who grow up
under chronic stress are less likely to possess strong executive functioning.238 Executive functioning is a key predictor of a child's ability to succeed in school.239 Yet, chronic stress is strongly correlated with living in
poverty. 24° Thus, it would appear that poor children are destined to repeat
the cycle of poverty. Not so.
A fascinating study measuring the effects of environmental stress on
children found that their cortisol levels-a hormonal response to stressspike when they experienced stress.24 1 However, a child's cortisol level
did not spike when encountering a stressful environment if the parent
was attentive and responsive to the child.242 In other words, parents who
can develop nurturing relationships with their children can mitigate the
effects of stress associated with living in a harsh environment, and in
turn, increase their children's executive functioning and ability to succeed in school.243
Thus, neuroscientists don't point to a particular type of family form
to ensure a child's chances of success, but rather a particular type of parent-child relationship. 44 One study revealed a 77% success rate at predicting whether a child would graduate from high school based on the
parental care the child received in his or her early years. 245 As expected,
though, developing these parenting skills in a harsh environment is not
an easy task. Such programs exist, but demand an investment in resources. Early childhood programs like Head Start, long considered one
of the most successful federal government "War on Poverty" programs
created, works with parents to support family stability. 246 One forty-year
longitudinal study that followed children into adulthood who had attended the Perry Preschool Project in a poverty-stricken neighborhood in
Michigan, found that the program led to profound social and economic
benefits.247 The graduates of the preschool program were "more likely to
237.

Gary W. Evans & Michelle A. Schamberg, Childhood Poverty, Chronic Stress, and Adult

Working Memory, 16 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6545, 6545, 6548 (2009).

238. Id."Executive functioning" refers to the ability of the brain to manage confusing and
conflicting information-the type of information that children encounter and must negotiate constantly in school. PAUL TOUGH, How CHILDREN SUCCEED: GRIT, CURIOSITY, AND THE HIDDEN
POWER OF CHARACTER 18 (2012).

239. See TOUGH, supra note 238, at 18.
240.
Id.
at 20.
241.
Clancy Blair et al., Salivary Cortisol Mediates Effects of Povertyand Parentingon Executive Functions in Early Childhood, 82 CHILD DEV. 1970, 1970, 1979 (2011).
242.
Id.
at 1970, 1978-80.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245.
L. ALAN SROUFE ET AL., THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON: THE MINNESOTA STUDY OF
RISK AND ADAPTATION FROM BIRTH TO ADULTHOOD 210-11 (2005).
246.
See Head Start of Morris County, NJ, HEAD START COMMUNITY PROGRAM MORRIS

COUNTY,INC., http://headstartmc.org/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
247. TOUGH, supra note 238, at xix-xx.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIE W

[Vol. 91:2

graduate from high school, more likely to be employed at age twentyseven, more likely to be earning more than twenty-five thousand dollars
a year at age forty, less likely ever to have been arrested, and less likely
to have spent time on welfare" than children who had not attended the
program.248 Recall that education and income were significant predictors
of family stability. 249 Thus, the cycle of family instability that seems to
plague poor families is not inevitable.
We do not need to reinvent the wheel. It can seem overwhelming
and hopeless to believe that any kind of meaningful redistribution of
resources is likely to occur. In fact, it may appear naive to believe that
even modest increased funding for social support networks is possible in
our current economic climate. Yet, research shows that this kind of resource investment actually yields tangible returns.2 5 0 Heckman analyzed
the Perry Preschool Project and found that for every dollar invested in
the program, a yield of seven to twelve dollars found its way into the
economy.251 These children developed non-cognitive skills like curiosity,
social fluidity, and social control that served them well throughout life.252
These are the same skills mirrored in affluent family structures, which
contribute to a child's success in life.253 Institutional support at the macro
level, though, will not succeed alone in creating family stability. At the
micro level, a cultural shift in individual interactions must occur-the
focus of the next section.
2. Renewing the Cultural Value of Respect
The second element that must be the focus of attention if the family,
in whatever form, is to experience stability is the resurgence of the cultural value of respect. The desire for a marginalized group to speak out
and ask for the same rights and access to resources should not be met
with condemnation or scapegoating 2 5 4 But even more pragmatically, we
should interact with our political, religious, and socioeconomic plurali248.
Id.at xx.
249.
See supra Part I.D.
250.
TOUGH, supra note 238, at 196.
251.
Id.
252.
Id.
at xx.
253.
See id.at 76.
254.
Something very wrong is present in a culture in which the media pays an individual to
write or declare contemptuous things about others--especially those with less social power. For
example, after observing the speeches of the first night of the Democratic National Convention, in
which Michelle Obama, Lilly Ledbetter, and Tammy Buckworth spoke, CNN commentator Erick
Erickson tweeted, "First night of the Vagina Monologues ... going as expected." CNN: Fire Erick
Erickson, ULTRA VIOLET, http://act.weareultraviolet.org/sign/erickson/?source=so%3E (last visited
Apr. 13, 2014)
(quoting Erick
Erickson, TWITTER
(Sept. 4,
2012, 5:31
PM),

hups:H/twitter.com/EWErickson/status/243144183529996288)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Such comments can be viewed as nothing more than contempt. When Sandra Fluke spoke up demanding access to birth control in the new health care law, Rush Limbaugh called her a slut. Jack
Mirkinson, Rush Limbaugh: Sandra Fluke, Woman Denied Right to Speak at Contraception Hear-

ing,

a

'Slut,'

HUFFINGTON

POST

(Feb.

29,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/29/rush-limbaugh-sandra-fluke-slut

2012,

9:26

n_1311640.html.

PM),
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ties with respect. As Harvard political philosopher Michael Sandel observed, "a better way to mutual respect is to engage directly with the
moral convictions citizens bring to public life, rather than to require that
people leave their deepest moral convictions outside politics before they
enter., 255 Indeed, we should interact with children and parents with respect because structural reform is not enough. Interpersonal behaviors
matter too.
Research reveals that the concept of respect, more so than any other
traditional measure of relationship success, determines relationship satisfaction-more so than love, likeability, personality, or attachment.256 In
Frei and Shaver's study, the results showed that, regardless of whether
respondents were considering what respect means for the general public
or for a romantic partner, five key concepts emerged.25 7 Respect was
associated with a person who had good morals, was considerate, listened,
was honest, and was accepting of other viewpoints.25 8 Moreover, the
researchers observed that the practice of respect actually engendered
more respect. 259 Other research by Sara Lawrence-Lightfoot demonstrated that respect brought reciprocal benefits. 260 Based on her research results, she encouraged a reformulation of the concept of respect not as
something accorded to someone in power, but rather grounded in empathy and connectedness in a place of equality-regardless of each party's
social or economic status.261
All the researchers agreed that respect was
262
the opposite of contempt.
Reinvigorating the concept of respect may better serve us in moving
towards a policy that supports social structures that will promote family
stability. However, respect must operate at both the individual and group
level in order for the necessary individual and social structural pieces to
successfully coalesce. As Coontz observed, "The problem is not to berate
people for abandoning past family values, nor to exhort them to adopt
better values in the future-the problem is to build the institutions and
social support networks that allow people to act on their best values rather than on their worst ones. 263

255.
Michael Sandel, Anne T. & Robert M. Bass Professor of Gov't, Harvard Univ., Talk
presented at official TED Conference: The Lost Art of Democratic Debate (Feb. 2010), available at
http://www.ted.com/talks/michael-sandel the-lost art of democratic debate.html.
256.
Jennifer R. Frei & Phillip R. Shaver, Respect in Close Relationships: Prototype Definition, Self-Report Assessment, and InitialCorrelates,9 PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 121, 135 (2002).
257.
Id. at125.
258.
Id. at 125, 128.
259.
Id. at 122, 128.
260.
SARA LAWRENCE-LIGHTFOOT, RESPECT: AN ExPLORATION 9-10 (2000).
261.
Id.
262.
Frei & Shaver, supranote 256, at 121-22.
263.
COONTZ, supra note 179, at 22.
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CONCLUSION

This Article has explored the extent to which state DOMAs are associated with their intended objective of increasing family stability. The
goal of the Article is to move the discourse and political-legal analysis
beyond whether DOMAs can promote family stability (they do not) to
considering means for achieving family stability for all family types
within a broad moral framework in a post-DOMA America. It may be
that those in power seek to maintain their power through the use of moral
panics, but the discourse of same-sex marriage as a threat to "traditional
families" seems off the mark. It is a distraction. After all, polls now show
that from 1988 to 2010, the gap between support of or opposition to gay
marriage has narrowed rapidly and significantly; 264 but the gap between
well-to-do versus hard-off and family stability and family volatility has
widened considerably. 265 Other industrial countries have managed to
welcome other family forms-including same-sex marriage-and yet
maintain family stability through the use of child-centered economic and
social policies. 266 Our goal should be to develop a policy that lets families thrive. 26 7 Marriage should not be a social objective in and of itself,
conceived from a singular hetero-normative notion. Rather, marriage
should be one possible outcome
of many from within an evolving family
268
and child-oriented policy.

264.
Nate Silver, Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage Appears to Shift at Accelerated Pace,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHTPOLITICS
(Aug.
12,
2010,
12:44
PM),
http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2010/08/opinion-on-same-sex-marriage-appears-to.html.
In fact,
51% of Americans are now in favor of same-sex marriage, and 72% believe that it is inevitable that
it will become the law of the land. PEW RESEARCH CTR., IN GAY MARRIAGE DEBATE, BOTH
SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS SEE LEGAL RECOGNITION AS 'INEVITABLE' 1 (2013), available at
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/06-0613%20LG BT%2OGeneral%2OPublic%2ORelease.pdf.
265.
STIGLITZ,supra note 196, at 19;seesupra Part I.B.1.
266.
Sixty percent of Norwegian families are married couples with children, despite allowing
for same-sex marriage. Fifty-five percent of Finnish families include married couples with children,
despite allowing for same-sex marriage. Sixty-three percent of Canadian families have married
parents with children, despite allowing for same-sex marriage. Seventy-eight percent of families in
the Netherlands comprise of married parents with children, despite allowing for same-sex marriage.
Fifty-one percent of Icelandic families contain married parents with children, despite allowing for
same-sex marriage. Various family structures thrive and do not threaten "traditional" family models
because these countries have far more generous economic and social policies devoted to children.
267.
See generally NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING
ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 10 (2008); Clare Huntington, Flourishing Families: Harnessing Law
to Foster Strong, Stable, Positive Relationships (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.law.ubalt.edu/centers/caf/pdf/Huntington.pdf.
268.
The Windsor decision moves us one small step closer in that direction. See United States
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013).
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APPENDIX A
MARRIAGE CALCULATED SLOPES FOR EACH STATE

Post

State
AK
AL

-0.190

-0.240

AR
AZ

-0.371

-0.486

-0.201

0.300

CA

0.033

0.000

CO

-0.143

-0.080

CT
DC

0.011
-0.286

0.060
0.770

DE

-0.132

-0.170

FL

-0.085

-0.200

GA

-0.190

-0.139

HI

0.625

-1.220

IA

-0.075

ID

-0.200

-0.420

IL

-0.193

-0.140

IN

-0.164

-0.050

KS
KY

-0.146
-0.360

-0.120
-0.251

MA

0.029

-0.090

MD

-0.111

-0.250

ME

-0.064

-0.170

MI
MN

-0.126
-0.154

-0.131
-0.190

MO
MS

-0.200
-0.306

-0.109
-0.214

MT

0.006

-0.006

NC

-0.193

-0.180

ND

0.043

-0.071

NH

-0.179

-0.040

NJ

-0.050

-0.120

NM

-0.218

0.120

NV

-4.730

-4.012

LA

NE

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
NY
OH

-0.104

-0.110

-0.271

-0.146
0.039

OK
OR

0.026

-0.183

PA

-0.036

-0.120

RI

-0.057

-0.210

SC

-0.401

-0.150

SD

-0.174

-0.190

TN

-0.705

-0.490

TX

-0.275

-0.130

UT

-0.003

-0.271

VA

-0.173

-0.240

VT

-0.164

0.160

WA

-0.121

-0.140

Wi

-0.106

-0.150

WV

-0.111

-0.180

WY

-0.139

-0.440
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APPENDIX

B

DIVORCE SLOPES CALCULATED FOR EACH STATE

State

Post

AK
AL

-0.123

AR

-0.049

-0.020
-0.063

AZ

-0.081

-0.100

CO

-0.071

-0.050

CT
DC

-0.014
-0.304

-0.060

DE

-0.089

-0.070

FL

-0.091

0.200

GA

-0.260

HI

-0.020

IA

-0.096

ID
IL

-0.075

CA

0.240

-0.132

0.110
0.010

KS

-0.057

0.140

KY

-0.091

-0.049

LA
MA

-0.050

0.030

MD

-0.011

-0.050

ME

-0.168

-0.010

MI

-0.080

-0.003

MN

-0.077

MO

-0.143

0.040

MS

-0.109

-0.080

MT

0.111

-0.117

NC

-0.089

-0.060

ND

-0.229

0.011

NH

-0.196

-0.070

NJ

-0.018

-0.030

NM

-0.025

-0.090

NV

-0.750

-0.128

IN

NE
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NY

-0.054

-0.070

OH

-0.086

-0.034

OK

-0.025

OR

-0.120

-0.037

PA

-0.093

-0.030

RI

0.043

0.060

Sc

-0.144

0.050

SD

-0.094

0.110

TN

-0.189

-0.060

TX

-0.089

-0.020

UT

-0.014

-0.071

VA

-0.064

-0.010

VT

-0.111

-0.010

WA

-0.100

0.010

WI

-0.043

0.020

WV

0.014

0.020

WY

-0.111

0.020
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BABY WITHOUT A COUNTRY: DETERMINING CITIZENSHIP
FOR ASSISTED REPRODUCTION CHILDREN BORN
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ABSTRACT

The United States has long followed the English common law view
that citizenship can be attained at birth in two ways: by being born in the
U.S. (jus soli) or by being born abroad as the child of a U.S. citizen (jus
sanguinis). For a child born abroad to claim citizenship throughjus sanguinis, the State Department for many years required proof of a blood
relationship between the child and a U.S. citizen. While a genetic test
serves this purpose for children conceived coitally, advances in assisted
reproduction techniques (ART) that have separated the two functions of a
birth mother-namely gestation and genetics-have greatly complicated
the definition of parentage. In modem times this has led to unjust results,
including the recent denial of U.S. citizenship to children born to American mothers who used donated eggs to conceive and give birth abroad.
While the State Department has recently modified its regulations to allow
the woman giving birth to claim maternity despite the lack of a genetic
tie, in many cases it continues to use a parentage standard that dates back
to 1952, when assisted reproduction techniques such as in vitro fertilization or the use of donated gametes had not yet been developed. This Article seeks to propose a workable solution to the question of citizenship
for children born overseas to American parents via ART. It first explores
the origins of jus sanguinis in Roman and English common law along
with ancient and medieval views of conception and maternity, and examines three prevailing methods to determine parentage: the parturient test,
genetic test, and parental intent test. Ultimately the Article recommends
that the State Department acknowledge advances in ART, and the different ways children are nowadays conceived, by altering its jus sanguinis
policy to allow several presumptions of parentage to apply.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States has long followed the English common law view
that citizenship can be attained at birth in two ways: by being born in the
United States (jus soli) or by being born abroad as the child of a U.S.
citizen (jus sanguinis). The first, jus soli, is now part of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside." 1 Jus soli theoretically does not inquire into the citizenship of the child's parents; the relevant fact is that the birth takes place in the United States. 2 Jus sanguinis,
in contrast, arises from the parent-child relationship. The State Department translates jus sanguinis as "the law of the bloodline," citing it as a
traditional "concept of Roman or civil law." 3 By "natural parent," the
State Department usually means a blood relationship with a U.S. citizen:
"It is not enough that the child is presumed to be the issue of the parents'
marriage by the laws of the jurisdiction where the child was born."
Jus sanguinis, involving proof of a blood relationship to one's child,
works well for children conceived the old fashioned way, through coitus-a blood test or DNA test will easily confirm the parentage of the
child in the vast majority of cases. But the matter is far more complicated
for those who have used donated sperm or ova to achieve a pregnancy;
I. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
2. Despite the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, Native Americans were not accorded
birthright citizenship until 1924, on the theory that the Indian tribes were an independent sovereign
and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. John Rockwell Snowden et al.,
American Indian Sovereignty and Naturalization: It's a Race Thing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 171, 182-83
(2001).
3. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, 7 FAM § 111 .a(2) (2012), available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86755.pdf. The American Philosophical Society's
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law defines jus (ius) sanguinis as "[the rights of blood (blood
ties = [cognatio]). They 'cannot be destroyed by any civil law."' 43 ADOLF BERGER, AM.
PHILOSOPHICAL SoC'Y, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW pt. 2, at 533 (1953). Cognatio
is defined as "[b]lood relationship." Id. at 393.
4. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, 7 FAM § 1131.4-I .a (2010).
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the man who intends to be the child's father, or the woman who will act
as the child's mother, may lack a blood relationship to the child. In such
a case, when donated gametes (sperm or ova) are used, the State Department always considers the child to be born out of wedlock, even if the
intended parents are married, and until a recent change in the website,
required proof of the blood or genetic relationship by clear and convincing evidence. 5
A purely genetic connection to the child is sufficient to establish
parentage in relatively few instances in American law. One is child support: even if the genetic father has had no contact with the child, and has
done nothing to establish a relationship (or has even been prevented from
knowing about the child), the genetic connection may be enough if no
other presumed father is on the scene. 6 As Theresa Glennon notes, "The
child support system for children born out of wedlock is based on the
assumption that biological fatherhood is a sufficient basis for legal and
financial responsibility for a child.",7 The rationale is that, once a man has
engaged in a sexual relationship, he has
a responsibility to provide for
8
any children born out of that encounter.
This Article explores a second instance in which the genetic connection is paramount: when an American citizen gives birth abroad. Over
7 million Americans live abroad, and more than 65 million travel abroad
annually. 9 Some Americans are venturing abroad specifically for infertility treatments because of lower costs at foreign clinics and the willingness of clinics to treat older patients.' 0 The result: in Fiscal Year 2012,
the State Department "registered 64,991 overseas births to U.S. parents."' However, citizenship has recently been denied to the children of
two American women who used anonymously donated gametes to con5.
See id. § 1133.4-2; Scott Titshaw, Sorry Ma'am, Your Baby Is an Alien: OutdatedImmigration Rules and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 47, 122, 129-30

(2010) (illustrating the State Department's genetic essentialist approach to determining the citizenship of children conceived through assisted reproductive technology). The State Department recently
changed its website to state that "a U.S. citizen mother must be either the genetic or the gestational
and legal mother of the child at the time and place of the child's birth." U.S. Dep't of State, Important Information for U.S. Citizens Considering the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology
(ART)
Abroad,
TRAVEL.STATE.GOv,
http://travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legalconsiderations/us-citizenship-laws-policies/assisted-reproductive-technology.htmI (last visited May
15, 2014).
6.
Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluatingthe Erosion of the Marital Presumption
of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 558 (2000).

7.
8.
9.
Do:

Id.
Id.
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE
CONSULAR
AFFAIRS
BY
THE
NUMBERS
(Jan.
2013),
available
at

http://travel.state.gov/pdf/ca fact sheet.pdf.
10.
Heather Won Tesoriero, Infertile Couples Head Overseas for Treatments-Clinics in
Thailand, Canada,Israel Tout CheaperIn-Vitro; Checking up on Success Rates, WALL ST. J., Feb.

19, 2008, at Dl; M. Susan Wilson, US. Women Crossing Globe for Fertility Help, NBC
NEWS.cOM,

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/1 9100571/ns/health-pregnancy/t/us-women-crossing-

globe-fertility-help (last updated June 13, 2007, 09:47 EST).
11.

BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, supra note 9.
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ceive and give birth to a child: one in Israel 12 and one in Switzerland; 13 in
a third case, the U.S. Embassy refused to recognize the birth mother as
the child's mother because she had used donated eggs and given birth to
the child in India.' 4 At least in these cases each woman knew that the
child to whom she had given birth was not genetically linked to her. The
State Department warns travelers:
The Department is aware of cases of foreign fertility clinics that have
substituted alternate donor sperm and eggs when the U.S. parents'
genetic material turned out not to be viable. The undisclosed switch
was revealed when the Post requested DNA tests as part of the process of documenting the child's citizenship for the purposes of issuing a passport. Such situations can have the unfortunate consequence
of leaving children stateless. 15
Part I of this Article discusses the origins ofjus sanguinis in Roman
and English common law, including ancient and medieval views of conception and maternity in determining the child's bloodline. Not surprisingly, these views differ significantly from those held today. Taking into
account this scientific background, Part II discusses citizenship laws in
early U.S. history and assumptions about who were the parents of a
child, both in wedlock and out of wedlock. While the definition of paternity has always taken note of biology as well as a man's relationship to
the birth mother, science began to play a more prominent role in the legal
definition of parenthood once blood grouping and blood tests were available starting in the early 1900s. Part III then introduces the law of U.S.
citizenship today, which in its main outlines is the same as first codified
in 1952. The ability of DNA testing to positively identify the father in
most cases, plus advances in assisted reproductive technology (ART) that
separate the two functions of the birth mother-genetics and gestationhave greatly complicated the definition of parentage for children, but the
State Department has, in large part, continued to use the same parentage
12.
Sarah Elizabeth Richards, Mother Country: The Perils of Getting an Assist Abroad on
Having a Baby-for Americans and Foreigners Both, SLATE (Mar. 27, 2012, 4:02 PM),

http://www.slate.com/articles/double-x/doublex/2012/03/fertility-tourism theperils of having a
babyabroad with assisted reproduction technology_.html.
13.
Conversation with Congressman Eliot L. Engel of New York, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 2, 2012) (notes on file with author) (discussing how Congressman Engel's office successfully helped the constituent gain citizenship for her child in January 2013, just before the child's
first birthday); Letter from Congressman Eliot L. Engel of New York, U.S. House of Representatives, to Hillary Clinton, Sec'y of State (July 10, 2012) (on file with author); E-mail from Brian
Skretny, Legislative Dir., Office of Congressman Eliot Engel, to author (Jan. 25, 2013, 10:18 AM)
(on file with author) (stating that child was granted citizenship prior to first birthday).
14.
Jaya Menon, In the Womb of Controversy, TIMES INDIA (Jan. 25, 2010, 04:59 IST),
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-01-25/chennai/28133900 I egg-donationconsulate-donor-eggs. In such a case, where only the egg and not the sperm has been donated, the
child may be able to obtain U.S. citizenship at birth if the father is a U.S. citizen. Id.
15.
U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 5. The child bom in Switzerland, for example, was officially stateless at birth because Switzerland does not recognize jus soli. Conversation with Congressman Eliot L. Engel of New York, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 2, 2012) (notes on file
with author).
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standard first detailed in 1952. Part IV examines and critiques three
methods of identifying parentage to determine which should be used for
children born abroad: the State Department's preferred method (genetics), the common law parturient test (the woman who gives birth is the
mother), and the recently developed intent test (those who intend to raise
the child are the parents). In Part V, the Article concludes that our citizenship rules for children born abroad must acknowledge the different
ways in which children are conceived and develop definitions of parentage that will avoid the unjust results noted in this Article.
I. WHERE Do BABIES COME FROM?
A. Greek andRoman Views of Parentage

The ancient Greeks and Romans shared two competing views on the
mother's role in creating a child but generally agreed that, whatever her
contribution, it was less important than the man's. 16 Most Greeks and
Romans followed the teachings of Aristotle, 17 who articulated the "one
'8
seed" theory in which the man provides the "movement and definition' 1
while the woman provides the nutriment. 19 Contributions by both male
and female were necessary, in Aristotle's view, but "birth must take
place in the female" because she "contains the matter out of which the
product is fashioned., 20 While Aristotle acknowledged that women could
become pregnant without experiencing orgasm, more often "the opposite
is the case" since the orgasm provided a means to draw the semen into
the uterus. 21 A second view among a minority of Greeks and Romans
was based on Hippocrates, who propounded the "two-seed" theory.22 In
16. See Nancy Tuana, The Weaker Seed: The Sexist Bias of Reproductive Theory, 3 HYPATIA
35, 41 (1988) ("Although such theorists [including Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Hippocrates, and
Parmenides] gave woman a role in the creation of the form as well as the material of the fetus, they
uniformly held that woman's contribution was weaker than that of man.").
17.

VERN L. BULLOUGH, SCIENCE IN THE BEDROOM: A HISTORY OF SEX RESEARCH 12-13

(1994). Aristotle lived from 384 to 322 B.C. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/aristotl/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
18.

ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE DE PARTIBUS ANIMALIUM I AND DE GENERATIONE ANIMALIUM I

51, 54 (D. M. Balme trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1992).
19. Id. at 50.
20. Id. at 54.
21.

THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD 48

(1990) (quoting ARISTOTLE, ON THE GENERATION OF ANIMALS bk. 2 ch. 4 § 739a[20]-[35]). Others
wrote that orgasm was a sign of conception: the physician to Justinian believed that women who
were raped were sterile, "while those 'in love conceive very often."' Id. at 49 (quoting AETIOS OF
AMIDA: THE GYNAECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS OF THE VI CENTURY, A.D. 36 (James V. Ricci trans.,

1950)). That debate has resurfaced today with the remarks of Representative Todd Akin that rape
rarely results in pregnancy because "[i]f it's a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to
shut the whole thing down." Lori Moore, The Statement and the Reaction, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2012, at A 13 (internal quotation mark omitted).
22. BULLOUGH, supra note 17, at 12 13; see also Yii-Jan Singh, Semen, Philosophy, and
Paul, 4
J.
PHIL.
&
SCRIPTURE
32,
35
n.14
(2007),
available at
http://www.philosophyandscripture.org/Issue4-2/Singh.pdf (referencing the two-seed theory). Hippocrates lived from 450 to 380 B.C. Michael Boylan, Hippocrates (c.450-c.380 B.C.E.), INTERNET
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/hippocra/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). Galen lived
from 130 to 200 C.E. and "was one of the most prominent ancient physicians." Michael Boylan,
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Hippocrates' view, both the man and the woman produced sperm which
then mixed together to create a child
just as though one were to mix together beeswax and suet,
using a larger quantity of the suet than of the beeswax, and
melt them together over a fire. While the mixture is still fluid, the prevailing character of the mixture is not apparent:
only after it solidifies can it be seen that the suet prevails
quantitatively over the wax. And it is23just the same with the
male and female forms of the sperm.
As early as the sixth century, Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis asserted that "the mother is certain" (mater semper certa est);24 the issue was
identifying the father. Roman law allowed the husband to dispute paternity of a child borne by his wife, but in a limited way: Once the wife
gave notice to her husband that she was pregnant, his role was "then either to send guards or to give notice to her that she is not pregnant by
him ....[U]nless he sends guards or replies giving her notice she is not
pregnant by him, the husband is compelled to acknowledge the offspring., 25 The guards were "[p]robably... meant to prevent a changeling child from being passed off as the" husband's child.26 Thus, in some
cases in ancient Rome, a child might lack a blood relationship to a man
designated as his father because he was married to the woman who gave
birth.
B. ParentageUnder English Common Law: Laying the Groundworkfor
the United States
As with the Romans and the Greeks, English common law emphasized the role of the male in conception. St. Thomas Aquinas 27 supported
the Aristotelian view that man's seed provided the form, while the wom-

Galen (130-200 C.E.), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/galen/ (last visited
Mar. 25, 2014).
23.
LAQUEUR, supra note 21, at 39 (quoting HIPPOCRATES & lAIN M. LONIE, THE
HIPPOCRATIC TREATISES "ON GENERATION," "ON THE NATURE OF THE CHILD," "DISEASES IV": A
COMMENTARY 3-4 (1981)).

24. Cindy L. Baldassi, Mater Est Quam Gestatio Demonstrat: A Cautionary Tale 3 (June 27,
2007) (unnumbered working paper, Univ. of B.C. Faculty of Law Working Papers Series) (quoting
GEORGE BLAXLAND, CODEX LEGUM ANGLICANARUM: OR, A DIGEST OF PRINCIPLES OF ENGLISH
LAW, ARRANGED IN THE ORDER OF THE CODE NAPOLEON 292 (1903)) (citing I THE DIGEST OF
JUSTINIAN 44 (Alan Watson ed., 1985)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-927147. Justinian,
born in 482 A.D., reigned from 527 to 565. Sarah Brooks, The Byzantine State Under Justinian I
(Justinian

the

Great),

METROPOLITAN

MUSEUM

ART,

http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/just/hdjust.htm (last updated Apr. 2009).
25.

(2004).
26.

BRUCE W. FRIER & THOMAS A.J. MCGINN, A CASEBOOK ON ROMAN FAMILY LAW 105

Id

27.
St. Thomas was born in 1225 and died in 1274 A.D. Ralph Mclnerny & John
O'Callaghan,
Saint
Thomas
Aquinas,
STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.,

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/ (last updated Sept. 30, 2009); Thomas Aquinas (12251274), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 6, 2009), http://www.iep.utm.edu/aquinas/.
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an supplied the "corporeal matter." 28 In the seventeenth century, the twoseed theory re-emerged in midwife manuals. While most still believed
that the woman's role in creating the child was solely passive, Nicholas
Culpeper 29 revived interest in Hippocrates' two-seed theory by propounding the "radical" idea that the woman contributed with an egg. 30 In
Culpeper's view, "the woman spends her seed as well as the man, and
both are united to make conception." 31 Another English writer at the
time, Jane Sharp, likewise believed that the woman released her seed in
orgasm, uniting with the male seed to become pregnant. 32 Later in the
seventeenth century a new theory emerged: the preformation doctrine,
which held that the embryo contained a complete miniature person who
was nourished in the uterus in order to grow.33 Debate ensued over
whether this miniature person was contained in man's semen (animalculism) or woman's egg (ovism). 34 In the 1670s Leeuwenhoek 35 sided
with animalculism by using a crude microscope to observe that semen
37
36
contained millions of animalcules, which he termed spermatozoa.
"Echoing centuries of tradition, Leeuwenhoek insisted that the nourishment of the masculine seed was the sole function of the female., 38 In
1694 Hartsoeker published a drawing of a drop of sperm containing a
tiny person, representing what he believed was contained in the semen.39

28. Tuana, supra note 16, at 46 (quoting THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1:98:2
(Fathers of the English Dominican Provinces trans., 1947)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
29. Nicholas Culpeper, an English physician (1616-1654), published his A Directory for
Midwives in 1651 to revive the two-seed theory. See Dylan Warren Davis, Nicholas Culpeper:
Herbalistof the People, SKYSCRIPT.CO.UK (Jan. 2005), http://www.skyscript.co.uk/culpeper.html.
30. Olav Thulesius, Nicholas Culpeper, Father of English Midwifery, 87 J. ROYAL SOC'Y
MED. 552, 554 (1994).
31.
Id.
Elaine Hobby, "Secrets of the Female Sex ": Jane Sharp, the Reproductive Female Body,
32.
and Early Modern Midwifery Manuals, 8 WOMEN'S WRITING 201, 202-03 (2001). Jane Sharp, a
midwife for over thirty years, was one of the first women to publish a book on her profession: The
Midwives Book: Or, the Whole Art of Midwify Discovered was published in 1671. Id. at 201, 209.
Ava Chamberlain, The Immaculate Ovum: Jonathan Edwards and the Constructionof the
33.
FemaleBody, 57 WM. & MARY Q. 289, 298 (2000).
34. Id.at 298-99.
35.
Antony van Leeuwenhoek was a fabric maker who built his own microscopes to be the
first to observe bacteria and other organisms. Antony van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723), U. CAL.
MUSEUM PALEONTOLOGY, www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/history/leeuwenhoek.htmi (last visited Mar. 26,
2014).
LAQUEUR, supra note 21, at 171.
36.
37. BULLOUGH, supranote 17, at 15.
Tuana, supra note 16, at 53.
38.
39. Id. at 54. Nicolaas Hartsoeker (1656-1725) published the pencil sketch in Essai de Dioptrique in 1694. Cera R. Lawrence, Nicolaas Hartsoeker, EMBRYO PROJECT ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://embryo.asu.edu/pages/nicolaas-hartsoeker (last modified Sept. 25, 2013).
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This material is reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. and also appears in Nancy Tuana's article The Weaker Seed: The
40
Sexist Bias ofReproductive Theory.

40.

Tuana, supra note 16, at 54.
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A century later, Erasmus Darwin (grandfather of Charles Darwin) 4' stat-

ed that the man supplied the form of the embryo, while the woman provided the oxygen and the food. 42 Astute observers wondered why some
children strongly resembled their mothers, if in fact only the father provided the blueprint, but science had an answer for that as well: a concave
impression that resembles the woman is in the "little nich[e] of the ova of
women," creating a mold to form the face of the child.43
As the science developed on conception and parentage, England had
several ways to determine citizenship at birth. As early as 1351, a statute
allowed children born abroad to English parents to be considered naturalborn English subjects, adhering to the principle ofjus sanguinis.44 After
King James VI of Scotland became King James I of England in 1603, the
question arose whether children born in Scotland after the "union of the
crowns" were English citizens.45 The decision in Calvin's Case in 1608
by the King's Bench, Common Pleas justices, the Lord Chancellor, and
the barons of the Exchequer-fourteen judges in all-was that they were,
thus confirming jus soli in English law.46 Those born in Scotland before
1603, such as Calvin's parents, were still Scottish subjects, not English.47
Thus, Calvin's Case expressed the common law view that the place of
birth, regardless of one's blood, could be a factor in determining citizenship. As Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, held,
Every one born within the dominions of the King of Eng-

land, whether here or in his colonies or dependencies, being
under the protection of-therefore, according to our
common law, owes allegiance to--the King and is subject
to all the duties and entitled
to enjoy all the rights and liber48

ties of an Englishman.

41.

Erasmus

Darwin

(1731-1802),

U.

CAL.

MUSEUM

PALEONTOLOGY,

www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/history/Edarwin.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). His book, Zoonomia, or,
The Laws of Organic Life (1794-1796), suggested a theory of evolution that his grandson later fully
developed. Id.
42.
Tuana, supra note 16, at 55.
43.
Id. at 56 (quoting 3 JEAN ASTRUC, A TREATISE ON THE DISEASES OF WOMEN 47-48
(1762)).
44.
Polly J. Price, NaturalLaw and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin's Case (1608), 9 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 83 (1997) (citing De Natis Ultra Mare, 1350, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2 (Eng.)).
45. Id. at 80.
46. Id. at 80-83.
47. Id. at 82-83.
48. Id. (quoting HERBERT BROOM, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VIEWED IN RELATION TO COMMON
LAW, AND EXEMPLIFIED BY CASES 31 (George L. Denman, 2d ed. 1885). The United Kingdom
continued to recognizejus soli until 1981. See Naturalization Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 14, § 4
(Eng.); British Nationality Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 56, § 4 (Eng.). The British Nationality Act
of 1981 changed the law by requiring that one of the child's parents be a British citizen even though
the child was born on British soil. British Nationality Act, 1981, c. 61, §§ 1, 3 (Eng.).
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II. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND SCIENCE, 1790 TO THE 1950s

When the Unites States was first formed, the definition of citizenship was left to the individual states. 49 Thomas Jefferson, then-Governor
of Virginia, crafted a statute enacted by his state in 1779 determining that
"all white persons born within the territory of this commonwealth"
would be citizens.5 ° In 1787, the U.S. Constitution granted Congress the
authority "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,"5 1 which was
exercised by the first Congress at its Second Session in 1790.52 The 1790
Act, in addition to allowing "any alien" who was "a free white person" to
apply for citizenship after residing here for two years, provided:
[T]he children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered
as natural born citizens: Provided,That the right of citizenship shall
not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the
United States .... 53

In 1795, the 1790 Act was repealed and replaced by a similar provision to provide citizenship for children born abroad.54 At that time, when
Congress first considered citizenship for those born abroad, it was not
possible for the birth mother to be anything other than the genetic mother
of the child. Whatever her role-whether she contributed some of the
seed for the child or merely nourished and housed a preformed childshe was the mother because she had given birth. The "ancient" Latin
maxim translated as "the mother is demonstrated by gestation" was
coined in 1983, 55 but until the advent of in vitro fertilization in the twentieth century, the definition of maternity was universally accepted. In any
event, the mother of a child born abroad could not transmit citizenship at
birth to her child. Like the 1790 and 1795 statutes, citizenship laws enacted in 180256 and 185557 required the child's father to be a resident of
49. Price, supra note 44, at 141. See also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 655
(1898) ('The [C]onstitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must
be had elsewhere to ascertain that."' (quoting Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167 (1874)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
50. James Brown Scott, Nationality: Jus Soli or Jus Sanguinis, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 58, 62
(1930) (referring to the Act of May 3, 1779, ch. 55, 1882 Va. Acts 129).
51.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
52. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815,823 (1971).
53.
Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 103-04 (creating uniform rules for naturalization).
54. Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414, 414-15 (establishing uniform rules for naturalization). The 1795 Act deleted the reference to a child "born beyond sea," but was otherwise nearly
identical to the 1790 Act in requiring the child's father to be a resident of the United States. Compare
id. § 3 ("[T]he children of citizens of the United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the
United States, shall be considered as citizens of the United States."), with Act of Mar. 26, 1790, § I
("[T]he children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of
the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens.").
55. Baldassi, supra note 24, at 6 (quoting U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,
INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 282 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153. The Naturalization Act of 1802 provided that
"the children of persons who now are, or have been citizens of the United States, shall, though born
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the United States but made no mention of the mother. 58 In 1907, Congress mandated that when a woman married a non-U.S. citizen, she lost
her U.S. citizenship. 59 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the statute's application to a woman who never resided abroad with her alien (British)
husband on the grounds that "[t]he identity of husband and wife is an
ancient principle of our jurisprudence., 60 The 1907 Act was later narrowed by the 1922 Cable Act to automatically strip the wife of U.S. citizenship only in cases where she married an alien ineligible for citizenship, 61 thus allowing many U.S. citizens with alien husbands to retain
their citizenship. Still, the foreign-born children of a U.S. mother and an
alien father were not eligible for citizenship at birth until 1934 when
Congress amended the statute to include a child "whose father or mother
or both at the time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United
States" and to require either the citizen father or the citizen mother to
reside in the United States before "the birth of such child." 62 As one
commentator noted, as of the 1934 Act:
[T]he foreign born children of a Chinese or Japanese woman born in
the United States would now be American. This is by way of sex
equality, however, not racial equality since previously the children of
no American woman, whatever her race, were American by virtue of
her nationality. Even under the present law if the native born American woman of Japanese or Chinese decent were to have children born
abroad by a husband racially ineligible to become a United States citizen it is not clear that they would
have American nationality or be
63
entitled to enter the United States.
Thus, in early U.S. history, and until 1934, the critical question in
determining citizenship for a child born abroad was the identity of the
child's father. If the mother was married, her husband was presumed to

out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States:
Provided, that the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never resided
within the United States." Id.§ 4.
57.
Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, 10 Stat. 604. An article published in 1853 had pointed out
that, by the terms of the April 1802 law, only parents who were U.S. citizens on or before April 14,
1802, could transmit U.S. citizenship to their children bom abroad. The Alienage of the United
States, 2 AM. L. REG. 193, 193 (1854); see also Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 663-64 (1927)
(discussing Binney's analysis of the 1802 law and the citizenship of children bom abroad). The 1855
Act corrected this glitch by allowing persons "whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their
birth citizens of the United States" to transmit citizenship to their children born abroad. See § 1, 10
Stat. at 604.
58.
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 461-62 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing
statutes determining citizenship for a child based upon the father's residence).
59.
Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, 1229.
60.
Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
61.
Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022. An alien ineligible for citizenship
referred to "the statutory exclusion of Asians from immigration eligibility." Kristin A. Collins, A
Short History of Sex and Citizenship: The Historians' Amicus Briefin Flores-Villar v. United States,
91 B.U. L. REV.1485, 1492 (2011).
62.
Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1,48 Stat. 797, 797 (emphasis added).
63.
Lester B. Orfield, The CitizenshipAct of 1934, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 116 (1934)..
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be the father-a principle followed in Roman times 64 and in English
common law. 65 If the mother was unmarried, the child had no legally
declared father or mother from whom to inherit 66 and could not claim
U.S. citizenship through either parent. Children born abroad to a U.S.
father and an alien secondary wife in a polygamous marriage, for example, were considered illegitimate and thus ineligible forjus sanguinis.6 7
Even with the marital presumption, an element of biology had long
been part of the paternity determination. As early as the 1700s, the English common law provided that if the husband was "beyond the seas" at
the relevant time, for example, he could challenge a finding that he was
the father.68 Science took a long time to ascertain when the "relevant
time" was, however. Fluger demonstrated in 1861 that menstruation
ceased in women whose ovaries were removed, and speculated "that
menstruation and ovulation occurred simultaneously." 69 As late as the
1890s, American doctors were still unsure how ovulation was triggered
and its connection to menstruation; 70 the relationship of hormones to
ovulation was not detailed until the 1930s. 71 Thus, evidence to include or
exclude a particular man as the father consisted of testimony regarding
access to the woman, but until the 1930s, such testimony focused on the
wrong time: the period of menstruation rather than ovulation.
The advent of blood testing provided a scientific means to identify,
initially, who was not the father. In 1901, Dr. Karl Landsteiner announced his theories on blood groups, along with the suggestion that the
groupings could be used in cases of disputed paternity, and in 1909 classified human blood into the groups still used today: A, B, AB, and 0.72
These new tests could only be used to exclude a man as the father.73 For
example, if the mother's blood was group A and the child's blood was
64.
65.

See I THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 24, at 44; Baldassi, supra note 24, at 3.
See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 446 (14th ed.

1803).
66. See id.at 444. "A [child born out of wedlock] wasfilius nullius, the child of no one, and
could inherit from neither father nor mother." JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 110 (9th ed. 2013).
67. See Mason ex rel. Chin Suey v. Tillinghast, 26 F.2d 588, 588-89 (1st Cir. 1928); Ng Suey
Hi v. Weedin, 21 F.2d 801, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1927).
68. Glennon, supra note 6, at 562-63; accord James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Proof of
lusband's Impotency or Sterility as Rebutting Presumption of Legitimacy, 84 A.L.R.3d 495 (1978)

(discussing cases where presumptive fathers disputed paternity presumptions).
69.
BULLOUGH, supra note 17, at 27.
70.
Id
71.
LAQUEUR, supra note 21, at 9. Before then, "standard medical-advice books recommended that to avoid conception women should have intercourse during the middle of their menstrual
cycles, during days twelve through sixteen, now known as the period of maximum fertility." Id.
72.

Karl

Landsteiner-Biographical,

NOBELPRIZE.ORG,

http://www.nobelprize.org/nobeljprizes/medicineiaureates/1930/landsteiner-bio.html
(last visited
Mar. 26, 2014).
73.
William Edward Taay, Blood Tests to Negative Paternity, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 126, 126
(1939) (citing State v. Wright, 17 N.E.2d 428, 431 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938), rev'd, 20 N.E.2d 229
(Ohio 1939)) (discussing the use of blood-grouping tests).
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group B, the father must have group B in his blood, and thus a father in
group 0 would be excluded.74 Although these blood tests were widely
accepted in paternity cases in Europe in the late 1920s, 75 American
courts were much more reluctant to consider them, even after Dr. Landsteiner won the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 1930 for this work. 76 U.S.
courts struggled with three issues regarding the tests in the 1930s and
1940s: (1) whether the science was sufficiently established to admit the
evidence; (2) if the evidence was admitted, how much weight it should
be given; and (3) if a party refused to consent to a blood test, whether the
court had the power to order it. The Supreme Court of South Dakota held
in 1933 that the trial judge's refusal to order the mother and child to
submit to a blood test was not an abuse of discretion because "it insufficiently appears that the validity of the proposed test meets with such
generally accepted recognition as a scientific fact among medical men as
to say that it constituted an abuse of discretion for a court of justice to
Demonstrating how quickly the
refuse to take cognizance thereof....
court's view of the science was changing, the same court clarified its
decision in 1936, stating:
[I]t is our considered opinion that the reliability of the blood test is
definitively, and indeed unanimously, established as a matter of expert scientific opinion entertained by authorities in the field, and we
think the time has undoubtedly arrived when the results of such tests,
made by competent persons and properly offered in evidence, should
be deemed admissible in a court of justice whenever paternity is in
issue.

78

Nevertheless, the court found no error in the trial court's refusal to order
blood tests in 1931 because "the literature of the topic of the scientific
reliability of the blood test (at least the body of such literature available
date., 79
in the English language) is, for the most part, subsequent to that
Even after courts ruled the evidence was admissible, and science
agreed that the blood test could definitively exclude someone as a par-

74. See, e.g., Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 74 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Cal. 1937) ("According to the Mendelian law of inheritance, this blood individuality is an hereditary characteristic which passes from
parent to child, and no agglutinating substance can appear in the blood of a child which is not present in the blood of one of its parents. According to the testimony of the physician in this case, the
blood of the child 'contains the agglutinogen B which is not present in the blood of the mother and
therefore must have been present in the blood of the father'; but the blood of the defendant does not
contain this element ....

[T]herefore . . . the defendant cannot be the father." (citation omitted));

Commonwealth v. Zammarelli, 17 Pa. D. & C. 229, 230 (1931).
In re Swahn's Will, 285 N.Y.S. 234, 236 (Sur. Ct. 1936) (finding credible evidence "that
75.
blood-grouping tests are commonly accepted as admissible evidence on questions of paternity in the
courts of Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Russia, Poland, Japan, and England" with
"over 5,000 instances... between 1926 and 1929" in continental Europe).
76. Karl Landsteiner-Biographical,supra note 72.
77. State v. Damm (Damm 1), 252 N.W. 7, 12 (S.D. 1933), aff'd, 266 N.W. 667 (S.D. 1936).
State v. Damm (Damm 1), 266 N.W. 667, 668 (S.D. 1936).
78.
Id. at 671.
79.
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ent, 80 triers of fact were not always persuaded by the expert testimony.
The Supreme Court of California upheld a decision that the defendant
was the father despite blood test evidence that excluded him, stating that
the trial court appropriately weighed "the testimony of the mother and
her witnesses on the one hand and the evidence of the defendant, including the blood test, on the other." 81 One of the most famous cases involved the actor Charlie Chaplin. Despite a stipulation from the mother
and her attorney that the paternity case would be dismissed with prejudice should the blood test exclude Chaplin as the father, and a subsequent test that did so exclude him, the jury's verdict of paternity was
upheld.
Once courts decided the tests were admissible, a further problem
remained: did courts have the inherent power to order a reluctant party to
submit to the test? An early decision in New York holding that a court
had such power was unanimously reversed,83 prompting the New York
legislature to enact a statute in 1935 to grant such power to a court
"[w]herever it shall be relevant to the prosecution or defense of an action. ''84 Similar statutes were enacted in Wisconsin in 1937,85 New Jersey
in 1939,86 and Ohio in 1940.87 In the absence of a specific blood test statute, some courts found "an inherent power to order [a] physical examination" without a specific statute. 88 A federal court interpreted Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 35, which generally allowed a court to order a physical examination if the condition is in controversy, to extend to a blood
test. 89 The Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, proposed
in 1952, provided a solution to these questions, but was adopted by very

80. While most of the cases involved paternity, the tests could also be used to determine
maternity. Ludvig Hektoen, Biologic Tests for Medicolegal Purposes, 199 NEW ENG. J. MED. 120,
126 (1928) (two women both claimed to be the mother of a child).
81.
Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 74 P.2d 1043, 1047 (Cal. 1937).
82.
Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442, 449-52 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946).
83.
Beuschel v. Manowitz, 271 N.Y.S. 277, 280-82 (Sup. Ct. 1934), rev'd, 272 N.Y.S. 165
(App. Div. 1934).
84. See In re Swahn's Will, 285 N.Y.S. 234, 237-38 (Sur. Ct. 1936) (quoting section 306-a of
the New York Civil Practice Act) (internal quotation mark omitted).
85. WIS STAT. § 325.23 (1937); see also Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479, 480 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1940) (identifying Wisconsin's statute as an example of a state law authorizing courts to order blood
tests to determine paternity when relevant).
86. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:99-3 to -4 (West 1939); see also Beach, 114 F.2d at 480 n.4 (identifying New Jersey's statute as an example of a state law authorizing courts to order blood tests to determine paternity when relevant).
87. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 12122.1 to .2 (West 1940); see also Beach, 114 F.2d at 480 n.4
(identifying Ohio's statute as an example of a state law authorizing courts to order blood tests to
determine paternity when relevant).
88. See, e.g., Damm 11, 266 N.W. 667, 670 (S.D. 1936) ("Though the cases are not entirely in
accord, it is distinctly the majority view that the courts have an inherent power to order physical
examination even in the absence of statute.").
89. See, e.g., Beach, 114 F.2d at 481 (holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a), which allows a court
to order a mental or physical examination of a party in an action in which such condition is in controversy, gives a court authority to order a party to submit to a blood test).
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few states in the 1950s and 1960s. 90 Section 1 of the Uniform Act empowered the court to "order the mother, child[,] and alleged father" to
undergo blood tests in any civil action "in which paternity [wa]s a relevant fact." 91 Section 4 declared that, if all the experts concluded that the
alleged father was not the father of the child, "the question of paternity
shall be resolved accordingly., 92 If the blood tests did not exclude the
father, the court exercised its discretion on whether to admit the evidence
because the test was capable
of excluding only 50% of the male popula93
tion as a potential parent.
III.

JUS SANGUINIS FROM

1952

TO THE PRESENT

In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), which remains in large part the law today.94 The Act gave the
Secretary of State the responsibility to administer and enforce the law
"relating to . . . the determination of nationality of a person not in the
United States., 95 The INA required a blood relationship to transmit citizenship from a U.S. citizen father to a child born out of wedlock
abroad.96 At that time, blood tests were admissible in many American
courts to exclude a man as the possible father of the child, but other evidence was needed to establish paternity. 97 Nineteen states adopted the
1973 Uniform Parentage Act,98 which provided for blood tests in Section
11 and governed the admissibility of the results in a paternity action in
Section 12.99 However, it was not until the development of the human
leukocyte antigen (HLA) test in the late 1970s, and then DNA tests, that
the parent could be determined solely by science in the vast majority of
cases. HLA tests, which examined tissue for various antigen markers,
increased the reliability of the results, especially when used in conjunction with blood tests, to exclude over ninety-one percent of all non-

90. A. Frederick Harris, Some Observationson the Un-Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity,9 VILL. L. REV. 59 app. at 76 (1963). Califonia, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Michigan initially adopted the 1952 Act. Id.at 59 n.2. California, Louisiana, New
Hampshire, Oregon, and Pennsylvania currently have versions of the Uniform Act. CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 7550-58 (West 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:396-:398.2 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
522:1-:9 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 109.250-264 (West 2013); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104
(2013).
91.
Harris, supranote 90, app. at 76.
92. Id.
93. Kevin L. Petrasic, Note, Cutchember v. Payne: Approaching Perfection in Paternity
Testing, 34 CATH. U. L. REV.227, 231 32 (1984).
94. See U.S. DE'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, 7 FAM §§ 1133.1-.3 (2010).
95. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), ch. 477, § 104, 66 Stat. 163, 174 (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(3) (2012)).
96. Id.§309, 66 Stat. 163, 238.
97.
Glennon, supra note 6, at 556.
98.
Why
States
Should
Adopt
UPA,
UNIFORM
L.
COMMISSION,
http://uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20States%2OShould%2OAdopt%2OUPA
(last
visited May 15, 2014).
99.
Parentage
Act
Summary,
UNIFORM
L.
COMMISSION,

http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspxtitle-Parentage%20Act (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:2

fathers.1°° In the late 1980s, DNA tests allowed courts to determine the
probability of paternity at a rate over ninety-nine percent. 10 1
Because the birth mother was always the genetic mother until the
advent of in vitro fertilization in 1978,102 determining maternity was
simple. Courts routinely noted that there was no problem establishing

maternity; the difficulty was always paternity.' 0 3 For children conceived
without assisted reproduction, American courts and statutes typically
determine paternity by first ascertaining whether the birth mother is married; if she is, then her husband is the presumed father. °4 Several states
allow the husband a brief window of time to dispute his paternity before
it becomes conclusive, 10 5 while others impose generous or no time limits
on the presumed father's right to rebut.10 6 To preserve family harmony, a

100. Petrasic, supra note 93, at 233-34.
101.
Glennon, supra note 6, at 555-56.
102.
In vitro fertilization (IVF) involves surgically removing the eggs from a woman and
combining them with the sperm in the lab to form a preembryo; the preembryo is then implanted in a
woman's uterus. In 1978, doctors in the United Kingdom announced the first successful birth of a
child after using
IVF.
1978: First 'Test Tube Baby' Born, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/25/newsid 2499000/2499411.stm (last visited
Mar. 27, 2014).
103.
E.g., Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1362 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (Gerber, J.,
concurring) (stating that the issue of maternity "seems to present no great practical problem because
maternal identity always seems to be a given fact"); Lohman v. Camahan, 963 So. 2d 985, 988 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) ("For centuries, the law developed on the assumption that a mother's parentage
was certain, but a father's connection to a child could be open to doubt."). But see Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., ConsideringMon: Maternity and the Model Act GoverningAssisted Reproductive Technology, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 601, 603-04 (2009) (recognizing that assisted reproductive technology may complicate maternity determinations).
104. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-20 (2013); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 584-4 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-204

(West 2013). This marital presumption may apply to a same-sex married couple in a state that recognizes such marriages. In Della Corte v. Ramirez, the court held that because Della Corte (the birth
mother) and Ramirez were married when the child was born and Ramirez had consented to the
procedure, Ramirez was the child's legal parent pursuant to a Massachusetts law stating that "[a]ny
child born to a married woman as a result of artificial insemination with the consent of her husband,
shall be considered the legitimate child of the mother and such husband." 961 N.E.2d 601, 602-03
(Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (2012)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court wrote, "We do not read 'husband' to exclude same-sex married
couples, but determine that same-sex married partners are similarly situated to heterosexual couples
in these circumstances." Della Corte, 961 N.E.2d at 603.
105.
In California and Delaware, for example, the husband has two years to challenge the
presumption of paternity. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541 (West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-607
(2013); In re Paulson, No. CS99-03153, 2006 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 281, at *30-31 (Del. Fam. Ct.
Sept. 15, 2006) (referencing Delaware's presumed paternity statute). In Louisiana, the husband has
one year from the day he "learns or should have learned of the birth of the child," unless the husband
and wife lived separate and apart for the 300 days preceding the birth. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189
(2013). Similarly, the District of Columbia provides two years to rebut the presumption unless the
presumed father did not live with the mother for the 300 days preceding the birth and did not openly
hold out the child as his own. D.C. CODE § 16-2342 (2012),
106.
E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-607(a) (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814 (2013); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-4-105 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-20 (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-4 (2013);

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2209 (2013) (a child or a person on behalf of the child can bring an action
any time if the relationship is presumed, but if not, a child or a person on behalf of the child can
bring an action "at any time until three years after the child reaches the age of majority"); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1562 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1027 (West 2013); UTAH
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man who believes he is the genetic father but is not married to the mother
has no standing to assert his parenthood in many states.' ° 7 Thus, in some
cases genetics is trumped by the marital presumption for paternity.
If the birth mother is not married, genetics play a wider role in determining paternity, although they still might not be conclusive. In a typical statute, the genetic father can claim paternity by participating in the
child's life.'0 8 DNA alone is not enough; the man must act as the child's
parent in some way.10 9 As the United States Supreme Court observed in
Lehr v. Robertson10 :
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the
natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop
a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may
enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do
so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a state to
listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie. I
In 1978, when the first child was born using in vitro fertilization,
maternity became an issue as well. Now that doctors were removing a
CODE ANN. § 78B-15-607 (West 2013) (presumption for child of marriage may be rebutted at any
time prior to filing action for divorce or in pleadings for divorce).
107. E.g., P.G. v. G.H., 857 So. 2d 823, 825, 830 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (holding that despite
DNA test establishing ninety-nine percent probability that G.H., not the birth mother's husband, was
the child's father, G.H. lacked standing to assert paternity as long as birth mother's husband maintained that he was father of her child); Rodney F. v. Karen M., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 402-03 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that Karen M.'s husband, not Rodney F., was the "presumed father" of the
child born to Karen M., a married woman, and thus Robert F. had no standing to sue for paternity);
J.S. v. S.M.M., 67 So. 3d 1231, 1233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (S.M.M. could not challenge patermity of husband when child born to wife of intact marriage); Barnes v. Jeudevine, 718 N.W.2d 311,
315 16 (Mich. 2006) (affidavit of parentage and birth certificate naming former boyfriend as child's
father did not rebut presumption that birth mother's husband was father; boyfriend had no standing
to assert paternity); Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B. U. L. REv. 227, 236 n.37 (2006) (identifying a few
states that allow a man to challenge a husband's status as father, but noting that, "[n]onetheless,
procedural doctrines of finality, such as issue preclusion and collateral estoppel, prevent geneticsbased challenges to adjudicated determinations of the husband's presumed paternity").
108. E.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a) (1973) ("A man is presumed to the natural father of a
child if: ...(4) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and
openly holds out the child as his natural child ....");UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (2002) ("A
man is presumed to be the father of a child if: . . .(5) for the first two years of the child's life, he
resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as his own.").
109. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389, 392 (1979) (holding that a state statute that
allowed unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, a veto over the adoption of the couple's children
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, but noting, however, that "[i]n those
cases where the father never has come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in
the Equal Protection Clause precludes the State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing
the adoption of that child"); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254 n.14, 255-56 (1978) (holding
that adoption of a child did not violate the genetic father's due process and equal protection rights
because, for eleven years between the child's birth and the adoption petition, the man had not legitimized the child and did not have custody).
110. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
Ill. Id.at 262 (footnote omitted).
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woman's eggs and fertilizing them in the lab, the woman who gave birth
might not be the genetic mother: She could be using eggs donated from
another woman, or she could be a gestational carrier. Rather than assume
that the woman who gave birth was the mother, the State Department
required the woman to have a blood relationship to the child as well,
even if she was married to the child's genetic father.1 12 "The laws on
acquisition of U.S. citizenship through a parent have always contemplated the existence of a blood relation between the child and the parent(s)
through whom citizenship is claimed,"' 13 the Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual asserts. Thus, even if the child is born in wedlock
and presumed to be the issue of that marriage, "This presumption [of
parentage] is not determinative in citizenship cases ... because an actual
blood relationship to a U.S. citizen parent is required."'1 14 The Ninth Circuit has rejected the State Department's interpretation in two cases that
did not involve ART, holding that a child was entitled to U.S. citizenship
15
even though the child lacked a genetic tie to the U.S.-citizen parent .
Others have criticized the State Department's interpretation
of the Act,
116
arguing that it goes beyond the language of the statute.
In late 2013, the State Department quietly amended its website to
recognize giving birth as a means to prove maternity. 17 With this
change, the State Department reflected language in recent U.S. Supreme
Court cases that assumes that the woman who gives birth is also the genetic mother of the child.' 18 Justice Stevens's opinion in Miller v. Albright"9 in 1998, for example, is based solidly on that assumption. In
noting the requirements for a single woman to convey her U.S. citizenship to her child born abroad, the court stated that "she must first choose
to carry the pregnancy to term and reject the alternative of abortion ....

112.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, 7 FAM § 1131.4-1.a (2010).
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
See Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a child
was born in wedlock and was not deportable, even though the child had no genetic tie to a U.S.
citizen, because the birth mother gave up the child to the genetic father and his U.S. citizen wife);
Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a child was born in wedlock
and was thus a "legitimate child" under the INA because, at the time of the child's birth, the Philippine mother was married to a U.S. citizen, even though the child was conceived prior to the marriage
by a non-U.S. father).
116.
E.g., Titshaw, supra note 5, at 105; Bernard Friedland & Valerie Epps, The Changing
Family and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Impact of Medical Reproductive Technology on the
Immigration and Nationality Act's Definition of the Family, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 429, 451 (1997)
(arguing, for example, that in cases where donor eggs are fertilized with the husband's sperm and
then implanted into the wife, "[t]here seems to be no reason not to treat the wife as the mother of the
child for immigration purposes, where it is clear that the egg donor waived any rights in possible
offspring").
117.
"[A] U.S. citizen mother must be either the genetic or the gestational and legal mother of
the child at the time and place of the child's birth." U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 5.
118.
See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 433-34 (1998); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53,
61 (2001).
119.
523 U.S. 420 (1998).
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She must then actually give birth to the child." 120 By so doing, "[t]he
blood relationship to the birth mother is immediately obvious and is typically established by hospital records and birth certificates" thus differentiating her conduct from that of the unwed father, who may not even be
aware of the birth. 12 1 Writing for the majority in a more recent citizenship case, Justice Kennedy likewise assumed that the birth mother is always genetically related to her child. He declared that "[first, a citizen
mother expecting a child and living abroad has the right to reenter the
United States so the child can be born here and be a [Fourteenth]
Amendment citizen., 122 That option would not be available if a foreign
gestational carrier gives birth to the child. Echoing Justice Stevens in
Miller, Justice Kennedy asserted that "[i]n the case of the mother, the
[biological parent-child] relation is verifiable from the birth itself." 123 If
that were true, however, all three of the women in our case studies,
American citizens who gave birth in Switzerland, Israel and India, would
their children had the language
have transmitted their U.S. citizenship to
124
now used on the website been followed.
IV. DETERMINING PARENTAGE FOR A CHILD CONCEIVED USING

ART

How should we determine parentage, and in particular maternity,
now that genetics and gestation can be separated through assisted reproduction technology (ART)? For centuries, we had only one test for maternity: the mother was (and still is, in most cases) the woman who gave
birth, the parturient. Many countries have adopted the parturient rule,
including Argentina, Austria, Chile, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the U.K.'25 The rule is justified
because:
[I]t is predictable, pragmatic and not dependent on further analysis,
such as a genetic test; it thus promotes legal certainty. Second, the
woman carrying the child is the person who, during pregnancy and at
birth, establishes a strong physical and psychological bond with the
child ....

This can also be [a] coherent choice for legal systems where surrogate motherhood, while not prohibited, is discouraged or strongly
regulated. If a surrogacy agreement is entered into nonetheless, without complying with the prescribed rules, the consequence again
120.
121.
122.
123.

Miller, 523 U.S. at 433.
Id. at 436, 438.
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 61 (2001).
Id.at 62.

124. The State Department website now recognizes the "genetic or the gestationa"'mother to
transmit her citizenship to the child. U.S. Dep't of State, supranote 5 (emphasis added).
125.
Daniel Gruenbaum, Foreign Surrogate Motherhood: Mater Semper Certa Erat, 60 AM. J.
COMP. L. 475, 476-77 (2012).
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would be that the parturient, not
the commissioning woman, should
126
be considered the legal mother.
As a New Jersey Court observed in denying a pre-birth order that
would have declared that the genetic parents, not the gestational carrier,
were the parents of the child:
A bond is created between a gestational mother and the baby she
carries in her womb for nine months. During the pregnancy, the fetus
relies on the gestational mother for a myriad of contributions. A gestational mother's endocrine system determines the timing,
amount
and components of hormones that affect the fetus. The absence of
any component at its appropriate time will irreversibly alter the life,
mental capacity, appearance, susceptibility to disease and structure
of the fetus forever. The gestational mother contributes an endocrine cascade that determines how the child will grow, when its cells
will divide and differentiate in the womb, and how the child will appear and function for the rest of its life. 127
Susan Appleton favors the parturient rule as a functional test that a
woman can meet "in an objectively ascertainable way." 128 Unlike a genetic test, which would "wreak havoc" with donated gametes and would
require routine genetic testing, or an intent-based test, which requires a
court to ascertain the parents, Appleton's test recognizes that a woman
29
who gestates a child for nine months has performed parental functions.
Jennifer Hendricks also advocates for the parturient rule, emphasizing
that "[a] woman acquires initial parental rights by having biological offspring whom she gestates and to whom she gives birth; a man acquires
similar rights by caring for his offspring after they are born."' 3 Like
Appleton, she notes that the test also allows maternity to be determined
without involvement by the state.131
The chief consequence of the parturient test is that it excludes those
who want genetic children if neither partner can gestate a child, because
the gestational carrier is deemed the mother.' 32 For states that seek to ban

126.

Id. at 477-79 (footnote omitted).

127.
A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 953-54 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
128.
Appleton, supra note 107, at 283.
129.
Id. at 283-84.
130.
Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 444
(2007) (footnote omitted).
131.
Id. at 466.
132.
Susan Appleton has pointed out a possible solution that some scholars have advocated:
apply the parturient rule only in cases of coital reproduction and donor insemination, but not when a
gestational carrier is used. Appleton, supra note 107, at 264-66. Ultimately, she rejected this variation:
Try as I might, I cannot escape the conclusion that, in applying a functional test to construct a default rule operative at the time of birth, the woman gestating the pregnancythe "surrogate"--will always have met the test, given the unique parental functions she
has performed during pregnancy ....
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or limit gestational carrier arguments, this would be a positive outcome
of the parturient test, even though it would preclude a number of infertile
couples, including all gay couples, from having children with a genetic
tie to one of the intended parents. Several states have attempted to curb
the use of gestational carrier agreements by stating that the gestational
carrier is the legal mother of the resulting child, 33 but an irrefutable pre34
sumption of maternity has been successfully challenged in two states.1
The highly publicized "Baby Manji" case illustrates the danger of
the parturient test for a gestational carrier. In 2007, a Japanese couple,
Ikufumi and Yuki Yamada, entered into a gestational carrier agreement
with an Indian woman, Pritiben Mehta.' 35 The Yamadas were not alone;
at that time India's commercial surrogacy industry was estimated to
bring in $445 million per year. 136 An anonymously donated egg was fertilized with Mr. Yamada's sperm, and the resulting pre-embryo was implanted in Ms. Mehta. 137 The Yamadas divorced in June 2008, one month
before Baby Manji was born, and only Mr. Yamada sought parentage of
the child. 38 The Japanese Embassy in India refused to give the child a
passport or visa because Japanese law does not recognize surrogate children. 39 India would not issue a birth certificate because Indian law requires both the mother and the father to be named, and authorities were
unsure whether the gestational carrier, the egg donor, or the intended
mother was the mother of the child, especially since none of the three
sought to be declared the mother. 140 With no birth certificate, India refused to issue a passport, and so Baby Manji was stateless. Mr. Yamada
did not have the option to adopt his own genetic child; an 1890 law prohibits single men from adopting baby girls."4 Following argument in the
India Supreme Court, the Indian government agreed to issue an identity

Id. at 275. The new Uniform Probate Code (UPC) amendments (2008) for children of assisted reproduction have adopted this solution. UPC § 2-120 declares that the woman who gives birth is the
mother if she is not a gestational carrier; another section, UPC § 2-121, applies when a gestational
carrier is used to declare that the woman who gives birth is ordinarily not considered the mother of
the child. Kristine S. Knaplund, The New Uniform Probate Code's Surprising Gender Inequities, 18
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 335, 341 & nn.46-48 (2011).
133.
ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25-218, invalidatedby Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (repealed 2005).
134.
Soos, 897 P.2d at 1360-61; J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1283 (D. Utah 2002).
135.
Kari Points, Commercial Surrogacy and Fertility Tourism in India: The Case of Baby
Manji,
KENAN
INST.
FOR
ETHICS
DUKE
U.
2
(2009),
available
at

https://web.duke.edu/kenanethics/CaseStudies/BabyManji.pdf.
136.
Id. at 3.
137.
Id. at 2.
138.

Japan

Gate-Pass

for

Baby

Manji,

TELEGRAPH

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1081018/j sp/nation/story_9984517.jsp.
139.
Points, supra note 135, at 5.
140.
Id,
141.
Id

(Oct.

18,

2008),
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certificate for Baby Manji, after which the Japanese embassy issued her a
one-year visa to travel to Japan.a 2
Some argue that the parturient test shortchanges the harm suffered
by the intended parents while emphasizing the loss felt by the gestational
carrier; 43 it assumes that the bond felt by the parturient is superior to
those developed by parents who lack a genetic or adoptive tie to the
child, an assumption that is not supported by existing studies.' 44 It also
allows a gestational carrier who has agreed to relinquish the child at birth
to renege on her promise.1 45 The test places great emphasis on the bond
formed during pregnancy, arguably making it superior to parental bonds
formed later. Part of this bond may be chemical. Many pregnant women
experience an increase in the hormone oxytocin (OT), which is believed
to encourage postpartum behaviors (such as nursing) and to "prime[] the
mental processes required for affiliative bonds."' 146 "[M]aternal bonding
to the fetus during the third trimester was predicted by the increase in
plasma OT from the 1st to the 3rd trimester, indicating dynamic associations between OT and the evolving maternal-infant bond.' ' 147 But not all
pregnant women have high levels of OT; those with low levels are asso148
ciated with symptoms of depression both before and after the birth.
High OT levels are also found in foster parents 149 and women playing
with children not their own. 150 A number of studies have found that
adoptive parents and their children have strong relationships. 5 1 Thus, the
142.
Finally, Baby Manji Flies to Papa in Japan Today, TIMES INDIA (Oct. 31, 2008, 17:56
IST), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-10-31/jaipur/27907561 _ japanese-surrogatebaby-manji-yamada-surrogate-child.
143.
See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 407 (1991); Marjorie Maguire
Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunityfor Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 366 (1990).
144.
See Hill, supranote 143, at 399-400.
145.
Id. at 393; John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal
Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 1014-15 (1986); Shultz, supra note 143,
at 384.
146.
Ruth Feldman et al., Evidence for a NeuroendocrinologicalFoundationof Human Affiliation: Plasma Oxytocin Levels Across Pregnancy and the Postpartum Period PredictMother-Infant
Bonding, 18 PSYCHOL. Sci. 965, 969 (2007). See also Wendy Saltzman & Dario Maestripieri, The
Neuroendocrinologyof Primate MaternalBehavior, 35 PROGRESS NEURO-PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
& BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1192, 1197 (2011) (noting the correlation of OT and attachment to
fetus, such that OT may act to facilitate the onset of maternal behavior).
147.
Ruth Feldman, Oxytocin and Social Affiliation in Humans, 61 HORMONES & BEHAV. 380,
384 (2012).
148.
Id. at 386; see also Feldman et al., supra note 146, at 969.
149.
Feldman et al., supra note 146, at 386.
150.
Johanna Bick & Mary Dozier, Mothers' Concentrations of Oxytocin Following Close,
Physical Interactions with Biological and Nonbiological Children, 52 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOBIOLOGY 100, 104 (2010) ("Mothers showed higher levels of oxytocin following interactions with unfamiliar children than following interactions with their own children.").
151.
Hill, supra note 143, at 402-03 & n.255; Steven L. Nickman et al., Children in Adoptive
Families: Overview and Update, 44 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 987, 989
(2005) (stating that in a study of 715 adoptive families in the United States, ninety-five percent of
the adoptive parents endorsed the statement "I feel deeply attached to my child" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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parturient test may assume a strong bond where none in fact exists, and
discount the bonds formed between parents and children after the child's
birth.
In the three cases cited above,' 52 in which American women used
donated ova to give birth to a child in Switzerland, Israel or India, a parturient test would provide the most equitable result. All three women
used donated eggs to become pregnant and give birth to children that
they intended to raise. In the United States, each of the three women
would be the presumed mother because she gave birth to the child.'53 No
one is likely to challenge her status as the mother if the egg donor is truly
a donor, 54 although many states have yet to enact statutes eliminating
parental status for an egg donor. 55 Thus, for our three present cases, the
matter could be easily resolved by changing the State Department regulations to mirror existing state law and the language on the State Department's website. However, because a parturient test would exclude infertile couples from being presumed parents in many cases, other parentage
tests should also be considered.
Now that the science has progressed to the point that we can positively identify a child's genetic parents with a very high degree of certainty,156 should that be our test for parentage? Anthony Miller is a key
proponent of the view that genetics should be one of the tests for parentage, arguing that the biological connection is unique and worthy of constitutional protection. 57 Indeed, he asserts that presumptions (such as the
marital presumption) that prevent a genetic father from proving paternity
may violate a man's substantive and procedural due process rights. 158 A
genetic test would always exclude at least half of a same-sex couple from
claiming parentage; it would also insert a third (or even fourth) party into

152.
See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
153.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(1) (2002); Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the
Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 497,
524 (1996).
154.
See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675, 678, 682 (Cal. 2005) (concluding the woman
who donated an egg to her same-sex partner and the woman who gives birth to the child are both
parents).
155.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3(b) (2013); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(f) (West 2013); MINN. STAT. § 257.56(2) (2013); MO. REV. STAT. §
210.824(2) (2013); MONT, CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(2) (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.061(2)
(West 2011); WISC. STAT. § 891.40(2) (2013), for examples of statutes that state that a sperm donor

is not a parent but do not explicitly include an egg donor.
156.
See, e.g., E. Donald Shapiro, Stewart Reifler & Claudia L. Psome, The DNA Paternity
Test: Legislating the Future Paternity Action, 7 JL. & HEALTH 1, 29-30 (1992-93) (stating that
current tests determine probability of parentage to 99.999999% accuracy); cf State ex rel. Dep't of
Soc. Servs. v. Miller, 218 S.W.3d 2, 3-4 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that blood tests showed that
twin brothers each had a 99.999% probability of being the father).
157.
Anthony Miller, Baseline, Bright-Line, Best Interests: A Pragmatic Approach for California to Provide Certainty in Determining Parentage, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 637, 694-97 (2003).

158. Anthony Miller, The Case for the Genetic Parent: Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, Lehr, and
Michael H. Revisited, 53 LoY. L. REV. 395, 437, 440-41 (2007).
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59
any couple-heterosexual or homosexual-using donated gametes.
The main allure of the test-its certainty-may prove to be ephemeral as
science progresses. Even today, a DNA test is unable to discern parentage in cases of identical twins.' 60 Two recent cases, neither involving
assisted reproduction, struggled with the issue of paternity when the potential father was an identical twin. Because DNA tests established both
men as the father, other evidence-the old nineteenth century, eighteenth
century, even seventeenth century tests of access to the mother-was
needed to determine which twin had fathered the child.

In the future, scientific advances in assisted reproduction technology may open the door to children with mixed DNA, thus rendering the
DNA tests inconclusive in more instances. In the early 1990s, researchers
reported a controversial and highly successful ART that created genetic
anomalies in the children. Dr. Jacques Cohen pioneered a solution for
female infertility in which the ooplasm (cytoplasm) of a donor egg was
61
injected into the egg of a woman who had had difficulty conceiving.'
The initial attempts resulted in twelve clinical pregnancies after twentyeight attempts in twenty-five women, a rate "higher than expected" in a
population in which participants had had difficulty conceiving.' 62 Over
the next several years, as many as thirty children were born using this
technique. 63 After confirmation that some of the children had genetic
material from three sources (the donor egg, the intended mother's egg,
and the sperm), 164 the Food and Drug Administration notified Dr. Cohen
and his team that the use of techniques such as ooplasm transfer "constitutes a clinical investigation and requires submission of an Investigation-

159.

See, e.g., Dantzigv. Biron, No. 07CA 1, 2008 WL 187532, at* 1-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 18,

2008) (dismissing action brought by genetic father who sued gestational carrier
for paternity for
failure to join the natural mother, the egg donor, as a party).
160.
See Dep't of Pub. Aid ex rel. Masinelli v. Whitworth, 652 N.E.2d 458, 459-60 (111.
App.
Ct. 1995) (deciding blood tests showed that either twin brother could be father of child despite
testimony by mother of child that she had sexual relations with one brother but not the other); Miller,
218 S.W.3d at 3-4, 6 (finding that blood tests showed that twin brothers each had a 99.999% probability of being the father; because mother testified to having had sexual relations with both brothers,
the court used other evidence to determine which brother had access to mother at time of conception). Because the children in these cases were conceived coitally, evidence other than genetic tests
could be used to determine paternity.
161.
Jacques Cohen et al., Ooplasmic Transfer in Mature Human Oocytes, 4 MOLECULAR
HUM. REPROD. 269, 277 (1998).
162.
Jason A. Barritt et al., Mitrochondria in Human Offspring Derived from Ooplasmic
Transplantation, 16 HUM. REPROD. 513, 513 (2001).
163.
David Whitehouse, Genetically Altered Babies Born, BBC NEWS (May 4, 2001, 15:26

GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sci/tech/1312708.stm.
164. Barritt, supra note 162, at 513; Heidi Mertes & Guido Pennings, Embryonic Stem CellDerived Gametes and Genetic Parenthood: A Problematic Relationship, 17 CAMBRIDGE Q.

HEALTHCARE ETHICS 7, 8 (2008) ("[Olne objection persists against both ooplasmic transfer and
oocyte nuclear transfer, namely, that the resulting child would have two genetic mothers: one providing the nuclear DNA (and in the [ooplasmic] case most of the mtDNA) and another providing mitochondrial DNA.").
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al New Drug application (IND) to FDA,' 165 shutting down the experiment in the United States.' 66 Doctors developing a related procedure to
overcome infertility, in which the nucleus from one woman's egg was
injected into a donor egg, halted their research after the FDA letter and
gave their results to doctors in China.' 67 Most recently, scientists have
replaced mutated mitochondrial DNA with donor DNA, reporting that
70% of the experimental eggs were successfully fertilized. 168 A recent
article in The Economist describing Dr. Shoukhrat Mitalipov's work at
the Oregon Health and Science University featured a cover banner that
proclaimed "The benefits of having three parents."'169 Even without human intervention to alter DNA, there is evidence that mitochondrial heteroplasmy, in which mitochondrial DNA inherited from the mother is not
170
identical in all samples from a single person, can occur spontaneously.
Although DNA tests today sequence nuclear DNA and not mitochondrial
DNA, we can't assume that this will always be the case as science progresses.
In the future, the use of inheritable genetic modifications (IGM)
could alter DNA such that the child's DNA would not reflect the genetic
makeup of her parents. Scientists are experimenting with ways to alter a
specific gene through in vitro fertilization, gene transfer, stem cells, and

165. Letter from Kathryn C. Zoon, Dir., Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research, Food &
Drug Admin., to Sponsors / Researchers, Dep't of Health and Human Servs. et al. (July 6, 2001),
available at http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/ucml 05852.htm.
166. The risks associated with mixing the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) are not known, but
there is speculation that the donor might transmit a hereditary disease or alter certain behavioral
traits. Mertes & Pennings, supra note 164, at 8; see also Rachel Levy et al., Cytoplasmic Transfer in
Oocytes: Biochemical Aspects, 10 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 241, 245 (2004) (noting that mtDNA is
transmitted only by the female for an evolutionary reason, and so including mtDNA from a second
female might have unexpected effects); M. De Rycke et al., Epigenetic Risks Related to Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, 17 HUM. REPROD. 2487, 2491 (2002) ("Ooplasmic transfer into human
oocytes may induce conflicts between the multiple genome parts (nuclear DNA, recipient mtDNA,
donor mtDNA) and lead to unpredictable outcomes."); E. Scott Sills et al., Genetic and Epigenetic
Modifications Associated with Human Ooplasm Donation and Mitochondrial HeteroplasmyConsiderations for Interpreting Studies of Heritability and Reproductive Outcome, 62 MED.
HYPOTHESES 612, 615 (2004) (observing that negative outcomes may not be known for several
decades). Note that the nuclear DNA is not affected by ooplasmic transfer. See A.L. Bredenoord et
al., Ooplasmic and Nuclear Transfer to Prevent Mitochondrial DNA Disorders: Conceptual and
Normative Issues, 14 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 669, 670 (2008).

167.

See Denise Grady, Pregnancy Created Using Egg Nucleus of Infertile Woman, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 14, 2003, at Al.

168. Gautam Naik, DNA Switch Boosts Disease Fight, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2012, at A4.
169. Hello Mothers, Hello Father, ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2012, at 79, 79-80, cover.
170.
See Mark R. Wilson et al., A Family Exhibiting Heteroplasmy in the Human Mitochondrial DNA Control Region Reveals Both Somatic Mosaicism and Pronounced Segregation of Mitotypes,
100 HuM. GENETICS 167, 167, 170 (1997), for an analysis of mitochondrial DNA typing of three
separate hair root extracts from a single individual. The study concluded that "the degree of heteroplasmy differs from hair to hair." Id.at 169. Accordingly, the authors advised that "[d]epending on
the situation, if there is an apparent difference of one or two nucleotides between two samples, one
should consider the possibility of heteroplasmy.... Should evidence exist for a heteroplasmic mixture at such a base or bases, the proper interpretation would be a failure to exclude" the two samples
as potentially originating from the same source. Id.
at 170.
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cloning.'17 Currently, prospective parents using in vitro fertilization can
analyze each pre-embryo for specific genetic diseases, such as Tay Sachs
or cystic fibrosis, to choose which to implant if at least one viable preembryo is free of the disease. No genes are modified or altered through
17
this procedure, called pre-implantation genetic diagnosis or screening. 2
By contrast, IGM would change the genetic makeup by removing embryonic stem cells from the pre-embryo, altering the cells to create new
genes, and eventually implanting the pre-embryo with the modified cells
in a woman. 173 The resulting child would have a gene that is absent from
both her mother and her father. In the distant future, science may make it
possible for prospective parents to assemble a child through synthetically
created genes, so theoretically the child's entire genetic makeup might be
different from the parents'. Now that J. Craig Venter and his team have
assembled a synthetic genome of a simple bacterium that has replicated
itself, 74 the possibility of a human genome constructed entirely from
synthetic materials, although far in the future, means that a genetic test
would be ineffective: such a child could have DNA constructed from a
parent's wish list which did not match any living person's DNA. 75 Thus,
the main appeal of the genetic test-its certainty-already fails in a variety of cases today and is likely to fail in even more cases as the science
progresses.
The use of ART-including in vitro fertilization, donated sperm and
ova, gestational carriers, and other techniques-has led to a third test:
intended parentage. The parent of the child, proponents argue, should be
the one who sets the process in motion with the ultimate goal of parenting the child, even if that parent has no genetic connection to the child
and did not give birth. 176 The "intended parent" test has long been applied to establish paternity: a man who consented to his wife's use of
assisted insemination with donor sperm was considered the father, despite his lack of a genetic tie. Can the intended parent test be used to establish maternity as well? Scholars have noted the arbitrariness of favoring a gestational carrier over the genetic mother through the parturient

171.

Inheritable Genetic Modification Basic Science, CENTER FOR GENETICS & SOC'Y,

http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=286 (last modified June 1, 2006).
172.
Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation Genetic
Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 283, 285 (2008).
173.
InheritableGenetic Modification Basic Science, supra note 171.
174.
Craig Venter, Watch Me Unveil "Synthetic Life", TED: IDEAS WORTH SPREADING (May

2010), http://www.ted.com/talks/craigventer unveils syntheticlife.html.
175.

See generally Kristine S. Knaplund, Synthetic Cells, Synthetic Life, and Inheritance, 45

VAL. U. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2011) (examining "the practical and regulatory issues that may encourage or inhibit the use of Venter's technology to create synthetic gametes and the legal issues of
parentage and inheritance for a synthetically created child").
176.
See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Parenthoodby Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and
the FunctionalApproach to Parentage,53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 602 (2002) ("[T]he law should un-

derstand intentional parenthood as subsumed by the notion of functional parenthood ....

).
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test. 177 A woman who agreed to carry the child for another person, promising to relinquish the baby on birth, should not be permitted to override
her earlier promise; after all, she never would have received the embryo
at all but for the earlier agreement.178 Some see the use of either the genetic or the parturient test as trying to wedge all couples into pre-existing
categories, with the paradigm being a married, 79heterosexual couple, even
though many using ART do not fit this model. 1
Rather than enacting one definition of maternity (such as "the
mother is the woman who gives birth"), a wiser course is to enact different presumptions of maternity, similar to those enacted for paternity. For
example, states no longer have a conclusive presumption that the birth
mother's husband is the father; rather, the husband is a presumed father,
but others can avail themselves of the presumption as well.180 If a husband and wife use in vitro fertilization to create a pre-embryo using their
genetic material and then hire a gestational carrier who gives birth to the
child, the gestational carrier can use the presumption of maternity because she gave birth, while the wife can use a presumption of maternity
based on a DNA test.'18 For an intended parent who has no genetic tie to
the child, a third presumption is needed,
which could be based on the
82
intent of the person to parent the child.

177. Hill, supra note 143, at 399-400 (arguing that no evidence exists to show that a biological
or birthing -bond is superior to the bonds formed by parents of children with no biological relation,
such as by adoption); Shultz, supra note 143, at 331-33 (asserting that there is no persuasive basis
for preferring the birth mother over the genetic mother).
178.
Robertson, supra note 145, at 1015; Shultz, supranote 143, at 366-67.
179. Richard F. Storrow, Parenthoodby Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage,53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 598-99 (2002) ("[R]estrictive policies ...
promise to widen the divide between the myriad forms of the family that exist in society today and
the ability of the law to protect the integrity of those families."); see Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining
or Biology? The History and Future of PaternityLaw and ParentalStatus, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 62 (2004) (arguing that an intent-based test eliminates the distinction between heterosexual
and homosexual couples, as well as distinctions between children conceived coitally and those
conceived with ART); Courtney G. Joslin, ProtectingChildren(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2010) (arguing that heterosexual limitation is unjust because a same-sex couple's child will have only one legal parent, resulting in financial and other deprivations for the child); Kelly M. O'Bryan, Comment, Mommy or Daddy and Me:
A Contract Solution to a Child's Loss of the Lesbian or Transgender Nonbiological Parent, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 1115, 1143 (2011) ("[N]o [legitimate] reason exists to provide the children born to
lesbian parents through the use of reproductive technology with less security and protection than that
given to children born to heterosexual parents through artificial insemination." (second alteration in
original) (quoting In re A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated sub nom. King v.
S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965 (Ind. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)),
180. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a) (1973) ("A man is presumed to be the natural
father of a child if:... (4) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his
home and openly holds out the child as his natural child .... "); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)
(2002) ("A man is presumed to be the father of a child if:... (5) for the first two years of the child's
life, he resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as his own.").
181.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781-82 (Cal. 1993) (in bank) (holding that the
genetic mother was the legal mother of the child because it was she who intended to procreate the
child).
182. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005).
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If we enact several presumptions of maternity, we face the difficult
problem of deciding which presumptive mother prevails. In a gestational
carrier case, in which the woman who gives birth is not genetically related to the child, who "wins" will depend on the court's view of the enforceability of the contract: if the agreement is enforceable, the intended
mother, not the birth mother, will prevail; 83 if the agreement is not enforceable, the gestational carrier will be the mother.' 84
But how do we resolve switched embryo cases? These are cases in
which the woman who gives birth intended to carry her own child, but
through a series of events (usually a mistake by the clinic, but it could
also occur by design), she is implanted with the wrong embryo. 85 Thus,
the birth mother is not a true gestational carrier, but she is also not the
genetic mother of the child she bears. Who should prevail? In a 2000
case in New York, for example, the Perry-Rogers' embryo was implanted in Ms. Fasano, along with Ms. Fasano's own embryo; Ms. Fasano
subsequently gave birth to two children, one her own genetic child and
the other the genetic child of Perry-Rogers.1 86 The court acknowledged
that a bond could develop with the gestational mother but held that "the
suggested existence of a bond is not enough under the present circumstances."'1 87 Thus, the court sided with the genetic parents (Perry-Rogers)
rather than the parturient (Fasano), in part because Fasano learned of the
mistake before she gave birth.188 A 2003 California case involving mistakenly implanted embryos also favored the genetic tie for the father. In
Robert B. v. Susan B., 189 Robert and his wife Denise used an anonymously donated egg and Robert's sperm to create an embryo that they intended Denise to carry; however, the embryo was mistakenly implanted in
Susan B., an unmarried woman.1 90 Rather than deciding that the birth
mother had no rights to the child, as the court held in Perry-Rogers v.
Fasano, this court ruled that, under California law, Susan B. was the
presumed mother because she gave birth; Robert could use the genetic tie
to argue he is the presumed father; and Robert's wife Denise, who lacked
191
either a gestational or a genetic tie to the child, was not a parent at all.
183.
See Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 793, 804 (Conn. 2011); De Bemardo v. Gregory,
No. FA074007658S, 2007 WL 4357736, at *3-4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2007); In re Baby Boy
A., No. A07-452, 2007 WL 4304448, at *6-7 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007); J.F. v. D.B., 879
N.E.2d 740, 741-42 (Ohio 2007); S.N. v. M.B., 935 N.E.2d 463, 470-71 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).
184.
See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796-97 (Mass. 1998).
185.
The State Department warns U.S. couples that "[tlhe Department is aware of cases of
foreign fertility clinics that have substituted alternate donor sperm and eggs when the U.S. parents'
genetic material turned out not tobe viable." U.S. Dep't of State, supranote 5.
186.
Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21-22 (App. Div. 2000).
187.
Id.
at 26.
188.
Id.at 26-27. Because Perry-Rogers is African American and Fasano is Caucasian, the
decision has been criticized for considering racial bias and sexist factors sub rosa. See Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents,and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, Race, & Law, 12

COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 32 (2003).
189.

135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Ct. App. 2003).

190.
191.

Id.
at 786-87.
Id at 789-90.
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Genetics may not control if enough time elapses before the genetic parents seek to claim the child. An attempt by the genetic parents for visitation was denied when the trial court found that it was not in
the best in92
terests of the children, who were almost fourteen years old. 1
The overseas mix-ups described in the State Department warning
present a more difficult ethical problem. In both Perry-Rogers v. Fasano
and Robert B. v. Susan B., the genetic parents of the mistakenly implanted embryo could be identified and wanted to claim "their"
genetic child. In some cases, however, the implanted embryo may have
been created by anonymously donated gametes. The birth mother believes she is carrying her own genetic child but learns otherwise when
the State Department requires a blood test. Even if the genetic parents of
the child can be found, it is not at all certain that they would want to
claim the child as their own. Will this child then be an orphan? If the
birth mother is a U.S. citizen, she may be able to transmit citizenship to
the child if she meets the residency requirements. If the couple were trying to claim citizenship through the father, however, citizenship would
be denied when the blood reveals no tie.
In denying a person's petition to be declared a parent, a court may
suggest adoption as an alternative.' 93 In Andres A. v. Judith N.,' 94 for
example, a married couple, Luz and Andres, used their gametes to form a
pre-embryo, which was implanted in a gestational carrier, Judith**95 After
Judith gave birth to twins, Luz, Andres, Judith, and Judith's husband
David sought a declaration that the genetic and intended parents, Luz and
Andres, were the children's legal parents. 196 Under New York law, Andres, as the genetic father, could challenge the presumption that the birth
mother's husband was the father of the children, but the court was powerless to make a declaration of maternity, and so Judith, the birth mother,
remained as the second parent. 197 "The court note[d] that petitioner Luz
A. [was] not without a remedy since she [could seek] to adopt the two
children." 198 That would have entailed considerable expense and time,' 99
as a Massachusetts court observed in another case seeking an uncontested pre-birth order. 200 Requiring the genetic parents to adopt the children

192.
Prato-Morrison v. Doe, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 515-16 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Simply put, the
social relationship established by the Does and their daughters is more important to the children than
a genetic relationship with a stranger.").
193.
See, e.g., In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 388-89, 398 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (finding
that, in the case of a child born to gestational carrier with sperm of husband T.J.S. and donated
ovum, wife A.L.S. was not the legal mother of her husband's biological child and must adopt).
194.
591 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
195.
Id.at 947.

196.

Id. at 947-48.

197.
Id.at 948-50.
198.
Id.at 950.
199.
Thomas Crampton, What Marriage Means to Gays: All that Law Allows Others, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at BI (citing a cost of about $3,000 for an adoption).
200.
Culliton v. Beth Isr. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1136-38 (Mass. 2001).
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born to a gestational carrier would mean that, during the four-day waiting
period in that state:
[t]he duties and responsibilities of parenthood (for example, support
and custody) would lie with the gestational carrier for at least four
days; the gestational carrier could be free to surrender the children
for adoption; and the genetic parents of the children would be forced
to go through the adoption process, possibly having to wait as long as
six months before becoming the legal parents of the children. As is
evident from its provisions, the adoption statute was not intended to
resolve parentage issues arising from gestational surrogacy agree20
ments. '
In the case of a heterosexual married couple like Luz and Andres in
Andres A. or the Cullitons, who sought to adopt their own genetic child
with the consent of the legal parents, the adoption is likely to be successful but still has drawbacks. 20 2 The dissenting justices in a 2012 New Jersey case in which the genetic father, his wife, and the gestational carrier
all sought a pre-birth order to include the wife (who had no genetic or
biological connection to the child) listed some of the disadvantages, calling adoption "a considerable burden.., on the intended mother., 20 3 Even
though all involved agreed that the wife should be named the child's
mother, the adoption process would take two to three months, during
which time the child would be "legally motherless.,, 2° 4 Until the adoption
process was completed, the child would not inherit from the wife if she
died intestate and would have no claim forS205benefits such as workers'
compensation, social security, and life insurance.
For a same-sex couple or a single parent, the process can be much more challenging. Several
states have statutes that prohibit unmarried couples or same-sex couples
from adopting.20 6 In other states, adoption severs the relationship of the

201.

Id. at 1138 (citation omitted).

202.
Cf Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage
Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201
(2009) (arguing that adoption should not be required for a genetic parent).
203.
In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d 263, 276-77 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting).
204.
Id. at 276.
205.
Id. at 277.
206.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (LexisNexis 2013) ("No person... may adopt if that person
is a homosexual."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2013) ("Adoption by couples of the same gen-

der is prohibited,"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (West 2013) ("A child may not be adopted by
a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the
laws of this state."). But see Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Cole, 380 S.W.3d 429, 431-32, 443
(Ark. 201 I) (holding that a law prohibiting unmarried cohabitants from adopting violated the Arkansas Constitution); Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. X.X.G., 45 So. 3d. 79, 91-92 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010) (holding that the ban violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution).
See also DAVID M. BRODZINSKY, EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., Adoption by Lesbians and
Gays: A National Survey of Adoption Agency Policies, Practices, and Attitudes, 3, 20 (Oct. 29,
2003),
available at http://adoptioninstitute.org/publications/adoption-by-lesbians-and-gays-a-

national-survey-of-adoption-agency-policies-practices-and-attitudes/ (summarizing a survey of 307
public and private adoption agencies in 1999 and 2000, which found that about 19% of agencies
followed religious beliefs that would reject a gay or lesbian applicant, 8% had policies of placing
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child with the biological parents unless the adopting parent is the spouse
of the biological parent and thus prevents unmarried couples from being
declared parents of the child.20 7 For many reasons, adoption is not a practical solution for couples using ART, and thus an equitable means of
determining parentage is critical.
In 2008, the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) proposed two amendments to determine parentage in cases in which ART is employed.2 8
Section 2-120 applies when no gestational carrier is used, and thus the
woman who gives birth intends to be a parent of the child, while Section
2-121 covers parentage when a gestational carrier is used.2 0 9 The new
UPC sections incorporate the assumption of the 2000 and 2002 Parentage
Acts that a "third party donor" of sperm or eggs is not a parent of the
child.21° If no gestational carrier is involved, the UPC presumes that the
woman who gives birth is the mother 21 ' and that her spouse, or another
individual who consented to the ART procedure, is the other parent. 212 If
a gestational carrier is used, then UPC Section 2-121 provides that the
213
woman who gives birth is generally not presumed to be the mother;
instead, the parent-child relationship is created with an intended parent,
defined as "an individual who entered into a gestational agreement
providing that the individual will be the parent of
a child born to a gesta'2 4
tional carrier by means of assisted reproduction." 1
In the same way that the Uniform Probate Code has recognized that
a single definition of "parent" will lead to unjust results if applied both to
children conceived coitally and to those conceived using ART, our citizenship rules for children born abroad should acknowledge the different
ways in which children are conceived. In 1952, when the current "blood
relationship" requirement was adopted by the State Department, sperm
banks did not exist 21 5 and no child had been conceived using in vitro

children only with married couples, and 5% were governed by state law prohibiting placement with
lesbians and gays).
207. S.J.L.. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 823 n.13 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (citing statutes and
cases in Nebraska, Oklahoma, North Dakota, Ohio, Wisconsin, Illinois, Georgia, and Tennessee that
have "reached our same conclusion" that adoption by the parent's same-sex partner will sever the
parent-child relationship with the first parent); see also In re T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488, 494 (Colo. App.
1996) (stating that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-5-203 regarding stepparent adoptions required the parent
seeking to adopt to be married to the child's parent, and thus unmarried lesbian partners could not
adopt each other's children).
208. See generally Sheldon F. Kurtz & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC Addresses the
Class-Gift and Intestacy Rights of Children of Assisted Reproduction Technologies, 35 ACTEC J.
30, 32 (2009).
209. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-120 to 2-121 (2010).
210. Id.§ 2-120(b).
211.
212.

Id.§ 2-120(c).
Id.§ 2-120(d), (f).

213.
214.

Id.§ 2-121(c).
Id § 2-121(a)(4).

215.
Dr. Jerome Sherman created the world's first sperm bank in Iowa City, Iowa in 1952.
Alexis C. Madrigal, The SurprisingBirthplaceof the First Sperm Bank, ATLANTIC (Apr. 28, 2014,
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fertilization. 216 Now that children can be conceived in a variety of ways,
the State Department regulations can mean that an ART child is not only
denied U.S. citizenship but, depending on the law of the country in
which the child is born, also stateless.
CONCLUSION

Unlike the ancient Greeks and Romans, we now know (or we think
we know) how a child is created: by the mixing of genes contributed by
both a man and a woman, and the nourishment of the resulting preembryo in a woman's womb. In the vast majority of cases, the woman
who nurtures and gives birth to the child is the genetic as well as the intended mother. All three tests of parentage-parturient, genetic, and intent-work equally well to determine maternity since they all lead to the
same woman. The problem arises when ART is used to conceive a child.
The parturient may not be the genetic mother of the child if a donated
egg or embryo is used in conception. The parturient may not be the intended mother of the child if she is a gestational carrier.
The State Department's definition of a parent as solely the genetic
contributor is out of step with current American law. It is contrary to its
origins in Roman law, which regarded the parturient as something akin to
a gestational carrier: someone who nurtured the child but not one who
determined its genetic makeup. It is also out of step with centuries of
family law, in which a pure genetic connection was not the sole determinant of paternity. The husband of a married woman might be declared
the child's father even though he had no blood relationship with the
child; the companion of an unmarried woman might not be declared the
child's father, even after proving the genetic connection, unless he acted
as a father in some way.
In late 2013, the State Department changed its interpretation of INA
sections 301 and 309 to recognize egg donations. While the prior posting
on the Department of State informational page stated, "[T]he U.S. citizen
parent must be the sperm or the egg donor in order to transmit U.S. citizenship to a child conceived through ART,, 21 7 their webpage "Important
Information for U.S. Citizens Considering the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Abroad" now states, "[A] U.S. citizen mother
11:59

EST),

http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/04/how-the-first-sperm-bank-

began/361288/.
216.
Louise Brown, the first child born using in vitro fertilization, was born in 1978. James
Gallagher, Five Millionth 'Test Tube Baby,' BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health18649582?print=true (last updated July 1, 2012, 21:22 EST) (noting that the first such child, Louise
Brown, was born in the UK in July 1978, and that, since then, about five million babies have been
born using the technology).
217.
U.S. Dep't of State, Important Information for US. Citizens Considering the Use of
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Abroad, WAYBACK MACHINE (Oct. 29, 2013),

http://web.archive.org/web/20131029203440/http:/travel.state.gov/law/citizenship/citizenship_5177.
html.
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must be either the genetic or the gestational and legal mother of the child
at the time and place of the child's birth. (A gestational mother is the
woman who carries and gives birth to the child.) '1 8 This is a good beginning, since it allows an American woman using a donated embryo to
secure American citizenship for the child she bears, even though she has
no genetic connection to the child. But much more is needed. First, the
INA sections 301 and 309 need to be amended to reflect this new policy,
and to make clear that children born before the policy change can apply
retroactively for American citizenship. Second, the new interpretation
covers children conceived with donated ova, but not children conceived
21 9
with donated sperm. The Department of State still requires, inter alia,
that the U.S. citizen father is the child's genetic parent in order for the
child to obtain American citizenship at birth through the father.
By focusing on just one factor-the blood relationship-the State
Department's policy of jus sanguinis forces us to examine the essential
attributes of parentage. Rather than articulating one test for all cases, the
rules for bestowing citizenship at birth should be amended to provide for
those conceived through ART, by allowing several presumptions of parentage to apply. The Uniform Probate Code amendments provide an excellent template with which to begin.

218.
U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 5.
219.
In addition to being the genetic parent, the U.S. citizen parent must meet certain residency
requirements to transmit American citizenship to the child.

JANUS CAPITAL GROUP, INC. V. FIRST DERIVA TIVE TRADERS:
THE CULMINATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S EVOLUTION
FROM LIBERAL TO REACTIONARY IN RULE
CHARLES W. MURDOCK

10B-5 ACTIONS

t

ABSTRACT

"Political" decisions such as Citizens United and National Federation of Independent Business (Obamacare) reflect the reactionary bent of
several Supreme Court Justices. But this reactionary trend is discernible
in other areas as well. With regard to Rule lOb-5, the Court has handed
down a series of decisions that could be grouped into four trilogies. The
Article examines the trend over the past forty years which has become
increasingly conservative and, finally, reactionary.
The first trilogy was a liberal one, arguably overextending the scope
of Rule lOb-5. This was followed by a conservative trilogy that put a
brake on such extension, but did so in a jurisprudentially sound manner.
The next trilogy, dealing with insider trading, regressed Rule lOb-5 analysis back to a common law perspective. This was ironic since the securities laws were enacted because of the inadequacy of the common law.
The final trilogy is unquestionably reactionary. Precedent is disregarded and the Court, in constraining the scope of Rule lOb-5, fails to
hold accountable clearly wrongful conduct such as conspiring to inflate a
corporation's earnings or making false representations in prospectuses.
In so doing, the Court characterizes a conspiracy to inflate the earnings
of a corporation as an "ordinary course transaction" taking place in the
"marketplace for goods and services" and adopts a definition of "making" a statement that exculpates the person who drafted the statement and
was the only person who knew the statement was false.
Consequently, the conclusion asserts that the Court is less interested
in protecting investors and more interested in constraining the scope of
Rule lOb-5, and asserts the need for Congress to reinstate aiding and
abetting liability in private securities fraud litigation. Such action by
Congress will reverse not just Central Bank but also Stoneridge and Ja-

t Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago. I would like to express my appreciation for
their helpful comments to Patricia O'Hara, Professor of Law at Notre Dame, and David Ruder,
Professor of Law at Northwestern University and Former Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission. Professor Ruder pointed out that, with class actions, an expansive approach to Rule 10 b-5
could potentially impose ruinous liability on an issuer. I concur. But Central Bank and its progeny
can create a "what, me worry" attitude. The best way to avoid liability is to tell the truth. Unfortunately, in business, as in politics, truthfulness is sometimes a forgotten virtue.
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nus Capital, which supposedly were mandated by the Supreme Court's
decision in CentralBank.

2014]

JANUS CAPITAL GROUP AND RULE JOB-5 ACTIONS

371

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRO DUCTION ......................................................................................
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF RULE 1OB-5 .....................

372

376
A. The Growth of a Little Acorn into a Massive Oak Tree .............. 376
B. The First Trilogy: The Supreme Court's BelatedRole in Expanding
the Scope of Rule lOb-5 ..............................................................
378
1. NationalSecurities: The Supreme Court's Initial Foray into
R ule lOb-5 .............................................................................
378
2. Bankers Life: The Apogee of Supreme Court Expansion of
Rule lOb-5 .............................................................................
380
3. Affiliated Ute Citizens: Engendering Unnecessary
C on fu sion ...................................................................................
383

II. THE SECOND, "CONSERVATIVE" TRILOGY: REACTION TO THE "OVER"
EXPANSION OF RULE lOB-5 .............................................................
386
A. Blue Chip Stamps: Adoption of the Birnbaum Standing Rule .... 387
B. Ernst & Ernst: Scienter Mandatedby Statute-A Lesson in
A dministrativeLaw .....................................................................
390
C. Santa Fe: HarmonizingState andFederalLaw and Putting
Closure on a FederalLaw of Corporations............................... 394
III. THE INSIDER TRADING TRILOGY ....................................................
397
A. Chiarella: The Start ofRetrenchment .......................................... 397
B. Dirks: A Clear Policy Choice FavoringGreedover Investors... 402
1. T he B asic Facts .....................................................................
402
2. The Divergent Views of the Majority and Minority ............. 403
3. The Failed Policy Chosen by the Majority in Dirks.............. 407
4. The Problem of Tone, the Explosion of Insider Trading, and the
Congressional Response ........................................................
410
C. Carpenter: The UncertainStatus of the
M isappropriationTheory ................................................................
412

IV. THE FOURTH TRILOGY: INSULATING COLLATERAL PARTICIPANTS
FROM L IABILITY ...............................................................................

415

A. Central Bank: The Demise ofAiding and Abetting .....................
1. Reactionary Judicial Decision Making ..................................
2. The Flaw ed A nalysis .............................................................
3. Distinction Between Express Negligence Causes of Action
an Implied Cause of Action Requiring Recklessness ............
B. Stoneridge: Direct ParticipantLiability .....................................
1. The Contrast Between CentralBank and Stoneridge............
2. The Arguments for and Against Direct Liability ..................
3. Contorting Fact to Fit Bias ....................................................
C. Janus Capital: Who "Makes" a Misrepresentation....................
1. T he F acts ...............................................................................
2. The Flawed Analysis of the Majority ....................................
3. The Consequences of the Court's Decision ...........................
C O NCLUSIO N .........................................................................................
EX H IB IT A .............................................................................................

415
416
418
and
419
422
422
423
424
426
427
428
431
437
440

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:2

INTRODUCTION

It is surprising that the United States Supreme Court would occupy
center stage in the midst of a presidential campaign. Yet, as the end of its
2012 term approached, the anticipated decision in National Federationof
Independent Business v. Sebelius' preoccupied the media. 2 To the surprise of many, Chief Justice Roberts switched from the "conservative"
block to join the four "liberals" in upholding the Affordable Care Act. 3
Although the mandate in the Act requiring those who could afford insurance to do so or pay a penalty was upheld as a tax, Justice Roberts determined that the federal government could not support the mandate under the Commerce Clause,4 nor could the federal government require the
states to expand Medicare coverage or else lose their existing Medicare
funding.5 Thus, his decision hardly reflected a conversion to the liberal
wing of the Court.
6
At the same time, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
again became topical as millions of dollars of political advertisements
flooded the media.7 Citizens United curtailed the power of the federal
government to limit political donations 8 and, in the current term, the
Court also limited the power of the states to do so. 9 While the Roberts
1.

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

2.
See Linda P. Campbell, Editorial, DecisionDay for Health Care Law, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, June 22, 2012, at A7 (discussing the media's repeated attempts to gain access for TV
cameras to record the Court's opinion announcements); Ann Gerhart, Nothing to Do but Wait for
Court Decision, WASH. POST, June 25, 2012, at Cl (discussing the strong interest in the court's
ruling in NationalFederation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, including members of the media); Michael Grillo & Kristin Stoller, 13K Tweets a Minute After Law Upheld Health
Care Ruling, HARTFORD COURANT, June 29, 2012, at A4 (noting that all news organizations were
anxiously waiting the Court's decision, leading to several releasing incorrect information before they
understood the actual result).
3. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2601 ("[The mandate] is therefore constitutional, because it can
reasonably be read as a tax."); see also Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., A Confused Opinion, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A25 (noting "[tihe stunner yesterday was that Chief Justice John G. Roberts

Jr., [was] joined by the Supreme Court's four most liberal justices ....); Martine Powers, Morning
of Tension Is Broken by Cheers, BOS. GLOBE, June 29, 2012, at A, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2012/06/29/harvard law professors students cheer su
preme court decision on health care act/ (discussing the surprise felt by all when learning that
Justice Roberts upheld the Affordable Care Act).
4. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2591.
5.
Id.
at 2607.
6. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
7.
See Mat Bai, How Did Political Money Get This Loud?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 22,
2012, at MM14 (discussing the impact of Citizens United on political fundraising); Richard L.
Hasen,
The
Numbers
Don't
Lie,
SLATE
(Mar.
12,
2012),
http://www.slate.com/artices/news-andpolitics/politics/201 2/03/the supreme-court-s-citizens uni
ted decision has led to an explosion of campaign spending .html (noting that in the 2012
election season through March 8, total spending was 234 percent higher than 2008's numbers and
628 percent higher than 2004's numbers).
8.
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365-66.
9. See Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S.Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam)
(stating that the holding from Citizens United clearly applies to state law).
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Court is often referred to as conservative, arguably it might be more accurately described as reactionary or libertarian. "Libertarian" is the term
George Will, a conservative
pundit, has applied to Justice Kennedy, the
0
so-called swing vote.'
These decisions, though highly significant, arguably involved "political" issues, rather than moral and ethical issues, that is, those that involve whether or not certain conduct is wrongful. However, the reactionary shift of the court is visible in these areas as well.
Consider Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, which
embraces the ethic of the securities laws that it is "sinful" not just to lie,
but to tell half-truths as well." The private cause of action under Rule
lOb-5 was judicially adopted in the 1946 case of Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co.12 Over twenty years passed before the Supreme Court
opined upon Rule 1Ob-5 and, during that period, lower courts *took an
expansive view of its scope to remedy a broad range of wrongdoing. The
initial approach of the Supreme Court to Rule lOb-5 was a "liberal" one,
but over time the approach became more conservative.
A little over a year ago, the Supreme Court, in Janus Capital
Group, Inc. v. FirstDerivative Traders, 3 decided the third case in a trilogy of decisions that are unique both in their dubious jurisprudence and
the willingness of the Court to adopt an interpretation of the law that
permitted clearly wrongful conduct to go unpunished. Accountability for
wrongful conduct is no longer a serious jurisprudential consideration for
the Roberts Court. Since the Supreme Court ventured into the Rule 1Ob-5
domain in 1969, it has handed down several decisions that can be
grouped into a series of trilogies.
The first trilogy was a liberal one that expanded the scope of Rule
1Ob-5,
while the second trilogy was a conservative one that put the
brakes on such expansion. 15 This latter trilogy embodied sound policy
and thoughtful jurisprudence, although Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores16 did not reflect judicial restraint-at this point a bellwether of
conservative judicial philosophy. But then came two trilogies, supposedly conservative, that were characterized by sloppy reasoning and an out10.
See Lucas Grindley, George Will Predicts Win for Marriage Equality in Supreme Court,
ADVOCATE.COM (July 2, 2012, 12:48 AM ET), http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriageequality/2012/07/02/george-will-predicts-win-marriage-equality-supreme-court
(quoting
George
Will as saying, "I think [Justice Kennedy is] ... driven in both directions by a constant compass and
that is he's a libertarian" (internal quotation mark omitted)).
11.
See SEC Rule l0b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2013) (making it a violation to "make any

untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading").
12.
69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
13.
131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
14.
See infra Part I.A.

15.
16.

See infra Part L.B.
421 U.S. 723 (1975).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 91:2

come-determinative approach to judicial decision making. The third trilogy dealt with insider trading 7 and the fourth, and current, trilogy with
the potential liability of those who might be characterized as "collateral
participants" in fraud. 18 Sadly, these latter two trilogies had the effect of
insulating corporate corruption from liability and undermining the investor protection that was the goal of the securities acts.
The first decision in the fourth trilogy, Central Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 1 9 eliminated secondary
liability for aiding and abetting under the securities laws. 20 Congress
responded by reinstating aiding and abetting liability in enforcement
actions brought by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).2 1 The
second decision, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 22 though it arguably involved primary liability, rejected a cause of
action against those who conspired with their customer to inflate the customer's earnings. 23 Supposedly the Supreme Court was constrained by
the CentralBank decision. The third and current decision, Janus Capital,
insulated an asset management firm and its investment advisor subsidiary
from liability for misrepresentations made by a mutual fund it sponsored. 24 The Court's ill-reasoned analysis as to who "makes" a misrepresentation has far-reaching implications, and the logic of its decision
could insulate corporate management, other than directors, from liability
for fraudulent representations the corporation makes affecting securities
markets.
Part I of this Article traces the evolution of Rule lob-5 from its
origin and development in the lower courts until the Supreme Court's
initial venture into the Rule lOb-5 thicket, in which the court facilitated
the expansion of Rule lOb-5 litigation, arguably beyond reasonable
boundaries. Part II then reviews the second trilogy in which the Court,
moving in a conservative direction after appointments by President Nixon, placed a series of constraints upon the ability to bring a Rule lOb-5
action, employing a well-reasoned perspective that took into account the
other provisions of the securities laws. Part III analyzes the third trilogy
which, rather than putting a brake upon unwarranted expansion of Rule
lOb-5, involved undercutting the essential purposes of the securities laws
to provide a fair playing field for investors-and regressed the analysis
of securities litigation to a common-law perspective, even though the
securities laws were enacted because the common law was inadequate to
17.
18.
19.

See infra Part Ill.
See infra Part IV.
511 U.S. 164(1994).

20.

Id. at 184-85.

21.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(109 Stat.) 737.
22.
552 U.S. 148 (2008).
23.
Id. at 159.
24.
Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
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deal with securities fraud. Part IV of the Article then focuses upon the
liability of what are arguably collateral participants, that is, persons who
are not the primary wrongdoer but rather assist or conspire with the primary wrongdoer. This is a critical area since the primary wrongdoer, by
the time the fraud is uncovered, is often insolvent or otherwise unable to
make whole the investors injured by the fraud. In addition, collateral
participants are often "gatekeepers" upon whom the public relies to ensure that issuers are responsible and accountable.
The tragedy of the decisions comprising the fourth trilogy is that,
even though the existence of wrongdoing is unquestioned, the Supreme
Court opted to let the wrongdoers go unpunished and extended similar
protection to subsequent generations of wrongdoers. Part IV first examines the unparalleled judicial activism reflected in the Central Bank decision. It then examines how the Court twisted well-settled principles of
law in an outcome-determinative mode of judicial decision making. Central Bank appeared to leave the door ajar when, arguably, those assisting
the primary wrongdoer were so directly involved in the fraud that they
could be considered primary wrongdoers themselves. But, in Stoneridge
Investment Partners, an unnecessary extension of Central Bank, the
Court again twisted logic in holding that a conspiracy with suppliers to
inflate earnings did not impact investors.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the impact of Janus Capital.Superficially,
the decision involves a limited issue: the responsibility of an asset manager for misrepresentations made by its captive mutual fund. However,
by markedly narrowing the concept of who "makes" a misrepresentation,
the decision could have far-reaching, untoward consequences. For example, the district court in the Enron litigation found that the attorneys for
Enron, who knowingly drafted false disclosure documents, could be liable for "making" a misrepresentation. This analysis would now be foreclosed by the Janus Capitaldecision.
The Conclusion asserts that the Supreme Court was fully aware of
the wrongdoing involved in Stoneridge Investment Partnersand Janus
Capital, and the impact of its decisions. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that the Supreme Court is more concerned with constraining the
scope of the securities laws than curtailing corporate fraud. The result is
diminished protection for the investing public. It is also clear that the
Court is not acting as an umpire, 25 dispassionately applying well-settled
law in the cases that come before it, but rather unsettling established law

25.
See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice
of the United States, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Chief Justice nominee),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091300693.html ("Judges and Justices are servants of the
law, not the other way around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply
them.").
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in a reactionary fashion to undermine the basic principles undergirding
the securities laws.
I. A BRIEF

HISTORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF RULE 1013-5

A. The Growth of a Little Acorn into a Massive Oak Tree
Rule lOb-5 was promulgated in 194226 pursuant to Section 10 of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act.27 By its terms, it defines certain manipulative or deceptive conduct as illegal and, thus, could be the basis for a
SEC enforcement action 28 or criminal prosecution by U.S. Attorneys. 29 It
was not until 1946, in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,30 that a federal
court implied a private course of action based upon Rule lob-5. What is
striking about the opinion is its brevity and curt analysis. Based upon the
analogy to a statutory tort, the Kardon court accepted as basically selfevident the judicial principle that a rule defining illegality could establish
31
a duty, the breach of which could give rise to a civil cause of action.
After the Kardon decision, litigation premised upon Rule lOb-5 fig32
uratively exploded. While courts frequently struggled to find deception,
many of these cases involved conduct that could be characterized as a
breach of fiduciary duty.33 Thus, some commentators questioned whether
a federal law of corporations was developing.34
The apogee of the development of Rule lob-5 occurred in 1968 in
the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation. In an enforcement action, SEC v. Tex26.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 Fed. Reg. 8177 (Dec. 22, 1948) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5(b) (2013)).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
28. See id.
29. See id
30. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
31.
Id. at 513-14.
32. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 463 (1977) (holding that deception
is required for a violation of Rule 10b-5); Kademian v. Ladish Co., 792 F.2d 614, 622 (7th Cir.
1986) (dismissing, after extensive analysis of whether defendants deceived the plaintiffs, the IOb-5
claims for lack of manipulation or deception); Madison Consultants v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 710
F.2d 57, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1983) (providing that alleged wrongful removal of a restrictive legend on a
stock issuance was not a cause of action under Rule lOb-5 because plaintiffs alleged no manipulation
or deception).
33.
See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), (holding that an investment
advisor corporation that realized profits in connection with the appointment of a new advisor upon
its recommendation violated its fiduciary duty, thereby violating the Investment Company Act),
superseded by statute, Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(f) (1975), as recognized in Meyer v. Oppenheimer Mgmt. Corp., 895 F.2d 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1990); Schein v. Chasen,
478 F.2d 817, 823 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that while a breach of fiduciary duty usually leads to
recourse through state laws, such a breach can also lead to a federal cause of action under Rule 1Ob5), vacated, Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174
F.2d 799, 814 (3d Cir. 1949) (stating that the court need not find a breach of a fiduciary duty to find
liability under federal securities laws, but such a breach can be sufficient in showing a violation).
34. See, e.g., Arthur Fleischer, Jr., "FederalCorporationLaw": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 1146, 1146-47 (1965); Stanley A. Kaplan, Corporation Law and Securities Regulation, 18
Bus. LAW. 868, 868 (1963); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessonsfrom History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (2006).
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35
the Second Circuit examined the conduct suras Gulf Sulphur Co.,
rounding the discovery by Texas Gulf Sulphur of a rich ore deposit in
Timmins, Canada. 36 "Act I" encompassed the period from the drilling of
a core in November 1963 until April 1964. 37 During this period, corporate employees and directors purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur stock on the
open market. 38 "Act II" began in early April 1964, when rumors that the
ore strike was extraordinary began circulating; in response, the company
issued what has been characterized either as a "gloomy" or a "misleading" press release on April 12, 1964 and four days later, announced the
extraordinary nature of the find.39

With regard to Act I, the Second Circuit determined that employees,
even low-level employees, who purchased stock, were "insider[s]" who
could not trade on "inside information," namely material non-public information, 40 but rather had a duty to "disclose ... or ... abstain.",4 1 In
Act II, in determining that the company was liable for the misleading
press release, the court essentially employed a negligence standard.42
And, in defining materiality, the court vacillated between information
that a reasonable investor might4 3 consider important versus would"t consider important. While the case was an enforcement action, it spawned a
series of private damages actions.45
Texas Gulf Sulphur was foreshadowed by an SEC decision authored
by former Columbia Law Professor William Cary, and then-SEC Chairman, In re Cady,Roberts & Co.4 6 That case was a "bad news" situation:
Curtiss-Wright's Board of Directors had decided to cut the dividend. In
such a situation, someone with foreknowledge might seek to sell CurtissWright stock. A board member, thinking that the corporate secretary had
earlier disseminated the information to the public, 47 telephoned a fellow
partner at Cady Roberts who then sold the stock.

35.

401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.at 839-40.
Id.
at 843-45.
at 844.
Id.
Id.
at 845-47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
at 848 (internal quotation marks omitted).

41.

Id.

42.
Id.at 862-63. This position was reversed in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), discussed infra Part l.B.
43.
Tex. Gulf, 401 F.2d at 860.
44.
Id.at 863. The Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976), adopted the would/probability standard.
45.
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 241 (2d
Cir. 1974) (holding insiders liable directly to plaintiffs that purchased stock on the open market
without knowledge of the material inside information); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.,
332 F. Supp. 544, 562 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (allowing civil liability in a class action based on material
misstatements and omissions contained in a registration statement).
46.
Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638 (Nov. 8, 1961).
note 201.
See discussion infra
47.
Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 60638, at *2.
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The Commission disciplined the partner who sold and its opinion is
significant in several respects. First, the partner back at the office who
sold stock (the "tippee") had no connection to Curtiss-Wright. 48 Second,
the "tipper," the director, did not know that dissemination of the information had been delayed and thus did not "sin," a fact that the Supreme
Court, in the Dirks v. SEC4 9 case, did not appreciate. 50 Most importantly,
because this was a bad news situation, the insider would be selling to a
buyer who very likely was not a shareholder.5' Contrast this with a "good
news" situation in which the insider would seek to buy stock: the only
person from whom the insider could buy stock would be a shareholder to
whom a corporate insider arguably would owe a fiduciary duty.5 The
defendant argued that no duty was owed to a non-shareholder to whom
the stock was sold, but the Commission made short shrift of this argument by asserting that the securities laws were enacted because the
common law was inadequate to protect investors.53 Thus, the absence of
a common law duty was irrelevant to whether there was a violation of the
securities laws-a proposition that the Supreme Court, in Chiarella v.
55
54
United States, declined to follow.
B. The First Trilogy.- The Supreme Court's BelatedRole in Expanding
the Scope of Rule lOb-5
1. National Securities: The Supreme Court's Initial Foray into Rule
IOb-5
Over twenty years passed between the judicial recognition of a private cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5 in Kardon and the Supreme
Court's initial consideration of this cause of action in SEC v. National
Securities, Inc. 56 As the Court noted, "[a]lthough § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
may well be the most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws,
this is the first time this Court has found it necessary to interpret them. 57
The National Securities Court then asserted a caution that the Court, as
48.
Id.
49. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
50. See id. at 665-67 (holding that the "tippee" only sins if the "tipper" sinned, meaning the
defendant who received inside information from an insider who did not personally benefit from the
disclosure was not liable under Rule 1Ob-5).
51.
In "bad news" cases, the insider knows about some impending harm to the company,
meaning the stock price will fall in the future. Here, the insider sells stock, and the buyer of that
stock generally did not already own stock in that company. While a current stockholder can always
buy more stock, it will often be someone without any current ownership of the company.
52. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933) (holding, in a "good news"
case, that directors had no duty to disclose their identity, or the good news, when buying shares from
a current stockholder).
53.
Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 60638, at *5.
54.
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
55. See id. at 236 (holding that the defendant, who was not a corporate insider, could not be
liable for trading on material, nonpublic information because the "outsider" owed no duty to the
shareholders, meaning no duty was owed to the plaintiffs).
56.
393 U.S. 453 (1969).
57.
Id. at 465.
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constituted subsequent to 1980, should have heeded: "The questions presented are narrow ones. They arise in an area where glib generalizations
58
and unthinking abstractions are major occupational hazards.,
The primary issue in the National Securities case was whether the
approval of a merger by the Arizona Director of Insurance precluded an
action by the SEC to set aside the merger on the ground that its approval
had been procured by a misleading proxy statement. 59 The defendants
argued that such action by the SEC would supersede state law regulating
6
the business of insurance in violation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 0
The Court concluded that "[t]he paramount federal interest in protecting
shareholders is in this situation perfectly compatible with the paramount
state interest in protecting policy holders.'
The Ninth Circuit had affirmed judgment on the pleadings in favor
of defendants on the basis that McCarran-Ferguson Act barred the SEC
action.62 However, defendants had also argued below that a merger did
not constitute a "purchase or sale" under Rule 1Ob-5, and that Rule lOb-5
would not apply to misrepresentations in connection with a proxy notification. 63 While these issues were not directly before the Court, it
"reached" to provide guidance to the trial court on remand.
The Court made short shrift of both arguments. With respect to the
purchase or sale issue, the Court rejected the "no sale" argument premised upon the former Rule 13364 and determined that a merger did constitute a sale for purpose of Rule 1Ob-5. The Court stated:
Whatever the terms "purchase" and "sale" may mean in other contexts, here an alleged deception has affected individual shareholders'
decisions in a way not at all unlike that involved in a typical cash sale
58.

Id.

59. Id. at 455-56.
60. Id. at 456; see 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012) (stating that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance .... ").
61. Nat ' Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. at 463. The Court also stated:
The gravamen of the complaint was the misrepresentation, not the merger. The merger
became relevant only insofar as it was necessary to attack it in order to undo the harm
caused by the alleged deception. Presumably, full disclosure would have avoided the particular Rule IOb-5 violations alleged in the complaint. Nevertheless, respondents contend
that any attempt to interfere with a merger approved by state insurance officials would
"invalidate, impair, or supersede" the state insurance laws made paramount by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. We cannot accept this overly broad restriction on federal power.
Id. at 462-63.
62. Id. at 456.
63.
Id. at 464-65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Former Rule 133 provided that certain transactions, such as mergers, did not involve a
"sale" under the 1933 Act, and thus the stock issued in the transaction did not need to be registered
with the SEC prior to sale. Registration of Certain Transactions Involving Merges, Consolidations
and Acquisitions of Assets, 37 Fed. Reg. 23631 (Nov. 7, 1972) (rescinding 17 C.F.R. § 230.133
(1968)).
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or share exchange. The broad antifraud purposes of the statute and

the rule would clearly be furthered by their application to this type of
situation. Therefore we conclude that Producers' shareholders "purchased"
shares in the new company by exchanging them for their old
65
stock.

The Court also determined to dismiss rather quickly the argument
that Rule lOb-5 did not cover misrepresentations in proxy material.6 6
Even though an insurance company might be exempt from federal proxy
regulation, "Congress may well have concluded that the Commission's
general antifraud powers over purchases and sales of securities should
continue to apply to insurance securities. 67 The approach of the Court
suggests a presumption in favor of expanding the coverage of Rule lob-5
to prevent fraud, rather than restricting the scope of Rule lOb-5 to facilitate fraud.
At this stage, the Supreme Court was not only comfortable with the
development of Rule lOb-5 by the lower courts but also focused upon an
expansive interpretation of Rule 1Ob-5 to further the anti-fraud purposes
of the securities acts.
2. Bankers Life: The Apogee of Supreme Court Expansion of Rule
lOb-5
Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co. 68 was a very short and superficial opinion dealing
with a very complicated set of facts. 69 In effect, a crook, Begole, purchased all the stock of Manhattan Casualty Co. for $5 million. 70 Begole
and other conspirators then caused Manhattan Casualty to sell U.S.
Treasury bonds for approximately $5 million and appropriated the proceeds to pay Bankers Life the $5 million purchase price.71 Plaintiff
brought suit as liquidator of the assets of Manhattan Casualty.
The Second Circuit, in affirming the dismissal, stated that "no investor [was] injured" and that "[t]he purity of the security transaction and
the purity of the trading process were unsullied. 72 The facts would seem
to support the Second Circuit's reasoning. Bankers Life sold the shares
of its subsidiary for $5 million. In fact, Bankers Life received $5 million,
apparently what the shares were worth. Therefore, there was no fraud in
the purchase of the Manhattan stock. With respect to the sale of bonds by
65.
Nat I Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. at 467.
66. Id. at 468.
67. Id. at 468-69.
68. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
69. Id. at 7-9.
70. Id. at 7-8.
71.
Id. at8.
72.
Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir.
1970), rev'd,404 U.S. 6 (1971).

2014]

JANUS CAPITAL GROUPAND RULE JOB-5 ACTIONS

381

Manhattan, apparently the bonds were worth what the buyer of the bonds
paid. Thus the buyer of the bonds was not defrauded. Moreover, since
the bonds were worth what Manhattan sold them for, Manhattan was not
defrauded in the bond transaction itself What happened was that the proceeds of the sale, instead of being deposited in Manhattan Casualty's
bank account, were misappropriated by the crooks.
The factor that enabled the Supreme Court to treat this as a securities case was that the asset that was sold was a financial asset, namely,
Treasury bonds. If, instead of being a Treasury bond, the circumstances
were the same except that the company whose stock was purchased was
a construction company and the asset sold was a large crane, this is no
way could be conjured to be a securities case.
In the case at bar, as the Second Circuit Court observed, no investor
was injured. This was a situation in which crooks embezzled from a
company they owned. The company became bankrupt and the state
agency sought to recover the embezzled funds. No one was deceived
about the value of any security. Each party to both of the securities transactions received the price that each sought. It was a real stretch to treat
this as a securities case.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that, "[t]o be sure, the full market price was paid for those bonds., 73 However, the Court added: "but
the seller was duped into believing that it, the seller, would receive the
proceeds. 74 The Court, understandably, was concerned that there was an
act "which operated as 'a fraud or deceit' on Manhattan., 75 But, embezzling the proceeds of the sale of a crane would also be a fraud or deceit.
However, it is not a securities fraud. This was a suit on behalf of creditors of a corporation to recover funds embezzled by the owner of a corporation. Cases such as this engendered concern about the development
of a federal law of corporations and about whether the fraud was "in
connection with" a securities transaction, as discussed below.
The Court stated that "Manhattan was injured as an investor through
a deceptive device which deprived it of any compensation for the sale of
its valuable block of securities 7 6 and that "[t]he Act protects corporations as well as individuals who are sellers of a security. 77 But the injury
here was not the typical injury that a defrauded investor would suffer.
Both the buyer and the seller were happy with the price. Manhattan Casualty's injury occurred when the proceeds were misappropriated. 8

73.
74.

Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 9.
Id.

75.

Id.

76.
77.
78.
ties laws,

Id.at 10.
Id.
The Court later recognized a related theory on which to find violations of federal securiwhich it termed the "misappropriation theory." See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S.
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Moreover, Manhattan Casualty was a unique corporate investor. It
was not injured in a transaction involving its own equity securities, as in
Pappasv. Moss. 79 Rather, it was, in effect, selling part of its "inventory,"
since the "inventory" of a financial institution in part consists of securities. As stated above, if Manhattan Casualty were a construction company and sold its crane, this would not have been a Rule 1Ob-5 case. As
also stated above, the "investor," Manhattan Casualty, was not complaining about the price received in the transaction.
The opinion contained other expansive language. The fact that the
fraud was committed by an officer, therefore breaching his fiduciary duty
to Manhattan, was "irrelevant" since § 10(b) bars fraud by "any person. ' 8° Also irrelevant was the fact that this was a private transaction,
i.e., one not conducted over an exchange or in the formal over-thecounter market and that the proceeds were "misappropriated."'"
The Court did realize that there must be some connection between
the fraud and a securities transaction, since the Court acknowledged "that
Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement., 82 But the Court
provided little guidance as to when fraud is "in connection with" a securities transaction when it held that Manhattan's injury was the result of
83
"deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor."
"Touching" is not a very precise legal standard.
Looking ahead to the next trilogy, 84 the opinion would have been
sounder if it would have held that Manhattan Casualty was not deceived
since its sole shareholder, who controlled the board of directors, was the
perpetrator of the misappropriation of the proceeds of sale. Instead, it
created a tenuous connection between the fraud and the securities transaction, a connection even more tenuous than that which exists in insider

642, 652-53 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a case dealing with insider trading, the
Court found that a lawyer who traded on secret information he obtained while working for the corporation could be liable under Rule lOb-5. Id. at 653. Even though no harm was caused to those selling
to the insider, the Court found that the lawyer misappropriated information from his employer,
making him liable under Rule lOb-5. Id. at 653-54.
79.
393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968). In Pappas,the board of directors voted to sell shares of the
corporation to themselves at a price far below market value. Id. at 867. The Third Circuit found that
this sale violated Rule I Ob-5 because the board of directors deceived the independent shareholders
by selling stock cheaply to themselves. Id. at 869. The corporation itself was harmed because the
board of directors acted against the interest of the corporation by improperly selling securities, which
is different from misappropriating the assets of the corporation.
80.
Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81.
Id.

82.

Id. at 12.

83.
Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).
84.
See infra Part 11(discussing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), as one of
the trilogy's conservative decisions limiting the scope of Rule I Ob-5 in Part II.C).
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trading under the misappropriation theory, which will be explored in
connection with the third trilogy."
The result reached by the Bankers Life Court was not necessarily
dictated by the language of the statute, by existing case law, or by the
facts of the case, and could be criticized as being overly expansive in its
view of Rule 1Ob-5. However, in contrast to the latest trilogy, the Bankers Life Court caused little disruption to existing statutory interpretation
86
and was not diametrically inconsistent with existing case law.
3. Affiliated Ute Citizens: Engendering Unnecessary Confusion
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States87 once again dealt
with a complicated set of facts but unfortunately did so, not in a short
opinion, but rather in an unnecessarily long one. In Affiliated Ute Citizens, a bank was appointed transfer agent for mixed-blood Indians with
regard to stock they owned in a corporation formed to hold assets for
which distribution would otherwise be impracticable. 88 These assets included transferred oil, gas and mineral rights, and unliquidated claims
against the U.S. government, pursuant to the Ute Indian Supervision
Termination Act. 89 Each mixed-blood Ute was to receive ten shares of
Ute Distribution Corp. (UDC) stock; however, instead of distributing the
shares directly to the mixed-bloods, UDC deposited 90the shares with the
bank and the bank issued receipts to the shareholders.
The primary focus of the litigation was the sale by eighty-five
mixed-bloods to two assistant managers at one of the defendant-bank's
branch offices and to thirty-two other white men. 91 Sales by the mixedbloods ranged from $300 to $700 per share. 92 The district court determined that the value of the stock was $1,500 and found that the bank and
93
employees were liable to the mixed-bloods for damages.
Considering the state of the law respecting Rule 1Ob-5 at this time,
this should have been a rather routine securities case. The basic ethic of
Rule lob-5 is that it is a sin not only to lie but also to tell half-truths. This
is embodied in paragraph (b) of the Rule, which makes it unlawful: "To
make any untrue statement of a material fact [(a lie)] or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light

85.
See infra Part III.C(discussing the uncertain status of misappropriation as discussed in
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), and United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642

(1997)).
86.
87.

See infra Part IV.
406 U.S. 128 (1972).

88.

Id.at 136.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

25 U.S.C. § 677a(f) (2012).
Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 136-37.
Id. at 146-47.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 156-57.
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of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading [(a
half-truth)] . . .94

Since the employees represented that their offers were at the market
price, but did not disclose that there was a two-tiered market, this was a
typical "half-truth" case. On the other hand, the Supreme Court treated
this as a "silence" case, in which materiality substituted for reliance.
The Tenth Circuit, even though taking a constricted view of defendants' liability, recounted that, as to the purchases personally made by the
bank employees, "the record shows that the individual defendants [represented] that the prevailing price or market price was the figure at which
their own purchase was made., 95 According to the Tenth Circuit, this
sufficed for liability on the personal purchases by the employees. However, the Tenth Circuit rejected liability for purchases by other white men
on the basis that, in the other purchases, the employees performed only
"ministerial" acts, such as preparing an affidavit that the mixed-bloods
had offered the shares to UDC. 96
With respect to the purchases by the other white men, the Tenth
Circuit acknowledged that one employee stated "I contacted a number of
people [mixed-bloods] telling them that if they were interested in selling,
I was interested in offering the highest price." 97 The Tenth Circuit also
stated 98that the employees actively encouraged a market for the UDC
stock.

Even under the Supreme Court's later, more restrictive definition of
who is a seller under the 1933 Act, the activity of the bank and its employees could constitute them as purchasers with regard to the mixedblood sales to other white men, because they solicited the purchases from
the mixed-bloods. 99 Furthermore, since the employees, besides purchas-

94.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2013).
95.
Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1347 (10th Cir. 1970), affd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
96. Reyos, 431 F.2d at 1346.
97. Id. at 1347 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. The court stated:
The record shows that the bank officials at the Roosevelt office of the defendant bank
were active in encouraging a market for the UDC stock among non-Indians. This was
probably not contemplated by the UDC-bank relationship. This gave rise to some indirect
benefits to the bank by way of increased deposits, but it did not constitute a violation of
any duty the bank may have had to the plaintiffs by contract or otherwise.
...The bank and the individual defendant employees had developed a market at the
Roosevelt Agency of the bank for UDC stock, received inquiries from time to time for
stock, and had customers of the bank who were prepared to make purchases from time to
time. The defendant bank and the individual defendants were thus entirely familiar with
the prevailing market for the shares at all material times.
Id.at 1345, 1347.
99.
Cf Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 654-55 (1988) (rejecting the "substantial factor" test in
determining who is a seller under the 1933 Act, however, determining that someone who actually
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ing for their own account, were soliciting the mixed-bloods to sell and
were soliciting or receiving orders from other white men to buy, the situation could certainly fall within clause (c) of Rule lOb-5: "[engaging] in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security."' t Thus the defendants could be liable for fraud in
their selling activity, both with respect to their own sales and those that
they facilitated.
Consequently, the Court found a course of business embodying a
scheme to defraud on the following basis: "This is so because the defendants devised a plan and induced the mixed-blood holders of UDC
stock to dispose of their shares without disclosing to them material facts
that reasonably could have been expected to influence their decisions to
sell."' 0' So far so good. But the Court then went on to categorize the defendants as "market makers," an unnecessary characterization: "The individual defendants, in a distinct sense, were market makers, not only for
their personal purchases constituting 8 1/3% of the sales, but for the other sales their activities produced. This being so, they possessed the affirmative 2duty under the Rule to disclose this fact to the mixed-blood
10
sellers."'
Not only did the Court refer to the defendants as market makers, but it
also cited Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 10 3 a case involving professional market makers, which had imposed a duty of disclosure upon
market makers, thus touching off a firestorm of concem. 1°4 While the
bank and its employees were "making a market," they were not professional market makers.' 0 5 Securities professionals who may make a marsolicited a sale could be a seller even though such person did not take title (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
100.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2013).
101.
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
102. Id. The Court also stated:
It is no answer to urge that, as to some of the petitioners, these defendants may have
made no positive representation or recommendation. The defendants may not stand mute
while they facilitate the mixed-bloods' sales to those seeking to profit in the non-Indian
market the defendants had developed and encouraged and with which they were fully familiar. The sellers had the right to know that the defendants were in a position to gain financially from their sales and that their shares were selling for a higher price in that market.
Id.
103.
438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
104.
See Note, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States-The Supreme Court Speaks on Rule
1Ob-5, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 119, 126-130 (1973) (explaining that while the Second Circuit in Chasins noted that identification as a market maker was material, it never found a duty to disclose such
status-the Court's holding that market maker status must be disclosed should be limited to the facts
of this case); see also Arthur Fleischer, Jr. et al., An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 846, 856-57 (1973) (discussing the problems created
by Affiliated Ute Citizens for market traders engaged in continuous trading activity due to unresolved
questions relating to the scope of this decision).
105.
Market maker is defined by the SEC as an organization, association, or group of persons
that "(1) [b]rings together the orders for securities of multiple buyers and sellers; and (2) [u]ses
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ket in several stocks and engage in hundreds of transactions a day were
concerned with what disclosure obligations could be imposed upon them
as a result of the Affiliated Ute Citizens decision.
This first trilogy clearly represented an expansive, possibly overly
expansive, approach to the scope of Rule 1Ob-5. The cases in the trilogy
could easily be characterized as "liberal." The analysis by the Court at
this point was not particularly rigorous and the Court appeared primarily
motivated to curb wrongdoing. Policy-protecting investors-was more
important than rigorous analysis.
II.

THE SECOND, "CONSERVATIVE" TRILOGY: REACTION TO THE "OVER"

EXPANSION OF RULE 10B-5

The 1960s were a time of social and political upheaval, sparked in
large part by the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War, 0 6 and to
some extent by reaction to the liberal decisions of the Warren Court.'0 7 In
1968, one issue upon which President Nixon campaigned was that he
would appoint a strict constructionist to be Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.0

8

After his election, he made good on his promise, appointing

Warren Burger as Chief Justice in 1969.109 He also had three other ap-

established, non-discretionary methods (whether by providing a trading facility or by setting rules)
under which such orders interact with each other, and the buyers and sellers entering such orders
agree to the terms of a trade." 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16(a) (2013).
106.

See, e.g., STEPHEN FEINSTEIN, THE 1960S FROM THE VIETNAM WAR TO FLOWER POWER

60-61 (2006) (noting the significant events of the 1960s); ROBERT BUZZANCO, VIETNAM AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LIFE 1-9 (1999) (explaining the social and political movements of
the 1960s). The Vietnam War, along with the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Martin
Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy; the riots after the King assassination; the Peace Movement of
the 1960s; the Women's Liberation movement of the 1960s; and the 1968 Chicago Democratic
Convention all had significant impact on politics of the 1960s. Id.
107. While Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was a 1954 case, its progeny
carried over to the 1960s and later. Howard A. Glickstein, Remarks, The Impact of Brown v. Board
of Education and Its Progeny, 23 HOW. L.J. 51, 51 (1980). In addition, there were many other liberal
decisions. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966) (holding that statements
obtained from defendants without full warning of constitutional rights were inadmissible as a violation of the Fifth Amendment); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964) (holding existing and
proposed plans for apportionment of seats in the Alabama Legislature invalid under the Equal Protection Clause); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (holding that defendants in a state
court criminal prosecution have the right to have counsel appointed); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961) (holding evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search was inadmissible at trial, thereby nullifying the conviction).
108.

DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON JR., CAMPAIGNS AND THE COURT: THE U.S. SUPREME

COURT IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 181 (1999) (noting Nixon's promise to nominate Supreme
Court Justices who "would be strict constructionists who saw their duty as interpreting law and not
making law" and who "would see themselves as caretakers of the Constitution and servants of the
people, not super-legislators with a free hand to impose their social forces and political viewpoints
on the American people" (quoting ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 513 (11 th ed. 1996)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
109.
Warren
E.
Burger,
1969-1986,
SUP.
CT.
HIST.
SOC'Y,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/chief-justices/warren-burger- 1969-1986/
(last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
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pointments: Justice Blackmun in 1970,"1 and Justices Powell and
Rehnquist in 1972."' Three of the four turned out to be moderate to
strong conservatives, but Justice Blackmun, to the chagrin of the conservatives, turned out to be a strong liberal, authoring the Court's opinion
in Roe v. Wade,'12 which has had political repercussions up to the present.
Speaking of his appointments, President Nixon stated:
I consider my four appointments to the Supreme Court to have
been among the most constructive and far-reaching actions of my
presidency ....
It is true that the men I appointed shared my conservative judicial philosophy and significantly affected the balance of
power that had developed on the Warren Court. But as individuals
they were each dedicated and able constitutional lawyers who often
disagreed on major cases. 13
The conservative shift that Nixon accomplished is reflected in the
next trilogy of cases. While the cases reflected movement away from the
prior expansionist approach of the federal courts to Rule 1Ob-5, they also
reflected, as President Nixon suggested, able constitutional lawyering.
A. Blue Chip Stamps: Adoption of the Birnbaum Standing Rule
The first case in this trilogy, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 1 4 involved a very unique set of facts. Normally, the concern in a
public offering is that the issuer, in preparing the registration statement
or other offering documents, will be unduly "optimistic" in order that the
investing public may be induced by misleading statements to buy and
thus to be euchred into a bad investment. The converse occurred in Blue
Chip Stamps.
Pursuant to a federal antitrust consent decree, "Old" Blue Chip and
its controlling shareholders were required to offer stock in the "New"
Blue Chip to retailers who had used the stamp service but were not
shareholders, in proportion to their past stamp usage." 5 The offering to
the retailers would reduce the holdings of the nine retailers who previ110.
Harry
A.
Blackmun,
1970-1994,
SUP.
CT.
HIST.
SOC'Y,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-courl/associate-justices/harry-blackmun- 19701994/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
111.
Lewis
F.
Powell,
Jr.,
1972-1987,
SUP.
CT.
HIST.
SOC'Y,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/associate-justices/lewis-powell-jr- 19721987/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014); William H. Rehnquist, 1986-2005, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y,
http://www.supremecourthistory.orghistory-of-the-court/chief-justices/william-rehnquist- 19862005/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
112.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
113.
Jonathan Movroydis, Nixon Era Legal Experts Revisit High Court Nominations, NEW
NIXON (Nov. 21, 2011), http://blog.nixonfoundation.org/2011/11/nixon-era-officials-re-visit-therehnquist-and-powell-nominations/.
114.
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
115.
Id. at 725-26.
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ously owned 90% of "Old" Blue Chip.' 16 Thus, it was to the advantage of
those who controlled "Old" Blue Chip that the retailers-to whom shares
in "New" Blue Chip were offered-not purchase such shares. Consequently, according to plaintiff-retailers, defendants prepared a prospectus
117
that was fraudulently "pessimistic" in order to induce them not to buy.
The so-called Birnbaum rule required that a plaintiff, in order to
have standing to bring an action under Rule lOb-5 (which required that
the fraud be "in connection with" a securities transaction), must have
been a purchaser or seller of securities.'" 8 This rule was generally followed in the lower courts, although certain exceptions were recognized. 1 9 Because plaintiffs had neither bought nor sold securities, the
district court in Blue Chip dismissed the complaint, 20 but a divided panel
of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on the basis that the instant
facts fell within an exception to the Birnbaum rule. 121
In the instant case, the Supreme Court declined to recognize an exception to the Birnbaum rule and made the rule an absolute standing requirement, subject to no exceptions. The majority opinion concluded:
Were we to agree with the Court of Appeals in this case, we would
leave the Birnbaum rule open to endless case-by-case erosion depending on whether a particular group of plaintiffs was thought by
the court in which the issue was being litigated to be sufficiently
more discrete than the world of potential purchasers at large to justify
an exception. We do not believe that such a shifting and highly factorientated disposition of the issue of who may bring a damages claim
for violation of Rule 1Ob-5 is a satisfactory basis for a rule of liability
122
imposed on the conduct of business transactions.
There is no question that permitting persons who are not purchasers
or sellers to sue carries with it possibilities of abuse. Consider the Texas
116.
Id.
117.
Id. at 726-27.
118.
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952). Birnbaum was short
and to the point; in contrast to the Blue Chip decision, which was almost fifty page long, Birnbaum
was only four pages.
119. See, e.g., Landy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that
a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief has standing after establishing a causal connection between the
alleged violations and alleged injury, even without showing a purchase of sale of the security); Mut.
Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967) (providing an exception to the
Birnbaum rule where the plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief, whereby no sale or purchase of the
security is necessary where the plaintiff is seeking an injunction to prevent the wrongdoing); Vine v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 637 (2d Cir. 1967) (granting standing because shareholder was
forced to sell his shares at a later time); see also 5B ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 9:5 (2013) (explaining the several exceptions to the

Birnbaum rule).
120. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35, 40 (C.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd,492
F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
121.
Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 141-42 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd,
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
122. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 755.
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Gulf Sulfur case previously discussed. 123 The corporation published a
misleading press release; subsequent to the SEC action, private plaintiffs
who had sold their shares after that press release initiated suits and prevailed. 24 Professor Ruder, later chairman of the SEC, opined that these
lawsuits worked to the disadvantage of the continuing shareholders who
25
did not sell on the basis of the press release.
Consider a pejorative spin on the foregoing. Assume the shareholders, prior to the press release, were composed of two groups: short-term
speculators and long-term investors. Upon the issuance of the press release, the speculators would sell and the investors would hold. The recovery of the speculators could devastate the capital of the corporation,
since corporations frequently trade at significant multiples of book value,
and thus the burden would fall upon those long-term investors who did
126
not sell.
But what if those who neither purchased nor sold could sue? Then
everybody in the world could potentially claim that they would have
bought "but for" the misleading press release. Such a situation would
wipe out the corporation.
At trial, probably only a few potential investors would succeed.
Discovery and cross-examination could demonstrate-as in the case of
Texas Gulf Sulfur127-that the investor had never invested in mining
stocks, or that he had sought no research on the corporation, or that he
did not have the requisite liquidity to buy. But the litigation process itself
can be costly, time consuming, and disruptive to the corporation and its
management. Moreover, there is always the risk of success by the plaintiff. Accordingly, an unfounded lawsuit still may have settlement or
strike-suit value. As the concurring opinion pointed out:
Proving, after the fact, what 'one would have done' encompasses a
number of conjectural as well as subjective issues: would the offeree
have bought at all; how many shares would he have bought; how
long would he have held the shares; were there other 'buys' on the
market at the time that may have been more attractive even had the

123.
124.
125.

See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 840-42 (2d Cir. 1968).
David S. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in

Rule 10b-5 Purchaseand Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 423, 426 (1968).

126.
Assume a corporation trades at four times book value. If the book value is 100, then the
pre-press release market value would be 400. If the market value were to lose 10% (to 360) upon the
issuance of the press release but then increase 50% (to 540) after a corrective press release, the
measure of damages would be $180 per share. If 20% of the shares traded between the two press
releases, the corporation would lose 36% of its capital base. This could have a devastating impact
upon the corporation and its patient investors. Judge Friendly, concurring in Texas Gulf Sulphur,
warned that this type of litigation could "lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by
innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers." 401 F.2d at 867 (Friendly, J.,
concurring).
127. Id. at 851 (majority opinion).
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funds (if any)
offeree known the facts; did he in fact use his available
128
more advantageously by purchasing something else?
Judge Hufstedler, dissenting in the Ninth Circuit below, put the issue into a concise perspective: "although [strike suits] are difficult ' to
29
prove at trial, they are even more difficult to dispose of before trial.'
By framing Birnbaum as an absolute standing requirement, the majority
insured that meritless litigation brought by a person who neither purchased nor sold could be disposed very simply and inexpensively, merely
by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
In Blue Chip Stamps, the statutory analysis was sound: the statute
and Rule lOb-5 both spoke of "purchase or sale"; Rule lOb-5 was derived from § 17 of the 1933 Act, which covered offerees-a phrase deleted from the Rule;' 30 and the SEC had unsuccessfully sought to have
Congress expand § 10(b) to cover "any attempt to purchase or sell, any
security."' 131 Accordingly, the judicial craftsmanship was well done.
Moreover, the policy concern was legitimate: "If § l0b were extended to
embrace offers to sell, the
number of persons claiming to have been of' 32
legion."'
be
could
ferees
The only criticism that could be levied against Blue Chip Stamps is
that the Supreme Court chose to bar a potentially meritorious case on the
basis that there might be subsequent meretricious ones, thus raising the
question whether this was the proper vehicle to adopt the current policy.
Because the defendants were required to offer shares only to a particular
group of plaintiffs, the potential liability was not to the world at large,
but only to a discrete group.
B. Ernst & Ernst: Scienter Mandated by Statute-A Lesson in Administrative Law
The conservative trend continued with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,133 where the Supreme Court rejected negligence as a basis for a Rule
1Ob-5 action and required a state of mind for the defendant that embraced
"scienter." In a footnote, the Court defined scienter as a "mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."''

34

However, the

128.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 758 n.2 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
129.
Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 147 n.9 (9th Cir. 1973)
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting), rev'd, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
130.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012) ("It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or
sale of any securities . . . or any security-based swap agreement .... ") (emphasis added), with 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) ("[It is unlawful to] use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security .... ").
131.
132.

103 CONG. REC. 11636 (1957) (internal quotation mark omitted).
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 758-59 (Powell, J., concurring).

133.
134.

425 U.S. 185 (1976).
Id. at 193 n.12.
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Court left the door open for private suits to be based upon a standard less
than subjective intent to defraud by adding:
In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of
intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act.
We need not address here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless 35behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § l0b

and Rule 1Ob-5.1

While President Nixon had succeeded in changing the liberal inclination of the Supreme Court, the circuit courts retained their "liberal"
perspective into the 1980s, when President Reagan in effect imposed a
litmus test upon all judicial nominees.136 Consequently, in short 37order, all
circuits adopted recklessness as the standard under Rule 1Ob-5.1
Interestingly, the opinion dealt with a lawsuit against an aider and
abettor. 138 Leston Nay was the president and controlling shareholder of
First Securities;1 39 however, on the side, he ran a Ponzi scheme analogous to that of Bernie Madoff, 140 in which he induced investors to invest
in escrow accounts that he personally managed and which he represented
would yield a high rate of return. To avoid detection, he had a policy that
no one could open his mail while he was gone from the office (the "mail

135. Id.
136.
1can speak from personal experience. When I was interviewed by the Justice Department
in connection with a judicial appointment, concern was raised about an article I had written, Charles
W. Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some CriticalIssues, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW.
133 (1972). While the title just as easily could have been "A Cost/Benefit Approach to the Care and
Education of the Retarded," it was difficult for those interviewing me to get past any expanded
notion of civil rights. See also Stuart Taylor Jr., The One-Pronged Test for FederalJudges, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1984, at 45 (stating that Reagan put ideology first in filling judicial vacancies).
137. Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 620 (4th Cir. 1999); SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d
636, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 369 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986); White
v. Sanders, 689 F.2d 1366, 1367 n.4 (11 th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d
1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir.
1979); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576
F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir.
1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp. v.
Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir. 1977); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th
Cir. 1977).
138. The Court reviewed judgment on whether civil liability exists for aiding and abetting.
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 191 n.7, 191-93. Eighteen years later, in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
InterstateBank of Denver, N.A., the Court struck down aiding and abetting liability under Rule lOb5, without recognizing how Ernst & Ernst undercut its analysis. 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994). See infra
Part IV.A.
139. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 189.
140. Bernard Madoff was seen by most on Wall Street as a top trader who consistently
achieved high returns for his clients while charging very low fees, who was able to maintain his
success in both bull and bear markets. In December 2008, he was arrested for what he described as
"a giant Ponzi scheme." Diana B. Henriques & Zachery Kouwe, U.S. Arrests a Top Trader in Vast
Fraud,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at AI (internal quotation mark omitted). Mr. Madoff had for
years been paying returns to certain investors using money he received from other investors. When a
few clients sought to make a large withdrawal from their accounts, the scheme collapsed. Losses
were estimated to be as high as $50 billion. Id.; see also Diana B. Henriques, U.S. Proposes 150
Years for Madoff,N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2009, at B3.
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rule"). 141 After he committed suicide, First Securities became bankrupt,
and Ernst & Ernst was charged by plaintiff for aiding and abetting Nay's
fraud by not uncovering the mail rule.142 Ernst & Ernst was not 1charged
43
with intentional misconduct but rather "inexcusable negligence."'
Once again, the opinion exemplified sound judicial reasoning. The
Court first turned to the language of the statute. Section 10 of the 1934
Act makes it illegal "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of SEC rules.' 44 In analyzing this language,
the Court concluded that "[t]he words 'manipulative or deceptive' used
in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that § 10(b)
was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct."' 145 The
Court then looked at the legislative history of the 1934 Act and found
little bearing upon the interpretation of § 10.146 However, what little history existed clearly was not inconsistent with the approach taken by the
Court.

147

Much of the opinion addressed and rebutted arguments by the SEC
that Rule lOb-5 encompassed negligent conduct. The Court extensively
addressed the SEC's argument that the structure of the securities acts
supported § 10 sounding in negligence. The SEC pointed out that § 9(e)
requires "willful[] participat[ion]' 14 1 while § 10(b) is "not by its terms
explicitly restricted to will[ing], knowing, or purposeful conduct."' 149 In
response, the Court embarked upon its own analysis of the structure of
the securities acts.
Looking first to the 1933 Act, the Court noted that the express liability provisions all sounded in negligence, 150 but also contained procedural protections, such as requiring plaintiff to post a bond 151 or imposing
141.
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 190 (internal quotation mark omitted).
142. Id.
at 189-90.
143.
Id.
at 190 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
144.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
145.
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197.
146. Id.
at 201-07.
147. In the concluding portion of its opinion, the Court stated: "When a statute speaks so
specifically in terms of manipulation and deception, and of implementing devices and contrivances-the commonly understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and when its history reflects
no more expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to negligent
conduct." Id.
at 214.
148.
15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) (2012).
149. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 207.
150. Section 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2012), imposes almost absolute liability on the issuer,
but directors, underwriters, experts and officers who sign the registration statement are not liable if
they can establish a due diligence defense. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 208 n.26. A similar defense exists
under § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2012), and controlling person liability under § 15, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77o (2012), may be avoided if the control person had no "reasonable ground(s) to believe" in the
facts rendering the control person liable. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 208 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Basically, a person who can establish that he or she was not negligent will
not be liable.
151.

Id.at 208-10.
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a shortened statute of limitation. 52 Because Rule 1Ob-5 protects buyers
as well as sellers, plaintiff-buyers could choose to bring suit under Rule
lOb-5, instead of the aforesaid express liability provisions, and thereby
short circuit these statutory protections for defendants in the case of negligent wrongdoing. The Court stated:
We think these procedural limitations indicate that the judicially created private damages remedy under § 10(b) which has no comparable
restrictions-cannot be extended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to actions premised on negligent wrongdoing. Such extension
would allow causes of action covered by §§ 11, 12(2), and 15 to be
brought instead under § 10(b) and thereby nullify the effectiveness of
the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on these express ac-

tions. 153
The Court addressed the 1934 Act provisions in a footnote. 15 4 Other
than § 16(b), which was directed at officers, directors, and ten percent
shareholders, and which essentially created absolute liability for "insider" trading encompassed within a six-month period, 155 the Court opined
that all other express liability provisions had state of mind conditions.
Section 9(e), as stated above, requires willful participation; § 18, dealing
with filing misleading statements with the SEC, requires knowledge; and
§ 20, dealing with controlling person liability, requires that the controlling person "induce" the controlled person's act.156 These latter two provisions are actually phrased as affirmative defenses.
In effect, the Supreme Court recognized that, if Rule 1Ob-5 sounded
in negligence, Rule 10b-5, like Sherwin Williams's paint, could "cover
the earth"'157 and make the express liability provisions superfluous.
The SEC also argued that the language of subsections (b) and (c) of
Rule lOb-5, standing alone, support a negligence standard. 58 This argument, in part, was also the rationale for the dissent. 59 The majority easily
disposed of an argument based upon the language of Rule lOb-5, rather
than on the statute, by recounting well-settled administrative law principles. The authority of the SEC to promulgate rules is limited by the rule

152.

15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012).

153. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 210 (footnote omitted).
154. Id.at 209 n.28.
155. Id.;
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012). The Court apparently saw Congress holding "insiders" to a
higher standard than that applicable to persons generally.
156.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78(i)(f), 78(r)(a), 78(t)(a) (2012).
157. SHERWIN-WILLIAMs, http://www.sherwin-williams.com/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014)
(depicting the company logo containing the slogan "cover the earth").
158.
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212. In Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 690 (1980), the Court held that
similar language in a statute, § 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012), sounded in negligence,
but the same language in Rule I Ob-5 could not because the interpretation of the rule was controlled
by the statute, § 10(b).
159. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 216-17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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making authority conferred by the statute.1 6° The rule must implement
the statute, not override it. Thus, if the statute gives the SEC power to
proscribe fraud, the SEC does not have the power to proscribe negligence. The rule cannot be broader than the authority conferred by the
statute. This probably accounts for the half-hearted dissent.
C. Santa Fe: Harmonizing State andFederalLaw and PuttingClosure
on a FederalLaw of Corporations
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green1 61 is the last case in the trilogy of
thoughtful and well-crafted conservative decisions limiting the scope of
Rule lOb-5. As will be discussed, the policy perspective envisioned in
the opinion actually played out in the controversy that gave rise not just
to the Santa Fe opinion but to two other cases as well. 162
Santa Fe involved the short form merger of a subsidiary of Santa
Fe, Kirby Lumber Corp., 163 with another subsidiary of Santa Fe. No vote
of the shareholders of Kirby was necessary, but the shareholders were
entitled to ten days' notice of the effectiveness of the merger and had the
right to dissent and receive the judicially appraised value of their
shares.' 64 Santa Fe furnished Kirby minority shareholders with an information statement containing an appraisal of the Kirby assets. While the
physical assets were appraised at $640 per share, Morgan Stanley valued
the shares at $125 per
share and Santa Fe offered the minority sharehold65
share.'
per
$150
ers
Rather than following through on their appraisal rights, 166 plaintiffs
in the Santa Fe case filed suit under Rule lOb-5, alleging a scheme to
defraud the minority shareholders out of the difference between the value
of the physical assets and the $150 per share offered by Santa Fe. Both
the district court 67 and the Second Circuit168 viewed plaintiffs' complaint
as presenting two grounds for liability: (1) gross undervaluation, and (2)
160.
See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) ("A regulation
which ... operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity."); see also
Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439 (1935) (noting an administrative agency cannot create a
rule that regulates anything beyond the what Congress enabled it to regulate through the plain meaning of the statute).
161.
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
162.
See infra text accompanying notes 182-84.
163.
Kirby was actually a subsidiary of a subsidiary and another subsidiary was formed which
merged into Kirby, such that Kirby was the surviving corporation. The net effect of the corporate
machinations was that the majority shareholders of Kirby were cashed out, and Santa Fe now had a
wholly owned subsidiary. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 465.
164.
Id. at 465-66.
165.
Id. at 466.
166. Initially, plaintiffs petitioned for appraisal, but then withdrew the petition and filed the
federal lawsuit. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd in part,
rev'd in part,533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
167. Id. at 852.
168. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1285 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977).
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squeezing out the minority without a business purpose. Both courts
agreed that gross undervaluation without any accompanying misrepresentation or lack of disclosure would not be actionable under Rule lOb5.169 Although the district court held that Delaware law did not require a
business purpose for a squeeze-out merger, I17 the Second Circuit held
that neither misrepresentation nor nondisclosure was necessary for a
Rule lob-5 action:
We hold that a complaint alleges a claim under Rule lob-5 when it
charges, in connection with a Delaware short-form merger, that the
majority has committed a breach of its fiduciary duty to deal fairly
with minority shareholders by effecting the merger without any justifiable business purpose. The minority shareholders are given no prior
notice of the merger, thus having no opportunity to apply for injunctive relief, and the proposed price to be paid is substantially lower
than the appraised value reflected in the Information Statement. 171
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Second Circuit, took essentially the same tack it took in Ernst & Ernst. It first looked to the language
of the statute, focusing upon the words "manipulative or deceptive" in
conjunction with "device or contrivance,"'' 72 and then reasserted that a
rule cannot exceed the power conferred by Congress pursuant to the statute. 173 Consequently, the Court concluded that "the claim of fraud and
fiduciary breach in this complaint states a cause of action under any part
of Rule lob-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive."",174 Since the district court found that there was
no omission or misstatement of a material fact, plaintiffs had no cause of
175
action.
The opinion could have concluded at this point but the Court also
undertook a Cort v. Ash 17 6 analysis to drive home the point that breaches
of fiduciary duty, unaccompanied by deception, are not within a private
cause of action under Rule lob-5. The Court asserted that the "fundamental purpose" of the securities laws was to implement a policy of "full
and fair disclosure."' 177 If there is full disclosure, then "the fairness of the
169.

533 F.2d at 1291; 391 F. Supp. at 854.

170.

Compare Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983) (explaining that corpo-

rations need not have a valid business purpose when effectuating a merger), with Coggins v. New
Eng. Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1119 (Mass. 1986) (holding that under Massachusetts law, defendants must prove (1) the merger was for a legitimate business purpose, and (2) it
was fair to the minority), and Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 570 (5th Cir. 1974)
(stating that the Georgia Corporation Merger Statute requires corporations to show a valid business
purpose for a merger in order to avoid the statute's anti-fraud provisions).
171.
Green, 533 F.2d at 1291.
172. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 472 (internal quotation marks omitted).
173.
Id. at 472-73.
174. Id. at 473-74.
175. Id. at 474.
176. See 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
177. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477-78.
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terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern."' 78 Consequently,
recognizing a cause of action merely for breach of fiduciary duty is not
necessary to fulfill the purposes of the securities laws. Moreover, breach
of fiduciary duty is an area traditionally relegated to state law. Accordingly, the Court rejected the possibility that Rule lOb-5 could be used to
create a federal law of corporations:
Federal courts applying a "federal fiduciary principle" under Rule
1Ob-5 could be expected to depart from state fiduciary standards at
least to the extent necessary to ensure uniformity within the federal
system. Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations
that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where estab79
lished state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden. 1
In effect, the Court was harmonizing federal and state law. The purpose of federal law is to promote disclosure. 80 Where, as here, full disclosure is made, there is no federal cause of action. However, if the fully
disclosed facts reveal a basis for breach of fiduciary duty or other state
remedy, the plaintiff has access to state law for a substantive remedy.
This is exactly what occurred in the Santa Fe situation. While plaintiffs in the case before the Supreme Court failed in their federal action
because Santa Fe made full disclosure, including the fact that the physical assets were worth $640 per share,' 81 substantially more than the $150
per share offered by Santa Fe, plaintiffs in two other lawsuits took advantage of this disclosure to initiate appraisal and breach of fiduciary
duty actions. In a case filed in Delaware under the appraisal statute,
plaintiffs recovered $254.40 per share; 8 2 on the other hand, in New
York, plaintiffs filed a breach of fiduciary duty case, but were not successful because, as required by Delaware law, there was no fraud, misrepresentation, or blatant overreaching. 83 Thus, the factual situation
demonstrates the workability of Santa Fe limiting Rule lob-5 actions to
those involving deception because the disclosure provided by federal law
would enable a plaintiff to take advantage of common law remedies.184
178. Id at 478.
179. Id. at 479 (footnote omitted).
180. Id. at 477-78.
181.
Id.at 466.
182. Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 140 (Del. 1980).
183.
Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 514 N.E.2d 105, 113 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that the plaintiff's acceptance of the offer by Santa Fe was not made in reliance on any deception or omission on
the part of defendants but was, on the contrary, the result of an informed judgment that resorting to
an appraisal proceeding would be too costly and time-consuming).
184. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1108 (1991), undercut this schema
somewhat by not finding maldisclosure actionable when the minority shareholders did not have
sufficient votes to defeat the merger proposal. As Justice Kennedy pointed out in his dissent, in this
situation there is all the more need for full disclosure. Id. at 1118 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He
asserted that the majority had engaged in "a sort of guerilla warfare to restrict a well-established
implied right of action." Id. at 1115.
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The second trilogy, while "curbing" the expansion of Rule lOb-5 litigation, did so in a responsible manner that was consistent with both the
policy and the language of the securities laws. The securities laws were
designed to protect investors; Blue Chip Stamps precluded a "noninvestor" from claiming he or she would have bought "but for" some
alleged misstatement, while using the benefit of hindsight. Ernst & Ernst
focused on the language of the statute, asserting that an administrative
rule cannot be broader than its statutory authorization. It also harmonized
the scope of an implied action with the express civil actions created by
Congress. Finally, Santa Fe recognized that the focus of the securities
laws is upon disclosure, and that a federal action should not lie where the
issuer has made full and complete disclosure, even if it has disclosed a
breach of fiduciary duty. State and federal law were harmonized since
the federal disclosure could provide the information necessary to assert
state remedies.
III.

THE INSIDER TRADING TRILOGY

The next trilogy of cases, Chiarella v. United States,'85 Dirks v.
SEC,186 and Carpenter v. United States,'87 all dealt with insider trading
and represent a significant departure from the sound reasoning reflected
in the previous trilogy. They also represent a move toward constraining
the scope of Rule 1Ob-5 in circumstances where its broad application
would have furthered the policy of the securities laws. While the previous trilogy put a brake upon the unwarranted expansion of Rule 1Ob-5, it
did so by focusing on the language of the statute, which limits the scope
of the rule; moreover, it did so in a manner that was not aimed at permitting fraudulent activity to escape accountability.
On the other hand, as will be demonstrated, the insider trading trilogy and the final trilogy dealing with collateral participants have encouraged illicit activity and undermined the purpose of the securities laws "to
ensure the fair and honest functioning of impersonal national securities
markets where common-law protections have proved inadequate, ' 88 or,
as Congress has stated, "to assure that dealing in securities is fair and
89
without undue preferences or advantages among investors."'
A. Chiarella: The Start of Retrenchment
Chiarella dealt with an employee of Pandick Press, a financial
printer.1 90 He worked on five documents dealing with corporate takeover

185.
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
186. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
187. 484 U.S. 19 (1987). The Court, in UnitedStates v. O'Hagan, later accepted the misappropriation theory. 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997); see infra text accompanying note 302.
188.
Chiarella,445 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189.
H.R. REP. No. 94-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. No. 94-75, at 3 (1975).
190. 445 U.S. at 224 (majority opinion).
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bids and, while the names of the bidder and the target were not disclosed
to the printer until the night before the bids were made public, Chiarella
was able to discern their identity and make pre-bid purchases at what was
then the market price. 191 After the takeover bids were made public and
92
the stock price rose, he sold the shares and realized a substantial gain.'
Chiarella was first investigated by the SEC, and subsequently entered
into a consent decree in which he disgorged his profits.' 93 He was then
indicted by the U.S. Attorney and convicted on seventeen counts of violating Rule lOb-5.194 The majority and the dissent viewed the scope of
the indictment and the jury instructions from very different perspectives.
According to the Court, the jury, pursuant to the district court's
charge, could convict Chiarella if it "found that he willfully failed to
inform sellers of target company securities that he knew of a forthcoming
takeover bid that would make their shares more valuable."1 95 The Court
opined that it could not affirm Chiarella's conviction "without recognizing a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information,"' 196 or, in other
words, a broad duty to the market as a whole. This the Court refused to
do. Instead, it asserted that silence 1 97 is actionable only where there is a
duty to disclose and such a duty arises only from a common law relationship of trust and confidence between the parties to the transaction. 198
The Court's decision is problematic in several respects. First of all,
the Court applied what it describes as the "catchall" provision of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act. 199 The reason why the securities laws
were enacted was because the common law was inadequate. Yet, the
Court used the common law to constrict the scope of the securities laws.
This is catch-22 reasoning. The Court opined that, although Rule lOb-5
is a catchall provision, "what it catches must be fraud. ' '20° But there is no
question that Chiarella engaged in fraudulent activity. As Chief Justice
Burger eloquently stated in his dissent: "Chiarella, working literally in
the shadows of the warning signs in the printshop, misappropriatedstole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him
in the utmost confidence. 2 °1
191.
Id.
192.
Over the course of 14 months, Chiarella made a profit of more than $30,000. Id. An
attorney who worked on the case told me that the SEC was tipped to Chiarella's activity by a jilted
boyfriend who thought his romance was undercut by his rival's new found wealth.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.at 225.
195.
Id.at 226.
196.
Id at 233.

197.
he traded.
198.
199.
200.
201.

The court treated this case as a "silence" case since Chiarella made no disclosure before
Id. at 226.
Id.
at 230.
Id.at 226.
Id. at 234-35.
Id. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger also pointed out that:
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20 2
In this connection, the Court positively cited Cady, Roberts & Co.
to support its position, without appreciating that Cady, Roberts in fact
undermined its opinion. As discussed earlier, Cady, Roberts dealt with a
bad news situation in which an insider would sell, very likely, to someone who was not a shareholder.2 3 The defendant in Cady, Roberts argued that there was not a common law fiduciary duty by a corporate insider to someone who was not a shareholder. On the other hand, the SEC
took the position that the securities laws were not constrained by common law concepts.

Cady, Roberts involved a "traditional insider" as tipper and "company-specific" information. Tender offers present a different paradigm.
The diagram set forth in Exhibit A illustrates the situation. 20 4 Below the
bidder is what is sometimes referred to as "temporary insiders," such as
attorneys and investment bankers. And the relevant information is not
company-specific, but rather "market information."
The majority focused upon the fact that Chiarella had no relationship, and thus no common law duty to the shareholders of the target corporation. °5 Chief Justice Burger, with a conservative "tough on crime"
perspective, focused upon the fact that Chiarella stole confidential information from his employer to obtain an illicit gain. 206 This was the essential difference between the majority and minority positions.
While the Court's majority, in applying "disclose or abstain," found
an obligation to disclose only when the defendant owed a duty to the
207
person on the other side of the transaction,
Justice Burger found the
duty to disclose became operative because of the illicit manner in which
the defendant obtained the information. 208 He found support from Professor Keeton:
[The] way in which the buyer acquires the information which he
conceals from the vendor should be a material circumstance. The information might have been acquired as the result of his bringing to
Chiarella, himself, testified that he obtained his informational advantage by decoding
confidential material entrusted to his employer by its customers [and that Chiarella's
counsel conceded that]...
"Mr. Chiarella
...
got on the stand and he conceded, he said candidly, 'I used clues I got
while I was at work. I looked at these various documents and I deciphered them and I decoded them and I used that information as a basis for purchasing stock.' There is no question about that. We don't have to go through a hullabaloo about that. It is something he
concedes. There is no mystery about that."

Id. at 244-45.
202.
Id. at 241-42 (discussing Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 1961
WL 60638 (Nov. 8, 1961)).
203.
See supra text accompanying notes 46-55.
204.
See infra Exhibit A.
205.
Chiarella,445 U.S. at 231 (majority opinion).
206.
Id. at 244-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
207.
Id. at 227 (majority opinion).

208.

Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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bear a superior knowledge, intelligence, skill or technical judgment;
it might have been acquired by mere chance; or. it might have been
acquired by means of some tortious action on his part.... Any time
information is acquired by an illegal act it2 would
seem that there
9
0
should be a duty to disclose that information.
Justice Burger also found support in the repeated use of "any" in the
statute: section (b) made illegal actions by "any person engaged in any
fraudulent scheme," 2 10 and concluded that "congressional concern was
[not] limited to trading by 'corporate insiders' . . . [and that] Congress
cannot have intended one standard of fair dealing
for 'white collar' in21 1
siders and another for the 'blue collar' level."
Finally, Justice Burger looked at legislative history which indicated
that the purpose of the securities laws was to prohibit "manipulative and
deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful
function," 21 2 and to "assure that dealing in securities is fair and without
undue preferences or advantages among investors." 21 3 He then concluded
that: "An investor who purchases securities on the basis of misappropriated nonpublic information possesses just such an 'undue' trading advantage; his conduct quite clearly serves21no
useful function except his
4
others.,
of
expense
the
at
enrichment
own
Justice Burger's approach makes more sense than that of the majority, which is predicated upon the existence, or lack thereof, of a common
law fiduciary duty. Since the securities laws were enacted because of the
shortcomings of the common law in dealing with securities fraud, why
then look to the common law to interpret the securities laws? On the other hand, Justice Burger was guided by the policy behind the securities
laws. As the SEC stated in Cady, Roberts, in view of the "broad language
of the anti-fraud provisions[,] we are not to be circumscribed by fine
distinctions and rigid classifications., 21 5 Accordingly, the SEC concluded:
Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law based on the
view that an officer or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship
to existing stockholders from whom he purchases but not to members
of the public to whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate to intro-

209.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealmentand Non-

Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1936)).

210.
211.
212.
213.
omitted).
214.

Id.
Id. at 240-41.
Id. at 241 (quoting S. REP. No. 73-792, at 6 (1934)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.)) (internal quotation mark
Id.

215.
Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *4 (Nov.
8, 1961).
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the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the secuduce these2 into
16
acts.
rities
Justice Burger's position is not quite a "possession" standard. But it is
not burdensome to expect that corporate insiders and securities professionals should know that it is illegal for them to trade on material, nonpublic information. The doctrine of scienter would limit the persons subject to liability. This, of course, would make it easier to surmount a motion to dismiss, whereas Justice Burger sought to encourage disposing of
litigation on a motion to dismiss in Blue Chip Stamps.
The majority may have been led astray by the inept phrase "disclose
or abstain," which originated in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case.217 The fallacy with phrasing the duty as disclose or abstain is that, invariably, the
person subject to this adage has a duty not to disclose. For example, in
Texas Gulf Sulphur, the employees had a duty to their employer not to
disclose while the corporation assessed the scope of the discovery and
obtained additional mineral rights.2 8Thus, the employee did not have the
option of disclosing or abstaining. 1
The Second Circuit should have articulated the employees' obligation as "abstain until disclosable." If that were the jargon with which the
federal courts were grappling, the Supreme Court might have upheld
Chiarella's conviction since this latter standard does not implicate any
duty to the shareholders of the target company. Holding a person like
Chiarella accountable for stealing his employer's information in order to
obtain an informational advantage is certainly consistent with the securities law policies recounted by Justice Burger.
In the long run, Justice Burger's position prevailed. His closing
comment that Chiarella stole valuable nonpublic information that was
entrusted to him 2 9 became the basis for the misappropriation theory. 22° A
year later, the misappropriation theory was the basis of a conviction in
UnitedStates v. Newman, 22 1 and four years later, in a case involving facts
that were a clone of those in Chiarella,the conviction of an employee of
a financial printing firm was upheld on the basis that he "misappropriated-stole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information" entrusted to
222
him by his employer.

216.
217.
218.
instances
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at *5.
See supra text accompanying notes 35-45.
The Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), discussion, infra note 243, is one of the rare
where "disclose or abstain" might actually work.
Chiarella,445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981).
SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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B. Dirks: A Clear Policy Choice Favoring Greed over Investors
1. The Basic Facts
Dirks v. SEC2 23 involved a very strange and convoluted set of facts,
which may, in part, account for the divergence between the majority and
minority opinions. 224 It is as if the members of the Supreme Court were
watching two different movies: the majority seeing a hero and the dissent
seeing a villain.
The underlying facts were close to unbelievable. Equity Funding
was an insurance company that sought to increase its earnings.225 Unfortunately, not enough real people were buying its policies. So, it began
creating people, who then bought policies so as to increase revenue. 226
Management understood that, in the insurance business, there are both
inflows and outflows, as people die and the beneficiaries collect on the
policies. Consequently, Equity Funding also killed some peoplefortunately, these persons were only fictitious to begin with. 22227
In early 1973, a disgruntled former executive, Ronald Secrist,
tipped Raymond Dirks, an officer of a broker-dealer firm who specialized in insurance company securities, about the scam and asked him to
publicize it. 228 Secrist estimated that, by 1972, Equity Funding had
40,000 fictitious policies, about one-third of its business. 229 Dirks interviewed Equity Funding employees and, although management denied the
230
charges, some employees corroborated Secrist's story.
Dirks then took two divergent courses of action. He disclosed what
he had learned to a number of clients and investors, including five institutional investors that subsequently liquidated more than $16 million in
223.
224.

463 U.S. 646 (1983).
See id. at 648-52.

225.

See id. at 649.

226.
Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd,463 U.S. 646 (1983).
227.
The SEC found:
Since 1970, EFCA had been creating fictitious life insurance policies, known to insiders
as "Y business." These policies were sold to reinsurers for an amount equal to 80% of
first-year premiums. By this method, management hoped to generate cash flow, maintain
an impressive growth rate and boost the value of EFCA stock. In some cases, legitimate
policies were reinsured for more than their face amount, while at other times totally fictitious policies were created. To carry out this scheme, EFCA created supporting files,
medical records and death certificates for non-existent policy holders, bribed and intimidated some of its auditors and state examiners, and falsified its financial records to show
the receipt and disposition of non-existent premiums. Secrist claimed that he had actually
witnessed the creation of fictitious files which were used to deceive EFCA's auditors. He
asserted that, as a result of such activities, many EFCA employees had left the company.
He estimated that, by 1972, EFCA carried at least 40,000 fictitious policies on its books,
representing at least one-third of EFCA's outstanding life insurance business.
Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17480, 1981 WL 36329, at *2 (Jan. 22, 1981)
(footnotes omitted).
228.
Id. at* 1-2.
229.
Id. at *2.
230.
Dirks,463 U.S. at 649.
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Equity Funding investments. 23' As the SEC opinion chronicles, Dirks
had numerous conversations with these investors and even arranged contacts between them and former employees of Equity Funding. Dirks also
opined that Equity Funding stock would soon stop trading and that the
stock should be sold.232 In return, Dirks received additional business; the
majority and minority took differing views as to the effect of this upon
Dirks's motivation.233
However, Dirks also contacted Equity Funding's auditors and the
Wall Street Journal, which, after following up on Dirks's information,
contacted the SEC and the SEC then called Dirks in.234 The majority
asserts then the Wall Street Journal declined to write the story,235 while
the dissent asserts that the Wall Street Journal investigated and informed
the SEC.236 The same day Dirks met with the SEC, March 27, 1973, the
New York Stock Exchange suspended trading because of the increased
trading volume and the precipitous drop in price from $26 per share to
$15.237 Also at this time, the California and Illinois Departments of Insurance were investigating
Equity Funding and were preparing to shut
238
down its operations.
2. The Divergent Views of the Majority and Minority
In view of the foregoing facts, consider the differing approaches of
the majority and minority. According to the majority, the SEC had "concluded" in disciplining Dirks that: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of their
motivation or occupation-come into possession of material

. .

. 'infor-

mation that they know is confidential and know or should know came
from a corporate insider,' they must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from trading. 239
While the foregoing quotation is found in the SEC's opinion, it is
not the conclusion or holding of the SEC. Rather the SEC concluded:

231.

Id.

232. Dirks, 1981 WL 36329, at *5.
233.
The majority focused upon the SEC finding that Dirks "played an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to light," Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651-52 (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted), while the dissent focused upon the fact that Dirks and his firm
"gained both monetary rewards and enhanced reputations for 'looking after' their clients," id.
at 669
n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), by enabling them to "dump[] stock on unknowing purchasers." Id. at
671.
234.
Id.at 670.
235.
Id.at 649-50 (majority opinion).
236.
Id.at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
237.

See id.

238.
In 1983, I was Deputy Attorney General for Illinois, and Illinois insurance officials informed me that they and the California officials were preparing a "raid" on the offices of Equity
Funding at the time the story broke.
239. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651 (majority opinion) (quoting Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-17480, 1981 WL 36329, at *6 (Jan. 22, 1981)).
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In sum, Dirks [an analyst] came into possession of material, nonpublic corporate information, from persons who he knew were insiders, at a time when he knew that the information was confidential and
not then publicly available. He communicated that information to
those likely to trade before the information became generally available. In committing these acts, Dirks acted with scienter. Accordingly,
we conclude that Dirks willfully aided and abetted violations by Boston, Dreyfus, TZP, M&N and Bristol of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule
240
10-5b thereunder.

There are two fundamental differences between the two "conclusions." The SEC did not rely on "disclose or abstain," but rather found
Dirks liable as an aider and abettor because he disclosed confidential
information to persons who would sell before the information would be
publicly available. In this regard, the SEC opinion was a forerunner of
Rule 10b5-2(b)(2).24 1
Second, the SEC clearly focused upon scienter. This is a key element in insider trading-one that provides the proper bounds to limit the
scope of persons who are subject to the insider trading proscriptions.
Dirks was a securities professional who knew the information was material,242 knew the information was non-public, knew that it was given to
him in confidence to publicly disclose, and knew that his tippees would
243
sell before public disclosure.
The Court began its analysis of the issues raised by the SEC sanctioning of Dirks by again referencing Cady, Roberts as a seminal case,
once again without realizing that the Cady, Roberts decision sanctioned a
securities professional who was tipped by an insider who did not "sin";

240.
Dirks, 1981 WL 36329, at *9.
241.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(2) (2013) (promulgated in Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7881, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24599, 73 SEC Docket 3 (proposed Aug. 15, 2000)).
242.
As the SEC stated:
The inside information to which Dirks had become privy demonstrated, in the words of
one commentary, that "one of the darlings of Wall Street, a company that had managed to
produce continued high earnings growth for a decade, was, instead, a gigantic fraud."
Under the circumstances, it took little insight into the operations of the market-and
Dirks was, of course, a highly experienced and highly sophisticated analyst-to recognize that anyone who held EFCA shares and became aware of the information in Dirks'
possession would have a strong incentive to sell before that knowledge became widespread. Indeed, Dirks expressly advised at least one of those whom he tipped to sell, and
he observed that others did so, even without an explicit recommendation, based on his
revelations. Accordingly, we find that Dirks knew or should have known that his selective disclosure of the information he had gleaned from EFCA insiders would result in
trading.
Dirks, 1981 WL 36329, at *9 (footnotes omitted).
243.
Parenthetically, this is one of the rare times that "disclose or abstain" made sense: Dirks
did have the option (if not the obligation) to disclose publicly the confidential information he had
received. Absent such a disclosure, he had the obligation to abstain.
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in other words, Cady, Roberts was in direct opposition to the approach
ultimately taken by the Court in Dirks.244
The Court, in Part II of the Dirks opinion, accepted the concept set
forth in Cady, Roberts that, for there to be a violation of Rule lob-5 in an
insider trading context, two elements must be met: "(i) the existence of a
relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a
corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without
disclosure. 24 5
But, relying on Chiarella,the Court asserted that "'a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic
market information.' Such
a duty arises rather from the existence of a
2 6
fiduciary relationship., 4
Again, Cady, Roberts rejected the argument that a duty under the
securities laws derived from common law fiduciary concepts. 247
The Court concluded Part II of its opinion by affirming the Cady,
Roberts principle that "an insider will be liable under Rule lOb-5 for
inside trading only where he fails to disclose material nonpublic
infor248
mation before trading on it and thus makes 'secret profits.'
At this point it is not clear where the Court is going. But the Court
then runs amuck in Part III, beginning its analysis by recognizing that a
"typical tippee" generally has no common law fiduciary relationship with
the corporation. 249 The SEC had taken the position that a tippee who receives confidential non-public material information from an insider is
subject to the same constraints as the insider. 250 Following Chiarella,the
Court rejected the proposition that "[anyone]-corporate insider or
not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use
that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative
duty to disclose." 251 However, it did acknowledge: "[t]he conclusion that
recipients of inside information do not invariably acquire a duty to dis-

244.
Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *2 (Nov.
8, 1961).
245.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 227 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
246.
Id. at 654 (citation omitted).
247.
As the SEC stated:
Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law based on the view that an officer
or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship to existing stockholders from whom he
purchases but not to members of the public to whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate
to introduce these into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the securities acts.
Cady, Roberts, 1961 WL 60638, at *5.
248.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (quoting Cady, Roberts, 1961 WL 60638, at *6 n.3 1).
249.
Id.at 655.
250.
Id.at 655-56.
251.
Id.at 656 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365
(2d Cir. 1978), rev'd,445 U.S. 222 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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close or abstain does not mean that such tippees always are free to trade
on the 2information. The need for a ban on some tippee trading is
, 25
clear.
What is the "some tippee trading" that is forbidden? According to
the Court:
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the shareholders not because they receive inside information, but rather because it has been made available to them improperly. And for Rule
lOb-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure is improper only where it
would violate his Cady, Roberts duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and
the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
253
breach.
Besides inferring that insider trading liability is the exception rather
than the rule by repeated use of "some," the Court then waffled on when
an insider breaches his fiduciary duty of non-disclosure: "All disclosures
of confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with the duty
insiders owe to shareholders. 254 Consequently, "the test is whether the
insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.
Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative
breach.,255 Consequently, the tippee sins only if the tipper sins, and the
tipper sins only when he or she receives a benefit from the tippee.
As indicated above, the dissent had an entirely different view of
both the law and the facts. With respect to the facts, the dissent observed,
"In disclosing .. .[inside] information to Dirks, Secrist intended that
Dirks would disseminate the information to his clients, those clients
would unload their Equity Funding securities on the market, and the
price would fall precipitously, thereby triggering a reaction from the authorities. '256
The dissent also focused upon the fact that Dirks was compensated
for "looking after" his clients 257 and that his efforts to bring the fraud to
252.

Id.
at 659.

253.

Id.
at 660 (footnote omitted).

254.

Id. at 661-62.

255.
Id at662.
256.
Id.
at 669 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent also opined:
But this is precisely what Secrist did. Secrist used Dirks to disseminate information to
Dirks' clients, who in turn dumped stock on unknowing purchasers. Secrist thus intended
Dirks to injure the purchasers of Equity Funding securities to whom Secrist had a duty to
disclose. Accepting the Court's view of tippee liability, it appears that Dirks' knowledge
of this breach makes him liable as a participant in the breach after the fact.
Id. at 671 (footnote omitted).
257.
Id.
at 669 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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light were "feeble. 258 Dirks informed his clients before making any attempt to contact the SEC. To the minority, Dirks was no hero who
brought to light a fraud, which otherwise might have gone undiscovered, 259 but, rather, a market professional who knew his actions would
injure most of
the shareholders 260 while enabling his clients to avoid a
1
major loss.

26

With respect to the law, the dissent, responding to the majority's
holding that Dirks was not liable because Secrist did not obtain any personal benefit and thus did not violate his duty to Equity Funding, stated
that "the Court imposes a new, subjective limitation on the scope of the
duty owed by insiders to shareholders. The novelty of this limitation is
reflected in the Court's lack of support for it." 262 The dissent asserted that
"[t]he fact that the insider himself does not benefit from the breach does
not eradicate the shareholder's injury. 263 According to the dissent, "[t]he
duty is addressed not to the insider's motives, but to his actions and their
consequences on the shareholder. Personal gain is not an element of the
breach of this duty."2 64 The scope of the duty is circumscribed by the
requirement of scienter.
3. The Failed Policy Chosen by the Majority in Dirks
Consider now the differing opinions from a policy standpoint. In
this case, there were two interests in conflict: those of the shareholders
and the investing public that bought from Dirks's tippees, on the one
hand, and those of analysts and others who wished to take advantage of
non-public information they had obtained, on the other hand. The purpose of the securities laws in general is to insure "the maintenance of fair
and honest markets, 26 5 and of § 10 in particular to support "the public
interest" and insure "the protection of investors. ' ,2 66 Consequently, whose
interests should the Supreme Court consider paramount: (a) those of
Dirks and his tippees who saved millions of dollars by bailing out early
on the basis of material non-public information, or (b) those of (i) the
shareholders, who were unaware of Dirks's information and suffered the
precipitous drop in price, and (ii) the investors, who bought from the

258. Id at 670.
259. As stated earlier, state officials were in the process of shutting down Equity Funding's
scam. See supra note 238; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 668-69 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
260. Once disclosure is publicly made, all shareholders have a comparable opportunity to sell
as the price declines. As a result of Dirks's actions, the uninformed shareholders were not informed
until after the stocks had plummeted. Id. at 669-70.
261.
Id. at 670.
262.
Id at 671.
263.
Id. at 673. The dissent added: "It makes no difference to the shareholder whether the
corporate insider gained or intended to gain personally from the transaction; the shareholder still has
lost because of the insider's misuse of nonpublic information." Id. at 674.
264.
Id. at 674 (footnote omitted).
265.
15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
266.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
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tippee institutions only to find that they owned stock in a defunct company?
While the majority favored the analysts and institutions that wanted
to make a fast buck, the dissent championed the uninformed shareholders
and investors. For the majority, opportunists are favored over the investing public. This is a pattern that continued through the fourth trilogy in
CentralBank, Stoneridge Investment Partners,and Janus Capital.267
The majority in Dirks, as it continued its pattern of cutting back on
the scope of Rule lOb-5, was overly enamored of the importance of analysts to the functioning of the securities markets. The majority rejected
the SEC position that those receiving material, non-public information
from a corporate insider had a duty to disclose or abstain (more properly,
abstain until disclosed) on that basis that such an approach "could have
an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts. 268 According to
the majority:
It is commonplace for analysts to 'ferret out and analyze information,' and this often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others who are insiders. And information that the
analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the
market worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment in
this respect is69 made available in market letters or otherwise to clients
2
of the firm.
The Court opined-erroneously as we will see ZV-that "[i]t is the
nature of this type of information, and indeed of the markets themselves,
that such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of
the corporation's stockholders or the public generally., 27 1 While the majority recognized that Dirks's startling information "required no analysis,, 272 it opined that "the principle at issue here extends beyond these
2 73
facts."
In taking this position, the Court was not embodying a conservative
approach because the majority focused not upon the facts of the case
before it, but rather "legislated," as it did in Blue Chip Stamps,274 to solve
a problem not then presented to the Court. Moreover, the majority opinion reflects a lack of understanding of the corporation's role in disclosing
material information and the analyst's role in uncovering information.

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See infra Part IV.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 (majority opinion).
Id. at 658-59 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
See infra text at notes 275-76.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
Id. at 658 n.18.
Id.
See supratext accompanying note 128-32.
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Contrary to the opinion, it is possible to disclose material information in a public fashion. The SEC has adopted Regulation F-D,275
which requires that when a corporation or a person acting on its behalf
discloses material, non-public information, it shall simultaneously disclose such information to the public or, in the case of inadvertent disclosure, as promptly as possible.276
With respect to the proper role of analysts, the SEC opinion in Dirks
should have provided insight to the Supreme Court as to what a legitimate analyst actually does:
In this connection, it is important to recognize that this is not a
case in which a skilled analyst weaves together a series of publicly
available facts and non-material inside disclosures to form a "mosaic" which is only material after the bits and pieces are assembled into
one picture. We have long recognized that an analyst may utilize
non-public, inside information which in itself is immaterial in order
to fill in "interstices in analysis." That process is legitimate even
though such "tidbits" of inside information "may assume heightened
significance when woven by the skilled analyst into the matrix of
knowledge
obtained elsewhere," thereby creating material infor277
mation.
The SEC opinion, while recognizing the importance of an analyst's
work and the legitimacy of tracking down rumors, concluded that "the
analyst's role, like that of any other person, is constrained by the wellestablished proscriptions of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, and we cannot condone the unfairness inherent in the selective
dissemination
of material, inside information prior to its public disclo278
sure."
Clearly the position of the SEC and the dissent is true to the purposes of the securities laws, while the position of the majority undercuts the
protection of investors.
Subsequent events in the 2000s have brought into question the integrity of the analyst community and the quality of its analysis. Enron
was a highly-touted stock that also was the darling of the analysts until
Bethany McLean questioned its business model and earnings. 27 9 Thereafter, Enron's scam was revealed and its stock became worthless. 28 Later,
after the dot-com bubble burst, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer
uncovered a flood of recommendations by analysts touting stocks for the
275.
17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2013).
276.
17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2013).
277. Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17480, 1981 WL 36329, at *7 (Jan. 22,
1981) (footnote omitted).
278. Id.
at *10.
279. Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced?, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2006/01 /13/news/companies/enronoriginal fortune/.
280. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
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public to buy that they were at the same time disparaging as "crap" to
their colleagues. 28' Their motivation frequently was to obtain underwriting commitments for the investment banking side of their firm. 282 Sometimes the motivation was merely to get a daughter into nursery school.283
The Court should no longer be overly solicitous about holding analysts to
account.
4. The Problem of Tone, the Explosion of Insider Trading, and the
Congressional Response
In the course of the Dirks opinion, the Court asserted:
1. "[O]nly some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred
from trading
while in possession of material nonpublic infor284
mation."
2. "Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarellaas repudiating any notion
that all traders must enjoy equal information before
'2 85
trading."
286

3. "[T]he disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary."

4. "[A] duty [to disclose] arises ...not merely from one's287ability to
acquire information because of his position in the market."
5. "All disclosures of confidential corporate information
are not in288
consistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders."
6. "Absent some89 personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to
2
stockholders."

281.
See Christopher Lucas, Note, The Triangle Shirtwaist Fire and the Merrill Lynch Analyst
Ratings Scandal: Legislative and Prosecutorial Responses to Corporate Malfeasance, I BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 449,463-64 (2007) (Spitzer found emails describing stock as "a POS [piece
of shit]" from an analyst that publicly described that same stock as "an attractive investment" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Joseph Nocera & Abrahm Lustgarten, Wall
Street
on
the
Run,
FORTUNE,
June
14,
2004,
available
at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2004/06/14/372633/
(explaining the settlements reached between the New York attorney general and Wall Street investment banks after
Spitzer learned of analysts' routine betrayal of investors); Complaint $ 86, SEC v. Blodget, No. 03
Civ.2947(WHP),
2004
WL
435059
(S.D.N.Y.
Mar.
10,
2004),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/compl8115b.htm (explaining that the public research
reports by analysts were inconsistent with the analysts' privately expressed negative views).
282.
See Pat Huddleston 11 et al., Protect Investors from Brokers' Stock Scams, TRIAL, Apr.
2003, at 38 (explaining that analysts recommended stocks in order to secure investment-banking
business, with no regard for the true financial conditions of the corporations).
283.
Gretchen Morgenson & Patrick McGeehan, Wall St. and the Nursery School: A New York
Story, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A1.
284.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983).
285.
Id.
286.
Id.
287. Id.at 657-58 (second alteration in original).
288.
ld. at 661-62.
289. Id at 662.
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7. "Chiarellamade it explicitly clear there is no general duty to forgo
information."- 29

market transactions 'based on material, nonpublic

8. "In one sense, as market values fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect information, there always are winners
and losers;
but those who have 'lost' have not necessarily been de' 29 1
frauded."
These observations created a tone that arguably contributed to a
rash of insider trading that followed the Chiarellaand Dirks decisions in
the 1980s. A Wall Street Journal reporter in Den of Thieves extensively
chronicled the upsurge in insider trading. 292 Correlation does not mean
causation but pronouncements such as those made by the Supreme Court
could well have led to disdain by many in the investment banking community toward any proscription against insider trading. There is no question that insider trading increased markedly in the 1980s. In 1984, a
Congressional Report opined that "[i]nsider trading has become a more
widespread problem in recent years," and the SEC "has brought more
such cases during the past four years than in all previous years combined., 293 The Report also opined that "if the Dirks decision is properly
and narrowly construed by the courts, the
Commission's insider trading
294
program will not be adversely affected.,
In response to the surge of insider trading, Congress twice took action in an attempt to curtail this activity: in 1984, with the Insider Trading Sanctions Act,295 and in 1988, with the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act. 296 The 1984 Act incorporated a potential treble
damage liability for those who engaged in insider trading.297 Decisions
by the circuit courts first had looked askance at the "draconian" liability
when damages were measured, not by the benefit to the guilty party but
298
by the loss suffered by all investors who traded contemporaneously,
and then limited recovery to the benefits obtained by a defendant who
illegally traded. 299 The problem with merely requiring the defendant to
290. Id. at 666 n.27 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980)).
291.
Id.
292.
See generally JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991).
293.
H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 5 (1983).
294.
Id. at 15.
295.
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264.
296. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677.
297.
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 § 2(A).
298.
In Fridrich v. Bradford, one insider's profit was $13,000 but was subjected by the district
court to a judgment of $361,186.75. 542 F.2d 307, 308 (6th Cir. 1976). In reversing the lower court,
the Sixth Circuit characterized this as "Draconian liability." Id. at 309 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The concurring opinion suggested that liability only attach to those plaintiffs who traded
"contemporaneously" with the insider. Id. at 327 (Celebrezze, J., concurring). The 1988 Act adopted
this approach. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 3(b). Fridrichalso
questions whether an insider who did not abstain "caused" the party on the other side of the transaction to trade. Fridrich,542 F.2d at 323.
299. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 173 (2d Cir. 1980).
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disgorge his or her profits is that there is no downside (other than a potential criminal sanction) to engaging in insider trading. If you do not get
caught, you win; if you do get caught, you merely return your ill-gotten
gain. To put additional teeth into insider trading enforcement, the SEC
requested, and Congress conferred, the treble damage penalty provision.
Notwithstanding this new enforcement tool, in 1988 another Congressional Report asserted that "the last few years have seen a dramatic
increase in insider trading cases, including cases against some of the
3
most prominent officials in Wall Street investment banking firms." 00
Accordingly, Congress enacted the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988. This act expanded the civil penalty provision
to include broker-dealers, investment advisors and others who failed to
take appropriate steps to prevent insider trading by incorporating the
prior penalty provisions into a new § 21A of the 1934 Act.3°1 Because the
logic of the Fridrichv. Bardford decision 30 2 had effectively undercut the
causation aspect of private insider trading litigation, Congress resuscitated this cause of action by providing for insider liability to contemporaneous traders.3 °3 But as damages were limited by the insiders benefit,
there has been little incentive to utilize this provision unless the insider's
gain was very substantial.
C. Carpenter: The Uncertain Status of the MisappropriationTheory
Carpenter v. United States304 was another case involving unusual
facts. David Carpenter, a roommate of R. Foster Winans, was a bit player
in a fraud concocted by Winans and Peter Brandt, a distinguished broker
with Kidder Peabody. 30 5 Winans wrote an influential column, "Heard on
the Street," for the Wall Street Journal. In his column, Winans applauded
certain stocks and downplayed others. Stocks frequently rose after a
positive column and fell after a negative one. Winans tipped Brandt as to
the publication date and nature of the column and Brandt would buy before a positive column and go short before a negative one .3 6 After the
column was published and the stock moved, Brandt would close out the
transaction. Over a four-month period, the scheme netted almost
$700,000.307

300.

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
20-22.
306.

H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 11 (1988).

Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 21A.
Fridrich,542 F.2d at 318-20, 323.
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 20A.
484 U.S. 19 (1987).
Kenneth Felis, another participant in scheme, was also a broker at Kidder Peabody. Id.at

The story of the scheme is detailed in Winans's book. R. FOSTER WINANS, TRADING
SECRETS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE SCANDAL AT THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (1986). From
reading the book, one could glean that the purpose was to punish Peter Brandt, an unscrupulous
social climber, who was the chief prosecution witness against Winans and the other defendants. See
Broker in Winans Case Is Sentenced, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1988, at 137.

307.

Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 23.
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In 1987, the decision of the Supreme Court in the pending case of
Carpenter was eagerly awaited. 308 There were some who argued that
insider trading was a "victimless crime," that it moved the stock market
in the "correct" direction, that prohibiting it was bad policy, 309 and that it
was an appropriate way to compensate entrepreneurs and corporate management. 310 On the other hand, there was hope that the Supreme Court
would affirm the misappropriation theory that Justice Burger had articulated in his dissent in Chiarella.31 1 The decision turned out to be anticlimactic, however, since the Court affirmed the convictions under Rule
lOb-5 due to the Court splitting 4:4 on this issue.31 2 The 4:4 split was
occasioned by the difficulty some Justices had in accepting that the fraud
against the Wall Street Journal, namely misappropriating its printing
schedule to "time" the trading, was "in connection with" a securities
transaction.
It was not until ten years later that the Court upheld the misappropriation theory under Rule 1Ob-5 and affirmed the conviction of an attorney in a law firm that represented the bidder in a potential takeover.3 13
The attorney had purchased stock and call options of the target company
based upon his knowledge of the pending transaction. When the stock
rose dramatically after the tender offer was announced, the attorney
314
made more than $4.3 million.
In United States v. O'Hagan, Justice Scalia dissented on the basis
that § 10(b) requires the "manipulation or deception of a party to a securities transaction," 315 while Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, dissented on the basis that the majority opinion and the SEC
308.
See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr., Winans Case Taken by Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1986, at
D1; James B. Stewart, Death of a Theory? Supreme Court May Revamp Insider-Trading Law, WALL
ST, J., Sept. 30, 1987.
309.
Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information, 4 CATO J.
933, 935-37 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a later view of this thinking, see Donald
J. Boudreaux, Learningto Love Insider Trading,WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2009, at W1.
310.
I offered to debate Professor Manne on this point at his Law and Economics program at
Dartmouth College. He declined. To rebut his position, consider Diamond v. Oreamuno, where two
entrepreneurs, knowing that earnings would drop sharply because of a sharp increase in costs, sold
56,000 shares at $28; the market dropped to $11 when the adverse earnings were announced. 248
N.E.2d 910, 911 (1969). Is this appropriate compensation?
Nor is insider trading victimless. The conceptual problem is that the injury is to the same

side of the market. The person on the other side of the transaction actually benefits because, if buying, the sale by the insider drops the price, whereas, if selling, the purchase by the insider raises the
price. But the person on the same side as the insider is always "late to the party." In Oreamuno, the
insider got out at $28, whereas the public could only sell at $11. If disclosure were first made, the
insider would need to compete with other sellers to get out as the market began to plunge. It is likely
that an exchange would stop trading until the market digested the news and all would then have
equal opportunity at the new price.
311.

See supra Part III.A.

312. The Court unanimously affirmed the convictions under the mail and wire fraud statute.
Carpenter,484 U.S. at 24.
313. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 642-44 (1997).
314. Id.
315. Id.at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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failed "to provide a coherent and consistent interpretation" of the "in
connection with" requirement. 3 16 In particular, they found inconsistent
the position that a misappropriation of information would give rise to a
Rule lOb-5 action, but a misappropriation of money would not. 317 The
distinction drawn by the majority was that the fraud regarding information occurs when the information is wrongfully used, whereas the
fraud in misappropriating money occurs at the time of embezzlement,
3 8
irrespective of whether the money is later used to purchase securities. 1
There is another weakness in the misappropriation theory that was
recognized by the Second Circuit in Carpenter.Because Winans's fraud
was converting the information of his employer as to printing schedules,
the court observed that "the Wall Street Journalor its parent, Dow Jones
Company, might perhaps lawfully disregard its own confidentiality policy by trading in the stock of companies to be discussed in forthcoming
' 9
articles."31
But the court felt assured that "a reputable newspaper, even
if it could lawfully do so, would be unlikely to undermine its own valued
asset, its reputation, which it surely would do by trading on the basis of
its knowledge of forthcoming publications. 320
That this would even be an issue illustrates the absurdity of relying
upon a common law duty to a person or entity that is not a party to a securities transaction to bring a lawsuit based upon, or "in connection
with," a securities transaction. This in turn illustrates the absurdity in
Chiarellaof requiring a common law duty to the person on the other side
of the transaction in order to establish deceit. How much more sensible
would the law have been if Chiarellahad truly followed Cady, Roberts
and rejected reliance on common law principles, reframed "disclose or
abstain" to "abstain until disclosable," and recognized that market professionals have such a duty when they knowingly [scienter] trade on material, non-public information?
The cases in this third trilogy reflect a reactionary approach by the
Supreme Court. The policy of the securities laws was given lip-service,
but basically ignored. A well-reasoned decision, such as Cady, Roberts,
was cited to support the Court's decision when, in fact, it was diametrically opposed to the rationale in both Chiarella and Dirks. The Court
took the inept phrasing in Texas Gulf Sulfur-"disclose or abstain"-and
constrained its application by appending to it a common law duty requirement. A flood of insider trading ensued. As stated above, while correlation is not necessarily causation, the tone of the Court's decision, and

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id. at 680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 683-84 (quoting the Government's argument at oral hearing).
Id. at 655-57 (majority opinion).
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026, 1033 (2d Cir. 1986).
Id.
at 1033.
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the roadblocks to insider trading enforcement that it created, certainly did
nothing to inhibit the explosion of insider trading.
IV. THE

FOURTH TRILOGY: INSULATING COLLATERAL PARTICIPANTS
FROM LIABILITY

The last trilogy of Supreme Court cases dealing with the liability of
collateral participants is unique in that fourteen years passed between the
first and second decision; however, the second and third quickly followed each other. The Supreme Court saw its most recent decision, Janus CapitalGroup, Inc., as a necessary outcome if its decision in Central
Bank of Denver, NA. 3 2 1 was not to be undermined.322 The Court in Stoneridge Investment Partners took essentially the same tack.323 Because
Central Bank is both significant in its own right, as well as essentially
determinative of the subsequent two cases, it is important to understand
the shaky foundation upon which it sits.
A. Central Bank: The Demise ofAiding and Abetting
The primary violator in Central Bank was a real estate development
company that issued bonds in 1986 and planned a new issue in 1988.324
The bond indenture required that the bonds be secured by real estate valued at 160% of the debentures. 325 Central Bank was the indenture trustee
under both the existing and proposed bond offerings.3 26 Early in 1988,
Central Bank secured a supposedly updated appraisal from the development's appraiser.327 The values were essentially unchanged from two
years earlier, notwithstanding a drop in real estate prices in the Colorado
Springs area and a number of foreclosures. 328 The underwriter under the
1986 offering wrote to Central Bank, informed the Bank that the underwriter believed that the appraisal was inflated and that the indenture covenants were violated, and requested that Central Bank commission a new
appraisal by an independent appraiser, as it had the authority to do under

321.
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
322. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivatives Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011). The
Court in Janus Capital was unaware of the fact that after its decision in Central Bank, the Enron
disaster and other massive corporate corruption cases ensued, followed by a major financial collapse,
triggered in substantial part by the fraudulent creation and marketing of innovative financial securities. See Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:
What Caused the FinancialCrisis and Will Dodd-FrankPrevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV.
1243 (2011). While correlation is not necessarily causation, Central Bank, by eliminating aiding and
abetting liability, arguably turned professionals, such as attorneys, who should be gatekeepers into
hired guns. See infra notes 432-44 and accompanying text.
323.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 162-63 (2008).
324. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 167.
325.
Id.
326. Id.
327.
Id.
328.
Id.
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the indenture.3 29 The Bank asked its own appraiser to examine the appraisal, and he also thought the appraisal was inflated. The Bank then
met with the developer and agreed to postpone the new appraisal until
after the 1988 offering. The new offering went forward and shortly
thereafter the development company defaulted.33u
The primary violation was the misrepresentations about the value of
the real estate by the development company. Central Bank was charged
with aiding and abetting 331and the litigation revolved around the second
element of aiding and abetting: Central Bank argued that it had no duty
under the indenture to get a new appraisal and that, absent such a duty,
recklessness was insufficient; without a duty, actual knowledge of the
primary fraud was necessary. 332 The Supreme Court went beyond this
argument, however, and determined that aiding and abetting liability did
not exist in a Rule lob-5 action. 333
1. Reactionary Judicial Decision Making
At the outset, it is paradoxical, as well as disingenuous, for a supposedly conservative court to engage in reactionary judicial activism. But
that is exactly what the Court in CentralBank did. First, the issue decided by the Court was not the one litigated in the courts below, nor was it
the issue raised by the parties on appeal. The issue below, and which the
parties raised on appeal, dealt with the defendant's knowledge of, or
recklessness in not knowing, the primary violation.334 The parties never
questioned the existence of a cause of action for aiding and abetting.
Nevertheless, on its own motion, the Court directed the parties to brief
this issue.
The next aspect of reactionary judicial activism was that all eleven
circuits had accepted aiding and abetting liability. 335 When there is a split
329.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 894 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd
sub nom. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
330.
Id. at 895.
331.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, set forth the elements of aiding and abetting liability:
The Courts of Appeals have usually applied a familiar three-part test for aider and abettor liability, patterned on the Restatement of Torts formulation, that requires (i) the existence of a primary violation of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, (ii) the defendant's knowledge of
(or recklessness as to) that primary violation, and (iii) "substantial assistance" of the violation by the defendant.
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 194 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
332.
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 175-76 (majority opinion).
333.
Id.at 177.
334.
Id. at 190. The Grant of Certiorari limited review to Question 2 presented by the petition
and directed the parties to brief and argue the following additional question: "[W]hether there is an
implied private right of action for aiding and abetting violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5." Scott M. Murray, Comment, Central Bank of Denver
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver: The Supreme Court Chops a Boughfrom the JudicialOak: There
Is No Implied Private Remedy to Sue for Aiding and Abetting Under Section 1O(b) and SEC Rule
lOb-5, 30 NEW ENG. L. REv. 475, 505 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
335.
See, e.g., Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1992); K
& S P'ship v. Cont'l Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991); Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc.,
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among the circuits, the Supreme Court often resolves it. But aiding and
abetting liability was well-settled law. As Justice Stevens pointed out in
his dissent:
In hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings in every
Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have concluded
that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b) and Rule
I0b-5 .... While we have reserved decision on the legitimacy of the
theory in two cases that did not present it, all 11 Courts of Appeals to
have considered the question have recognized a private cause336of action against aiders and abettors under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
CentralBank did not resolve unsettled law but rather unsettled very
resolved law. While the majority stated that it "granted certiorari to resolve the continuing confusion over the existence ... of the § 10(b) aiding and abetting action[,]" the only confusion as to its existence was in
337
the mind of the majority.
The Court in the Stoneridge Investment Partnersdecision sought to
justify its decision by asserting "[t]his is not a case in which Congress
has enacted a regulatory statute and then has accepted, over a long period
of time, broad judicial authority to define substantive standards of conduct and liability." 338 But that was exactly what had occurred prior to
CentralBank with respect to aiding and abetting liability. Section 10(b)
was enacted in 1934, Rule lob-5 was promulgated in 1942, and a private
cause of action recognized in 1946, shortly after World War II ended.339
Aiding and abetting liability in Rule lob-5 actions was recognized at
least as early as 1963, 34 and the Supreme Court first considered Rule
lOb-5 in 1969. 34' Congress substantially revised the 1934 Act in 1964342
950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496-97 (4th Cir. 1991);
Fine v. Am. Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990); Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d
1477, 1480 (11th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied
sub norn. Moore v. Frost, 483 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 3231 (1987); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700
F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); IT, An Int'l Inv. Trust v.Comfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980);
Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir. 1978). The only court not to have
squarely recognized aiding and abetting in private § 10(b) actions has done so in an action brought
by the SEC, see Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844-45 (D.C. Cir. 1982), revd on other grounds, 463
U.S. 646 (1983), and has suggested that such a claim was available in private actions. See Zoelsch v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Seventh Circuit's test differs
markedly from the other circuits' in that it requires that the aider and abettor "commit one of the
'manipulative or deceptive' acts prohibited under section 10(b) and rule l0b-5." Robin v. Arthur
Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990).
336.
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
337. Id.at 170 (majority opinion).
338.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163 (2008).
339.
340.

See supra Part I.A.
See, e.g., Burley & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-3838, 23 SEC Docket 461 (Aug. 5,

1946).
341.
See SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 455 (1969).
342.
Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565. These amendments expanded the reach of disclosure requirements under the 1934 Act, by making the registration,
periodic reporting, proxy, and insider trading provisions applicable to large over-the-counter companies in addition to listed companies which were previously covered by the Act. The amendments
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and again in 1975,343 well aware of aiding and abetting liability in Rule
for a century, 344
lOb-5 actions. The doctrine itself has been recognized 345
and was formulated in the Restatement of Torts in 1939.
2. The Flawed Analysis
Judicial activism could be accepted if it made sense from a policy
standpoint or if it were supported by sound judicial reasoning. Central
Bank met neither criterion. From a policy standpoint, the law should discourage wrongdoing, not insulate it from accountability. From a jurisprudential perspective, the Central Bank opinion was so outcome determinative that it discredited the Court's objectivity.
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that "Congress did not
create a private § 10(b) cause of action and had no occasion to provide
guidance about the elements of a private liability scheme.''346 However,
with respect to the type of conduct prohibited, the statutory language
controls. According to the Supreme Court, because the statutory language controls, this "bodes ill" for the existence of aiding and abetting
liability as "Section 10(b) does not in terms mention aiding and abetting. '347 This is absurd reasoning. The Court acknowledged that the private cause of action was judicially created and thus Congress provided
no guidance about its elements. Why then would any rational person
expect Congress to deal with whether a remedy it did not create would be
complemented by aiding and abetting liability for those who assist a primary violator?
Viewed from a different perspective, the argument can be made that
Congress did anticipate aiding and abetting liability under § 10. This
section, by its terms, defines "unlawful" activity, and unlawful activity
can be prosecuted criminally by the U.S. Attorney. The Crimes and
Criminal Procedure section of the U.S. Code specifically provides:
"Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,

also imposed increased standards and disciplinary controls for broker-dealers in securities. For a
thorough analysis of the 1964 Amendments, see Richard M. Phillips & Morgan Shipman, An Analysis of the SecuritiesActs Amendments of 1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706 (1964).
343.
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97. These amendments
further expanded the reach of the SEC to oversee self-regulatory organizations and develop a national system for clearance and settlement of securities transactions. They also expanded the reporting
requirements of large financial institutions and generally sought to eliminate obstacles to competition within the securities industry. For a thorough analysis of the 1975 Amendments, see John G.
Gillis, Securities Law and Regulation: Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 31 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 12

(1975).
344.

THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS: OR THE WRONGS
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT 244 (3d ed. 1906).
345. 4 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PERSONS ACTING IN CONCERT § 876(b) (1939).

346.
(1994).
347.

Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173
Id. at 175 (internal quotation mark omitted).
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counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable
as a principal. 348
There is also further statutory language that suggests that aiding and
abetting liability does not affront the statutory scheme: Section 10(b)
forbids conduct that "directly or indirectly" is "manipulative or deceptive., 34 9 The Court rebuts this argument by asserting that "federal courts
have not relied on [this language] when imposing aiding and abetting
liability., 350 This is because all federal courts prior to CentralBank did
not find it necessary to construe the statute with regard to aiding and
abetting liability as they were dealing with a judicially created cause of
action. But, if the statute is viewed with an open mind, rather than an
outcome-determinative mindset, there is little basis for rejecting the
cause of action.
The Court then asserts that Congress knew how to create aiding and
abetting liability. Congress also knows how to pass a budget-or at least
it did. 351 But Congress's knowledge of neither is relevant to a judicially
created cause of action. The Court then concluded its analysis of the statute by asserting that the Court could not amend the statute by "creat[ing]
liability for acts that are not themselves manipulative or deceptive." 352 In
so doing, the Court fails to understand the difference between primary
and secondary liability. It is the primary violator who engages in manipulative or deceptive conduct. The aider and abettor is secondarily liable
because the person assists the primary violator. An essential element of
aiding and abetting liability is that there must be a primary violation that
would encompass manipulative or deceptive conduct.
3. Distinction Between Express Negligence Causes of Action and
an Implied Cause of Action Requiring Recklessness
After it completed its nonsensical examination of the statute to determine whether Congress provided for aiding and abetting liability with
regard to a judicially created cause of action, the Court then fantasized
whether, had Congress created a private cause of action, it would have
provided for aiding and abetting. The Court examined the private causes
of action that Congress expressly created and noted that none of them
provided for aiding and abetting liability. The Court accordingly concluded that "[t]here is no reason to think that Congress would have at-

348.
349.

18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).

350.
351.

Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 176.
See Len Burman, Budget Brinkmanship in Congress Must End, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR

(Dec. 18, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Tax-VOX/2011/1218/Budget-brinkmanshipin-Congress-must-end (explaining that Congress consistently followed a successful budget process
beginning in 1974, but that in five of the past twelve years, Congress has not passed a budget resolution at all, instead relying on emergency measures and last-minute stop-gaps).
352. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177-78.
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tached aiding and abetting liability only to353§ 10(b) and not to any of the
express private rights of action in the Act.,
Unfortunately for the Court, there is a very significant reason to distinguish between § 10(b) and the express private rights in the 1933 and
1934 securities acts-a reason the Court itself created almost twenty
years earlier. In Ernst & Ernst, the Court determined that the language of
§ 10(b) precluded a private action under Rule lOb-5 from sounding in
negligence, thereby requiring scienter 354 -today recklessness. 35 5 As the
Court itself recognized, aiding and abetting liability originated in criminal law, 356 and its extension to negligence cases is of relatively recent
origin. 357 Since the express private causes of action sound in negligence,
it is not surprising that Congress did not attach aiding and abetting liability. But, in the express private causes "ofaction, Congress did cast a broad
net in terms of liability. For example, § 11 of the 1933 Act imposes liability, not only upon the issuer, but also upon officers, directors, investment bankers, and experts named in the registration statement.358 In other
circumstances, some of these named defendants could be considered
aiders and abettors.
One of the private actions listed by the Court was § 9 of the 1934
Act. 359 Because liability is imposed on those who "willfully participate"
in the proscribed manipulation, this is not a negligence provision. But it
also does not negate a policy accepting aiding and abetting liability.
While § 10 imposes liability upon those who "use or employ" manipulative or deceptive acts, § 9 imposes liability upon one who "willfully participates" in manipulation. The conduct of the suppliers in Stoneridge
Investment Partners,who conspired with the issuer to inflate its earnings,
was challenged on the basis that they directly and willfully participated
in the fraud.360 Section 9, by its terms, covers "willful" participants. Yet,
on the basis of CentralBank, such liability was rejected even though the
1934 Act clearly does not reflect a policy against liability for willful participants.
The Supreme Court, in CentralBank, also made short shrift of the
argument that the 1984 and 1988 legislative reports approved of aiding
and abetting liability under Rule lOb-5.36t While the Court characterizes
353.
Id. at 180.
354.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 185 (1976).
355.
Id at 193 n.12 ("In this opinion the term 'scienter' refers to a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be
a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act.").
356.
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 181.
357.
See id.at 181-82.
358.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
359.
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at178.
360.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 148 (2008).
361.
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 185 (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 27 n.23 (1988)) (noting that

a certain provision did "not affect the availability of any other theories of liability, such as aiding and
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the Committee reports as making "oblique references" to aiding and
abetting,362 the references are hardly oblique. For example, the 1984 Report stated: "The committee endorses the judicial application of the conliability to achieve the remedial purposes of
cept of aiding and abetting
3 63
the securities laws.
The Court also states that "the interpretation given by one Congress
(or a committee ... thereof) to an earlier statute is of little assistance in
discerning the meaning of that statute. '' 364 But, paradoxically, this is in
effect what the Supreme Court itself has been doing. In the late 1970s,
the Court began restricting the circumstances in which a private cause of
action would be implied.365 It then uses its recent antipathy toward private courses of action to restrict causes of action developed under an
earlier Supreme Court regime in which the law at that time favored the
implication of a remedy.
In Central Bank, the Court downplayed the fact that Congress had
amended the securities laws many times without rejecting the judicial
doctrine of aiding and abetting. But, previously with respect to Rule 1Ob5, the Supreme Court had stated that "[t]he longstanding acceptance by
the courts, coupled with Congress' failure to reject Birnbaum 's reasonable interpretation ... argues significantly in favor of acceptance of the
Birnbaum rule by this Court. '' 366 Now, let us rewrite the prior sentence,
substituting "aiding and abetting" for "Birnbaum": "The longstanding
acceptance by the courts, coupled with Congress' failure to reject [aiding
and abetting], argues significantly in favor of [aidingand abetting liability]." Or let us take the same tack to the Court's language in Herman &
MacLean, substituting aiding and abetting for "Section 10(b)":
In 1975[,] Congress enacted the "most substantial and significant revision of this country's Federal securities laws since the passage of
the Securities Exchange Act in 1934." When Congress acted, federal
courts had consistently and routinely permitted a plaintiff to proceed
[under aiding and abetting]. In light of this well-established judicial
interpretation, Congress' decision to leave [aiding and abetting]36in7
tact suggests that Congress ratified [aidingand abettingliability].

abetting"). "Current law generally imposed secondary liability on persons who aid and abet the
inside trader." H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 10 (1983).
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 185.
362.
363.
H.R. REP. No. 98-355 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2283.
364.
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 185 (internal quotation mark omitted).
365.
See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980),
affd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 677-78 (1979); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 560 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 186 (1976);
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 67 (1975).
366.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975).
367.
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1983) (footnotes omitted)

(citation omitted).
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Apparently, the guiding principle for this Court is "[a] foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." 368 The opinion is an exemplar
of justification, not thoughtful and objective analysis. As will be developed in the balance of this Article, if there is a guiding principle for the
Court in these cases, it is protecting wrongdoers at the expense of the
public investor.
B. Stoneridge: DirectParticipantLiability
1. The Contrast Between CentralBank and Stoneridge
The facts in Stoneridge bore no relation to those in CentralBank.
Central Bank was a classic case of aiding and abetting. The elements of
aiding and abetting traditionally have been (i) a primary violation, (ii)
knowledge of the primary violation or recklessness in not being aware of
the primary violation by the secondary actor, and (iii) substantial assistance to the primary violator by the secondary actor.369
In contrast to Stoneridge, as discussed earlier, the primary violator
in Central Bank was a real estate development that had issued bonds in
1986 and planned a new issue in 1988, while Central Bank was the indenture trustee under both the existing and proposed bond offerings. The
primary violation was the misrepresentations about the value of the real
estate by the development company. Central Bank was charged with
aiding and abetting, and it was with this issue that the Court dealt.
While it would be naive to say that Central Bank did not benefit
from deferring the appraisal and letting the second offering go forwardit had both a stake in the fees from acting as trustee under the second
offering and a stake in keeping a client happy to secure business in the
future-it clearly was not a direct participant in the primary violator's
fraud. Nonetheless, had it fulfilled its responsibilities and promptly obtained a new appraisal, the fraud on the investors probably would not
have occurred.370
Although it would be hard to label Central Bank as a crook, that is
exactly what the defendants in Stoneridge were. And the Supreme Court
was hardly unaware of the situation. It set out the facts as follows:
For purposes of this proceeding, we take these facts, alleged by petitioner, to be true. Charter, a cable operator, engaged in a variety of
fraudulent practices so its quarterly reports would meet Wall Street
expectations for cable subscriber growth and operating cash flow.
The fraud included misclassification of its customer base; delayed
reporting of terminated customers; improper capitalization of costs
368.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS (FIRST SERIES) 19 (Infomotions, Inc.

2001).

369.
370.

See supra note 331.
The Supreme Court apparently does not understand that it is engaging in risk allocation.
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that should have been shown as expenses; and manipulation of the
company's billing cutoff dates to inflate reported revenues. In late
2000, Charter executives realized that, despite these efforts, the company would miss projected operating cash flow numbers by $15 to
$20 million. To help meet the shortfall, Charter decided to alter its
existing arrangements with respondents, Scientific-Atlanta and
Motorola.

Respondents supplied Charter with the digital cable converter (set
top) boxes that Charter furnished to its customers. Charter arranged
to overpay respondents $20 for each set top box it purchased until the
end of the year, with the understanding that respondents would return
the overpayment by purchasing advertising from Charter. The transactions, it is alleged, had no economic substance; but, because Charter would then record the advertising purchases as revenue and capitalize its purchase of the set top boxes, in violation of generally accepting accounting principles, the transactions would enable Charter
to fool its auditor into approving a financial statement showing it met
projected revenue and operating cash flow numbers. Respondents
agreed to the arrangement.
So that Arthur Andersen would not discover the link between
Charter's increased payments for the boxes and the advertising purchases, the companies drafted documents to make it appear the transactions were unrelated and conducted in the ordinary course of busi371
ness.
2. The Arguments for and Against Direct Liability
Thus, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola jointly conspired with Charter to engage in a series of transactions for the purpose of inflating earnings and thereby inflating the price of Charter's stock. Scientific-Atlantic
and Motorola directly benefitted from the arrangement through increased
revenues and profits, and their direct participation in the fraud was essential to carrying out the fraud. With respect to the fraud, they were arguably primary violators, not secondary violators. The secondary characterization comes into play only because the purpose of the fraud was to inflate Charter's earnings and it was Charter that "made" the misrepresentation to the investing public about its earnings.
Yet, the Court in Stoneridge blithely took the position that its decision was controlled by Central Bank and arguably extended it, stating:
"[t]he conduct of a secondary actor must satisfy each of the elements ...
for liability,"372 including reliance.373 However, while the Court supposedly followed Central Bank, in which it had examined the express pri371.
372.
373.

Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 153-54 (2008).
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158.
Id. at 159.
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vate causes of action to discern congressional intent, an examination of
the express liability provisions does not establish, or even support, the
argument that the liability of secondary actors must meet all of the elements of liability for primary actors. The express liability provisions in
the 1933 and 1934 Acts are complemented by liability imposed upon
controlling persons who, in effect, are secondary actors. Section 15 of the
1933 Act provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title, shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person
to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason
of which the liability of the controlled
374
person is alleged to exist.
Section 20(a) of the 1933 Act provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same
extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable ... unless the controlling person acted in good
faith and did not directly or indirectly
induce the act or acts constitut375
ing the violation or cause of action.
In none of these statutory secondary liability provisions is there any
indication that, in order to hold the controlling person liable, a plaintiff
must prove the same elements of a cause of action against the person
secondarily liable as it does against the primary violator. Rather, Congress provided the direct opposite: plaintiff first must prove the cause of
action against the primary violator and then the unique elements regarding the secondary violator's responsibility come into play.
3. Contorting Fact to Fit Bias
From a standpoint of common sense, the opinion goes downhill
from this point. Let us briefly go back to the facts. The defendants executed documents and engaged in transactions with the issuer, Charter
Communications, the sole purpose of which was to inflate Charter's
earnings-which was exactly what was accomplished.
With respect to this fraud, the Court made the following statements:

374.
375.

15 U.S.C. § 77o (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012).
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(i)"[Respondents'] deceptive acts were not communicated to the public"; 376

(ii) "No member of the investing public had knowledge, either actual or presumed, of respondents' deceptive acts... ";377
(iii) There is no authority for a rule "that in an efficient market investors rely not only upon the public statements relating
to a security
' 378
but also upon the transactions those statements reflect."
(iv) Petitioner seeks to apply § 10(b) beyond the securities markets-"to purchase and supply contracts-the realm of ordinary
379
business operations";
(v) "§ 10(b) ...does not reach all commercial transactions that are
fraudulent
and affect the price of a security in some attenuated
, 380
way.
(vi) "Here respondents were acting in concert with Charter in the
ordinary course as suppliers and, 381
as matters then evolved in the not
customers";
as
course,
ordinary
so
(vii) "Unconventional as the arrangement was, it took place in 382
the
marketplace for goods and services, not in the investment sphere."
(viii) "Charter was free to do as it chose in preparing its
books" [i.e. it
383
was not compelled by respondents to cook its books].
The foregoing characterizations make little sense. First of all, the
stock market is driven by earnings. Missing an earnings projection by a
penny a share can send a stock plummeting. 384 To say that an investor
relies on the earnings but not the transactions that underlie such earnings
is sophistry. The reported earnings have no relevance absent the integrity
of the underlying transactions. In WorldCom, for example, the earnings
were fraudulent because cash outflows that should have been expensed
were capitalized.3 85 That was analogous to the fraud in the case at bar.
Investors rely upon earnings as a surrogate for the integrity of the under376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159.
Id.
Id.at 160.
Id.at 161.
Id.
at 162 (emphasis added).
Id.
at 166 (emphasis added).

382.

Id.

383.

Id.

384.

See, e.g., Oracle Profit,Revenue Miss Expectations; Shares Drop, CNBC.COM (Dec. 20,

2011, 5:39 PM ET), http://www.cnbc.com/id/45736368 (Oracle reported its quarterly earnings were
54 cents per share, up from 51 cents per share for the previous year, but this was 3 cents per share
lower than analysts expected, causing its stock to fall 14.6%).
385. See Peter Elstrom, How to Hide $3.8 Billion in Expenses, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
MAG.,

July

7,

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02

2002,

27/b3790022.htm.

available

at
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lying transactions. It is the financial health of the company, and its ability
to generate a stream of cash flow in the future, that determines stock
price.386 Thus, as stated above, the reported earnings are a surrogate for
the underlying health of the company. When the underlying transactions
are fraudulent, the earnings based upon such transactions misinform the
market about the underlying health of the company.
Moreover, this fraud did not affect the price of Charter stock in
some attenuatedway. As the Supreme Court expressly stated:
Charter, a cable operator, engaged in a variety of fraudulent practices
so its quarterly reports would meet Wall Street expectations for cable
subscriber growth and operating cash flow.... Charter executives
realized that, despite these efforts, the company would miss projected
operating cash flow numbers by $15 to $20 million. To help meet the
shortfall, Charter decided to alter its existing
arrangements with re38 7
spondents, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola.
Rather than affecting the price of Charter stock in some attenuated way,
the whole purpose of the fraud was to affect the price of the stock.
Finally, this fraud did not occur in the realm of ordinary business
operations, the defendants were not acting in the ordinary course as suppliers, and the transactions did not take place in the marketplace for
goods and services. Rather, the fraud was the antithesis of ordinary business operations. In ordinary business operations, buyers do not pay double the market price for goods and advertisers do not buy advertisements
they do not want. These transactions were not in the marketplace for
goods and services; they were outside the marketplace and involved privately orchestrated corruption.
For the Supreme Court to classify the present fraud as an ordinary
commercial transaction is beyond naive; the Court is consciously straining to present unconscionable activity as merely commercial. It is a little
like Humpty-Dumpty in Through the Looking Glass: Words mean exact388
ly what I mean them to mean; neither more nor less.
C. Janus Capital: Who "Makes" a Misrepresentation
Just when you think Supreme Court jurisprudence cannot become
any more detached from reality, the Court proceeds to outdo itself. A

386.
Discounted cash flow is a norm for valuing a corporation. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983). The process involves projecting cash flows for a number of years in the
future and then taking the present value of such cash flows in order to obtain the present value of the
corporation. See CHARLES W. MURDOCK, The Earnings Value of a Business, in 8 ILLINOIS PRACTICE
SERIES: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 19.3 (2d ed. 2013).

387.

Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 153.

388.

LEwIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 66

(Selwyn H. Goodacre ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1983) (1871).
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straight reading of Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders
suggests that the Court has eliminated management liability for securities
fraud except for those members of management who sit on the board of
directors. After Janus Capital,the new model for corporate governance
could be a board composed only of one inside director, the CEO, and the
balance of the board composed of outsiders who, if they are sufficiently
uninformed, can escape liability for securities fraud. The rest of man-

agement need not worry. 390 And the CEO need not worry if he did not
expressly authorize the misrepresentation. Rather than encouraging an
informed board, the decision does the converse. Rather than encouraging
accountability, it discourages accountability.
1. The Facts
Janus Capital involved a mutual fund, Janus Investment Fund (the
Fund), that stated in its prospectuses that it had taken steps to curb market timing,3 9' when in fact it had not. Janus Capital Group (Janus Capital)
is a publicly traded asset management company that created the Fund as
a separate legal entity owned by the Fund's shareholders. 392 Janus Capital Management LLC (Management) is a wholly owned entity controlled
by Janus39 3Capital, which was engaged by the Fund to be its investment
advisor.

The investment advisory services provided by Management included "management and administrative services necessary for the operation
389.
131 S.Ct. 2296 (2011).
390.
It is too early to predict with assurance how Janus Capitalwill play out. See infra text
accompanying notes 413-20.
391.
See, e.g., Gary D. Halbert, The Hedge Fund/Mutual Fund Scandal, PROFUTURES INV.,
http://www.profutures.com/article.php/206/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). Halbert described the market timing scandal as follows:
Canary [Capital Partners LLC] (and perhaps other large hedge funds) allegedly obtained
special trading opportunities with several leading mutual fund families-reportedly including Bank of America's Nations Funds, Banc One, Janus and Strong-by promising
to make substantial investments in various mutual funds offered by these firms.
The special trading opportunities, in this case fraudulent trading opportunities, consisted
primarily of so-called "late trading" of mutual funds after the stock markets close at 4:00
eastern time. If you or I, for example, want to make a purchase or sale of a mutual fund,
we have to get our orders in to the fund family before the close of the markets, sometimes
30 minutes or more before the markets close. If you or I place our order after the markets
close at 4:00 today, then we don't get that order filled until tomorrow at the 4:00 closing
price.
In the case of Canary, the mutual funds noted above (and possibly others) allegedly allowed Canary (and others) to place its orders AFTER the markets closed and still get the
closing price for the same day. As you know, there are frequently announcements just after the markets close that can have significant effects on the markets the following day.
Allegedly, these hedge funds would trade on this after-market information and reap big
profits the following day.
Allowing large hedge funds to trade after hours is illegal and it serves to reduce profits
and/or increase losses to the other shareholders of the mutual funds!
Id.
392. Janus, 131 S.Ct. at 2299.
393. Id.
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of [the Fund]., 394 All the officers of the Fund were officers of Management; one member of the Fund's board of directors was associated with
395
Management.
Plaintiffs alleged that Janus Capital and Management caused the
Fund to issue prospectuses that created a misleading impression that Janus Capital and Management would implement measures to curb market
timing in the Fund.3 96 The district court dismissed the complaint, but the
Fourth Circuit reversed on the basis that "JCG [Janus Capital] and JCM
[Management], by participating in the writing and dissemination of the
prospectuses, made the misleading statements contained in the documents." 397 With respect to reliance, the Fourth Circuit also determined
that investors would infer that Management "played a role in preparing
or approving the content of the Janus fund prospectuses," but would not
infer the same about Janus Capital, "which could be liable only as a 'con398
trol person.' ,,
To this, the Supreme Court simply responded that, to be liable,
"JCM [Management] must have 'made' the material misstatements in the
399
prospectuses. We hold that it did not."

2. The Flawed Analysis of the Majority
The policy perspective from which the majority began its analysis is
(i) contrary to the philosophy that formerly covered interpretation of the
securities laws, namely, "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for
the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry," and to construe legislation
enacted to avoid fraudulent activity "not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes" ;4° (ii) contrary to Congres-

sional policy in enacting the 1934 Act "to insure the maintenance of fair
and honest markets"; 40 and (iii) contrary to the policy of § 10 of that Act
to further the public interest and to protect investors. 402 According to the
majority, "[c]oncems with the judicial creation of a private cause of action caution against its expansion," and thus the Court must give "narrow
dimensions" to a private cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5.4 °3 It should be
394.
Id.(internal quotation mark omitted).
395.
Id.The opinion pointed out that the Fund's board was more independent than required by
the securities laws: "[U]p to 60 percent of the board of a mutual fund may be composed of 'interested persons."' Id.(citing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2006)).
396.
Id.at 2300.
397.
Id.at 2301 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566
F.3d I 11,121 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd,Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296).
398.
Id.(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at

127-30).
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

Id.
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186, 195 (1963).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 78i.
Janus, 131 S.Ct. at 2302 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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noted that the "concerns" about a private cause of action are those of the
Supreme Court, not of Congress.41 4
After engaging in some wordsmithing, the majority determined that
"the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority
over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it."' 40 5 According to the Court, "[a] broader reading of
'make' . . would substantially undermine Central Bank" because, "[i]f
persons or entities without control over the content of a statement could
be considered primary violators who 'made'
the statement, then aiders
'4 6
and abettors would be almost nonexistent. 0
The problem with this statement of the Court is that it is dead
wrong, as indicated by the cases it was seeking to preserve and felt compelled to follow and protect. Central Bank4 7 dealt with an aider and
abettor bank that failed to follow up on information that the land, which
secured the debentures of which it was a trustee and which was the subject of a forthcoming offering, was substantially overvalued. On the other
hand, Stoneridge4 8 dealt with businesses that conspired with the issuer to
manipulate the prices each charged the other in order to inflate the issuer's earnings. In CentralBank, there was no assertion that the aiders and
abettors made any statement. On the other hand, in Stoneridge, while the
defendants were not charged with directly making a statement, they were
charged with knowingly participating in transactions which they knew
would lead to an earnings statement that misled investors.
In the case at bar, the majority rejected the idea that Management
could have "made" the statement in the Fund's prospectus. The Court
asserted that only the person with ultimate authority can "make" a statement and that attribution is strong evidence as to who is the maker. 40 9 In
so doing, the majority used the analogy of a speechwriter and a speaker. While the speechwriter may draft a speech, it is the speaker who is
responsible for the content.
But in this case, respondent's analogy may be more apt: that of a
playwright and the actor.411 While the actor speaks, it is the playwright
who is responsible for the statements.

404.
Courts first recognized a private cause of action in 1946. See supra text accompanying
note 12. Until CentralBank, all eleven circuit courts of appeals had expressly recognized this private
cause of action and understood that it included aiding and abetting liability. See supra text accompa-

nying note 334. Congress amended the securities laws several times in the interim and never once
mentioned any concerns about the application of the private right of action.
405.
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
406.
Id.

407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

See supra text accompanying note 324-33.
See supra text accompanying note 367-69.
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
Id.
Id at 2304.
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The majority emphasized that the Fund had an independent board of
directors.41 2 Thus, the board would be responsible for the misstatements
in the prospectuses. But the Fund does not have its own employees.4 13
The Fund's board is dependent upon Management for information and
advice. As is well known: She who controls the information, controls the
decision.4 14 But this reality is beyond the ken of the majority. It concludes that, even though Management "was significantly involved in
preparing the prospectuses," since Management was "subject to the ultimate control of' the Fund, the Fund, and not Management, made the
statements in the prospectuses, 4 15 even though the board may not have
had any knowledge that the statements in the prospectus were false and
misleading.
This stance by the majority is even more irrational since the false
statements related to a matter-namely, whether market timing had been
stopped-which was totally in the control of Management, which drafted
the prospectuses. You can rest assured that Management did not tell the
board of the Fund that it continued to permit market timing, and that it
would also be asserting the contrary in the prospectuses. The Court also
relied upon the Stoneridge holding that the public could not have relied
upon the actions of Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta in conspiring with
Charter Communications to inflate the latter's sales, which thus inflated
Charter Communications's earnings and stock price, because it was not
"inevitable" that the company would use the increased sales to increase
its earnings.4 16 At the risk of wordsmithing like the majority, it depends
upon what the word "inevitable" means. Of course, it is possible that
Charter Communications's management might have had a conversion
experience, realized the evil of inflating earnings, and reversed the inflated sales data. But is not the likelihood of a conversion experience by
management so remote that any rational person would conclude that the
pattern of inflated sales would "inevitably" be incorporated into the fi412. Id
413. See supra Part IV.C. I ("The Facts") and text accompanying notes 390-98.
414.
This conclusion is based upon my experience as an expert in mutual fund litigation. Basically, the board does what the manager recommends. Portions of my opinion were quoted extensively by the Eighth Circuit in reversing the district court in Gallus v. Ameriprise Financial,Inc. (the
American Express mutual fund advisor). 561 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2009), vacated, 559 U.S. 1046
(2010). This experience is confirmed by the administrative proceedings in connection with the Janus
Group market timing. See Lammert, Exchange Act Release No. ID-348, 2008 WL 6593436 (ALJ
Apr. 28, 2008), where the administrative law judge stated:
The existence of approved market timing relationships was widely known no later than
the completion of the Beery Report, which was circulated to dozens of Janus employees
and executives. This knowledge was never shared with the Board. In the presentation to
the Board on the use of redemption fees on market timing the legal department relied
heavily on the Beery Report in the preparation of materials for the presentation, However, the final materials provided to the Board did not include any mention of the approved
market timing relationships.
Id
415.

Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2305.

416.

Id. at 2303 (internal quotation mark omitted),
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nancial statements? As indicated above, the thinking process of the majority is either outcome determinative or Alice in Wonderland. To suggest that management would orchestrate an elaborate series of fraudulent
transactions, but then not "inevitably" incorporate them into the public
financial statements, is again irrational.
Yet, the majority uses this twisted logic from Stoneridge to support
its reasoning in Janus Capital that only the person with ultimate control
over the statement and its communication can "make" a statement, because "[w]ithout such authority, it is not 'necessary or inevitable' that
any falsehood will be contained in the statement.,' 41 7 Again, refer back to
the prior discussion. It was in the best interest of Janus Capital not to
disclose that it had not terminated market timing. Janus Capital, through
Management, controlled the drafting of the prospectus. Would any rational person expect Janus Capital to either disclose in the prospectuses
that it had continued this illegal activity, or to disclose to the board of
directors that it was denying the continuation of this activity in the prospectuses, even though it had not been terminated? The board and thus
the Fund were at the mercy of Management. Clearly the statements were
"made" by Management. But, since Management did not make the
statement, according to the Court, it is not liable, nor is its control person, Janus Capital. And the board of directors is not liable because they
lacked scienter as to the misleading nature of the prospectuses.
Once again, the Supreme Court provides a safe harbor for fraudulent activity. Moreover, as discussed below, it has choreographed the
perfect crime.
The dissent took the majority to task, not only for the Court's unwarranted reliance upon Central Bank and Stoneridge,41 8 but also, and
more importantly, for its unnecessary wordsmithing with regard to the
scope of the word "make." The dissent asserted:
But where can the majority find legal support for the rule that it
enunciates? The English language does not impose upon the word
"make" boundaries of the kind the majority finds determinative. Every day, hosts of corporate officials make statements with content that
more senior officials or the board of directors have "ultimate authority" to control.4 19
Whether this will be the case in the future is discussed below.
3. The Consequences of the Court's Decision
Arguably, the Supreme Court has written the script for the perfect
crime. According to the administrative law judge in the disciplinary pro417.
418.
419.

Id.
Id.at 2307-08 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.at 2307.
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ceedings with respect to market timing by Janus Group, the board of
directors was not informed of the market timing activities.420 If only the
board of directors is deemed to make the statement because of its ultimate authority, and if the board is unaware of the truth, then there is no
primary violation, which would also mean that, even in an SEC proceeding, there could be no aiding and abetting liability because of the lack of
a primary violation.
Under the law prior to Janus Capital,as the dissent pointed out:
[B]oth language and case law indicate that, depending upon the circumstances, a management company, a board of trustees, individual
company officers, or others, separately or together, might "make"
statements contained in a firm's prospectus-even
if a board of direc42
tors has ultimate content-related responsibility. 1
Additionally, the Supreme Court in 1983, in the process of determining
that an express private cause of action under the 1933 Act did not exclude an implied cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5, stated:
Moreover, certain individuals who play a part in preparing the registration statement generally cannot be reached by a Section 11 action. These include corporate officers other than those specified in 15
U.S.C. § 77k(a), lawyers not acting as "experts, " and accountants
....If, as Herman & MacLean argues purchasers in registered offerings were required to rely solely on Section 11, they would have no
recourse against such individuals even if the excluded parties engaged in fraudulent conduct while participating in the registration
statement. The exempted individuals would be immune from federal
liability for fraudulent conduct even though Section 10(b) extends to
"any person" who engages in fraud in connection with a purchase or
422
sale of securities.

Thus, it is clear that, in 1983, the Supreme Court envisioned that someone who participated in the drafting of a document could be liable under
Rule 1Ob-5.
The Supreme Court's approach in Janus Capitalwould also seem to
make its warning in Central Bank that "[a]ny person or entity, including
a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or
makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or
seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under Rule
10b--5,''23 illusory. Arguably, Central Bank, by eliminating aiding and
abetting liability, reduced the likelihood that attorneys would act as gate420. See Lammert opinion cited supra note 414. "However, the final materials provided to the
Board did not include any mention of the approved market timing relationships." Id.
421.
Janus, 131 S.Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
422. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 n.22 (1983) (emphasis added).

423.
(1994).

Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191
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keepers in preventing their clients from making fraudulent representations.
In the wake of Janus Capital, one circuit court has employed the
Janus Capital "only the person with ultimate authority can make a
statement" test to insulate a corporation called during a conference call
from liability for statements made during the call. 424 In Fulton County
Employees Retirement System v. MGIC Investment Corp.,425 MGIC
owned 46% of the equity of Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securitization LLC (C-BASS), Radian Group Inc. owned another 46%, and the
managers at C-BASS owned the remaining 8%.426 Thus, C-BASS was
essentially a joint venture between MGIC and Radian Group. C-BASS
securitized sub-prime mortgages before the financial crisis destroyed its
business. 427 As the sub-prime mortgage market began to falter in the
summer of 2007, C-BASS's lenders increasingly began making margin
calls, creating potential liquidity problems.428 One of the issues in the
case was a conference call held by MGIC on July 19, 2007. According to
plaintiffs, Williams, the CEO of C-BASS, and Draghi, its COO, made
false or misleading statements.
The Seventh Circuit held that MGIC could not be liable under
42 9
§ 20(a) as a control entity because Radian also had 46% ownership.
Consequently, according to the court, MGIC did not have control.430
With no liability under that section, the plaintiffs other recourse was
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. However, because the two officers of CBASS, Williams and Draghi, made the statements during the C-BASS
conference call, MGIC could not be held liable under Rule lOb-5 because, under Janus Capital, only the person with ultimate control can be
the maker of a statement and MGIC did not have control.431 Moreover,
the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's analysis rejecting the
claims against Williams and Draghi.432 The district court had opined that,
even though much of the remaining money that the managers pointed to
when stating that C-BASS had substantial liquidity had already been
subject to margin calls before the conference call, this information "may
not have made its way up corporate channels" by the time of the call.433
424.
See generally Fulton Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. MGIC Inv. Corp., 675 F.3d 1047, 1048-52
(7th Cir. 2012).
425.
675 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir. 2012).
426.
Id. at 1048.
427.
Id. at 1048-49.
428.
Id. at 1049.
429.
Id.at 1051.
430.
Id. The Seventh Circuit noted that this type of investment structure is very common in
joint ventures. Id. With § 20(a) liability precluded in all of these types of cases, the impact of Janus

can be far-reaching.
431.
432.
433.
"17 (E.D.

Id.
Id. at 1052.
Fulton Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. MGIC Inv. Corp., No. 08-C-0458, 2010 WL 601364, at
Wis. Feb. 18, 2010), afid, 675 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir. 2012).
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Without personal knowledge of the extent of these margin calls, Williams and Draghi could not have had the requisite scienter to be liable

under Rule lOb-5. 434 This fantasy by the district court was possible be43 5
cause, under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),
plaintiffs must meet a severe pleading burden when met with a motion to
dismiss without the benefit of discovery.436
Janus Capital may have limited impact with regard to statements
made by corporate management, in light of the Supreme Court's own
language and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 437 Justice Thomas accepted that "attribution within a statement or implicit from surrounding circumstances is strong evidence that a statement was made
by-and only by-the party to whom it is attributed., 438 And, pursuant to
section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,439 the CEO and CFO must sign

and certify in each annual and quarterly report that they have reviewed
the report, that to their knowledge it does not contain any material untrue
statement or omission of a material fact, that the financial statement presents fairly the financial condition of the company and the results of its
operations, that they are responsible for and have designed such internal
controls as necessary to ensure the material information is made known
to them, that they have evaluated the effectiveness of such internal controls, and that they have reported any significant deficiencies to the company's auditors and audit committee.44°
Accordingly, several district courts have recognized that officials
who make public statements cannot defend on the basis that they did not
have the ultimate authority, but rather that it resided in the board of directors. 441 However, other courts have recognized this defense. 42 In any
434.
Id.
435.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
436.
Id.
§ 101. It is unfathomable that, with the subprime mortgage market collapsing, and with
C-BASS in the first six months of the year having been subject to $290 million of margin calls, that
the CEO and COO would not be aware of the fact that another $145 million of margin calls had been
made between July 1 and July 19, the date of the conference call. The district court, in effect, indulges in a presumption that management is incompetent to save management from liability.
437.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
438. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S.Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
439.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302.
440.
See 17 C.FR. § 240.13a-14 (2013); 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 tbl. Instruction (31) (2013).
441.
See In re Merck & Co., MDL No. 1658 (SRC), 2011 WL 3444199, at *24-25 (D.N.J.
Aug. 8,2011). In In re Merck, plaintiffs alleged that Merck overstated the commercial viability of its
top-selling drug Vioxx. Id. at * 1. Several of the individual defendants, all officers of Merck, raised
defenses based on Janus, arguing that the statements attributed to them cannot lead to liability because the defendants did not have "ultimate authority over the statement[s]." Id.at *24 (quoting
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302) (intemal quotation marks omitted). The district court used agency concepts to differentiate, arguing that Management in Janus was a separate entity from the Fund, meaning it was not an agent of the Fund. Id.at *25. In In re Merck, the officers were agents of Merck. Id.
Because corporations can only act through agents, it would be unreasonable to absolve corporate
officers of primary liability for all lOb-5 claims just because the statements they make are ultimately
within control of the corporation that employs them. See id.; see also Monk v. Johnson & Johnson,
No. 10-4841 (FLW), 2011 WL 6339824, at *17 n.19 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2011) (defendants raised
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event, the confusion caused by Janus Capital has added to the cost and
inefficiency of litigation by creating another issue that needs to be dealt
with by litigants and the courts.
Other courts have suggested that the Janus Capital limitation is applicable only to third parties who now cannot be liable for statements
made by their clients." 3 Unfortunately, even if Janus Capital were so
limited, it would undercut the effectiveness of the securities laws in holding gatekeepers accountable. The idea that a lawyer, in drafting documents in connection with a securities transaction, can be held liable as a
primary violator for co-authoring or co-creating the document was first
developed in Klein v. Boyd,444 a case that was later settled on appeal and
the opinion withdrawn. This was further developed in In re Enron Corp.
Securities, Derivative, and ERISA Litigation."5
Consider the massive fraud perpetrated at the turn-of-the-century by
Enron, assisted by its attorneys. In litigation arising out of Enron's massive fraud, plaintiffs sued two law firms, Vinson & Elkins and Kirkland
claims almost identical to those in In re Merck, and the district court used the same analysis from In
re Merck to refute them); SEC v. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d 109, 116 (D.D.C. 2012).
442. In Hawaii Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, No. 3:10CV371, 2011 WL 3862206
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011), the court stated that there was nothing in Janus that would limit its holding "to legally separate entities." Id. at *3.The court concluded that "[t]he complaint does not state a
claim for primary liability under Janus, because the defendants[, former officers of the company,]
did not have ultimate authority over the content of the statement." Id. at *5.
443.
City of Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 359, 374
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
As for Janus Capital,that case addressed only whether third parties can be held liable
for statements made by their clients. Its logic rested on the distinction between secondary
liability and primary liability and has no bearing on how corporate officers who work together in the same entity can be held jointly responsible on a theory of primary liability.
It is not inconsistent with Janus Capital to presume that multiple people in a single corporation have the joint authority to "make" an SEC filing, such that a misstatement has
more than one "maker."
Id. (citations omitted).
444.
949 F. Supp. 280, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, Nos. 97-1143, 97-1261 (3d Cir. Mar. 9,
1998), 1998 WL 55245, rehgen banc granted,vacated.
445.
In re Enron Corp. Sec., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 586 (S.D. Tex. 2002). In re Enron Corp.
summarized Klein as follows:

[I]n
Klein v. Boyd, a panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals [found that the law firm
in the dispute could be liable as a primary violator of securities fraud even though the attorney did not sign the documents and was never known to the investor as a participant in
the documents' creation. The appellate court concluded] that once the law firm "elected
to speak" by creating or participating in the creation of [the] documents ... it could not
make material misrepresentations or omit material facts in drafting the non-confidential
documents[, such as opinion letters]. The law firm's duty did "not arise from a fiduciary
duty to the investors; rather, the duty arose when the law firm undertook the affirmative
act of communicating with investors .... Thus the Third Circuit panel concluded that
although the firm may not have a duty to blow the whistle on its client, once it chooses to
speak, a law firm does have a duty to speak truthfully, to make accurate or correct material
statements, [even though the document may not be facially attributed to the lawyer].
The panel did require that the lawyer's "participation in the statement containing a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact [be] sufficiently significant that the statement can properly be attributed to the person as its author or co-author," so that it would
not fall within the parameter of conduct constituting aiding and abetting.
Id at 602 (last alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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& Ellis, in connection with their participation with the fraud. 46 Vinson &
Elkins was the general counsel for Enron and not only represented it in
structuring illicit partnerships and special purpose entities for the purpose
of inflating Enron's earnings, but also drafted numerous disclosure documents, including registration statements and SEC filings, 447 which incorporated misrepresentations about the nature and purpose of these entities and their effect upon Enron's earnings. According to the court, the
law firm effected the "deceptive devices and contrivances that were the
heart of the alleged Ponzi scheme. '448 Vinson & Elkins' "voluntary, essential, material, and deep involvement ' 4 9 made it a primary violator in
Enron's fraudulent scheme. Moreover, "Vinson & Elkins was not merely
a drafter, but essentially a co-author of the documents it created for pub450
lic consumption concealing its own and other participants' actions.
The court determined that the law firm "deliberately or with severe recklessness" put these misrepresentations in the public domain in order to
"influence those investors to purchase more securities, credit agencies to
keep Enron's credit high, and banks to continue providing loans to keep
the Ponzi scheme afloat. Therefore Vinson & Elkins had a duty to be
accurate and truthful.

4 51

According to the court, this was not a situation where Vinson &
Elkins "merely" violated its professional principles and ethics. On the
other hand, the court determined that this was the case for Kirkland &
Ellis since, while "Kirkland & Ellis represented some of the illicit Enroncontrolled, non-public SPEs and partnerships that Enron ...used ...to

446.

Id.at 563-64.

447.

See, e.g., id at 660-61.
Disclosures in the following SEC filings, drafted and approved by Vinson & Elkins,
concealed material facts about the JEDI/Chewco, LJM, and/or Raptor transactions:
A. Quarterly Reports (on Form 10-Q) filed on: 8/16/99; 11/15/99; 5/15/00; 8/14/00;
11/14/00; 5/15/01; and 8/14/01.
B.Annual Reports (on Form 10-K) filed
on 3/31/98; 3/31/99; 3/30/00; and 4/02/01.
C.Annual Proxies filed on: 3/30/99; 5/02/00; 5/01/01.
D. Report on Form 8-K, filed
2/28/01.
Furthermore, Enron related-party disclosures from Enron's previous Report on Form
10 -K and Report on Form I0-Q were incorporated by reference into the following Registration Statements and Prospectuses for Enron securities offerings: the resale of zero
coupon convertible senior notes, due 2021, filed 7/25/01; 7.875% notes due 6/15/03, filed
6/2/00; 8.375% notes due 5/23/05, filed 5/19/00; 7% exchangeable notes due 7/31/02,
filed 8/11/99; 7.375% notes due 5/15/2019, filed 5/20/99; common stock, filed 2/12/99;
6.95% notes due 7/15/2028, filed 11/30/98; and floating notes due 3/30/00, filed 9/28/98.
The disclosures consistently misrepresented that terms of Enron's transactions with related third parties were representative of terms that could have been obtained from independent third parties. Both Sherron Watkins' letter and the Powers' Report concluded
that the transactions were not arm's length, lacked true economic import, and were such
that no independent third party would have accepted.

Id.
448.
449.
450.
451.

Id.
at704.
Id. at705.
Id
Id.
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hide its debt and record sham profits, ' '452 it never made any misstatements or misrepresentations to the public. While it also breached professional ethical standards, its conduct was not actionable under Rule 1Ob-5.
The difference in approach between the Texas District Court and
the U.S. Supreme Court is striking. The conduct of the investment advisor in Janus Capital was even more pervasive than the conduct of
Vinson & Elkins. The investment advisor had complete practical control
over the misrepresentations and hid their true nature from the directors of
the mutual fund. The district court's focus was, appropriately, on the
existence of wrongdoing and whether this wrongdoing was directed to
the investing public. The fact that the client had "the final authority to
control the contents of the registration statement" 453 was irrelevant in
view of the deep involvement of the law firm in the preparation of the
registration statement and the law firm's knowledge of the true state of
affairs. The focus of the Supreme Court was on a hypertechnical definition of "make," which it utilized to ensure that wrongdoing would go
unpunished. The effect of the district court's decision was to send a sober
warning to gatekeepers that they are not hired guns, but have a responsibility to the public. The effect of the Supreme Court decision is to create
a "what, me worry" attitude in attorneys and other gatekeepers.
Cases such as the foregoing, which required that a lawyer be a
counselor and not just a hired gun, are now eviscerated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Janus Capital.
CONCLUSION

The evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence over the past forty
years reflects a sea of change in judicial philosophy. At the start of the
1970s, the liberal trend characterized by the Warren Court still prevailed.
An implied private cause of action was still in favor and litigators were
viewed as private attorneys general,454 enforcing the securities laws to
further the policy of protecting investors. Arguably, judicial overexuberance led to some loose reasoning in cases such as Superintendent
of Insurance and Affiliated Ute.
The expansion of Rule lOb-5 was slowed and more judicial discipline was injected by the Burger Court in the mid-1970s. A trilogy of
well-reasoned conservative decisions put Rule 1Ob-5 jurisprudence in a
proper perspective: plaintiffs needed to be buyers or sellers to have
standing, scienter was required to distinguish the implied cause of action

452. Id. at 705-06.
453. Id.
at 704 (internal quotation mark omitted).
454. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) ("Private enforcement of the
proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action. As in anti-trust treble damage
litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in
the enforcement of the proxy requirements.").

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:2

from the express remedies in the securities acts, and deception was the
touchstone for an action predicated upon a statute giving the SEC the
authority to prohibit only manipulative or deception conduct.
In the 1980s the Rehnquist Court began a naYve and reactionary
trend-ignoring fraudulent conduct in order to further circumscribe the
reach of Rule lOb-5. Although the securities laws were enacted because
the common law was inadequate, the Court in Chiarella introduced the
common law concept of fiduciary duty to curtail the application of the
securities laws, while citing authority that took a diametrically opposed
interpretation. This was the beginning of an outcome-determinative analysis that was expanded in Dirks to add a naYve quality when the Court
ignored the SEC's warning that some excuse could always be fabricated 455 to evade the test for liability formulated by the Dirks majority.
The final trilogy began with the Rehnquist Court and ended with the
Roberts Court. Conservative jurisprudence has now been abandoned, and
the Court used one ill-reasoned decision to awkwardly justify an even
more ill-reasoned decision. Central Bank was the epitome of judicial
activism. The Court instructed the parties to brief an issue that had not
been considered in the courts below nor raised by the parties on appeal;
the Court rejected the unanimous position of all the judicial circuit courts
that aiding and abetting liability did attach to a primary violation under
Rule lOb-5; the Court ignored statutory language and legislative history
that dictated a contrary result; and the Court relied upon the lack of aiding and abetting provisions with respect to express private causes of action sounding in negligence to justify the elimination of aiding and abetting liability under Rule 1Ob-5, which requires scienter-ignoring the
fact that aiding and abetting liability traditionally had not been applicable
with respect to negligence actions.
In the Stoneridge and Janus Capital cases, the Court then strained
to contort these cases as being controlled by Central Bank, even though
they involved direct participation in the fraud, rather than aiding and
abetting liability. It then articulated an absurd interpretation of the word
"make" in Janus Capital to exculpate the person who not only drafted
the document but also controlled the "facts" in the document that made it
misleading.
Since the 1980s, the fact is inescapable that the Supreme Court,
confronting activity that it acknowledged as fraudulent, 456 has engaged in

455.
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983) ("The SEC argues that, if inside-trading
liability does not exist when the information is transmitted for a proper purpose but is used for trading, it would be a rare situation when the parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate
business justification for transmitting the information. We think the SEC is unduly concerned.").
456.
Arguably, this is not true of the defendant in Dirks: the majority saw him as a hero even
though he personally profited by enabling his clients to dump stock and depress the market, to the

detriment of uninformed public investors. Id. at 665-67.
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tortuous, outcome-determinative reasoning to create, in effect, safe harbors for fraudulent activity. In so doing, the Court reflects not a conservative philosophy, but a reactionary one. Its advocacy for conduct that
in some instances could be criminal stands in stark contrast to the Warren
Court. The Warren Court sought to protect the uninformed from the
power of the State; the Roberts Court appears to protect the powerful
from the uninformed investing public.
While correlation is not causation, it is noteworthy that a rash of insider trading followed the insider trading trilogy, and that the corporate
corruption scandals 457 of the 2000s followed Central Bank and
PSLRA.458 The impact of the insider trading cases has been dampened by
the enactment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act and the Insider Trading Securities Fraud Enforcement Act, 459 and the reluctant acceptance of
the misappropriation theory by the Supreme Court in O 'Hagan.46° On the
other hand, the Court's ill-advised emasculation of liability for collateral
participants needs to be reversed legislatively. Congress went part way
when it reinstated aiding and abetting liability in actions brought by the
SEC. It now needs to complete this effort by extending aiding and abetting liability to private litigation. By reversing CentralBank, it will also
take down Stoneridge and Janus Capital, and close the judicially created
loopholes that have enabled corrupt actors to act with impunity and avoid
accountability.

457.
See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-)XLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE app. D at 86970 (2006-2007 ed. 2006) (listing over twenty of the more spectacular examples of corporate corruption during this period).
458.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2012) (the effect of this provision is to exculpate a
person who, with knowledge, makes a fraudulent forward-looking statement, if the statement is
accompanied with cautionary language).
459.
See supra text accompanying notes 295-96 (discussing the impact of these legislative
enactments).
460.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented from the Court's acceptance of the misappropriation theory. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 646, 650 (1997).
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WHAT'S MONEY GOT TO Do WITH IT?:
PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING AND PROFIT
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ABSTRACT

Definitions of "public interest lawyering" influence financial support, regulation of lawyers, and professional identity. This Article examines three contexts in which legal institutions have operationalized the
concept of public interest lawyering: tax exemptions, exceptions to solicitation prohibitions, and fee-shifting statutes. The Article critiques the
common conception of public interest lawyering as work provided by
non-profit organizations or through volunteer activities outside the mainstream market for legal services. It argues that interpreting public interest
lawyering as a market exception not only is incomplete but also threatens
the viability of important work.
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Public interest lawyers are too busy acting in behalf of the public in-

terest to worry a great deal about how it is defined.

-Stuart A. Scheingold'
INTRODUCTION

Public interest lawyering 2 is a term we all know and an activity we
all support in principle. 3 Yet, upon inspection, its definition remains obscure. 4 A common conception is that public interest lawyering is distinct
from commercial, profit-generating practice.5 The profession identifies
public interest lawyering as work with discounted value in the regular
market for legal services. 6 For the past few decades, the phrase "pro bono publico" has been used to signify services provided for free or at a
reduced rate. 7 From pro bono requirements 8 to public interest loan assis1.

STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND

POLITICAL CHANGE 185 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2d ed. 2004) (1974).
2.
This Article will use the terms "public interest lawyering," "public service lawyering,"
and "pro bono lawyering" interchangeably.
3. For a description and critique of the broad support for professionals engaged in public
interest lawyering, see Dennis G. Jacobs, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
Remarks Before the Rochester Lawyers Chapter of the Federalist Society: Pro Bono for Fun and
Profit
4
(Oct.
6,
2008)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.fedsoc.org/publications/pubid. 1178/pub detail.asp).
4. See David Luban, Taking out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest
Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 210 n.1 (2003) ("By 'public-interest law,' I do not mean 'law
practiced on behalf of the public interest.' That usage would make the phrase completely tendentious, because people disagree fundamentally over what the public interest is.").
5.
See Howard M. Eichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087, 2106-10
(2004) (describing how the legal profession constructs the dichotomy between public interest lawyering and financial earnings).
6. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct describe "pro bono publico" as "a professional
responsibility to provide ...

services to those unable to pay." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 6.1 (2012). The services are to be provided "without fee or expectation of fee," or at a "substantially reduced fee." R. 6. ](a), (b). A statutorily-awarded fee for pro bono activity should be donated,
at least in part. R. 6.1(a) cmt. 4.
7. See Erichson, supra note 5, at 2108-09 (highlighting that "pro bono publico" has come to
mean "lawyering for no fee" rather than lawyering "for the public good).
8.
See, e.g., In the Public Interest: Pro Bono Requirement, TUL. U. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.tulanc.edu/Publiclnterest/index.aspx?id=12020 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (defining
"pro bono work" as services "on behalf of indigent persons or with non-profit, public interest organizations that serve the community"); Public Service: JD Requirement, U. PA. L. SCH.,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/publicservicelpro-bono/d-requirement.php (last visited Feb. 12, 2014)
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tance programs, 9 institutions have relied on non-profit status or the absence of fees as a key indicator of lawyering for the public good. A handful of scholars have pointed to private, for-profit firms whose work complicates the picture, 10 but leaders of the profession continue to perceive a
dichotomy between public interest lawyering and profit, and they continue to perpetuate that perspective." This Article builds on previous scholars' research to question whether profit should play a role in assessing
the public value of lawyers' work. Further, this Article suggests that interpreting public interest lawyering as a market exception not only is
incomplete, but, moreover, it threatens the viability of important categories of work.
It must be recognized at the outset that the common conception of
public interest lawyering as free or low-cost legal services is not the
product of an historical accident; it reflects an intentional emphasis on
access to representation.12 The access perspective starts from the premise
that a core public obligation of the legal profession is to provide equal
access to the legal system without regard for any client's status or viewpoint. 13 Many have interpreted public interest lawyering to mean increas(defining "pro bono" as "uncompensated, voluntary work that yields a public benefit," including
work "with community, government, or non-profit organizations" or individuals "unable to pay for
legal services"); Pro Bono, VINSON & ELKINS, http://wwwvelaw.com/overview/ProBono.aspx (last
visited Feb. 12, 2014) (defining pro bono work as "free legal service ...to those in need"); Pro
Bono News: NY Firm Adopts Internal Mandatory Pro Bono Policy, LEGAL SERVS. Now (ABA Div.
for Bar Servs. & Div. for Legal Servs.), Jan. 7, 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/legal services now/legalservices_sclaidIs
n does LSN200501.authcheckdam.pdf (announcing firm's mandatory pro bono policy requiring
free services to indigent clients).
9.
See HEATHER WELLS JARVIS, EQUAL JUSTICE WORKS, FINANCING THE FUTURE:
RESPONSES TO THE RISING DEBT OF LAW STUDENTS 12, 21 (Cindy Adcock et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006),

available at
http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/sites/default/files/financing-the-future2006.pdf;
Philip G. Schrag & Charles W. Pruett, Coordinating Loan Repayment Assistance Programs with
New Federal Legislation, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 583, 587-90 (2011).
10.

See, e.g., ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A

CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 169-200 (2013); Scott L. Cummings & Ann Southworth, Between
Profit and Principle: The Private Public Interest Firm, in PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 183 (Robert Granfield &

Lynn Mather eds., 2009); Louise Trubek & M. Elizabeth Kransberger, Critical Lawyers: Social
Justice and the Structures of Private Practice, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 201, 201 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).

1I. See infra Parts I and II.
12.

NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980S AND

BEYOND 3 (1989) ("Public interest law is the name given to efforts to provide legal representation to
interests that historically have been unrepresented or underrepresented in the legal process. Philosophically, public interest law rests on the assumption that many significant segments of society are
not adequately represented in the courts, Congress, or the administrative agencies, because they are
either too poor or too diffuse to obtain legal representation in the marketplace."); Oliver A. Houck,
With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1448-50 (1984) (describing "access for unrepresented
issues to the judicial system" as the rationale for and definition of public interest practice); Louise G.
Trubek, Public Interest Law: Facing the Problems of Maturity, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
417, 421-22 (2011) (describing the Ford Foundation's use of 'market failure' economic literature"
to justify the development of non-profit, public interest law firms).
13.
See Erichson, supra note 5, at 2119, 2119 n. 140; see also John D. Colombo, The Role of
Access in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 343, 362-63 (2004) (articulating an accessbased vision of public interest law).
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ing access to the legal system for those persons or interests that are "underrepresented" in the regular market for services.14 Persons may be underrepresented because they cannot afford to pay market rates for representation, or interests may be underrepresented because, though important for the public at large, they are not attached to economic incentives sufficient to attract private litigants. Providing free or low-cost services to these underrepresented persons and interests corrects for failures
of the market.
The access perspective embodies an important equality aspiration
and should not be abandoned, but, without more, the emphasis on access
to services results in an incomplete definition of public interest lawyering." All lawyers serve the interests of some portion of the public, 16 but
few would suggest that all lawyering is public interest lawyering. 17 Under the access perspective, the absence of market incentives or sufficient
subsidies creates a scarcity of lawyers for certain persons and interests,
and the provision of free or low-cost services to fill that gap is therefore a
public service, like an act of charity.' 8 While market undervaluation
could be one part of the equation, recommending subsidies wherever
there is a shortage of funding,' 9 market undervaluation does not tell us
which work is substantively worth funding, beyond the notion that all
lawyering has social value and should be distributed evenly. 20 Notably,
the emphasis on access suggests that all lawyering is equally valuable
and that even distribution of legal services promotes social equality (or
some other, more important, social goal).
Beyond the view that serving any subset of the public is a public
service, however, there remains a question as to which categories of lawyering should be specially recognized as public interest lawyering. 21
14.
Scott L. Cummings, Privatizing Public Interest Law, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 1-2
(2012) (internal quotation mark omitted); Luban, supra note 4, at 210 n. 1.
15.
See David R. Esquivel, Note, The Identity Crisis in Public Interest Law, 46 DUKE L.J.
327, 342-43 (1996).
16.
Conservative lawyers see themselves as protecting important public interests. For example, the lawyer opposing an environmental group might believe she is the protector of jobs for loggers, just as the anti-New Deal lawyers believed they were fighting oppressive governmental overreach. See Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning of "Public
Interest Law," 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223, 1251-52 (2005).
17.
See Comment, The New Public InterestLawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1071 n.3 (1970).
18.
See Houck, supra note 12, at 1419-20, 1448 (describing the development of public interest law organizations as "public charities" that improve "access" for "underrepresented" and "underfinanced interests").
19.
See Erichson, supra note 5, at 2110 (suggesting that defining public interest lawyering in
terms of low pay or market underrepresentation is appropriate for subsidies).
20.
See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 (1986) (proposing that as long as the
lawyer does not facilitate unlawful conduct, "what the lawyer does is a social good," even if it may
not be morally good); cf David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative:A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 644 (1986).
21.
Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold prefer the term "cause lawyering." See STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND
CAUSE LAWYERING 3-7 (2004). They argue that the term "public interest" begs the question of
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Which lawyering has a special social value? This question raises controversy, particularly in a democratic society with a constitutional framework that purposefully embraces government neutrality and avoids defm22
ing a substantive conception of public good.
Nonetheless, institutions do construct definitions of public interest
lawyering on a regular basis, and should do so on the basis of candid and
thorough deliberations. The definitional question tackled in this Article is
not purely academic; it carries implications for professional identity,
regulation, and financial support. With respect to the identity of the profession, it pushes us to consider what kind of professional work is in the
23
public interest and what is expected from the profession as a whole.
With respect to regulation of the profession, this inquiry could inform
whether to hold public interest lawyers to higher standards and when, if
ever, to exempt them from professional requirements that hamper their
work.2 4 Lastly, the definition carries implications regarding financial
support,25 including grants from governmental or private sources, loan
repayment or forgiveness by law schools or lenders, summer stipends for
students, and entire years of salaries paid by corporate law firms that
defer their incoming classes and encourage recent recruits to pursue work
in the public interest. 26 Grappling with the definition of public interest
lawyering means considering which behavior the profession should encourage when it confers reputational advantages and formal awards, and
which behavior it should require when it adopts pro bono mandates. 27

defining the public and what is in the public's interest, and leaves unexamined the tension between
serving private clients and serving the public good. Id. at 5-6. Cause lawyering is clear about its
chief priority: commitment to social, political, or economic principles, such that serving the client is
but one component of serving the cause. Cause lawyering literature has made an enormous contribution in shifting moral and political commitments from the margins to the core of legal ethics, and it
has been radical in suggesting that service to a client could be secondary to another purpose. Moreover, it has been thoughtful in focusing on attorneys' motivations, rather than any pecuniary indicator,
to distinguish cause lawyering. Yet the inclusiveness of this framework is also its weakness: it fails
to indicate which kinds of lawyering activities are in the public interest, beyond recognizing those
activities the lawyers performing them say should be so recognized. See Luban, supra note 4, at 210
n. 1 (defining public interest lawyers with two limiting criteria, one based on lawyers' motives and
the other based on representing the underrepresented, with the latter criterion excluding "self-styled"
public interest lawyers who represent well-funded corporate interests). This Article suggests that
legal institutions need to make substantive determinations as to which work deserves special support,
based on priorities defined by those institutions.
22. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 25-54, 71-79 (1996).
See infra Part I (describing implications for professional identity); see also Lincoln
23.
Caplan, An ExistentialCrisisfor Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2012, at SRIO.
24. See infra Part I1.B (describing exception to solicitation prohibition).
25. See, e.g., infra Part lI.A (describing tax benefits), II.C (describing fee-shifting provisions).
26.
PRO BONO INST., LAW FIRM DEFERRED ASSOCIATES AND PUBLIC INTEREST
PLACEMENTS: SURVEY REPORT AND PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 4 (2010), available at

http://www.probonoinst.org/wpps/wp-content/uploads/deferred

associates survey_201 0.pdf;

COUNCIL FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC

INTEREST LAW INAMERICA 217-338 (1976) (describing funding sources for public interest law).
27.
States have begun experimenting with pro bono requirements. New York is the first to
adopt one. 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 520.16 (2013).
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This Article calls for renewed efforts to fashion positive visions of
public interest lawyering defined by more than the absence of resources.
A central question is whether public interest lawyering means any representation that increases access to legal services or, instead, law practice
that promotes particular substantive values. This Article argues that the
former approach is incomplete. Rather than use profit status, fee restrictions, or client indigency as a litmus test of public value, we should
come to terms with what our public values are. To be clear, this Article
does not suggest that there can or should be one universal definition of
public interest lawyering, but that public interest lawyering does have
substantive, "institutionally specific '28 meanings, and legal actors must
take responsibility for how they apply the term. This will require making
conscious choices about priorities and not shying
away from the norma29
tive and practical implications of those choices.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I situates public interest lawyering within the identity of the legal profession as a whole. Part II describes three contexts in which legal institutions operationalize public
interest lawyering: (a) tax benefits for public interest lawyering; (b) a
public interest exception to the legal profession's prohibition of solicitation of employment; and (c) fee-shifting statutes that provide special
funding for public interest lawyering. Part III draws comparisons between the three contexts and analyzes what they reveal about the larger
definitional project. Fee-shifting statutes stand in contrast to the other
two settings. In fee-shifting statutes, elected officials have recognized
substantive definitions of public interest lawyering, acknowledged that
successful public interest practice requires financial support, and created
a mechanism to facilitate public interest lawyering for profit. Part IV
challenges the definition of public interest lawyering in opposition to
profit. It highlights empirical research that reveals alternative models of
public interest practice. Part IV suggests that there are inherent benefits
of supporting fee-based and for-profit forms of public interest work. Further, economic strength and economic power are necessary to engage in
certain categories of public interest work. Fee-shifting statutes could
offer one realistic source of that strength and power, but judges' percep28. As Alan Chen and Scott Cummings explain in their new book:
[T]he use of "public interest law" as a label for a distinctive form of lawyering ...retains
its power not because there is an Archimedean point by which we may judge the public
interest across the divisions of politics and culture, but rather precisely because it claims
a higher political ground, asserts a vision (or multiple visions) of the good society, and
frames the definitional question in historically grounded and institutionally specific
terms.
CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 10, at 7.
29.
See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2128

(2000) (suggesting, in the context of judges' fee decisions, that reliance on market measures of the
value of lawyers' work is a method of attempting to avoid making substantive value assessments);
see also Sandel, supra note 22 (arguing for articulation of substantive public good).
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tions of public interest lawyering as charity currently threaten the effectiveness of these statutes. Ultimately, the view of public interest lawyering as services provided exclusively by non-profit organizations or volunteer activities, outside the market for services, threatens the viability of
lawyering in the public interest.

I. A PUBLIC PROFESSION,

WITH SOME AMBIVALENCE

Mainstream discourse treats public interest lawyering as an exception to the practice of law. This begins in law schools, before lawyers
have even entered practice, when their professional identities are still
nascent. It can be seen in how many law schools maintain separate "Career Services" and "Public Interest" offices. 30 It can be seen in how wellmeaning faculty and administrators encourage students to pursue pro
bono projects as an extracurricular activity, conveying the impression
that "pro bono" means a volunteer activity on the side. 3' Law graduates
regularly take this conception of pro bono with them into the profession. 32 They develop an impression of their profession distinct from public interest lawyering, which they view as an act of charity for when they
have the time and inclination.
Some scholars have argued that constructing the notion of public interest lawyering as an exceptional form of practice can harm the image of
the profession. 33 Sarat and Scheingold have suggested that, during periods of public criticism of or suspicion about the profession, the American
Bar Association has made special efforts to embrace and highlight the
34
public interest work of its members, and it has done so with success.

Including public interest activities within the scope of lawyering, and
30. See, e.g., Careers,HARV. L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/current/careers/index.html
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (Office of Public Interest Advising separate from Office of Career Services);
Office
of
Public
Interest
and
Community
Service,
GEO.
L.,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/careers/opics/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (Office of
Public Interest and Community Services separate from Office of Career Services); cf Public Interest
CareerServices, YALE L. SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/academics/publicinterestcareerservices.htm
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (specialized counseling for public interest careers available within Career
Development Office).
31.
See, e.g., Standing Comm. on Pro Bono & Pub. Serv. & the Ctr. for Pro Bono, Chart of
Law
School
Pro
Bono
Programs,
A.B.A.,
http://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/probono/lawschools/pbprograms chart.html (last updated
Sept. 23, 2013) (summarizing law schools' extracurricular pro bono programs); see also Standing
Comm. on Pro Bono & Pub. Serv. & the Ctr. for Pro Bono, Law School Pro Bono Programs Awards
and
Recognition,
.
A.B.A.,
http://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/probono/lawschools/pb awards.html (last updated Feb. 14,
2014) (describing law schools' awards for pro bono activity).
32. See Robert W. Gordon, CorporateLaw Practiceas a Public Calling,49 MD. L. REV. 255,
257 (1990). See generally Gerald J. Postema, MoralResponsibility in ProfessionalEthics, 55 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 63, 73-81 (1980) (discussing the moral detachment of lawyers).
33. See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 21, at 24-25.
34. See id.In an earlier time, Justice Brandeis put this idea in starker terms when he warned
that there would be "a revolt of the people against the capitalists, unless the aspirations of the people
are given some adequate legal expression." Louis D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in
BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 329,339 (Hale, Cushman & Flint 1933) (1914).
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taking ownership of such activities as a central part of the profession,
might create a more likeable, less amoral portrait of lawyers, and generate increased respect for the rule of law.35
Another reason for concern about the split between doing good and
"conventional, 36 practice is that, if lawyers see public interest lawyering
as marginal, such lawyers may lose sight of their moral agency. Once
they have set off, by choice or by need, in a conventional legal career,
they may believe they have left behind public interest concerns and bear
no professional obligation to consider the public interest while fulfilling
their daily responsibilities. Robert Gordon describes students who, after
abandoning ambitions of public interest careers, make the switch to pursue corporate law and "go all the way." 37 They see themselves as driven
solely by interests of clients, and are shy to consider, let alone express,
any ethical misgivings about client choices or directions from superi38
ors.
To be sure, thoughtful scholars can disagree about where lines
ought to be drawn in the roles of counseling or advocating for a client.
David Luban has emphasized the lawyer's obligation to guide clients'
activities, insert oneself in decision-making, and steer clients towards
conformance with the public interest. 39 William Simon argues that lawyers should maintain discretion to decline to pursue procedural or substantive arguments despite clients' instructions to pursue them and despite the possibility of legal merit. 40 Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith,
on the other hand, make compelling arguments that once a lawyer has
signed up to represent a client, it is improper to hold back any tools at her
disposal. 41 The lawyer serves the public interest as a zealous advocate,
42
and any dereliction of that duty is the greatest failure. Yet Freedman
and Smith still make ethical distinctions between available legal options.
They suggest an ethical decision must be made at the moment of entering
into a retainer.43 Rather than accepting that a lawyer should represent

35.
Id.
36.
This Article uses Sarat and Scheingold's definition of the term "conventional lawyering."
See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 21, at 1-22. Conventional lawyering "involves the deployment of a set of technical skills on behalf of ends determined by the client, not the lawyer." Id. at 2.
In contrast to cause lawyering, conventional lawyering "is neither a domain for moral or political
advocacy nor a place to express the lawyer's beliefs about the way society should be organized,
disputes resolved, and values expressed." Id.
37.
Gordon, supra note 32, at 291-92.

38.

Id.

39.
See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 1 (2007); DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 50-103,174 (1988).
40.
William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1113-19

(1988).
41.
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 79-80, 8687, 121-25 (2d ed. 2002).

42.
43.

Id. at8, 13-14, 19-31,45-49.
Id. at 59, 8-84; Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer's Moral Obligation of Justification,74

TEX. L. REV. 111, 112-13 (1995).
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anyone who comes to her door, they
recognize the choice of whom to
44
represent as an important question.
Regardless of their differences regarding how or when in the representation process it occurs, all of these scholars acknowledge some point
at which the individual lawyer's ethics could restrict her advocacy. In
contrast, if Gordon is right that some law graduates believe their new
professional identity means setting aside their ethical instincts, as lawyers, these persons might become wholly unmoored from any sense of
public obligation. That possibility threatens the image and, potentially,
the legitimacy of the legal profession.4 5
Historically, working for the public interest has not been an afterthought, left to positions on the margins. On the contrary, serving the
public interest has been described as a founding principle of the profession.46 Talcott Parsons and sociologists following him have highlighted
the important social functions served by the legal profession. 47 Roscoe
Pound famously stated that a profession is geared towards public service
by definition:
The term [profession] refers to a group of men pursuing a learned art
as a common calling in the spirit of a public service-no less a public
service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood. Pursuit
of the learnedart in the spirit of a public service is the primary purpose. Gaining a livelihood is incidental, whereas in a business or

trade it is the entire purpose.48

From this perspective, the pursuit of public service is the marker that
distinguishes a profession from a trade.49

Notably, Pound's depiction of the professions indicates not only
that service is central, but also that "[g]aining a livelihood is incidental." 5° With regard to the legal profession in particular, this is a his44.

Id.

45.

See Posterna, supranote 32, at 73 81.

46. See, e.g., BRANDEIS, supranote 34, at 330.
47. TALCOTT PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 370, 381-85 (rev. ed. 1954) (arguing that lawyers provide a critical function
in society). For critiques of the functionalist view, see MAGALI SARFATrl LARSON, THE RISE OF
PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 167-69 (1977) (discussing lawyers' interest in
maintaining economic power). For a critique of both Parsons's approach and "anti-Parsonian" approaches, see Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L.
Geison ed., 1983).
48.

ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953) (emphasis

added).
49. Id; see John M. Conley & Scott Baker, Fall from Grace or Business as Usual? A Retrospective Look at Lawyers on Wall Street and Main Street, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 783, 813 (2005)
(summarizing sociological debates on the significance of professions); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical
Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 592 (1985) (collecting examples of heightened rhetoric surrounding images of lawyers as professionals and not businesspersons).
50. POUND, supranote 48, at 5.
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torically accurate representation of an earlier age. When the profession
first developed in England, pecuniary gain was neither a goal nor a reality of the practice. 51 Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries,
barristers were not permitted to charge fees and accepted payments only
as honoraria.52 According to Henry Drinker, barristers "regarded the law
in the same way they did a seat in Parliament-as primarily a form of
53
public service in which the gaining of a livelihood was but an incident.,
Barristers came from wealthy families and did not depend on their legal
work to generate income.54 These men occupied a privileged position
that afforded them the luxury to pursue the public interest without regard
for financial support.55
Today, however, the American Bar Association boasts roughly one
and one quarter million members, 56 and it would be a rare member who
could perform this role as an unpaid volunteer.57 While some attorneys
possess public service aspirations, most need and expect financial compensation for their work.58 This is relatively uncontroversial, and the
current ideals of the profession do not conflict with the desire to earn a
living. 59 On the contrary, a handsome salary is commonly viewed as an

51.
HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210 (1953); see also Alexander Schwab, Note, In
Defense of Ambulance Chasing: A Critique of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3, 29 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 603, 606 (2011) (explaining that it was considered ungentlemanly for English barristers to be motivated by financial gain).
52.
Kelly Buechler, Note, Solicitationin Class Actions: Should Class CertificationBe Denied
Because Class Counsel Solicited the Class Representative?, 19 REV. LITIG. 649, 662 (2000); Katherine A. Laroe, Comment, Much Ado About Barratry:State Regulation of Attorneys' TargetedDirectMail Solicitation, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1513, 1520 (1994).
53.
DRINKER, supra note 51, at 210-11; see Buechler, supra note 52, at 662; Laroe, supra
note 52, at 1520.
54.
DRINKER, supranote 51, at 210; see also Buechler, supranote 52, at 662.
55.
DRINKER, supranote 51, at 210; see Schwab, supra note 51, at 606. For discussion of the
business-profession dichotomy in the early United States, see Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America 'sGoverning Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understandingof the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 386-87 (2001).
56.
AM.
BAR
ASS'N,
LAWYER
DEMOGRAPHICS
(2011),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer
de
mographics 201 l.authcheckdam.pdf.
57.
See Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant G. Garth, Pro Bono as an Elite Strategy in Early Lawyer
Careers, in PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 115, 115-22 (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., 2009) (suggesting that
elite lawyers atlarge firms promote the ideals of pro bono, can afford to engage in it, and reap its
rewards).
58.
See, e.g., Conley & Baker, supra note 49, at 793-94 (citing CARROLL SERON, THE
BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK LIVES OF SOLO AND SMALL-FIRM ATTORNEYS 129
(1996)) (describing study of small firm lawyers who, while struggling to earn a living, believe they
offer a public service "by making representation available and affordable to ordinary people").
59.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1 .16(b)(5), (6) & cmt. 8 (2012) (permitting lawyer to withdraw if client "fails substantially tofulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding
the lawyer's services," "such as an agreement concerning fees," or representation creates "unreasonable financial burden").
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indicator of excellence, and those who reach the heights
of the salary
6
0
peers.
their
among
admiration
enjoy
charts generally
Yet the expectation for public interest lawyering is that it exists outside the market for services. 61 Public interest lawyering is frequently
depicted as the activity of two groups, 62 for which pecuniary gain is either "incidental, 63 to their work or entirely disconnected from it. 64 The
first group is classic public interest lawyers who work at non-profit organizations. Although these lawyers earn income from their positions,
salaries correspond to neither hours nor case outcomes and are notoriously low. 65 The second group consists of "conventional '66 attorneys who
work at for-profit firms but engage in "pro bono" work as a volunteer
activity. 67 These lawyers take relatively small quantities of time from
their jobs or personal lives. 68 They donate their hours to non-profit organizations or indigent persons, as if tithing or contributing a charitable
69
donation.

REV.,
e.g.,
Columbia
University
School
of
Law,
PRINCETON
60.
See,
http://www.princetonreview.com/schools/law/LawBasics.aspx?iid=1035777 (last visited Feb. 17,
2014) (ranking law schools according to category of "Best Career Prospects" based on "[k]ey
[s]tatistics" including "[a]verage [s]tarting [s]alary"). One set of lawyers who have attracted significant criticism related to the size of their fees is class action counsel. The particulars of class actions
are beyond the scope of this Article, but it is possible that the degree of hostility directed towards
class action counsel reflects discomfort with their hybrid public-private role. See Myriam Gilles &
Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 109-12 (2006) (describing original view of class action
lawyers as furthering public rights, and change towards criticizing the lawyers and their high fees in
the 1980s); see also id. at 162-63 (highlighting current discomfort with wealth accumulation by
plaintiffs' class action lawyers).
61.
See generally Huge Gap Remains Between Public Interest and Law Firm Attorney Salaries, NALP Reports, NAT'L JURIST (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/hugegap-remains-between-public-interest-and-law-firm-attomey-salaries-nalp-reports
(highlighting
discrepancy between public interest and law firm salaries).
62.
One category of lawyers left out of the traditional public interest portrait but increasingly
recognized is lawyers employed by government entities. See, e.g., CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note
10, at 152-64; Douglas NeJaime, Cause Lawyers Inside the State, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 653
(2012); Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type... : Categoriesof Cause Lawyering, 29 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 657 (2004).
63.
POUND, SUPRA NOTE 48, at 4-5.
64.
On the history of the split between the "distinct public interest bar" and "elite" lawyers
"who served the public only in their limited and separate pro bono efforts," see Pearce, supra note
55, at 384, 417-20.
65.
See Erichson, supra note 5, at 2106 (painting image of public interest as financially selfsacrificing); Philip G. Schrag, Why Would Anyone Want to Be a Public Interest Lawyer?, in
GEORGETOWN
LAW FACULTY LECTURES
AND APPEARANCES
(2009), available at
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fac lectures/I/.
66.
See supranote 36.
67.
See Scott L. Cummings & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Beyond the Numbers: What We Knowand Should Know-About American Pro Bono, 7 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 83, 83 (2013); Scott L.
Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18 (2004).
68.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2012) (setting aspiration of fifty hours of
"pro bono publico legal services per year"); R. 6.1 cmt. 9 (condoning failure to perform "hours of
service" and acknowledging financial donation as substitute).
69.
See Jacobs, supra note 3, at 10 (praising "relief of those who require but cannot afford
legal services" as part of"a great tradition of American volunteerism"); Deborah M. Weissman, Law
as Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 737, 802-08 (2002)
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In both groups, public interest lawyering is the provision of services
devalued in the market. It is legal work provided at a rate lower than the
legal professional could otherwise earn. In the first case, the legal profes70
sional accepts a salary lower than she could garner in the hiring market.
In the latter, the work is not part of the lawyer's primary occupation but
something in which she engages on the side. Big firms generally separate
attorneys' pro bono lawyering from their tallies of billable hours, and the
legal services are often offered without expertise in the relevant field.7 '
The client in both situations pays a reduced fee, if any. Although serving
the public may have been a founding principle of the profession, public
interest lawyering has come to be understood as a deviation from the
core activity of the legal market.
II:

INSTITUTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING

Part I described general perceptions of public interest lawyering,
and Part II turns to specific ways in which institutions have operationalized the concept. This Part examines: (a) tax benefits conferred on public
interest lawyering, which Congress and the Internal Revenue Service
have defined by a charitable purpose and compliance with financial and
political restrictions; (b) a public interest exception to the profession's
prohibition on solicitation of employment, which the Supreme Court and
the American Bar Association have defined by the absence of a pecuniary motive; and (c) fee-shifting statutes, which fund public interest lawyering that serves public policies prioritized by Congress.

(describing culture of philanthropy); id. at 816 (describing critiques of volunteerism as approach to
provision of legal services).
70.
Fact
vs.
Fiction:
Public
Interest
Careers,
YALE
L.
ScH.,
http://www.law.yale.edu/studentlife/cdobrochureshandouts -factvsfictionpicareers.htm
(last visited
Feb. 19, 2014) ("Getting a permanent public interest job is more challenging than getting a large
firm job."); Nita Mazumder, Myths and Realities of PursuingPublic Interest Careers, EQUAL JUST.
WORKS (Apr. 17, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/news/blog/myths-and-realities
("Public interest jobs are often incorrectly perceived as employment options for those unable to land
a financially lucrative position.."); Debra Cassens Weiss, Unable to FindPublic Interest Jobs, Some
Harvard Law Students Settle for BigLaw, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 29, 2012, 8:32 AM),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/unable-to-findpublicinterestjobs some-harvard lawst
udents settle for bi/ (Assistant Dean for Public Service at Harvard Law reports that in searching for
jobs students "work four times as hard to get a quarter of the money in public interest." (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
71.
See Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, ManagingPro Bono: Doing Well by Doing
Better, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2357, 2395 (2010) (documenting inadequate knowledge and supervision of volunteer attorneys); Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60
STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2071-72 (2008) (documenting scarcity of volunteer attorneys with relevant
skills and inefficiencies of work by inexperienced counsel); cf Cummings & Rhode, supra, at 2429
(documenting that some firms seek to develop expertise in particular areas and channel volunteer
efforts in those directions). Note that the inexperience of volunteer attorneys is not a coincidence but
more likely the direct result of intentionally avoiding fields where the lawyers perform their "real
work" for paying clients. See infra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
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A. Tax Benefits
The classic understanding of a "public interest law firm" is a nonprofit law firm. 72 From pro bono requirements to loan assistance programs, institutions rely on non-profit status as a key indicator of public
interest lawyering. 73 Before analyzing the descriptive and normative value of this nomenclature, below is a brief review of the regulatory benefits
and burdens of non-profit organizations and public interest law firms
organized as such. As described below, federal law supports the growth
of non-profit, public interest law firms but also imposes significant restrictions on their activities.
1. Tax-Exempt Non-Profits
Non-profit organizations are corporations formed for a public purpose, 74 which generally enjoy special tax treatment in exchange for accepting certain limits on their activities. 75 The most common non-profit
organization 76 is the charitable organization, or charity, defined by Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.77 One benefit of recognition
as a 501(c)(3) organization is that the organization is exempt from paying federal income taxes. 78 Arguably even more significant, donations to
a 501(c)(3) organization are deductible from the income tax calculations
of individual and corporate donors, which may encourage donations.79
To qualify as a charity under Section 501(c)(3), an organization
must meet three core requirements: it must be organized and operated
exclusively for a public purpose as defined in the statute; it must comply
with limits on handling of corporate assets; and it must comply with limits on political activities. 80 So long as the organization "serves a public

72.
See, e.g., CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 10, at 127; see also George Norris Stavis, Note,
Collecting Judgments in Human Rights Torts Cases-Flexibilityfor Non-profit Litigators?, 31

COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 209, 227-30 (1999) (describing revenue limits for public interest law
firms). See generally Houck, supra note 12, at 1438-54 (describing history of public interest law
firms and non-profit status).
73.
See supra notes 3-6.
74. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(l) (as amended in
2008). A non-profit organization is formed by filing bylaws or articles of incorporation with a state
agency, pursuant to corporate laws of the relevant state. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
PUBLICATION 557: TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION

5 (2013), available at

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf. The non-profit corporation can then apply to the federal
government and the state for exempt status with respect to tax laws. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)l(a)(2) (as amended in 1982).
75.
See 26 U.S.C. § 501(a).
76.

Setting

Up

a

Nonprofit

Tax-Exempt

Corporation,

SPARC,

http://www.arl.org/sparc/publications/papers/setting up_a nonprofit.shtml (last visited Feb. 19,
2014). Many use the term "non-profit" to mean the 501(c)(3) charitable organization, but there are
twenty-nine different kinds of non-profits under the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. §
501 (c)(l)-(29).
77. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
78.
Id. § 501(a), (c).
79. Id.§ 170(a)(l), (c)(2).
80. Id. § 501(c)(3). The full language of Section 501(c)(3) is as follows:
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rather than a private interest," 81 the particular purpose can be broadly
defined. Section 501(c) specifies that the non-profit corporation may be
organized and operated "for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals." 82 Although the IRS originally interpreted "charitable" to mean relief of the poor, it has since determined that the term "charitable" is a more general reference to any of
83
the listed public purposes.
The other requirements for charities-the financial and political
limitations-are more restrictive than the public purpose requirement.
Non-profit organizations may actually earn profits in that they may earn
revenue higher than expenses, but the organizations are limited in how
they handle those funds. Assets and income may not be distributed to
individuals, except as fair compensation for services, and the organization may not be used for personal gain.84 Additionally, attempting to influence legislation, or supporting or opposing a candidate for public
of85
fice, may not comprise a substantial part of a charity's activities.
2. Public Interest Law Firms
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recognizes the "public interest
law firm" (PILF)8 6 as a type of charity exempt from income taxes under
87
Section
of the of
Internal
Code.
IRS indicates
although501(c)(3)
the substance
PILF Revenue
work need
not beThe
"unique"
to the that,
non-

List of exempt organizations. The following organizations are referred to in subsection
(a): ...Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part
of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
Id.; see also id. § 501(h) (allowing charitable organizations to spend a limited amount on lobbying,
defined in proportion to the each organization's annual expenditures); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)l(a)(1) (as amended in 2008) (organizational and operational tests); id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2); id. §
1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3).
81. Id. § 1.501(c)(1)-l(d)(1)(ii).
82. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(a).
83. Steven D. Simpson, Tax-Exempt Organizations: Organizational and Operational Requirements, 869 TAX MGM'T PORTFOLIO atA-109 (2008).
84. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).
85.
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(3).
86. The acronym "PILF" is used only for public interest law firms recognized as such under
federal tax law.
87. Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411.
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profit sector, it must concern "issues of significant public interest., 88 The
"[c]haritable classification is based not upon the particular positions advocated, but upon the fact that legal representation is made available in
important cases where it would not be available from private firms." ,89
The rationale for recognizing PILFs as charitable organizations is that,
because of their legal work, "courts and administrative agencies are' 90 afforded the opportunity to review issues of significant public interest."
In Revenue Procedure 92-59, the IRS sets out guidelines that PILFs
must follow in addition to the general requirements of Section
501(c)(3). 9l A major focus of these guidelines is to limit the acceptance
of legal fees.92 Shortly after the IRS first recognized PILFs as charities,93
it issued guidelines forbidding such firms from accepting fees from clients94 on the basis that "charging or accepting fees from clients makes
the organization indistinguishable from a private law firm." 95 The IRS
did permit acceptance of fees if awarded by a court or administrative
agency, or if paid by an opposing party, if the PILF derived most of its
financial support from grants and contributions.9 6 Yet the IRS specified
that the possibility of a fee award could not be a substantial motivating
factor in the selection of cases.97 Moreover, PILFs were required to
"cease to handle issues with a strong possibility of a fee award if these
become economically feasible for private litigants." 98 The IRS revised
these guidelines in 1992 to permit PILFs to accept fees directly from
clients, 99 but it imposed new requirements "to distinguish
a public inter' °
est law firm's practice from the private practice of law."'
The current Revenue Procedure restricts PILFs' finances in a number of significant ways. First, to maintain its charitable status, a PILF
must cover no more than fifty percent of its operating costs with attorneys' fees. 10 1 The organization is required to rely on donors. Under this
definition, a public interest case cannot be economically self-sufficient.
Second, fees paid by clients may not exceed the actual costs of litiga88.
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Litigation by IRC 501(c)(3) Organizations, in 1984
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
PROGRAM TEXT (1984), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicd84.pdf, superseded in
part by Rev. Proc. 92-59.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152.
Rev. Proc. 92-59.
Id
See Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575.
Rev. Proc. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 662, modified andsuperseded by Rev. Proc. 92-59.
Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 2(03) (interpreting Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975-1 C.B. 154).

96.

Rev. Rul. 75-76, 1975-1 C.B. 154.

97.

Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 4(03).

98.
Id. § 2(04).
99.
Id. § 2(05)-(06); see also COUNCIL FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, supra note 26, at 306-11
(noting fee restrictions adopted in 1970 and suggesting that the IRS should allow public interest
firms to accept client fees).

100.

Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 2(06).

101.

Id. § 4(05).
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tion. 102 While costs may be charged against a retainer with any remaining
balance refunded, 10 3 a contingency fee agreement would likely be impermissible given that a percentage of a client's award might exceed the
actual costs incurred. This is worth noting because contingency fee
agreements are one of the market-based mechanisms by which lawyers
can earn a living while representing clients unable to pay fees with their
own financial assets.' ° ' Third, to maintain favorable tax status, the lawyers for the PILF may not consider the likelihood or probability of a fee
when selecting cases.' 0 5 Presumably, this requirement aims to omit the
distraction of a potential for private gain so lawyers focus on their public
purpose. Finally, even if a case is of "sufficient broad public interest" to
justify representation under the organization's mission,' °6 the organization may not accept any case "if the organization believes the litigants
have a sufficient commercial or financial interest in the outcome of the
litigation to justify retention of a private law firm."' 0 7 Although the IRS
does not indicate what level of financial interest would be "sufficient...
to justify retention of a private law firm," it is clear that the case must be
unattractive in the regular market for services.
3. What Public Interest Law Firms Are Not
The IRS distinguishes the PILF from legal aid and civil rights organizations. 0 8 Legal aid and civil rights organizations gained recognition
as charitable organizations based on the definition of "charitable" under
regulations issued by the Treasury Department pursuant to Section 501
of the Internal Revenue Code. 10 9 Treasury Regulations define "charitable" to include:
[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; erection
or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening
of the burdens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by
102. Id.§ 5(01). Additionally, a public interest law firm may not withdraw from representation
due to a client's failure or inability to pay. Id.§ 5(02).
103.

Id.§ 5(01).

104.
In theory, a public interest law firm could draft a retainer agreement to award fees as a
percentage of winnings, with an express caveat that the amount could not exceed the costs of litigation, but this would necessarily undercut the utility of a contingency agreement. Contingency fee
arrangements are designed toreflect a lawyer's acceptance of a risk of low or no fees. See Herbert
M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
267, 270-71 (1998). Particularly when one considers an attorney's practice as an interrelated portfolio, the value of any one case must carry the potential to compensate for more than the costs of
litigation measured in terms of time and tangible resources expended. Another possible source of
funding could be third parties, but third parties can change the dynamics and present their own
complications. See generally Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation
Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011).

105.
106.
107.

Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 4(03).
Id.
§ 4(04).
Id.

108.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 88.

109.

See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.0-1-802 (as amended in 2014).
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organizations designed to accomplish any of the above purposes, or
(i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and
discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law;
or (iv)
to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquen0
1

cy.1

Legal aid organizations serving poor clients received recognition as
tax-exempt charities in 1969, based on the first clause of this provision.1 11 Highlighting that the Treasury Regulation had defined "charitable" to include "relief of the poor and distressed," the IRS determined
that providing free legal services to indigent persons otherwise incapable
of obtaining such services qualified as a charitable purpose.12 Organizations providing such services therefore qualified as tax exempt." 3 Ten
years later, the IRS recognized a broader exemption and included organizations that charged modest fees." 4 It determined that charging an hourly
fee to clients did not negate an organization's charitable purpose where
the fee was based on the ability to pay, not the type of services provided." 5 The decision reasoned that, despite charging a modest fee, the6 organization still provided economic relief to the poor and distressed."
Civil rights organizations, including those with a focus on litigation
like the ACLU and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF),1 7 received
recognition as charities on the basis that they "defend human and civil
rights secured by law,""18 another charitable purpose recognized by the
same Treasury Regulation." 9 The IRS recognizes that human and civil
rights include not only constitutional but also statutory rights.12 Litigation to "defend... rights secured by law" also includes2 that which seeks
to broaden the definition of a legally recognized right.' '
The IRS was slower to recognize PILFs as tax-exempt non-profits
than to confer this benefit on legal aid or human and civil rights organizations. 122 This may be due to the definitional challenges PILFs present:
their work does not fit the traditional conception of charity. 123 Legal aid

110.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2008).

Ill.
112.
113.
114.

Rev. Rul. 69-161, 1969-1 C.B. 149.
Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Rev. Rul. 78-428, 1978-2 C.B. 177.

115.

Id.

Id.Note there is a difference between indigency, inability to afford representation despite
116.
mid-level income, and lack of economic incentives to pursue legal representation. The IRS did not
recognize, or at least did not explore, these distinctions.
117.
See Nicole T. Chapin, Note, Regulation of Public Interest Law Firms by the IRS and the
Bar: Making It Hardto Serve the Public Good, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 437, 442 (1993).
118.
Rev. Rul. 73-285, 1973-2 C.B. 174; Rev. Rul. 68-438, 1968-2 C.B. 209.

119.
120.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2008).
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 88.

121.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2).

122.
123.

See Houck, supranote 12, at 1446.
Id.at 1446-47.
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organizations represent indigent clients. 2 4 Although the IRS does not
explicitly limit the client population served by civil and human rights
organizations, commentators have assumed that such organizations represent minorities. 25 PILFs, in contrast, focus their representation on neither the poor nor minorities; 126 PILFs do not limit their client base to any
particular class. A PILF may also represent a client on either side of an
issue, whereas civil or human rights organizations serve specifically to
defend civil and human rights. 127 When the IRS did recognize PILFs, the
key substantive requirement imposed was simply that the cases be of
"significant public interest."'' 28 The definition of PILFs depended primar29
ily on financial restrictions, not the substance of the work.1
Although both Congress and the IRS aim to support public interest
lawyering pursued by the non-profit sector, the regulation of PILFs reveals the tension between doing so and maintaining viewpoint neutrality.130 The next section of the Article addresses another area in which
legal actors struggle with the appropriate role of government in defining
public interesting lawyering: the solicitation doctrine.
B. Exception to Regulation

The regulation of solicitation provides a window into how the Supreme Court and the profession, as represented by the American Bar
Association, define public interest lawyering. Although in-person solicitation is no longer the major form by which lawyers attract new clients,' 3 ' it is one of the only areas in which the Supreme Court has offered
a detailed examination of how to distinguish public interest lawyering

124. Rev. Rul. 69-161, 1961-1 C.B. 149.
•125.
Rev. Rul. 73-285, 1973-2 C.B. 174. See Houck, supra note 12, at 1446 (suggesting civil
rights organizations represented minorities, while PILFs often represented "diffuse majorities"
concerned with environmental protection, consumer health, and other issues (quoting Benjamin W.
Heineman, Jr., In Pursuit of the Public Interest, 84 YALE L.J. 182, 183 (1974) (reviewing SIMON
LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

126.

See Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411.

127.

See id.

128.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 88. In contrast to both PILFs and civil and human
rights organizations, legal aid organizations provide legal services in "routine personal problems"
related to family, criminal, and consumer matters. See id.
129.
Rev. Proc. 92-59.
130. Coming to terms with conservative PILFs is a challenge for progressives. Oliver Houck
argued in With Charity for All, supra note 12, that foundations created and directed by business
corporations can be distinguished from PILFs because the rationale for and definition of public
interest practice is "access for unrepresented issues tothe judicial system," which the corporate
interest groups do not serve. Houck, supra note 12, at 1449. Houck makes very compelling arguments, but access is not a complete definition of and purpose for public interest lawyering, so this
distinction does not answer the question for all contexts. Part of the problem when imagining a
substantive conception of public interest lawycring is that the liberal U.S. political system seeks a
neutral government. Both toavoid viewpoint discrimination challenges and because of a genuine
belief in a particular view of the role of government, legislatures are wary of making values-based
distinctions. Yet avoiding values is constricting, if it is even possible. For a critique of the neutrality
principle in liberalism, see SANDEL, supra note 22, at 3-24.
13 1. Schwab, supra note 5I, at 607-10 (describing decrease in solicitation).
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from the rest. As will be discussed below, the solicitation doctrine replicates the dichotomy between public interest and profit.
1. Solicitation Is Discouraged
When the legal profession first developed in England, barristers
viewed solicitation as unseemly.132 This was so, at least in part, because
barristers came from wealthy families and did not depend on income
from their work. 133 They believed seeking business to be distasteful; such
activity belonged to tradesman and was unbecoming
to professionals
34
engaged in a higher calling of public service.'
The ranks of lawyers swelled in the nineteenth century in the United
States.135 Once states expanded eligibility for practice, many chose to
pursue the profession.' 36 Unlike their predecessors, many of these attorneys were immigrants or persons from lower classes. 137 To manage the
newcomers, states drafted codes of ethics.138 By 1908, the American Bar
Association had formed and issued the Canons of Professional Ethics,
which included a clear prohibition on solicitation of employment. '39
Since its beginning, this prohibition has applied primarily to solicitation for pecuniary gain. Despite the absence of an express limitation in
the Canons, the Supreme Court interpreted this limitation to have been
assumed by the drafters. 140 When the ABA issued the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1969, the Code included a broad ban on
solicitation "for compensation."' 41 The first version of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct included a ban on attorney solicitation "when a
significant motive ...is.. . pecuniary gain.' 42 That language remains in
the Rule today. The current Model Rule 7.3(a) prohibits lawyers from
engaging in "in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact
solicit[ation of] professional employment from a prospective client [with

132.
See DRINKER, supra note 51, at 210-11; see also Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty,
24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 72 (1935).
133.
See supranotes 52-56 and accompanying text.
134.
Louise L. Hill, Solicitation by Lawyers: Piercing the First Amendment Veil, 42 ME. L.
REV. 369, 377 78 (1990); Schwab, supranote 51, at 606.
135.
RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 40-44 (1989).
136.
Louise L. Hill, A Lawyer's Pecuniary Gain: The Enigma of Impermissible Solicitation, 5
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 393, 396 (1991).
137.
ABEL, supra note 135, at 85-90.
138.
See id.at 112-13, 119, 124-25. For a discussion of the stratification of the legal profession and the use of ethics codes to limit newcomers from capturing business or sullying the professional image, see SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE AMERICAN
PROFESSIONS, 1750-1900, at 67-90, 206-39 (199 1). See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE INMODERN AMERICA (1976).
139.
For literature on the class-based elements of anti-solicitation rules, particularly as applied
to personal injury lawyers, see Pearce, supra note 55, at 396-97. whereas elite, big firm lawyers
connected with clients in country clubs, lower classes of lawyers scrambled and solicited. See id.
140.
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 437 n.31 (1978) (analyzing bar opinions).
141.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-3 (1980).
142.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2012).
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whom she has had no prior relationship] when a significant
motive for
' 43
the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain."'
2. Public Interest Exception
44

While acknowledging rationales for a prohibition on solicitation,'
the Supreme Court in 1963 recognized an exception for public interest
lawyering. 45 In NAACP v. Button, the Court concluded that interference
with the NAACP's solicitation efforts threatened the viability of litigation intended to enforce constitutional rights of racial minorities. 46 The
Court ruled that a solicitation prohibition by the State of Virginia unduly
restricted the freedoms of speech and association, in violation of the First
Amendment. 147 Although the Court's opinion reflected the constitutional
claims of the underlying litigation, 148 the Court emphasized the absence
of any pecuniary motive on the part of the NAACP LDF lawyers. 149
To distinguish solicitation for desegregation litigation from the historically disreputable activities of champerty and maintenance, 50 the
majority made a point of highlighting the relative poverty of civil rights
lawyers.' 51 It explained that their work generated less income than that
earned for equivalent private professional work.152 In spite of a dissent by
Justice Harlan, pointing out that, pursuant to fee-shifting statutes, the
NAACP LDF lawyers do, in fact, earn fees from desegregation litigation, 153 the majority stated broadly that "[1]awsuits attacking racial discrimination, at least in Virginia, are n[ot] very profitable."''5
The Supreme Court again contrasted public interest lawyering with
profit in In re Primus155 and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass 'n. 156 Edna
143.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2012).
144.
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439-43 (1963).
145.
Id. at 428-29, 434-36, 441-44.
146.
Id.at 434-36.
147.
Id at 428-29, 444.
148.
Id.
at 428, 444.
149.
Id.at 441-43.
150.
Intervention in the lawsuit of another has always carried a negative taint, and yet, at various points in history, an exception has been recognized to serve the public interest. In Ancient
Greece, only judges, parties, and the personal supporters of parties were to be involved in trials.
Radin, supra note 132, at 48-49. Starting in the sixth century B.C., intervention on a stranger's
behalf was permitted if the injured party could not effectively appear against a more powerful adversary. Id. at 49. Assistance for the less powerful party was understood to serve the public interest. Id.
As this practice developed in Rome, the intervenor was explicitly recognized as the representative of
the public, with his client identified as the populus Romanus. Id.at 49.
151.
Button, 371 U.S. at 443-44.
152.
Id.at 420-2 1.
153.
Id.at 457 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

154.
Id.at 443 (majority opinion). Not surprisingly, the majority cited no evidence in the
record to support these conclusions. Id.This observation is not intended to minimize the impact of
boycotts and other penalties exacted on desegregation lawyers, but to demonstrate how the Court's
decision, which made no direct reference to such context, inadvertently constructed a portrait of
public interest litigation that now threatens its financial viability. See infra Part IV.C.
155. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
156. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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Primus practiced as a member of a private, for-profit firm and served as a
paid consultant to a non-profit organization, the South Carolina Council
on Human Relations (SCCHR).'57 Ms. Primus also cooperated on cases
with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) on a volunteer basis
and served as an officer of the local chapter of the ACLU. 158 The solicitation arose when a community member invited Ms. Primus to speak with
a group of low-income women who had been sterilized as a condition of
receiving Medicaid assistance. 159 Ms. Primus met with the women and
informed them of their constitutional rights. 16° She later contacted one of
her a letter with an offer of free legal representathe attendees, sending
61
tion by the ACLU. 1
In response, the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the State of South Carolina charged Ms. Primus
with solicitation in violation of the state's ethical canons. 62 Specifically,
the Secretary claimed Ms. Primus had promoted the services of an organization whose primary purpose was the provision of legal services and
given unsolicited advice to join a prospective class action. 163 The state
supreme court ordered that she receive a public reprimand. 64 Ms. Primus
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled in her favor, finding
that that South Carolina had violated her First Amendment rights of expression and association. 65 Making direct comparisons between the
NAACP and the ACLU, 16 6 the Court explained that, for both organiza67
tions, litigation was "not a technique of resolving private differences."',68
Citing literature on public interest law and private attorneys-general,
the decision emphasized the larger public purpose of the work and

157.

In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 414-15.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.at 414.
Id at 415.
Id.at 416.
Id.
Id.at 417.
Id.at 420-21.
Id.at 421.
Id.at 439. The Court had first introduced the concept of a "right to advocate" in NAACP

v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, holding that the First Amendment protected "freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas." 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). That opinion
highlighted the "close nexus between the freedoms" of association, assembly, and speech, and em-

phasized that association is often necessary to realize "[elffective advocacy." Id at 460. Following
Button, the Court also extended First Amendment protection to communications in support of work-

ers' compensation claims, which the Court did not recognize as political, but the discussion of which
was protected as part of union members' right of association. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v.
State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971); United Mineworkers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 225 (1967).
In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 427.
166.
167.
Id.at 428 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963)) (internal quotation mark

omitted).
168.
Id. at 414 n.2 (citing, inter alia, Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 211-12 (1976); Comment, Private AttorneysGeneral: Group Action in the Fightfor Civil Liberties, 58 YALE L.J. 574, 576 (1949)).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 91:2

demonstrated the Court's developing conception of public interest lawyering.169
This portrait of public interest lawyering contrasted with working
for a fee. The Court labored over the facts to show that Ms. Primus
lacked a pecuniary motive. Rather than simply concluding that, Ms. Primus's solicitation constituted an expression of political ideas because of
the substance of the underlying lawsuit, the Court highlighted the distance between Ms. Primus and any pecuniary gain that might result from
17
it.
The Court devoted attention to the fee agreement between the
ACLU and cooperating attorneys, recognizing that the ACLU could collect fees under the governing fee-shifting statute if the organization prevailed.' 7' The Court determined, however, that Ms. Primus's income did
not depend on the outcome of the litigation. 72
The same day the Court ruled that Ms. Primus's solicitation "to advance 'beliefs and ideas"' deserved constitutional protection, 73 it issued
a companion decision, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass 'n, holding that "ordinary" solicitation did not. 174 Mr. Ohralik, a solo practitioner in Ohio,
solicited two clients after an uninsured driver crashed into the car in
which the clients were traveling. 75 Mr. Ohralik provided the clients with
accurate advice about their legal rights and responsibilities, including
their entitlement to recover $12,500 each from an insurance company.176
Mr. Ohralik's behavior was, however, unusually aggressive and potentially fraudulent. Mr. Ohralik solicited the clients, two 18-year-old
women, when one lay in a hospital bed and the other had returned home
from the hospital only a day earlier. 177 Under such circumstances, a reasonable person might have questioned whether these individuals voluntarily elected to engage Mr. Ohralik's services. Perhaps even more troubling, without prior permission or notice, Mr. Ohralik tape-recorded conversations with one of the clients and with the other's parents. 78 Finally,
when the clients attempted to discharge him, he insisted that the repre-

169.
Id. at 437-38.
170.
Id at 428-29. As Louise Hill has observed, the Primus Court ignored how intertwined the
ACLU's and Ms. Primus's interests were. See Hill, supra note 136, at 404-05. All three members of
Ms. Primus's law firm worked with the ACLU; two volunteered and one was a staff attorney. In re
Primus, 436 U.S. at 418 n.8. Ms. Primus was also engaged as a consultant by the SCCHR, the organization that invited her to speak to the potential plaintiffs. Id. at 415.
171.
In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 429-31.
172.
Id. at 436 n.30.
173.
Id. at 438 n.32.
174.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 n.20 (1978) (quoting Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977)).
175.
Id. at 449-50.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. at 450-51.
178.
Id.
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sentation agreements80 were binding.' 79 He ultimately sued one of them for
breach of contract. 1
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the
Supreme Court of Ohio found that, by engaging in solicitation, Mr.
Ohralik had violated the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility. 8 '
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not protect
Mr. Ohralik, and, in addition to the public reprimand, his license
ought to
83
182
be indefinitely suspended. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed. 1
-The Justices could have distinguished this case from In re Primus
84

based on the coercive and fraudulent nature of Mr. Ohralik's conduct,'
but the majority instead focused on his profit motive.' 85 Mr. Ohralik offered representation in exchange for a contingency fee; he would receive
one third of any award obtained, but, if he failed to secure any relief, he
would earn nothing.' 86 Research demonstrates that contingency fee
agreements actually provide a method of securing legal services for persons without sufficient
means to pay upfront,' 87 but this did not enter into
188
analysis.
the Court's
The Court interpreted Mr. Ohralik's attempt to gain "remunerative
employment" as a proposal for "a business transaction."' 189 It character-9°
ized his solicitation as commercial speech comparable to advertising'
but even more dangerous because of its live, in-person format. 19 1 The
Court had previously recognized truthful, nondeceptive advertising as
valuable for delivering information to the public and therefore entitled to
limited First Amendment protection.192 The Court recognized no special
179. Id. at 451-52,
180. Id. at 452.
181.
Id. at453-54.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 454.
184. Id. at 467-68 (describing Mr. Ohralik's conduct as a "striking example of the potential for
overreaching that is inherent in a lawyer's in-person solicitation").
185. Id. at 464 (reasoning that presence of a pecuniary motive is "inherently conducive to
overreaching and other forms of misconduct").
186.
Id.
at 450-51 .
187.
See supranote 104 (describing market role of contingency fees).
188.
Indeed, the Court apparently took exception to Mr. Ohralik's characterizing the contingency fee arrangement as one in which the client would not have to pay with her own assets. See
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 467 ("He emphasized that his fee would come out of the recovery, thereby
tempting the young women with what sounded like a cost-free and therefore irresistible offer."); id.
at 451 n.4 ("In explaining the contingent-fee arrangement, appellant told Wanda Lou that his representation would not 'cost [her] anything' because she would receive two-thirds of the recovery if
appellant were successful in representing her but would not 'have to pay [him] anything' otherwise."
(alterations in original)).
189. Id.at 457.
190. Id. at 454.
191.
The Ohralik majority distinguished Bates v. State Bar ofAriz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977)
(striking down prohibition on attorney advertising), on the grounds that in-person solicitation poses
more of a danger of coercion than print advertising. See Ohralik,436 U.S. at 455.
192.
Id. at 455-56 (discussing lower level of protection for commercial speech as defined after
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
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test for advertising by attorneys.' 93 In the Ohralik majority's view, a
"lawyer's procurement of remunerative employment is a subject only
marginally affected with First Amendment concerns. It falls within the
State's proper sphere of economic and professional regulation."' 94 The
Court drew a bright line between remunerative employment and public
interest lawyering.
Once the majority in Ohralik found that the lawyer did have a pecuniary stake in the outcome, the Court made no assessment as to the public value of the lawyer's work. Only Justice Marshall, in his concurrence,
noted that Mr. Ohralik had in fact provided the two clients with accurate
information about their rights. 95 The other Justices saw Mr. Ohralik's
pecuniary motive as central, 196 and therefore viewed the substantive value of his work as irrelevant, or else saw the public value of Mr. Ohralik's
work as so minimal as not to deserve mention. Given the facts, it is also
possible that the Justices viewed Mr. Ohralik's conduct as so troubling
that no degree of public value in the work could possibly justify his behavior. If so, the Court still could have distinguished the improper manner of his conduct from whether his motive was pecuniary. Yet the Justices grounded their decision in Mr. Ohralik's apparent goal of pecuniary
gain. 197 The Court stated without explanation that Mr. Ohralik not only
did not but "could not" have made an argument based on political expression or freedom of association. '98
Representing accident victims could, however, include both profitable and political components. This argument could be strong in a case
where an attorney aggregates multiple parties' claims against large corporate defendants and alters industry practices.19 9 Even Mr. Ohralik accurately advised non-wealthy individuals to recover health care costs

193.
Cf Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536-48 (2001) (striking down funding
conditions that prohibited lawyers from challenging welfare laws on grounds of special expressive
value of lawyers' communications); see id.at 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of
"improper special solicitude for our own profession"); see also Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Towards an
Understanding of Litigation as Expression: Lessons from Guantdnamo, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.

1487, 1508-12 (2011) (analyzing role of lawyers' speech as portrayed by Velazquez majority).
194. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at459.
195.
Id.
at473 (Marshall, J., concurring).
196.
Id.
at464 (majority opinion) (reasoning that the presence of a pecuniary motive is "inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct" and likely to result in unacceptable
harm to the client).
197.
Id.(explaining that the state necessarily has a strong interest in preventing solicitation
where there is a pecuniary motive for the purpose ofprotecting the public).
198.
Id at 458.
199.
See Anne Bloom, Taking on Goliath: Why Personal Injury Litigation May Represent the
Future of Transnational Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL

ERA 96 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001); Erichson, supra note 5, at 2093-101 (exploring motives of mass tort lawyers); id at 2094 n.28 (collecting relevant literature on mass tort lawyers).
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from a corporate insurer; perhaps this, too, could be considered a form of
public interest lawyering. °°
The Court's jurisprudence reflects a broader ambivalence as to
whether litigation for profit can be a method of vindicating public rights,
and where public interest lawyering fits in relation to the norms of the
profession.201 As for whether the potential to earn a fee makes lawyers'
communications unworthy of protection, members of the Court have
acknowledged that earning a living is not mutually exclusive from pursuing public aims, and that the divide between professionalism and remuneration is largely an artifact of an earlier age, disconnected from "the
real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the bar., 20 2 Yet, in deciding the companion cases of Primus and Ohralik, the Court leaned
heavily on the notion that some but not all solicitation is in the public
interest, and that public interest lawyering is incongruous with the presence of any pecuniary motive.
Solicitation doctrine is an area where public interest lawyering has
been defined in opposition to that which generates a fee. The next section
of the Article will address an area that turns this model on its head.
C. Fee-Shifting Statutes
Congress has repeatedly affirmed a major category of financial support for private litigation in the public interest: fee-shifting statutes. For
certain statutes, the private enforcement of which Congress believes
serves the public interest, Congress has created judicial authority to allow prevailing plaintiffs to receive full attorneys' fees from defendants.
It is notable that Congress chose not only to encourage potential plaintiffs to enforce these statutes, which it might have done by other
means, 20 3 but also specifically to foster representation by skilled attorneys through financial incentives. Fee-shifting statutes therefore offer an
interesting window into which statutes and what kinds of lawyering
Congress has determined would serve the public interest, and they

200.

See Susan D. Carle, Re-valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM L.

REV. 719, 729-32, 736-37 (2001); see also Cummings, supra note 14, at 10 (defining "private
[public interest law] firms to include for-profit legal practices whose core mission is to advance a
vision of the public interest that enhances legal and political access for underrepresented groups or
pursues a social change agenda that challenges corporate or governmental power").
201.
Compare, e.g., Ohralik,436 U.S. at 460 ("Lawyers have for centuries emphasized that the
promotion of justice, rather than the eaming of fees, is the goal of the profession." (quoting Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 674, 674
(1958)) (internal quotation mark omitted)), with id. at 458-59 (distinguishing public interest lawyering with political, expressive, or associational value as an exception to the mainstream of lawyers'
"remunerative employment").
202.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977); see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460.
203.
As examples of alternative approaches, a statute could sanction waiver of filing fees to
decrease barriers to litigation or expand categories of available damages to increase plaintiffs' financial incentives.
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demonstrate the legislature's recognition of the need to make such lawyering financially viable.
Fee-shifting contrasts with the general rule about availability of
counsel in the United States. 204 The traditional rule is that each party
pays all costs of participating in any civil lawsuit, including the costs of
hiring a legal representative. 205 As a corollary to that principle, if a party
cannot pay the costs of participation in a civil matter, with limited exceptions, ° there is no guarantee that the government or any private party
will cover the costs. 20 7 Generally, if a party lacks the means to pay a lawyer, it might be unable to pursue litigation or it might be forced to do so
pro se. 208 Fifty years after Gideon v. Wainwright,2°9 no federal constitutional decision has promised payment for legal representation in civil
matters. °
Fee-shifting statutes, however, suggest a different approach. Congress has passed extensive fee-shifting legislation that authorizes judges
in certain categories of cases to shift the cost of legal representation from
prevailing plaintiffs to the defendants against whom they have prevailed. 211 Most of these statutes include the following language: a "court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. ' ' 212 While the lan-

204. For a history of the American rule, see generally John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the
American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984).
205.
See generally Resnik, supra note 29, at 2130-37 (introducing concept of "unaided access"
as premise of the U.S. civil justice system).
206. If indigent, a party may request a waiver of court fees.
207. As is well-known, Gideon v. Wainwright recognized a constitutional right to counsel in
criminal matters, but the same does not apply in civil proceedings. 372 U.S. 335, 339-40, 343
(1963); see Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (ruling that, even if incarceration is at
stake, there is no guaranteed right to appointed counsel in civil cases); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (denying right to appointed counsel in parental termination proceeding).
208. See Rhode, supra note 49, at 597 (highlighting that allocation of lawyers based on market
forces influences individual outcomes).
209. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
210. See Russell Engler, Turner v. Rogers and the Essential Role of the Courts in Delivering
Access to Justice, 7 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 31, 36-37 (2013) (describing civil right to counsel
movement); Earl Johnson Jr., 50 Years of Gideon, 47 Years Working Toward a 'Civil Gideon', 47
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL'y 35 (2013).

211.
See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1,app. at 44-51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting federal statutory fee-shifting provisions).
212. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012). The Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of
1976 (CRAFAA) was one of the first of the modem fee-shifting provisions, and many other provisions track this language. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The ProceduralAttack
on Civil Rights: The EmpiricalReality of Buckhannonfor the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 1087, 1093-94 (2007). Congress passed CRAFAA in direct response to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), which
had held that courts lacked the authority to award fees to prevailing plaintiffs in the absence of a
specific statutory mandate. Albiston & Nielsen, supra at 1093-94. For an analysis of the legislative
response to Alyeska, and the Supreme Court's further response to CRAFAA and similar statutes, see
generally Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court,
Congress,and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291 (1990).
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guage may appear neutral as to the identity of the prevailing party,
the
statutes serve to support work by lawyers striving to enforce these statutes and serve the public values behind them. The Supreme Court specifically recognized this aspect of fee-shifting statutes in a pair of cases,
Newman v. Piggie ParkEnterprises,Inc.2 14 and ChristiansburgGarment
Co. v. EEOC,2 1 holding that fees are to be awarded to prevailing plaintiffs in virtually all cases,216 while prevailing defendants may be awarded
fees only in highly exceptional ones.2 17
Congress created fee-shifting provisions where it decided that pursuit of litigation, with the assistance of counsel, was in the public interest. Congress did not use statutory authority to restructure the civil justice system and provide fees for all prevailing plaintiffs. This approach
could have supported retention of counsel by parties with meritorious
claims and arguably increased the deterrent value of all civil laws. Yet
Congress adopted the approach of creating fee-shifting provisions only
for constitutional and statutory rights whose enforcement has special
public value.218
In fee-shifting jurisprudence, Congress and the Supreme Court have
indicated that some civil litigation has value beyond serving the substantive or procedural rights of the litigants. In those areas, Congress has
seen fit to authorize the reimbursement of attorneys pursuing the cases so
that attorneys will, in fact, pursue them. 219 These statutory provisions
span areas including civil rights, workers' rights, consumers' rights,
freedom of information, and environmental protections, among others. 220
Congress designed fee-shifting provisions as an exception to the
traditional American rule for the purpose of encouraging and sustaining
legal representation in areas that serve the public. 221 It is important to
recognize that the fee-shifting provisions indicate not only that Congress
wanted aggrieved persons to pursue certain categories of cases, but also
that Congress wanted lawyers to represent the plaintiffs in those cases.
The fee-shifting provision does not provide an additional reward to plaintiffs who pursue claims; it rewards only those plaintiffs who secure representation. In theory, Congress could have created a new category of

213.
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 3-4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,
5910-11 (1976).
214.
390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
215.
434 U.S. 412 (1978).
216.
See Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
217.
ChristiansburgGarment Co., 434 U.S. at 421.
218.
S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 4-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5912 (explaining the
intent behind the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976); see also W. Va. Univ. Hosps.,
Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 108-11 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (summarizing legislative history).
219.
See, e.g., Newman, 390 U.S. at 402; Brand, supra note 212, at 309-10.
220.
See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, app. at 43-51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)

(collecting federal statutory fee-shifting provisions).
221.

See infra notes 286-93 and accompanying text.
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compensatory damages awarded to successful plaintiffs, but instead
Congress provided an award for the lawyers who take those cases. Congress determined that parties would be unable to assess the merits of their
222
Particularly
cases or litigate them effectively without representation.
given the absence of a civil Gideon, fee-shifting statutes represent a
strong statement as to which lawyering activities serve the public interest.
III. COMPARING THREE APPROACHES
The previous section surveyed three very different institutional contexts in which public interest lawyering is operationalized: tax exemptions, exceptions to the solicitation prohibition, and fee-shifting statutes.
This section will compare and analyze the definitions constructed in the
three contexts.
A. Fee-ShiftingLegislation as a Counter-Example
In its solicitation jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between litigation aimed at public purposes and litigation motivated by pecuniary gain.223 The Court has recognized public interest litigation, in contrast to commercial lawyering, as an extension of political
expression entitled to the highest level of First Amendment protection. In
the companion cases of In re Primus and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, the Court protected the solicitation of an attorney volunteering
with the ACLU on a potential substantive due process case, while upholding censure of an attorney who engaged in solicitation of personal
injury cases for a contingency fee.224 In addition to the substantive differences distinguishing the underlying litigation, the majority opinion in
each case devoted significant attention to the role of the soliciting attorneys' pecuniary gain. Particularly in Ohralik, although the concurrence
pointed out that Mr. Ohralik had, in fact, provided accurate and potentially useful legal advice, the majority failed to consider seriously the extent
to which Mr. Ohralik's lawyering activities served a public purpose. 225
The majority determined that the attorney's motives were pecuniary in
nature and resolved the case on that basis. 226 This binary approach has
since dominated solicitation doctrine jurisprudence 227 and shaped the
222.

S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 3-4, 6, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910-11, 5913. Con-

gress wanted to attract counsel who could handle sophisticated cases and recognized that fees needed
be set accordingly. See id at 6 (fees should be set at an amount that would "attract competent counsel").
223.

See supra Part l.B.

224.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 447-48 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 412-13 (1978). For literature on the class-based elements of anti-solicitation rules, particularly
as applied to personal injury lawyers, see Pearce, supra note 55, at 396-97.
225.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 473-74 (Marshall, J., concurring).
226. See id. at 467 (majority opinion).
227.
Note that there has been some ambivalence on the Court. In one of its advertising cases,
the Court noted that law is no less a profession because lawyers "earn their livelihood at the bar."
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public interest exception to the Model Rule, which bars solicitation of
motive for the lawyer's doing so is the
employment "when a significant
228
lawyer's pecuniary gain.,
The IRS recognizes a broad category of lawyering as public interest
work deserving of tax benefits. 229 Treasury Regulations specify that to
qualify, the lawyering work must serve a public rather than private interest.23° One form of activity that tax law recognizes is legal services for
indigent clients, provided at a reduced fee based on the indigent clients'
ability to pay, rather than at a market rate based on the type of service.
This category qualifies because it is considered a form of charity to the
poor, which necessarily serves the public, as opposed to a private interest. 231 The IRS has interpreted public interest lawyering deserving of tax
benefits to include organizations that defend human or civil rights, even
if their clients are not indigent persons. 232 To qualify for tax exemption, a
human or civil rights organization must comply with the asset restrictions
of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.233 The IRS will also
engage in special scrutiny of whether a human or civil rights organization engaged in litigation serves a public, as opposed to private, interest.
If client fees provide a primary form of financial support for the organization, that fact can indicate that the organization services a private rather than public purpose. 234 Finally, another form of activity that the tax
law recognizes is that of a "public interest law firm" (PILF) that complies with the particular requirements of Revenue Procedure 92-59.235 In
that case, even if a law firm neither serves indigent clients nor defends
human or civil rights, the IRS may recognize the law firm as engaged in
a unique category of public interest law if it serves the "public rather
than a private interest" and handles "issues of significant public interest. ,23 6 To distinguish these PILF cases from "traditional private law,"
237
the IRS has issued guidelines restricting the finances of PILF firmS.
Although such cases may generate attorneys' fees, to qualify as "public
interest law" for tax exemption purposes,238 the fee for those cases must

be severely limited.23 9 Most importantly, the fee must be small enough to
make the case "not

. .

. economically feasible for the traditional private

law firms," and the fees must add up to less than fifty percent of the
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977). Perhaps there is acceptance of the notion that
the profession must earn a living, but public interest work is still held out as special.
228.
229.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2012).
See supra Part II.A.

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)-l (d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008).
Rev. Rul. 69-161, 1969-1 C.B. 149.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2); Rev. Rul. 73-285, 1973-2 C.B. 174.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4).
Id.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(l)(ii).
Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 88; Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 3(01).
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 88; Rev. Proc. 92-59 §§ 3-5.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 88; Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 4.
Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 4(03)-(05).
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overall costs of operating the lawyer's firm. 240 In all three of these areas
recognized for tax benefits-legal aid to the poor, defending human and
civil rights, and public interest law more broadly conceived-the IRS
tethers its definition of the category of public interest law to the economics of the legal services. In the first category, the economics of the client
population are the defining factor. In the remaining two, the work is demarcated by exceptional fee structures and market conditions.
Fee-shifting statutes stand in stark contrast to the approaches to
public interest lawyering taken in the contexts of tax benefits and solicitation. Although Congress has not expressly crafted one statute defining
all public interest litigation in which fee shifting is to be available, in a
series of subject-specific laws, it has carved out a major exception to the
traditional American rule regarding the availability of civil counsel, and
legislative history makes clear that the purpose of this exception is to
encourage litigation in the public interest. 24 1 The subjects of this public
interest litigation have historically focused on civil rights but, for the past
half century, they have expanded into other areas including labor, consumer protection, securities, the environment, and public access to government records.242
There are two key differences between the concept of public interest
lawyering as expressed in fee-shifting statutes, on the one hand, and in
solicitation rules and tax exemptions, on the other. First, fee-shifting
statutes define public interest lawyering based on the substance of the
work. This definition does not depend primarily on the unavailability of
representation in the current legal services market. Rather, because the
lawyering addresses topics of particular public interest, the statutes seek
to facilitate it within, and build on, the existing economic market. This is
not to say that the creation of fee-shifting statutes is unrelated to market
conditions and market failures. The fee-shifting provisions would not be
necessary if all potential plaintiffs with claims had both the means and
the incentives to pay market-rate attorneys' fees.243 Yet what is notable is
that the definition of which kind of lawyering work is worth supporting

240.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 88; Rev. Proc. 92-59 §§ 2(02), 4(04)-(05).

241.

See supra Part I.C.

242. Although the collection of statutes carrying such provisions may be recognizable as public
laws, as a historical matter, the group does not necessarily reflect one unified scheme for public
interest lawyering so much as the priorities of legislators at various times in U.S. history.
243. Although the statutes were passed with the assumption that potential litigants could not
afford to pay attorneys' fees, not all fee-shifting statutes were based on evidence of that empirical
reality. Moreover, some of the statutes aim to remedy social problems that even wealthy individuals
or a collection of such individuals would not have sufficient economic incentive to pursue. Even to
assess whether potential clients could afford the litigation in the current market makes little sense,
where the case is too expensive for anyone's private interests to make it worthwhile and yet it is
highly worthwhile given the larger public interest. See, e.g., Chapin, supra note 117, at 442-43
(characterizing PILF cases as those on behalf of a non-indigent majority lacking economic incentive
to sue).
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is a positive one, based on the substance of the cases, as opposed to a
negative one, based on the market's devaluation of the work. 2 "
There is a second unique attribute of the fee-shifting statutes as a
definition of public interest lawyering. Unlike solicitation jurisprudence,
which focuses on pecuniary motives, and tax law, which distinguishes
between organizational purposes, fee-shifting provisions do not consider
good intentions. Fee-shifting statutes recognize and reward only that
activity which, through a court order or settlement, brings results. Under
the Model Rule and jurisprudence on which it is based, public interest
lawyering without pecuniary intent will be granted an automatic exception to the general prohibition on solicitation.245 It does not matter
whether or not that lawyer accomplishes anything for a client. The same
is true for public interest lawyering under federal tax law. A non-profit
law firm will enjoy tax benefits so long as it complies with federal tax
law requirements, regardless of the actual utility of the services it offers.
Yet, to enjoy the benefits of fee-shifting provisions, a lawyer must not
only engage in work whose subject matter is defined by statute, but she
must prevail.246 She must not only intend to do good, but also she must

actually accomplish something for her clients. 247
B. SolicitationRules and Tax-Exempt Non-Profits

The rationale behind the solicitation prohibition might lend itself to
a public interest exception defined by pecuniary motive. Bar associations
and courts have advanced a number of slightly different rationales for the
general rule. These rationales can be divided into three categories.
244.
The financial means of the clients is not totally irrelevant, because if the clients could
afford to pay lawyers out of pocket, arguably the fee-shifting statutes would not be necessary. But
the reason for the fee-shifting statutes goes beyond obtaining lawyers for individual clients without
means to pay; it stems from a sense that the litigation serves a larger public purpose. It serves to
enforce laws whose public policies are of particular value and to deter bad actors who would violate
those laws in the future. The fee-shifting provisions serve not only to assist the individual with
securing access to legal services but, even more, to promote certain kinds of lawyering in the public
interest. Unlike in legal services, the class status of the clients is not among the key factors in determining whether the representation should be provided as a form of public service lawyering. On the
contrary, the class status of the clients varies widely across fee-shifting statutes, from securities cases
to consumer cases to employment discrimination cases, many of which involve persons of means but
without sufficient economic incentives to engage a lawyer's services, given the likely damages. But,
again, a major purpose of these statutes and the enforcement of them is deterrence, and, for that, the
class status of the individual plaintiffs is irrelevant.
245. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2012); see also infra notes 248 56 and
accompanying text.
246.
The fee-shifting approach also carries special vulnerabilities and challenges. See infra Part
IV.
247.
It should be noted that some critics believe the lawyer can obtain fees even if the result
offers relatively little value for her client. Compare Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734-35 (1986)
(describing relatively high fees despite relatively low monetary damages), with Danya Shocair Reda,
The Cost-and-DelayNarrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallaciesand Functions, 90 OR. L. REV.
1085, 1117-18 (2012) (describing image of overpaid lawyers as inaccurate). Yet, in theory, successful litigation pursuant to a fee-shifting statute benefits not only the individual client, but also the
public at large, see Evans, 475 U.S. at 752 (Brennan, J., dissenting), so the estimated value of the
legal services should incorporate the broader benefit.
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First, solicitation of clients for the lawyer's own employment arguably creates an inherent conflict of interest. 248 When a lawyer communicates with a layperson about the viability of any potential claims or defenses, and the prudence of retaining counsel, the person looks to the
lawyer for advice. However, when that lawyer hopes to enter into a retainer with a client, the lawyer cannot provide unbiased advice.
Second, solicitation could result in a retainer when the client does
not truly want representation. This is the greatest risk in the case of coercion or fraud by the attorney. Even in the absence of behavior that qualifies as fraud or coercion, courts have issued warnings about the consequences of lawyers, "trained in the art of persuasion," interacting with
laypersons.249
Third, solicitation could result in a retainer where the client does not
need, or would not benefit from, representation. Like the second rationale, this is a concern where the attorney engages in fraud or coercion,
or the layperson is fragile or incapable of assessing her own interests.
But the concern here is substantive: preventing solicitation where enter250
ing into the retainer is not in the person's best interests.
To the extent that solicitation prohibitions aim to avoid conflicted or
otherwise bad behavior by attorneys, it could seem that a public interest
exception based on pecuniary motives makes sense. One rationale for the
pecuniary motive limitation is the idea that a lawyer with a pecuniary
motive will necessarily have a conflict of interest when advising a potential client, because of the lawyer's desire to enter into the retainer and

248.

See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 461 n.19 (1978); see also

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmts. 1-3 (2012).

249. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-66; see also Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 96-103 (2d Cir.
2010) (upholding moratorium on post-accident targeted solicitation regardless of actual fraud or
coercion); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmts. 2-3 (2012). Regulators and courts
generally view in-person solicitation as particularly likely to risk harm to potential clients. Compared
with recordings, mailings, and general advertisements, in-person solicitation may allow less time for
a layperson to make a decision about entering into a retainer, and she may feel pressured by the
presence of an attorney while deciding. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmts. 2-3
(2012). In Ohralik, the Court suggested that in-person solicitation presents special dangers of pressuring potential clients to respond quickly and affirmatively to offers of representation, which might
be easier to ignore if presented in printed form. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. Additionally, in-person
communications may be the most difficult to monitor and to challenge. The content of a written or
recorded form of solicitation can more easily be established. Finally, as courts and regulators have
loosened restrictions on advertising and non-live forms of solicitation, these alternative avenues of
communication may be cited to show a decreased need for in-person solicitation and therefore decreased acceptance of the risks in-person solicitation entails.
250. Another, less emphasized, concern may be that retainers entered into under conditions of
in-person solicitation are particularly likely to be gateways to other substantive problems, such as the
provision of substandard services. One might believe that in-person solicitation agreements tend to
be formed between unscrupulous lawyers and particularly vulnerable populations that lack recourse
if the lawyer fails to perform well. If that were the case, regulators might determine that the regulation of the quality of services is too expensive and too intrusive to pursue as thoroughly as would be
necessary to stamp out all such incidents of inadequate legal representation, but stopping the formation of such relationships before they occur is a productive approach.
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earn a fee. 1 If the lawyer bears no financial incentive to convince the
target of the solicitation to become a client, the conflict might disap252

pear.

Lawyers motivated by pecuniary gain might also be more likely to
engage in the types of abusive practices that solicitation restrictions are
designed to prevent. Comment 5 to the Model Rule says exactly this:
"There is far less likelihood that a lawyer would engage in abusive practices ... in situations in which the lawyer is motivated by considerations

other than the lawyer's pecuniary gain., 253 The drafters of the comment
posit that if an attorney's primary motivation is something other than
profit, she will be less likely to behave badly.254 They suggest that pecuniary gain is the bad motive most likely to cloud a lawyer's judgment.255
The construction of this rule reflects a progressive idea that, so long as an
expert was removed from economic interest, "his
commitment to the
256
common good [would be] pure and incorruptible."
Yet, following this logic, the pecuniary motive approach to the public interest exception can be both overinclusive and underinclusive. The
exception may be too broad, permitting solicitation in situations where
the absence of pecuniary gain does not provide a sufficient guarantee of
good behavior. Monetary greed is not the only motivator that can lead to
bad behavior or conflicts of interest. Take the case of Ms. Primus: while
she might have wanted to help the women she met, she also wanted to
participate in crafting litigation to challenge the imposition of sterilization requirements. This might be a motivation separate from pecuniary
gain, and it might benefit the public at large, but it could be different
from the needs of the potential clients. Scholars have previously written
about the conflicts public interest lawyers may face when representing a
cause and not just a client. 257 While the lawyer may have multiple goals
and the majority of those may be pure in the sense of not being monetarily self-interested, this does not necessarily safeguard the goodness of the
solicitation with respect to potential conflicts.
If the goal of the public interest exception is to make room for solicitation that serves the public interest, the pecuniary gain exception is also
potentially too narrow. 258 First, an attorney could possess mixed motives,
seeking to promote the public interest and to earn a living. Her motives
could change over time; for example, an attorney might come to believe
251.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmts. 2, 5 (2012).

252.
Id. at cmt. 5.
253.
Id.
254.
Id.
255. See id.
256. Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105
YALE L.J. 1445, 1467 (1996); see Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early
NAACP (1910-1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 144 & n. 162 (2002).
257.
See Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 548, 555 (2004).

258.

See Hill, supra note 136, at 393-94.
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strongly in the public value of a case that she previously accepted only
for monetary reasons. As Carrie Menkel-Meadow has discussed with
respect to cause lawyers, parsing or quantifying motives may be impossible. 219 Second, and perhaps more importantly, an actor's conduct may
be good or bad regardless of intent. 260 The lawyer might have pecuniary
or other "bad" motives and the legal services could still be good. 261 The
reverse is also true. In both cases, the motive of the attorney can be unrelated to whether the solicitation serves the public interest.
Aside from the specific rationales behind the solicitation rules, the
other factor influencing the solicitation doctrine is the role of the First
Amendment. The solicitation cases may have framed public interest in
opposition to pecuniary motives due to what the Court perceived as a
dichotomy between political and commercial forms of speech. The Court
framed Primus and Ohralik as follows:
Unlike the situation in Ohralik, however, appellant's act of solicitation took the form of a letter to a woman with whom appellant had
discussed the possibility of seeking redress for an allegedly unconstitutional sterilization. This was not in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. Appellant was communicating an offer of free assistance by
attorneys associated with the ACLU, not an offer predicated on entitlement to a share of any monetary recovery. And her actions were
undertaken to express personal political beliefs and to advance the
civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive financial
gain. The question presented in this case is whether, in light of the
values protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, these differences materially affect the scope of state regulation of the conduct
of lawyers.

262

The status of the commercial speech doctrine at the time of the decisions may partly explain this approach.263 It was shortly before the de259.
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an Understanding
of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 10,
at 31, 37-48.
260.
A separate question, beyond the scope of this paper, is whether bad acts may be justified if
they serve a greater good. In the case of an attorney engaged in solicitation, the solicitation might be
conducted poorly, even coercively, for the purpose of serving a greater good. If an individual plaintiff were enlisted by the NAACP LDF under circumstances we might view as pressured, but the
organization represented her zealously and it won both a judgment for her and a victory for racial
equality, we might have different views as to whether this solicitation should be punished.
261.
See, e.g., Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2212-13 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting that lawyers were prohibited from using the Freedom of Information Act to obtain public
information to locate additional plaintiffs for ongoing suit, even though statute allows provision of
information for litigation or "investigation in anticipation of litigation" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also infra notes 304-08 and accompanying text (describing important public interest
served by some lawyering by large, conventional law firms).
262.
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,422 (1978).
263.
See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622-24, 635 (1995) (interpreting attorney
advertisements as commercial speech subject to intermediate scrutiny pursuant to CentralHudson
and holding that restriction on targeted mail advertisements withstood intermediate scrutiny); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980) (identifying
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cisions of Primus and Ohralikthat the Court issued Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,264 recognizing
limited First Amendment protection for commercial speech.265 In
Ohralik, the Court explained that commercial speech merits only "a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in
the scale of First Amendment values . . . allowing modes of regulation
that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression. 266 The Court has since broadened the protections for commercial
speech, but the notion has persisted that public interest lawyering is disconnected from the commercial market. 267 The drafters of the Model
Rules continue to use the absence of a significant pecuniary motive as
the key indicator of public interest lawyering excluded from the solicita268
tion prohibition.
Lawyers employed by non-profit organizations are understood to be
exempted from solicitation prohibitions, though Supreme Court jurisprudence does not require the exemption to reach so broadly.269 Comment 5
to the Model Rule explains that the solicitation prohibition "is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from participating in constitutionally protect' 270
ed activities of public or charitable legal-service organizations.
Courts tend to view solicitation by non-profits as excluded under a blanket rule, without separate analyses of the attorneys' motivations or
whether the activity is entitled to constitutional protection. 271 Although
the structure of a non-profit means the lawyer will not receive a profit
directly from the case, should litigation lead to fees pursuant to a feetest for commercial speech); see also Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 473-77, 479-80
(1988) (striking down restriction on targeted mailings); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626, 647, 649 (1985) (reversing discipline against attorney for truthful and not misleading
statements in advertising).
264.
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
265.
Id. at 770.
266.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
267.
The Court specifically applied First Amendment protections to attorney advertising in
Bates v. State Bar ofArizona, "holding that advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket
suppression ... [but] not ... that advertising by attorneys may not be regulated in any way." 433
U.S. 350, 383 (1977). It encouraged the bar to "assur[e] that advertising by attorneys flows both

freely and cleanly." Id. at 384.
268. See supra Part II.B. The drafters of the Model Rules are of course free to recognize and
exempt a category of public interest lawyering broader than the category of public interest lawyering
determined to be constitutionally protected.
269.
Compare Rivera v. Brickman Grp., Ltd., No. 05-1518, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10210, at
*5- (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2006) (finding that, given non-profit status of law firm, there was no evidence that plaintiffs' counsel was motivated by pecuniary gain, even though attorneys sought fees
provided by statute), with McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1215 n.5 (8th Cir.
1984), abrogatedon other grounds by Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989)
(distinguishing employment case in which class was represented by "a private attorney who is requesting a court-awarded fee" from GulfOil Co. v. Bernard,452 U.S. 89 (1981), where class was
represented by the NAACP LDF, a "nonprofit organization formed to litigate civil-rights cases").
270.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 5 (2012).

271.
See, e.g., Rivera, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10210, at *5- ("If, like most non-profit organizations, plaintiffs' counsel's employer uses income to fund more projects rather than supplement the
salaries of its employees, one can expect plaintiffs' counsel to receive no pecuniary gain whatsoever
from their efforts in this litigation.").
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shifting statute, the fees could increase the size of the organization's war
chest or even determine its overall financial health. Additionally, since
attorneys' careers can crisscross between for-profit firms, government
agencies, and non-profit organizations, an individual attorney could have
a pecuniary motive in pursuing a case in any one of these settings. If a
case might increase the lawyer's legal skill or reputation, it could very
well lead, albeit indirectly, to pecuniary gain down the road.272
Putting aside motives, it still is not obvious why solicitation for every kind of case handled by a charitable legal-services organization would
be constitutionally protected. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence indicated that solicitation for law reform cases involved rights of free expression and association,273 but the First Amendment might not protect runof-the-mill legal services cases. Explaining the special democratic role of
274
the litigation on behalf of minorities,
the Court emphasized that the
NAACP did not take on "ordinary damages actions [or] criminal actions
in which the defendant raises no question of possible racial discrimination. ' 275 In Primus, the Court highlighted that "the ACLU has only entered cases in which substantial civil liberties questions are involved. 2 76
It is not clear that the Court intended for solicitation of all charitable legal organizations to be constitutionally protected.277
Why, then, is all non-profit lawyering treated as exempt from solicitation rules? Most likely, bar associations and courts view charitable
organizations as providing access to legal services for low-income populations, and they recognize solicitation as a means of improving that access. This access-based definition of public interest lawyering recognizes
an exception to the regulation for lawyering that serves otherwise neglected segments of society. The approach of the American Bar Association, in facilitating solicitation by non-profits, offers special regulatory
privileges for legal services that compensate for market failures, just as
the Court's solicitation jurisprudence reflected special appreciation for
legal services that compensate for failures of the political system.
The access-based approach to public interest lawyering stands in
contrast to the approach implicit in fee-shifting statutes. Such laws incorporate substantive decisions as to which cases serve the public, and
implement those decisions by making use of market mechanisms. Unlike
actors that identify public interest lawyering as lawyering in absence of
272.
273.

See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 259, at 41.
See generally Sabbeth, supra note 193 (analyzing theory of political expression suggested

in solicitation cases).
274. The Court emphasized that litigation expressing the views of minorities and minority
interests has special importance in a political system where such views might not find other avenues
of expression. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,430-31 (1963).
275.
Button, 371 U.S. at 420.
276.
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 427 (1978) (quoting In re Smith, 233 S.E.2d 301, 303 (S.C.
1977), rev'd, Primus, 436 U.S. 412) (internal quotation marks omitted).
277. See generally id.; Button, 371 U.S. 415.
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profit or fees, Congress has, in fee-shifting statutes, identified substantive
categories of public interest lawyering, and implemented measures to
make it profitable precisely because of its public value.
C. Tax Benefits and Fee Shifting
Both fee-shifting statutes and tax law involve private actors supporting public interest lawyering, yet they do so in different ways. Feeshifting statutes encourage public interest litigation and put the cost on
the bad actors whose behavior creates the need for it. The legislature
defines which litigation is in the public interest and mandates that bad
actors pay the costs of the litigation brought against them. Tax benefits,
on the other hand, serve as a financial subsidy from the federal government to private actors, who in turn provide a service in the public interest. An important critique of relying on the non-profit sector is the unaccountability of the private provider.278 The tax benefit model allows unelected, wealthy funders of the non-profits to define the public interest and
set the priorities for funding. In contrast, in fee-shifting statutes, the federal government maintains responsibility for setting priorities and defining the public interest.
In fee-shifting statutes, Congress makes a substantive determination
that certain lawyering activity is in the public interest, while, in the context of tax benefits, the IRS defines public interest lawyering based primarily on finances and leaves the substantive decisions to the donors. An
organization may qualify as a charity for tax purposes based on the finances of the client population, in the case of legal aid organizations
serving the indigent, or asset restrictions and fee restrictions in the case
of civil and human rights organizations or PILFs. The IRS does maintain
some control over what counts as public interest lawyering by defining
the public purposes that qualify an organization for 501(c)(3) status, but
those purposes have been so broadly interpreted that it is difficult to
identify a clear set of priorities. Moreover, the IRS has specified that, in
the case of the PILF, it is the fee restrictions that distinguish it. 279 Although the definition of charitable purposes necessarily reflects some
value judgments,280 the federal government has attempted to create the

278.
See Garry W. Jenkins, Nongovernmental Organizations and the Forces Against Them:
Lessons of the Anti-NGO Movement, 37 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 459, 510 (2012) ("The notion that nonprofits need to improve their levels of accountability is conventional wisdom among students of civil

society and philanthropy."); Weissman, supra note 69, at 803 ("Philanthropies engage in the social
issues of their choosing, without accountability to political processes, yet often perform government
functions and influence state power."); Penina Kessler Lieber, 1601-2001: An Anniversary of Note,
62 U. PiTrr. L. REV. 731, 736 (2001) (describing "unbridled power and potential for abuse" of private

foundations).
279. See Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411.
280.
See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 533 (1959); Slee v. Comm'r, 42
F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930); see also Resnik, supra note 29, at 2128-29 (describing how judges
have attempted to rely on market indicators of the value of lawyers' work to avoid making their own

assessments of the utility of certain forms of litigation, but arguing that, in issuing opinions on fees,
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while recognizing activities worthy of tax

The key theoretical bases for granting tax benefits to charitable organizations and their donors can be summarized in three categories: (1)
charitable donations relieve pressure on the government by offering services that the government would otherwise be obligated to provide or
could face political costs for failure to provide, such as shelter for the

homeless; 8 2 (2) charity creates positive externalities beyond redistribution of resources or the provision of services, such as encouraging civic
283
engagement and educating the public
and (3) taxing
charities may be practically impossible.on284policy matters;

In the case of non-profits engaged in public interest lawyering, tax
benefits allow the government to support private actors engaged in activities that the government could not engage in directly. For example,
through tax benefits, the federal government facilitates the work of the
ACLU or the NAACP LDF, and much of that work is to challenge government action. Of course the government could not actually appear in
litigation as its own adversary, but through the tax benefits, the govern-

judges do in fact make value judgments, and it is "irresponsible not to talk openly about how judges
should spend money in pursuit of social goals achieved through litigation").
281.
The political neutrality of the federal government is questionable. Critics on the right
would point to recent audits of Tea Party organizations, while critics on the left have described
historical persecution of the NAACP and other progressive organizations. See, e.g., CHEN &
CUMMINGS, supra note 10, at 36.
282.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2008) (defining charitable organizations as organizations that "lessen[] .. .the burdens of [g]overnment"); see also McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972) ("The rationale for allowing the deduction of charitable
contributions has historically been that by doing so, the [g]overnment relieves itself of the burden of
meeting public needs which in the absence of charitable activity would fall on the shoulders of the
[g]overnment"). One theoretical justification for granting tax benefits to non-profits is that to offer
the tax benefits costs less than to provide the services directly. See Paul Valentine, A Lay Word for a
Legal Term: How the Popular Definition of Charity Has Muddled the Perception of the Charitable
Deduction, 89 NEB. L. REV. 997, 1009-10 (2011); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 590 (1983) ("The exemption from taxation of money and property devoted to charitable
and other purposes is based on the theory that the [g]overnment is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations
from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare." (quoting
H.R.REP. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
283.
See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax Subsidies,
91 B.U. L. REV. 601, 610 (2011); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 430
(1998); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 404-05 (1998) (discussing the view
that tax deductions give donors the ability to influence government support).
284.
Some of the most common practical objections to taxing non-profits are: taxes could
threaten the viability of non-profit organizations, while generating relatively little income for public
coffers; identifying taxable income of non-profits creates definitional puzzles; and exemptions for
religious non-profits are needed to preserve the separation of church and state. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer,
The "Independent" Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the Limits ofAutonomy, 65 VAND. L. REV.
51, 64-65 (2012); Robert Christopherson & James J. Coffey, Hedging Property Taxes for Exempt
Organizations, 34 TAX'N EXEMPTS 39, 40-42 (2012). See generally Diane L. Fahey, Taxing Nonprofits out of Business, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547 (2005).
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ment helps to fund its own opposition. The rationale for doing so is, at
least in part, the public interest in a vibrant, democratic dialogue.
The rationale for fee-shifting statutes is similar to that of tax benefits for non-profits in that it creates an incentive for private actors to engage in public interest lawyering that exceeds what the government can
afford to fund. As the Senate Report concerning the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976 (CAFAA or the Fee Act) 28 6 indicated,
"[a]ll of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement,
and fee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to
have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional
policies which these laws contain., 287 The legislature designed feeshifting statutes to support the "private attorney general, 288 who enforces
28 9
public policy.
One difference between the public interest lawyering supported by
fee-shifting statutes and that supported by tax benefits is that the former
serves as a deterrent to the behavior of identified bad actors, while the
latter provides a universal open invitation to do good. The Senate Report
for CAFAA highlighted not only representation of victims of civil rights
violations, but also prosecution of the violators: "If private citizens are to
be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation[]'s
fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must
have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these
rights in court., 290 The fee-shifting statutes function not only as carrots
but also as sticks; they encourage public interest lawyering, but also
mandate that bad actors will be required to cover the costs of it when
necessary to bring them into compliance with the law. Tax law portrays
public interest lawyering as a politically neutral activity, to be funded by
private parties inclined by generosity. Fee-shifting statutes, in contrast,
elevate public interest lawyering to an essential activity, whose funding,
though covered by private actors, is mandatory. 291

285.
See Sabbeth, supranote 193, at 1499-502, 1530-31 (discussing importance of dissent).
286.
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012). The Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976 was
one of the first of the modem statutory provisions, and most other provisions use it as a model.
287.
S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 2 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910 (1976).
288.
Id. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-and Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2133-37 (2004) (describ-

ing the growth of the concept of the private attorney general).
289. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. Notably, the Senate Report
described civil rights victims, the potential plaintiffs, as private attorney generals, but their lawyers
are the better private analogue to the attorney general, and, as is discussed in Part II.C of this Article,
it is clear that it is the lawyers at whom the legislation was aimed.
290. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
291.
Of course, to the extent the tax benefits support litigation, there is a less explicit adversary. For example, if there were no subsidy for the ACLU, that would weaken, if not destroy, the
ACLU, and violators of the constitutional rights defended by the ACLU might be able to more freely
engage in unconstitutional behavior in the absence of any lawyers to challenge their acts. The same
is true for legal aid organizations that, for example, represent poor tenants and make it harder for
private or public landlords to violate housing laws.
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A second difference between the incentives in fee-shifting statutes
and tax benefits is worth noting. Fee-shifting is tied to prevailing in individual cases, while tax subsidies are based on an organization's overall
activities. Tax law recognizes charitable organizations engaged in nonlitigation activities and imposes special restrictions on charities engaged
in litigation. Fee shifting, in contrast, is available only
for litigation and,
292
as discussed above, only that in which one prevails.
Both of these contexts reflect fundamental conceptions of what public interest lawyering is and should be. Tax law depicts public interest
lawyering as an individual choice, a voluntary act of charity and good
will. Fee-shifting statutes, on the other hand, embrace a vision of public
interest lawyering grounded in democratically defined values and a social mandate to enforce them.293
IV. COMPLICATING THE DIVISION BETWEEN PUBLIC INTEREST
LAWYERING AND PROFIT

The ambiguity about where financial gain fits in the definition of
public interest lawyering may reflect a broader ambivalence about the
identity of the legal profession. We may be confused or conflicted about
how earning an income fits with the view of ourselves as enlightened
professionals serving the public. If all lawyering helps to ensure that social problems are resolved within the rule of law and all lawyering protects the interests of some members of the public, then perhaps all lawyering is in the public interest. Yet we tend to believe that there is a subset of lawyering activity for which the term public interest lawyering is
reserved. The term is typically used as shorthand for volunteer activities
outside of a lawyer's regular practice or the activities of a small subset of
lawyers who have selflessly committed themselves, at least temporarily,
to a life different from the mainstream of practice; in many cases, they
have taken vows of relative poverty and sacrificed the usual rewards of
the profession. Yet this approach is both descriptively incomplete and
potentially dangerous.
When legal actors are in the position to make choices about regulation, funding, or less tangible forms of support, they ought not to mistake
undercompensation for the only indicia of public interest lawyering. Rather, they must engage in constructing a substantive definition fitting the
specific institutional context and the legal actors' priorities. There are
292.

See supra Part III.A.

293.
Fee-shifting statutes do not require government expenditures (unless a government entity
is liable as a defendant), but tax benefits cost the federal government millions of dollars per year. See
S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 3-4, reprinted in 1976 U.SC.C.A.N. (highlighting the advantage of fee-

shifting, rather than the creation of more government "bureaucracy" for enforcement, in terms of
both revenue and political philosophy). Tax laws reflect value judgments, but they also maintain the
appearance of substantive neutrality. Perhaps it would be difficult to make a substantive judgment,
like that in the fee-shifting statutes, in combination with a significant allocation of resources, like
that in the tax laws, without generating significant controversy.
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two reasons why this is important. First, there are lawyering activities
that serve important public functions, regardless of whether they generate
income. Second, to the extent that there are public values worth protecting, it is critical that protection efforts are strong and financially independent. Otherwise, lawyering against economically or politically powerful actors may be too easily thwarted.
A. Public Interest Lawyering in For-ProfitSettings
Empirical research complicates the dichotomized portrait of public
interest lawyering and profit-generating practice. 294 Since the days of
Button and Primus, attorneys motivated by political commitments have
increasingly crafted careers not only as staff attorneys at impactlitigation funds and legal aid offices, but also as partners, associates, and
solo practitioners at private, profit-generating firms. Though all of these
lawyers share an abiding commitment to the pursuit of law as a public
profession, the form they choose varies widely, as do their explanations
of their choices. Some lawyers are candid about seeking higher salaries,
admitting that the romance of public interest lawyering proved insufficient to sustain them while sending children to college, yet others choose
alternative, for-profit structures as integral to their public interest
goals. 295 Those choices reflect diversifying definitions of public interest
practice.296
To some degree, the development of for-profit, fee-based structures
represents an increasingly pluralist approach to the delivery of services. 297 One might charge low-income clients a fee on the view that
paying even a small sum encourages clients to be more active in their
cases and take ownership of the process by which they participate in the
legal system. For low-income clients, paying a small fee can increase
their agency and improve their relationships with their lawyers. By paying, clients may be in a better position to make demands of their lawyers,
shifting the paradigm away from the traditional power dynamics between
public interest lawyers and their indebted non-paying clients. In this way,
the presence of the fee, rather than the absence of the fee, contributes to
298
the public interest nature of the lawyering.

294.
See Ann Southworth, What Is Public Interest Law? Empirical Perspectives on an Old
Question (Univ. of Cal., Irvine Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2013-106,
2013), availableat http://ssm.comlabstract-2256719.
295.
See Trubek, supra note 12, at 429-32; Trubek & Kransberger, supra note 10, at 202-03.
296.
See Cummings, supra note 14, at 9-11; Scott L. Cummings, What Good Are Lawyers?, in
THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 1, 4-10 (Scott L.
Cummings ed., 2011).
297.
Until 1992, non-profit, tax-exempt legal services organizations were not permitted to
accept fees from clients. Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411 § 2(05)-(06); see also COUNCIL FOR
PUB. INTEREST LAW, supra note 26, at 306-11 (describing IRS restrictions on client-based fees for
public interest law centers and the Council's recommendation to relax the restrictions).
298.
See Trubek & Kransberger, supranote 10, at 209.
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Another area of developing for-profit practice has been firms serving particular demographic groups. As the Supreme Court noted in Button, the NAACP LDF at that time did not handle "ordinary" litigation,
only cases where the substance of the claims or defenses related to racial
justice. Some lawyers, however, view the provision of legal services to
particular client populations as a vital form of public interest lawyering,
regardless of the substance of the individual cases. 2 99 If a lawyer wants to
dedicate herself to racial justice, the NAACP LDF may offer the best
opportunities, and, similarly, if she wants to work for women's rights,
then Legal Momentum (formerly NOW LDF) is an excellent forum. Yet,
if one believes in increasing the relative power of certain segments of the
population, a small, for-profit organization may provide the means to do
it. As with the acceptance of a fee, the for-profit firm may provide an
important avenue for democratic, public interest lawyering. 3° °
Beyond using profit structures to more freely pursue empowerment
for a client population, the pursuit of economic power can itself be understood as a function of public interest lawyering.
B. Economic Strength andIndependence
Certain categories of public interest lawyering require economic
strength and independence. In particular, fact-intensive civil litigation
requires significant resources, and challenging powerful corporate interests requires independence from those interests. Non-profit organizations
and volunteer services of conventional lawyers both contribute valuable
legal services that increase access for clients unable to afford representation, but each carries its own limitations due to its economically devalued
30 1
and dependent position in the legal market.
299.
Trubek, supra note 12, at 418; see Trubek & Kransberger, supra note 10, at 207-08.
300. See Trubek & Kransberger, supra note 10, at 208-09.
301
The fee-shifting model of public interest lawyering also carries special vulnerabilities and
challenges, and the Supreme Court has not offered consistent support. First, the Supreme Court ruled
in Buckhannon that serving as a catalyst for change in a defendant's behavior is not sufficient to
prevail and be entitled to fees; rather, an attorney must obtain a judgment against the defendant.
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600,
610 (2001). This means that an attorney can consult with a client regarding violation of an important
public policy, reach out to the bad actor to request that it cease its unlawful conduct, draft and file a
complaint, litigate a case through discovery and up through trial, and then, if a defendant "chooses"
to change its conduct, the attorney representing the plaintiff will receive no fees. This seems odd
given the public interest in ensuring compliance with public policy and the lawyer's role in forcing
the defendant to comply. It makes taking on these public interest cases much riskier for attorneys
representing clients not paying out of pocket. Catherine Albiston and Laura Beth Nielsen have
demonstrated that the financial impact of the Buckhannon decision has in fact curtailed public interest lawyers' activity. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 212, at 1120-21.
Another challenge of the fee-shifting model of public interest lawyering is that civil litigation increasingly ends in settlement and defendants can condition settlements on the sacrifice of
payment for plaintiffs' lawyers. If such an offer otherwise satisfies a plaintiff's interests, it can be
difficult to refuse. Yet in the aggregate, these sacrificial offers threaten to defund this category of
public interest lawyering. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734-36, 742-43 (1986) (permitting
sacrifice offers); id. at 754-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority decision would
have damaging aggregate effects for enforcement of civil rights laws). For further discussion of
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The accumulation of economic power is particularly important
preparation for successful litigation against wealthy corporate defendants. Civil litigation is often an expensive proposition, and for any public
interest lawyer to serve as a serious gladiator, she must bring the resources to fight as aggressively and persistently as her adversaries. Cases
involving multiple parties and complex factual disputes can create insurmountable challenges for a firm without ample financial resources. 302
Even where fee-shifting provisions offer the possibility of fees after prevailing, the firm needs to have sufficient resources to survive until the
time of any such payout. In the meantime, salaries and other overhead
costs must be covered, and the firm must be financially prepared to absorb the full cost of the suit if, for any reason, the client does not prevail.
This is all the more daunting given
the Supreme Court's limited interpre30 3
tation of what it means to prevail.
To the extent that public interest lawyering includes litigation to
change industry standards, 30 4 economic power is a prerequisite. 30 5 Quali-

tative empirical research shows examples of lawyers who have migrated
Court-condoned obstacles to the recovery of fees for public interest lawyering, see infra Part IV.C.
See also Cummings, supra note 14 at 89 (describing terms of one firm's retainer, which prohibits
acceptance of sacrifice offers and provides for contingency fees in the absence of fees from statutory
awards).
A number of these obstacles could potentially be addressed through legislation, but deeper, structural challenges remain. Because fee-shifting statutes encourage lawyers to litigate cases
they are likely to win, the fee-shifting model does not necessarily support the pursuit of risky cases
or clients. Yet risk may be involved in impact litigation seeking to change the law. Risk may also be
required to represent marginalized clients whose voices are less likely than more privileged members
of society to receive respect and empathy. If there is hope of public interest lawyering for social
change, it must, at least sometimes, take on risks. One way lawyers can pursue risky cases under the
fee-shifting model (or a contingency fee model), is if they support the risky work by balancing it
with less risky matters. See Cummings, supra note 14, at 61 (describing how one firm develops
portfolio of cases so it can pursue some riskier cases). Nonetheless, were fee-shifting statutes the
only form of support for public interest lawyering, certain categories of wrongs might go unaddressed. Notably, this Article does not argue that fee-shifting is categorically superior to other
forms of public interest lawyering but simply that it ought to be recognized and supported as one
important form.
302. See COUNCIL FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, supra note 26, at 143.
303.
See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-05 (ruling that, even if litigation is the catalyst for
change in defendant's behavior, plaintiff does not "prevail" for purposes of fee-shifting statute
unless plaintiff obtains judgment against defendant (internal quotation mark omitted)); see also
Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 761 (1989) (holding that, in Title VII class
action where intervenor unsuccessfully challenged settlement, plaintiffs could not recover fees
without showing intervenor's claim to be "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation"); Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 212, at 1130 (documenting empirically that the Buckhannon decision has
limited lawyers' case selection). For more evidence that these fee decisions do have an impact, see
Brand, supra note 212, at 361-62.
304. See, e.g., Bloom, supranote 199, at 96.
305.
To the extent that litigation remains a viable avenue for social change, today's most successful approach may be to exact economic costs from private entities, rather than to seek ongoing
injunctions against government actors. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (questioning the extent to which the

judiciary can affect social change). But see Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedureand the Failureof InstitutionalReform Litigation After Home v. Flores, 46
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1435, 1444-48 (2013) (describing ongoing importance of institutional reform
litigation against government actors).
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from legal aid offices to large firms precisely because they believe they
can lodge more powerful attacks on corporate wrongdoers when armed
with larger war chests.30 6 Some might question whether attorneys earning
handsome salaries at large firms deserve recognition as public interest
lawyers. But access to justice should mean more than individual representation,30 7 and, to the extent that structural change remains a recognized goal of public interest lawyering, 30 8 the enforcement and deterrent
values served by economically powerful actors should not be overlooked.
Such actors may be uniquely positioned to challenge corporate and government entities with significant power of their own.
Like economic strength, economic independence also improves
public interest lawyering. 309 Financial dependence can limit the nature
and scope of activity. To receive tax benefits as a non-profit, an organi310
zation must agree not to lobby or organize more than a limited amount.
Private donors, whether foundations offering grants, or members paying
dues, can impose their priorities on the use of funds. 31 1 Both government
actors and financial benefactors have been known to censor controversial
public interest lawyering. 312 In contrast, a lawyer who earns her income
directly from public interest lawyering is beholden to no one but her clients. This not only increases the clients' power in the representation relationship but also decreases the power of outside influences. 313 For public
306. See Erichson, supranote 5, at 2101 n.63.
307. See Gary Blasi, How Much Access? How Much Justice?, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 875
(2004).
308. See ROSENBERG, supra note 305, at 32-33 (suggesting courts may be able to produce
social change when paired with market incentives and deterrents).
309. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 11 (2012) ("To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is
obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government
domination. An independent legal profession is an importantforce in preservinggovernment under
law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not
dependent on governmentfor the right to practice." (emphasis added)).
310. See supra notes 81, 85-86 and accompanying text.
311.
For a discussion of the challenges of alternative funding sources, see CHEN & CUMMINGS,
supranote 10, at 128-42, 174, 184-86, and SCHEINGOLD, supra note 1, at 194-99.
312.
In one important example of how public interest lawyers' activities have been restricted
by funders, the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) in 1996 imposed a variety of restrictions on all
lawyers in offices receiving LSC funding. Luban, supra note 4, at 220-24. These restrictions ranged
from censoring the substance of the cases (no constitutional challenges to welfare regulations) to
limiting the client population to be served (no representation of undocumented immigrants except in
limited domestic violence matters) to cutting off access to other sources of support (no collection of
fees under fee-shifting statutes). Id. at 221, 224.
313.
See Debra S. Katz & Lynne Bemabei, PracticingPublic Interest Law in a Private Public
Interest Law Firm: The Ideal Setting to Challenge the Power, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 293, 294-97
(1993) (describing the authors' for-profit firm, independent of funders or a Board of Directors, as the
best structure to represent clients with "a vital interest in shaking up the system" and provide "representation [that] necessarily involves aggressively challenging the existing power structures and
institutions"). It should be recognized that even if, in an attempt to maintain independence from
government actors and foundations, a legal services provider relies on fees, government choices still
influence the success of that effort. At the most basic level, legislatures and courts determine which
legal claims and defenses are cognizable and which damages are available. One example is feeshifting provisions, which depend on the legislature to recognize the enforcement of particular laws
as in the public interest and the judiciary to cooperate in awarding fees. Even the contingency fee,
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interest lawyering to be free to challenge the power of governments and
corporations, both economic strength and economic independence may
be crucial.3 14
Neither non-profit organizations nor conventional firms engaged in
pro bono activity can perform all public interest lawyering functions. The
structure of non-profits creates limits and presents special challenges for
capacity building.315 Funding uncertainty and dependency can make it
hard to build new programs, take risks with existing programs, and establish and maintain relationships with individuals and other organizations. 3 16 Securing and maintaining funding also is time-consuming and
requires expertise.3 17 This can strain the resources of staff time and salary
budgets. 318 Further, attracting and retaining well-qualified employees can
be difficult for non-profit organizations requiring long hours but paying
low salaries. 31 9 Due to the contingent nature of funding, the security of
positions may be difficult to guarantee; the lack of job security discourages potential applicants and creates stress and anxiety for current workers. 320 These difficulties can lead to a high rate of employee turnover,
creating a workforce with a lack of expertise and further increasing administrative costs. 32 1 Additional costs tie up resources that an organization could otherwise devote to expanding its public interest lawyering.
Certainly, many non-profit organizations do attract and retain highly
intelligent, skilled, and dedicated staffs, and many do operate with impressive budgets. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that, even
for elite non-profits, obtaining and maintaining donations can be a challenge.322

which may be one of the more independent sources of funding, is subject to legislative support or
reduction. Capping awards, for example, can make those cases financially infeasible. See, e.g.,
Bloom, supra note 199, at 108 (describing reform legislation proposed in response to litigation that

was too successful).
314.
See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 60, at 163 (suggesting that plaintiffs' class action
lawyers "use their wealth to finance further class action litigation against U.S. companies" and
"comprise the most effective lobbying counterweight to corporate interests in [American] politics").
315.

See VENTURE PHILANTHROPY PARTNERS, EFFECTIVE CAPACITY BUILDING IN NONPROFIT

ORGANIZATIONS
33-36
(2001),
available
at
http://www.vppartners.org/sites/default/files/reports/fullrpt.pdf (describing model of defining and
evaluating "nonprofit capacity").
316. See Rhode, supranote 71, at 2056.
317. Id.
318.

Nell Edgington, Overcoming the Catch-22 of Nonprofit Capacity, SOCIAL VELOCITY

(Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.socialvelocity.net/2011/08/overcoming-the-catch-22-of-nonprofitcapacity/.
319.
Cf VENTURE PHILANTHROPY PARTNERS, supra note 315, at 49-53 (explaining how some
organizations overcome recruiting challenges).
320. Cf id (explaining how some non-profits have attracted professionals by providing benefits packages and generous compensation).
321.
Cf id. (demonstrating that some organizations have overcome human resource challenges
through innovative programs).
322.
See Rhode, supra note 71, at 2056 (describing fundraising challenges for even the most
elite, wealthy organizations).
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For PILFs, these structural challenges make industry-changing litigation difficult. Donating for discovery costs does not appeal to funders
choosing among worthy causes. Simply amassing enough funds for these
cases may be an insurmountable obstacle. The unreliability of funding
can make it difficult to commit to a large piece of litigation, particularly
one that is risky or controversial. To responsibly accept a large case, an
organization must be in a suitable position, financially and in terms of
available labor. In the early stages of case selection, the number of hours
and years a case might demand will be uncertain, and this, in addition to
the risk of losing, must be weighed. The capacity to absorb the costs of
the case, in the event of a failure to prevail, is essential to public interest
lawyering of this kind.
Beyond the structural challenges inherent in operating a non-profit,
PILFs face additional regulatory restrictions. Although Congress created
fee-shifting statutes to make certain categories of public interest lawyering profitable, the IRS limits the ability of PILFs to use fees from such
cases for that purpose. To maintain the tax benefits of non-profit status, a
PILF must cover no more than fifty percent of its operating costs with
attorneys' fees, and it must receive at least half of its financial support
from outside, non-client sources. 323 This means both its economic
strength and its economic independence are necessarily curtailed.
Pro bono volunteer work by large, conventional law firms cannot
fill the gaps of the non-profit sector. First, while the non-profit setting
suffers from one kind of employee problem, pro bono suffers from another. Volunteer lawyers often lack relevant expertise. 324 Firms lack sufficient incentives to provide robust training because the clients, if they
even know enough to identify its absence, cannot threaten to take their
business elsewhere. The firms often see pro bono as a vehicle for acquiring skills; firms generally do not allow inexperienced lawyers to "practice on" paying clients.325 In the interest of avoiding conflicts, attorneys
typically volunteer in fields disconnected from the main of their work.326
The disconnect between the fields of the attorney's paid and volunteer
work can further stunt the development of expertise in the fields pursued
pro bono.
Excellent representation requires knowledge and commitment, both
of which are more likely to flourish when the legal services are central to
an attorney's practice, rather than provided on a voluntary basis. As U.S.
323.
Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411 § 4(05).
324. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 71, at 2395 (documenting inadequate knowledge and
supervision of volunteer attorneys); Rhode, supra note 71, at 2071-72 (documenting scarcity of
volunteer attorneys with relevant skills and inefficiencies of work by inexperienced counsel); cf
Cummings & Rhode, supranote 71, at 2429 (documenting that some firms seek to develop expertise
in particular areas and channel volunteer efforts in those directions).
325.
Cummings & Rhode, supra note 71, at 2426-28.
326. id. at 2393.
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District Judge Myron Thompson explained in the context of awarding
fees to lawyers who successfully represented victims of employment
discrimination:
Both local and national pools of plaintiffs' lawyers, with an in depth
knowledge about the theory and practice of employment discrimination law, are essential if the plaintiffs' perspective is to be fully and
adequately represented both in court, in cases presenting new and
complex legal issues, and out of court, before national and state legislative committees and before national and local bar committees
where policy decisions affecting the direction of employment discrimination law are made. Fees in employment discrimination cases
should therefore be awarded so a lawyer can32litigate
such cases for a
7
living rather than as occasional charity work.
Beyond the question of expertise, volunteers sometimes demonstrate less zeal than when they are doing their "real jobs., 328 Perhaps
because they believe they are doing a good deed by engaging in charity,
they approach the exploration of various strategic options and other
components of zealous advocacy as voluntary. As a result, the quality of
the legal services may suffer, as may the achievement of the broader
329
aims of public interest lawyering.
Additionally, although big-firm lawyers working pro bono may
have more economic strength for litigation than their counterparts at nonprofit organizations, economic independence for conventional lawyers is
illusory. Conventional for-profit firms function to amass profit; they seek
to secure and maintain paying clients, preferably as many as possible,
paying fees as high as possible. Not surprisingly, paying clients take priority over those receiving free representation. In the selection and pursuit
of pro bono work, big-firm lawyers first examine their dockets of paying
clients and then seek out pro bono activity that raises no potential conflict, as opposed to taking on these responsibilities in the opposite order.
Lawyers have withdrawn in the middle of pro bono representation due to
conflict with a paying client. 33 In this way, the economic devaluation of
pro bono results in the devaluation of the work in terms of the ethical
expectations of the profession.

327.

Stokes v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 706 F. Supp. 811, 817 (M.D. Ala. 1988), affld
mem.,

891 F.2d 905 (11 th Cir. 1989).
328.
See Weissman, supra note 69, at 816 (describing critiques of volunteerism as an approach
to the provision of legal services).
329.
For example, if a defendant knows plaintiff's counsel is acting pro bono and therefore will
litigate the case less aggressively, this could influence strategic choices in the litigation of the case or
in settlement. Ultimately, it might well mean that the enforcement and deterrence goals of the litiga-

tion are compromised.
330.
Cummings, supra note 67, at 116-20, 147 (describing how firms decline to accept, and
sometimes withdraw from, cases that could create either actual conflicts with paying clients or even
positional conflicts with those clients' business interests); see also Cummings & Sandefur, supra
note 67, at 102.
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Moreover, conventional firms engaged in pro bono work are so beholden to their paying clients, and the paying clients they hope to attract,
that they will not engage in litigation that threatens the positions or business interests of these client populations. Most large firms will refuse
entire categories of pro bono cases, including employment discrimina33
tion, labor rights, consumer interests, and environmental claims. '
"[W]hen [conventional] firms do bring pro bono civil rights cases, they
tend to bring them against state and local governments-who have their
own in-house attorneys-rather than against private corporations for
whose business [the firms] might compete." 332 Ultimately, most large,
conventional firms will not engage in pro bono litigation that threatens
the business
interests of large corporate defendants, let alone entire in33 3
dustries.
C. Public Interest Practicefor Profit
Congress recognized the limits of relying on charity for public interest lawyering. 3 Congress believed that public interest lawyering
would have to be profitable for lawyers to pursue it with the frequency
and force required for effective enforcement and deterrence. 33' The legislature passed numerous fee-shifting statutes for this reason.336 However,
the ongoing perception of public interest lawyering as free services by
non-profits and pro bono donations threatens the success of the legislature's vision.
In a variety of decisions from the Supreme Court and lower courts,
judges have demonstrated ambivalence about awarding fees under feeshifting statutes. They have rationalized their decisions by suggesting
that public interest lawyers can be expected to act in spite of, and sometimes in opposition to, their own economic incentives.337 This overly

generous, perhaps patronizing, view of public interest lawyers contrasts
with the assumptions the judges bring to the interpretation of other ac-

331.
Cummings & Rhode, supra note 71, at 2393 (amassing evidence that firms avoid employment, consumer, and environmental claims likely to involve suits against major corporations).
332.

Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and Private Attorneys General, 101 Nw. U.

L. REV. 1459, 1463 (2007).
333.
Weissman, supra note 69, at 816-17 ("Pro bono services, like foundation funded projects,
do not typically include representation in matters that challenge structural inequities, nor do they
seek solutions to fundamental injustices.").
334. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 747-48 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing legislative history describing strain on legal aid organizations and unavailability of counsel); see also
Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1970) ("Congress did not intend that
vindication of statutorily guaranteed rights would depend on . . . the availability of legal assistance
from charity-individual, collective or organized. An enactment aimed at legislatively enhancing
human rights and the dignity of man through equality of treatment would hardly be served by compelling victims to seek out charitable help.").
335.
Evans, 475 U.S. at 748-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
336. See supranote 213.
337. See supra Part II.B.2.
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tors. 338 The results pose a real danger for the viability of important categories of public interest lawyering. Attorneys cannot litigate industrychanging litigation without first accumulating significant economic resources. Small, for-profit firms are the main individual enforcers of civil
rights laws, 33 9 and they too cannot afford to pursue public interest lawyering for free.
Jeffrey Brand's review of the Supreme Court's fee-shifting decisions from 1976 to 1990 demonstrates the Justices' "assumption that
public interest litigation is not part and parcel of ordinary practice, but is
more in the nature of charity or volunteer work. '' 34 0 Professor Brand
highlights a string of cases in which the Court has limited the effectiveness of fee-shifting statutes. A few examples from his analysis should
suffice to make the point.
In Marek v. Chesny,34 1 a Section 1983342 case brought by a father
whose son had been shot and killed by police officers, the Court held that
Rule 68 offers of judgment could cut off entitlement to fees governed by
fee-shifting statutes.343 The decision opened up the possibility of a strong
pecuniary interest on behalf of the lawyer-to settle and get paid rather
than risk years more work for no reward-that could directly oppose her
client's interest going forward. The Marek majority acknowledged that
its holding could "serve as a disincentive for the plaintiffs attorney to
continue litigation after the defendant makes a settlement offer," but
surmised that "[m]erely subjecting civil rights plaintiffs to the settlement
provision of Rule 68 does not curtail their access to the courts, or significantly deter them from bringing suit."' 344 In other contexts, the Court has
sought to remove conventional lawyers from situations where pecuniary
interests could test their ethical commitments; for example, the Court has
approved the general use of solicitation prohibitions. 345 Nonetheless, in
the case of public interest lawyering, the Court expects a lawyer to rise
above such challenges and continue the work even if denied financial

338.
See supra notes 186-99 and accompanying text (describing the Court's approach to solicitation rules in Ohralik).
339.
See Bagenstos, supra note 332, at 1460-61 (citing Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the
Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 768 (1988), and Christine Jolls, The Role and
Functioning of Public-Interest Legal Organizations in the Enforcement of the Employment Laws, in
EMERGING LA13OR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141, 162--64 (Richard

B. Freeman et a]. eds., 2005)).
340.
Brand, supra note 212, at 373; see also Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 530 (1986) (describing judicial hostility in case limiting
veterans' rights lawyers to fees often dollars).
341.
473 U.S. 1 (1985).
342.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
343.
Marek, 473 U.S. at 11-12.
344.
Brand, supra note 212, at 357 n.397 (alteration in original) (quoting Marek, 473 U.S. at
10) (internal quotation marks omitted).
345.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978) (reasoning that presence of a
pecuniary motive is "inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct").
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support. The Marek majority failed to come to terms with the ethical
conflict its decision permitted and the serious ramifications for civil
rights enforcement.
346
the Supreme Court ruled that after years of
In Evans v. Jeff D.,
protracted settlement discussions in a class action concerning inadequate
education and healthcare for disabled children, defense counsel could
condition a consent decree on plaintiffs' counsel waiving all costs and
attorneys' fees. 34 7 The majority claimed to be "cognizant of the possibility that decisions by individual clients to bargain away fee awards may,
in the aggregate and in the long run, diminish lawyers' expectations of
statutory fees in civil rights cases," but
the majority determined that the
348
likelihood of such a result was remote.

Again, the Court's analysis suggested public interest lawyers have
no pecuniary needs. The Jeff D. plaintiffs had sought an injunction to
repair educational and health care systems but requested no monetary
damages, other than payment of the fees and costs accumulated during
the litigation. 349 Three years into the case and one week before trial, the
defendants offered injunctive relief in exchange for a waiver of fees and
costs. 350 Given the offer of virtually everything the plaintiffs wanted,
their attorney felt ethically bound to advise his clients to accept, even if
that meant his office had to absorb the accumulated costs of the litigation. 351 The parties agreed to a settlement that made the waiver of fees
352
The plaintiffs' counsel
and costs conditional on the court's approval.
then filed a motion asking the court to order the defendant to pay costs
and fees. 3 53 He argued that requiring his office to absorb these expenses
when the plaintiffs had essentially prevailed-after years of litigation
fueled by thousands of hours of public interest lawyering of the kind
encouraged by Congress-undermined the spirit of the fee shifting provisions.354 The lower court and Supreme Court rejected this argument.355
The majority ruled that plaintiffs' counsel faced no ethical "dilem356
ma" because he had "no ethical obligation" to recover statutory fees.
This approach suggests that ensuring payment for public interest lawyers
has no broader purpose, or at least that removing payment would have no
impact on that broader purpose. And yet the fee-shifting provisions were

346.

347.
348.
dence).
349.

475 U.S. 717 (1986).

Id. at 721-28.
Id. at 741 & n.34. But see id. at 754-55 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (pointing to such eviId. at 721 (majority opinion).

350.

Id at 722.

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Id.
Id.
Id at 723.
See id.
Id at 723-24, 728.
Id. at 728 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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adopted precisely because this is not a realistic approach to human behavior. In fact, contrary to the Jeff D. majority's assertion that there was
no evidentiary basis for the concerns that the decision could have an "aggregate" effect, the legislative history of the Fees Act does include such
evidence.357
Nonetheless, in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Counsel
for Clean Air,35 8 a case that limited the calculation of awards under the
fee-shifting provision of the Clean Air Act, 359 the plurality again assumed that profit has minimal impact on public interest lawyering. 360 In
this case, the plaintiffs' counsel, after prevailing, argued that calculation
of their fee should reflect the level of risk the attorneys absorbed by accepting a case with slim chances of success (and winning it).3 6' The
Court, in a fractured opinion, restricted the availability of such a risk
enhancement. 362 Confronted with the point that such a decision would
dim prospects for future representation in similarly meritorious but risky
cases, the plurality explained, "[W]ithout the promise of risk enhancement some lawyers will decline to take cases; but we doubt that the bar
in general will so often be unable to respond that the goal of the feeshifting statutes will not be achieved., 363 In referring to "the bar in general," the Justices seem to suggest that even if fees are not available, the
profession can expect someone to step in and take these cases. Perhaps
the Justices expect non-profit organizations to rely on donors for support,
or perhaps they imagine that for-profit organizations will pursue these
cases pro bono. Yet, the costs and risks of such lengthy and complex
environmental cases make them infeasible without financial support.
Professor Brand identified "a deeply held view that public interest
lawyers should be expected to act on a higher moral plane and should not
be subject to the same economic pressures as other practicing civil litigators.",364 Building on that observation, Sam Bagenstos has also suggested
that more recent decisions reflect "a fundamentally prissy, goo-goo"
view of civil rights lawyers as pious devotees who should not be moti-

357.

See id. at 741 n.34; see also Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 212 (documenting empirically

that the Buckhannon decision has limited lawyers' case selection). For more evidence on the fact that
these fee decisions do have an impact, see Brand, supranote 212, at 361-62.
358.
483 U.S. 711 (1987).
359. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2012).
360. Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. at 727.
361.
See id. at 714; id. at 740-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
362. Id. at 734 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
363. See Brand, supra note 212, at 355 n.387 (quoting Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. at 727 (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
364. Id at 373. See also Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 193-94 (2d Cir. 2007) (reasoning that public interest cases should garner lower
fees than regular lodestar because lawyers have other incentives to do the cases). But see Perdue v.
Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 546 (2010) (holding that fee-shifting statutes may be used to increase
attorneys' fees in extraordinary situations).
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vated by financial interests. 365 The issue goes beyond civil rights lawyers
to public interest lawyering more generally, and to a deeper difficulty
with reconciling public interest lawyering and profit. To be clear, in the
case of civil rights, 366 the problem is likely compounded by some judges'
distaste for this particular type of work and perhaps their doubts as to
whether the litigation does serve the public interest. Yet it should not be
overlooked that the view of public interest lawyering as pious, a view
often perpetuated by non-profit and conventional lawyers alike, helps to
buttress the judges' decisions.
The common confusion about the definition of public interest lawyering has significant real-world consequences. If we keep in mind that
fee-shifting statutes are designed for more than the individual litigants
and are aimed at the broader public interest, it is harder to paint the lawyers as greedy for seeking financial compensation,3 67 and harder to shrug
off the aggregate public impact of refusing to provide this support. The
view of public interest lawyering as a charitable endeavor may be clouding the judges' thinking. Moreover, the widespread acceptance of that
view obscures the reality that fee-limiting decisions are, intentionally 368
or
not, defunding public interest lawyering and "taking out the adversary"
of corporate and government power.
CONCLUSION

exceptions, 369

With few
the legal profession understands public interest lawyering as charity work donated by non-profits or volunteers,
operating outside the market for legal services. Defining public interest
work in terms of the absence of pecuniary gain neglects the substantive
value of the work. This understanding not only is incomplete, but also
damages the pursuit of public interest law and, ultimately, the profession.
It threatens the viability of important public interest lawyering work because it fosters an environment in which public interest lawyers seeking

365.

Samuel R. Bagenstos, Thurgood Marshall,Meet Adam Smith: How Fee-Shifting Statutes

Provide a Market-BasedSystem for PromotingAccess to Justice (Though Some Judges Don't Get It)

4-5 (Univ. of Michigan Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 150,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1407275; Bagenstos, supra note 332, at 1464-66; see
Brand, supra note 212, at 373-75.
366. See Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys'Fees: What Is "Reasonable"?, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 281, 310 (1977) (pointing out that antitrust lawyers received statutory fees averaging
$181 per hour, while those engaged in comparable civil rights litigation were compensated at the rate
of $40 per hour).
367.
See Reda, supra note 247, at H 16-17 (collecting literature).
368. See Luban, supra note 4, at 213 (internal quotation marks omitted).
369. One increasingly dynamic area is law schools' loan repayment assistance programs. See
sources cited supra note 9. Roughly one quarter of the top 50 law schools in the United States currently recognize for-profit work as public interest, depending on the substance of the firms' dockets.
Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Loan Repayment Eligibility Requirements and Their Implications (unpublished
report) (on file with author). Eligibility requirements of most law schools' loan repayment programs
can be found on the schools websites.
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market-rate fees encounter skepticism.37 ° If they cannot collect fees, they
will remain beholden to powerful economic and political actors who can
limit, and historically have limited, their work.371
The dichotomized view of public interest lawyering and making a
profit also threatens the profession as a whole. Despite the many lawyers
who need work and the large quantity of work worth doing, there is
dwindling funding to connect the tWo.372 Defining public interest lawyering as an activity divorced from independent economic support makes it
unavailable to most as a career. Developing a more nuanced and flexible
approach could broaden the professional outlook.
There are various opportunities, from pro bono awards to financial
subsidies, where the legal profession can and should explore the question
of which lawyering to promote in the public interest. The answers should
be context-specific and will necessarily reflect and promote the values of
the institutions involved.373 While the definitional project will be challenging,374 and people will disagree,375 if we recognize doing good as a

duty of the legal profession, it is necessary to struggle with what that
means.

370. See Bagenstos, supra note 365, at 4-5; Bagenstos, supra note 332, at 1464-66; Brand,
supra note 212, at 373-75.
371.
See Luban, supranote 4, at 241-44. It must be recognized that public interest lawyering in
profit-generating settings carries its own challenges. Certain categories of cases or clients may
receive lower priority or be neglected completely. See supra note 301 (describing risk-aversion of
lawyers seeking fees); supra note 331 and accompanying text (describing how for-profit firms reject
employment and environmental cases perceived to create conflicts of interest with industry clients);
Cummings, supra note 14, at 90 (describing how the search for profit causes a firm to prioritize
cases seeking monetary damages over cases seeking injunctive relief, because of the difference in
availability of contingency fees); Cummings, supra note 14, at 91 (suggesting that "privatizing
[public interest lawyering] may produce better litigation [but] not better social outcomes). To be
clear, this Article does not argue that fee-based, for-profit models of public interest lawyering are
superior to all others; rather, itsuggests that such models offer particular strengths for particular
contexts, and ought to be recognized and supported as one important form of public interest lawyering among others.
372. See generally STEVEN J. HARPER, THE LAWYER BUBBLE: A PROFESSION IN CRISIS, 3
(2013); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
373. See CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 10, at 7 (arguing that the term "public interest law...

asserts a vision (or multiple visions) of the good society, and frames the definitional question in
historically grounded and institutionally specific terms") (internal punctuation omitted).
374.
See, e.g., Luban, supra note 4, at 210 n.I; Esquivel, supra note 15, at 328. Drawing on
comparative law literature may help us to approach this challenge in new and creative ways. See,
e.g., Po Jen Yap & Holning Lau, Public Interest Litigation in Asia: An Overview, in PUBLIC
INTEREST LITIGATION IN ASIA 1, 2 (Po Jen Yap & Holning Lau eds., 2011) (explaining that standing

doctrine in Hong Kong and India depend on defining public interest lawyering).
375. See Houck, supra note 12, at 1420-21 (arguing that non-profit organizations supporting
corporate interests should not be recognized as PILFs because they do not increase access for underrepresented groups or interests); Southworth, supra note 16, at 1250-52 (explaining that progressive legislation does not represent a universally recognized public interest but instead reflects distributional priorities with which conservative members of the public disagree).

SPEECH, ASSOCIATION, CONSCIENCE, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT' S ORIENTATION
MARK STRASSERt
ABSTRACT
More and more states are permitting same-sex unions to be celebrated, which will likely result in an increase in the number of individuals claiming that they are precluded by conscience from providing goods
or services to such families. While the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides great protection to religious belief, it provides much less protection to conscience-based conduct in violation of
nondiscrimination statutes, especially when such refusals of conscience
are in a commercial context.
This Article discusses a variety of cases that are often thought to
implicate matters of conscience-compelled speech, symbolic conduct,
conscientious objection-as well as several unemployment benefits and
right of association cases. While these cases might be interpreted in a
number of ways, they nonetheless seem to provide relatively little protection to conscience-based refusals to engage in allegedly symbolic activities that themselves might be interpreted in a number of ways.
After providing an analysis of existing constitutional protections,
the Article focuses on Elane Photography v. Willock, explaining how the
case should be decided in light of existing constitutional guarantees as
they have been explained by the Court. The Article concludes that were
the Court to ignore the current jurisprudence and find such consciencebased actions protected under the Federal Constitution, the Court would
thereby create an exception that was difficult if not impossible to cabin,
which would lead to a variety of regrettable consequences.
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I. INTRODUCTION

More and more states are affording recognition to same-sex relationships either by amending their marriage statutes or by creating a separate civil union or domestic partnership status. These developments
have not been greeted with universal acclaim. Indeed, some claim that
the promotion of same-sex marriage contravenes their religious principles and that they should not be forced to violate their consciences by
providing services to same-sex couples and their families. As more states
accord rights to sexual minorities, an increasing number of individuals
will likely claim that the First Amendment immunizes their consciencebased refusals to provide goods or services to such allegedly objectionable families.
Last term, the United States Supreme Court heard two cases with
implications for same-sex couples and their families: United States v.
Windsor 1 and Hollingsworth v. Perry.2 The former resulted in Section 3
of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) being struck down, 3 whereas
the denial of standing in the latter 4 resulted in California again permitting
same-sex marriages to be celebrated.5 Because more and more states
I.
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2.
133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013).
3.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 ("The federal statute is invalid ....
4. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 ("We have never before upheld the standing of a private
party to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen not to. We
decline to do so for the first time here.").
5. Eric Woomer, Same-Sex Couples Marry in County, DESERT SUN, July 2, 2013, at A3
("Same-sex marriages are underway in California .... ").
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(including California) now permit same-sex marriages to be celebrated,
the number of individuals who may seek a conscience-based exemption
for their refusals to provide services to same-sex couples and their children will likely also increase. Ultimately, the United States Supreme
Court will have to clarify the conditions under which individuals are
entitled to conscience-based exemptions from the application of neutral
laws.
Thus far, the Court has given contradictory signals about the protections afforded to conscience. While individuals cannot be forced to affirm principles that they do not believe, the protections for symbolic
conduct are less clear. In addition, the Court has repeatedly emphasized
that individuals engaging in commerce do not have the same constitutionally protected associational freedoms as they would in a noncommercial context. Finally, while the Court has sometimes implied that the
Constitution takes religious convictions seriously, the Court's decisions
do not suggest that such convictions will trump the application of nondiscrimination laws in the commercial context. In short, a significant
change in the current jurisprudence would be required for such conscience-based-exemption claims to win the day.
This Article examines several First Amendment grounds upon
which an exemption to providing goods or services to same-sex couples
and their children might be founded, analyzes how the Court has applied
First Amendment jurisprudence when discrimination on the basis of orientation was at issue, and then focuses on how a much discussed caseElane Photography,L.L.C. v. Willock 6-should be decided. This Article
concludes that the First Amendment neither does nor should immunize
individuals engaging in commerce from nondiscrimination laws, religious qualms about treating customers and clients equally notwithstanding.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The First Amendment limits the degree to which the state can re7
quire private individuals to speak or to remain silent T-absent
compelling justification, the state cannot force individuals to affirm a principle
in which they do not believe. 8 Further, the state cannot require organizations to extend membership to nondesired individuals if so doing would
6.
284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), affd, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
7.
Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988) ("There is
certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of
protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment
guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and
what not to say.").
8.
See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("if there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.").
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change the organization's message. 9 In addition, the Court has recognized that individuals place great importance on being able to act in accord with their religious convictions.10 In short, the First Amendment
offers significant protections against government interference with expression and association, and some protection for conscience.
A. ProtectionsAgainst Compelled Speech
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,'" the Court
addressed whether children in public schools could be forced to salute
the flag in contravention of their faith. 2 The Court rejected the proposition that the Constitution permits the state to force an individual "to utter
what is not in his mind."' 3 At least in part because the "sole conflict4
'
[wa]s between authority [i.e., the state] and rights of the individual'
and because the "freedom asserted by these appellees d[id] not bring
them into collision with rights asserted by any other individual,"'' 5 the
Court overruled Minersville School District v. Gobitis16 and struck down8
17
the flag salute requirement. In a stirring and frequently cited passage,'
the Court explained, "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters' 9of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."'

9. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) ("In this respect, freedom of
association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. . . . [Tlhe Court has
recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.
The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.").
10. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that it was a violation of the free exercise of religion of the First Amendment to deny unemployment compensation benefits to a claimant who left his job for religious reasons); Sherbert v.
Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that it is unconstitutional to apply eligibility provisions for
unemployment compensation such that a claimant who refused employment because it required her
to work on Saturdays in contravention of her religious beliefs would be denied benefits).
I1. 319 U.S. 624 (1943),
12. See id. at 629.
13.
ld. at 634, 642.
14. Id. at 630.
15.
Id.
16.
310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
17.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
18.
See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 500 (2007) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S.
at 642); Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 616 (2005) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415 (1989) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 55 (1985) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870 (1982)
(quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 514 n.9 (1980) (quoting Barnete, 319 U.S. at 642); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at
642); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593 (1969) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641-42);
Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 244 n.15 (1957) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
19. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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Yet it is not always clear when one's required action is equivalent to
a forced confession contravening one's beliefs, 20 and the Court has offered too little guidance about how to resolve difficult cases. Instead, the
Barnette Court simply stated that "the compulsory flag salute and pledge
requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.",21 Precisely because the flag salute in that context was a "form of utterance ' 22 symbolizing one's "adherence to government as presently organized" 23 and
one's "acceptance of the political ideas [the flag] bespeaks," 24 there was
no need to discuss what a 25
more ambiguous physical action in a more
neutral context would mean.
In Wooley v. Maynard,26 the Court was afforded another opportunity to discuss the conditions under which behavior would constitute a
forced affirmation. At issue was a New Hampshire requirement that the
state motto, "Live Free or Die," not be obscured on passenger license
plates.27 George and Maxine Maynard were Jehovah's Witnesses who
believed the state motto was "repugnant to their moral, religious, and
political beliefs" ' 28 and who began to cover up the motto. 29 The Court
framed the legal question as "whether the State may constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological
message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the
express purpose that it be observed and read by the public., 30 But characterizing the legal question in this way almost guaranteed the result-it is
as if what was at issue was whether the state could force an individual to
post political signs such as "Vote for Jones" in her yard. 3'

20. Cf Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 638 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But if it is a permissible inference that one who is standing is doing so simply out of respect for the prayers of others
that are in progress, then how can it possibly be said that a 'reasonable dissenter.., could believe
that the group exercise signified her own participation or approval'?" (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 593
(majority opinion))).
21.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.
22. Id. at 632.
23.
Id. at 633.
24. Id.
25.
See Mark Strasser, Passive Observers, Passive Displays, and the Establishment Clause,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1123, 1126 (2010) ("But for the presence of the flag, the forced salute

might be thought to have a much different meaning. For example, were that same movement part of
an exercise in a physical education class where no flag was nearby, the compelled movement would
not implicate the same constitutional concerns, because it would not carry the same symbolism.").
26. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
27. Id.at 706-07 ("The issue on appeal is whether the State of New Hampshire may constitutionally enforce criminal sanctions against persons who cover the motto 'Live Free or Die' on passenger vehicle license plates because that motto is repugnant to their moral and religious beliefs.").
28. Id.at 707.
29. Id.at 708.
30. Id.at 713.
31.

See Laura Jackson, Case Note, The Constitution-It'sWhat'sfor Dinner,2 WYO. L. REV.

617, 626 (2002) (explaining that Wooley "addressed the issue of whether the State could require a
person to display a political message on private property"); Katherine Earle Yanes, Note, Glickman
v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc.: Has the Supreme Court Lost Its Way?, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1461,
1473 (1998) (same).
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The Wooley Court referred to Barnette, noting that "[c]ompelling
the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more serious infringement
upon personal liberties than the passive act of carrying the state motto on
a license plate." 32 However, the Court characterized "the difference [a]s
essentially one of degree, 33 holding that the "First Amendment protects
the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majori34
ty and to refuse to foster.., an idea they find morally objectionable."
Such a holding was unsurprising, given that the Court was in effect characterizing the New Hampshire law as a kind of commandeering of private individuals by the state to disseminate an approved message. The
Court described the state measure as "forc[ing] an individual ...to be an
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view
he finds unacceptable," 35 and held that the state
was precluded by the
36
way.
this
in
citizens
its
using
from
Constitution
The difficulty was not that the state's message was itself so objectionable, since New Hampshire's attempt to foster a "proper appreciation
of history, state pride, and individualism" 37 was likely welcomed by
many. 38 Rather, "the State's interest [in] disseminat[ing] an ideology ...cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid
becoming the courier for such message." 39 While the First Amendment
does not impose limits on what the government may say, 40 it does
impose
4
limits on what the Government may force an individual to say. 1
Then-Justice Rehnquist dissented in Wooley on the ground that the
"State has not forced appellees to 'say' anything; and it has not forced
them to communicate ideas with nonverbal actions reasonably likened to
'speech,' such as wearing a lapel button promoting a political candidate
or waving a flag as a symbolic gesture. ''42 Rehnquist's dissent might be
interpreted to have been making either of two different points. The first
is that having the slogan "Live Free or Die" on a license plate should not
be construed as speech at all, perhaps because the letters would be too
32.
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714-15.
33.
Id. at 715.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
Id; Vikram David Amar, Reflections on the Doctrinal and Big-Picture Issues Raised by
the Constitutional Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), 6
FlU L. REV. 9, 22 (2010) ("[T]he First Amendment prohibits government from mandating that
individuals be vessels for government speech.").
37.
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
38.
Id.at 715 ("The fact that most individuals agree with the thrust of New Hampshire's
motto is not the test.").
39.
ld. at 717.
40.
See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) ("The Free Speech
Clause ...does not regulate government speech." (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544

U.s. 550, 553 (2005))).
41.
See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 557 ("We have sustained First Amendment challenges to allegedly compelled expression in ...true 'compelled-speech' cases, in which an individual is obliged
personally to express a message he disagrees with, imposed by the government.").
42.
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 720 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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small to be seen or because the writing would be viewed as decorative
rather than as conveying information. 3 However, current experience
belies that such expressions are viewed as not conveying any message.
For example, several states permit individuals to choose the message that
is on their license plates. 44 The difficult question for the courts has not
been whether the specialty license plates constitute speech but, instead,
whether the speech is government speech, private speech, or both.45
At issue in Wooley was not the speech that the Maynards had chosen to place on their license plate but, instead, the speech that New
Hampshire required. A different interpretation of Justice Rehnquist's
point is that the speech would likely be attributed to the state rather than
to the Maynards and that they would not be inferred to be endorsing anything.46 Thus, someone seeing the Maynards' license plate would not
impute any beliefs about freedom or death to the Maynards themselves.
Suppose that the Court had accepted Justice Rehnquist's assessment
that no one would impute an endorsement of the state motto to the
Maynards. The New Hampshire requirement might nonetheless have
been found constitutionally offensive if the license plate was viewed as
private 47 rather than governmental property 48 for a reason having nothing
to do with expression-for example, that the state was effecting a taking. 49 In that event, however,
Wooley would not be viewed as a seminal
5
First Amendment case. 0
43. Cf Nancy Cook, Breaking Silence with Ourselves: Stepping out of Safe Boundaries, 29
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 757, 759 (1995) (discussing "using words. . . merely as decorative diversions").
44. See, e.g., ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Tennessee
statutory law authorizes the sale of premium-priced license plates bearing special logotypes to raise
revenue for specific 'departments, agencies, charities, programs[,] and other activities impacting
Tennessee."' (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-201(i) (2013))); see also Nelda H. CambronMcCabe, Commentary, When Government Speaks: An Examination of the Evolving Government
Speech Doctrine, 274 EDUC. L. REP. (WEST) 753, 762 (2012) ("Today specialty license plates have
proliferated as states have opened up a market that generates revenue for the state, and oftentimes to
the groups sponsoring specialty plates.").
45. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles,
305 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) ("[T]he
speech that appears on the so-called 'special' or 'vanity' license plate could prove to be the quintessential example of speech that is both private and governmental ....
");
Joseph Blocher, Government
Property and Government Speech, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1413, 1479-80 (2011) (arguing that
"the expression emanating from specialty license plates is both governmental and private").
46.
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 720-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The issue, unconfronted by the
Court, is whether appellees, in displaying, as they are required to do, state license tags, the format of
which is known to all as having been prescribed by the State, would be considered to be advocating
political or ideological views.").
47. The Court explained that "New Hampshire's statute in effect requires that appellees use
their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message or suffer a penalty."
Id.at 715. But the Court did not specify whether the license, rather than the license plate, was the
private property.
48.
Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1680(2010)
("[L]icense plates are considered to be governmental, rather than private property.").
49.
Cf Gregory C. Sisk, Returning to the Pruneyard: The Unconstitutionality of StateSanctioned Trespass in the Name of Speech, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 389, 413 (2009) ("[T]he
governmentally encouraged physical invasion by strangers onto private property for speech, distribu-
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Nonetheless, the Court's rationale in both Barnette and Wooley affords robust protection against compelled speech; 51 the state cannot force
individuals to affirm messages that they do not believe. A separate issue,
however, involves the degree to which the symbolic conduct of private
individuals is protected.
B. Protectionsfor Symbolic Conduct
In United States v. O'Brien,52 the Court announced the test for determining the conditions under which the state regulation of symbolic
conduct violates constitutional guarantees. At issue was the criminal
prosecution of an individual for intentionally burning a draft card in front
of a courthouse.53 This act was performed during a period of social unrest
due to opposition to the Vietnam War, 54 and O'Brien claimed that Congress was trying to limit speech by targeting the burning of draft cards.55
The Court held that O'Brien's action was not properly characterized as
speech, rejecting "the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct
can be labeled 'speech' whenever 56the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an idea.",
Even if burning the draft card was not speech per se, a separate
question was whether O'Brien's action was nonetheless entitled to some
First Amendment protection, and the Court was willing to assume that it
was. 57 But that did not settle whether his action was immune from prosecution. 58 The Court outlined the relevant test for the regulation of sym-

tion of flyers, or any other purpose that the owner does not authorize is a classic example of a per se
taking.").
50.
See Lauren R. Robbins, Comment, Open Your Mouth and Say 'Ideology': Physiciansand
the First Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 167 (2009) (describing "Wooley v. Maynard [as
one of the Court's] ...seminal speech cases"). See generally Lorin Brennan, The Public Policy of
Information Licensing, 36 Hous. L. REV. 61, 84 (1999) (discussing "the seminal case of Wooley v.
Maynard').
51.
See Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695,
712 (2011) (describing Wooley and Barnette as "landmark cases" establishing the right to refrain
from speaking); Susan Nabet, Note, For Sale: The Threat of State Public Accommodations Laws to
the First Amendment Rights of Artistic Businesses, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1515, 1525 (2012) ("The
right not to speak is most famously set forth in two Supreme Court cases, West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard.").
52.
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
53.
Id.at 369 ("David Paul O'Brien and three companions burned their Selective Service
registration certificates on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse.").
54.
Cf David Kairys, The Contradictory Messages of Rehnquist-Roberts Era Speech Law:
Liberty and Justice for Some, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 195, 209 (2013) ("[T]he actual government
purpose in O'Brien was to prohibit draft card destruction as an expression of opposition to the draft
and the [Vietnam] War ....").
55.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 ("O'Brien nonetheless argues that the 1965 Amendment is
unconstitutional in its application to him, and is unconstitutional as enacted because what he calls the
purpose' of Congress was 'to suppress freedom of speech."').
56. Id.
57.
Id. (proceeding "on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's
conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment").
58.
Id. ("[l]t does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is
constitutionally protected activity.").
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bolic conduct, explaining that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements
are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." 59 The Court
summed up the test in the following way:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the

constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is
60
essential to the furtherance of that interest.

When using the "no greater than is essential" language, the O'Brien
Court was not implying that narrow tailoring was required. On the contrary, the kind of tailoring required in the symbolic conduct context is
less exacting than the kind of tailoring required in the regulation of pure
speech.6'The Court employs intermediate scrutiny to evaluate state regulation of symbolic speech 62 and strict scrutiny with respect to the regulation of pure expression.63
There are two distinct respects in which O'Brien may be important
to consider in the context of a refusal to provide services for consciencebased reasons. First, the Court is suggesting that merely because an individual believes that her conduct is expressive will not make it so for constitutional purposes. Second, even if a regulation affects conduct that is
expressive, that regulation may be subject to intermediate rather than
strict scrutiny and thus may be upheld as long as it promotes important
state interests.
Two issues should be distinguished. One is whether a particular action should be characterized as pure speech rather than symbolic conduct. A different issue is whether an action is religiously inspired, because then an analysis may be necessary to determine whether the expression at issue-whether or not pure speech-must be accorded special
protection because it was required by conscience.
59. Id.
60. Id.at 377.
61.
Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989) ("[W]ith respect to
government regulation of expressive conduct, including conduct expressive of political views... we
have not insisted that there be no conceivable alternative, but only that the regulation not 'burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests."' (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989))).
62.
See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Towards a Balanced Approach for the Protection of Native
American Sacred Sites, 17 MIcH. J.RACE & L. 269, 293 (2012) ("[T]he intermediate scrutiny test
[is] used in O'Brien to determine the validity of government restrictions on symbolic speech.").
63.
See Laura Markey, Article, Repairing the Rusty Needle: Recognizing First Amendment
Protectionfor Tattoos, 21 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 310, 311 (2012) ("If the government attempts to

restrict pure speech based on the content of the speech, it must overcome a presumption of unconstitutionality and the strictest standard ofjudicial review, strict scrutiny.").
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C. Protectionsfor Conscience
The Court has addressed the protections that should be accorded to
conscience-based activity in a few different kinds of cases. Some spelled
out the conditions under which conscientious objector status in particular
would be accorded, while others helped delimit more generally the extent
to which conscience-based activities would be protected.
Consider the Court's discussion of conscientious objector status in
United States v. Seeger.64 At issue was the proper interpretation of a federal statute affording an exemption "from combatant training and service
in the armed forces of the United States [to] those persons who by reason
of their religious training and belief are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." 65 David Seeger "declared that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of his
'religious' belief," 66 although his "belief was not in relation to a Supreme
Being as commonly understood., 67 The Court interpreted congressional
intent to include someone whose "given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by
the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption., 68 This interpretation was a matter of statutory construction, 69 although Justice Douglas suggested in his concurrence that a contrary interpretation would have resulted in a violation of constitutional guarantees.7 0 Seeger has been interpreted to stand for a robust protection of conscience.7'
Welsh v. United States7 2 involved another conscientious exemption
claim, and that plurality opinion also affords robust protections to conscience Elliott Welsh II "held deep conscientious scruples against taking
part in wars where people were killed,, 73 although Welsh was "explicit... in denying that his views were religious. '74 This case might also be

64. 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965).
65.
Id. at 164-65. The relevant section was "6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C.App. s 456(j) (1958 ed.)." See id. at 164.
66. Id. at 166.
67.
Id. at 167.
68. Id at 166.
69. Id. at 165-66 ("We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression 'Supreme
Being' rather than the designation 'God,' was merely clarifying the meaning of religious training
and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views.").
70. Id. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring).
71.
See Michael Rhea, Comment, Denying and Defining Religion Under the First Amendment: Waldorf Education as a Lens for Advocating a Broad DefinitionalApproach, 72 LA. L. REV.

1095, 1112 (2012) (reading Seeger to stand for the proposition that "individual interests in freedom
of conscience and of religion are to be protected as sacred even in the face of important state policies").
72. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
73.
Id. at 337.
74. Id. at 341.
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interpreted to be a testament to the required state accommodation of conscience.75
There is reason to believe, however, that conscience is not afforded76
such robust protection after all. For example, Gillette v. United States
involved whether an individual who had religious objections to a particular war was entitled to conscientious objector status on that account. Guy
Gillette "stated his willingness to participate in a war of national defense
or a war sponsored by the United Nations as a peace-keeping measure,
but declared his opposition to American military operations in Vietnam,
which he characterized as 'unjust."' 77 Gillette argued that "Congress
interferes with free exercise of religion by failing to relieve objectors to a
particular war from military service, when the objection is religious or
conscientious in nature.,, 78 The Court recognized that some religions
distinguish among just and unjust wars, only prohibiting participation in
the latter, 79 and did not question Gillette's sincere conviction that this
war was unjust and hence that participation in it would contravene his
religious principles. 80 Nonetheless, the Court held that "valid neutral
reasons exist for limiting the exemption to objectors to all war," 81 and
affirmed the lower court holding that Gillette was not entitled to an exemption.82
Some of the cases implicating conscience concern a refusal to perform a job or work at certain times for religious reasons. Sherbert v. Verner83 involved an individual, Adell Sherbert, who could not work on Saturday because of her religious beliefs. 84 She was not only fired from her
job because of her refusal to work on that day85 but also could not secure
any other job for that same reason. 86 Her application for unemployment

75.
76.
77.

SeeRhea, supranote 71,at 1112.
401 U.S. 437 (1971).
Id. at 439.

78.

Id.at 448-49.

79.

Id.at 452 ("[S]ome religious faiths themselves distinguish between personal participation

in 'just' and in 'unjust' wars, commending the former and forbidding the latter, and therefore adherents of some religious faiths-and individuals whose personal beliefs of a religious nature include
the distinction-cannot object to all wars consistently with what is regarded as the true imperative of
conscience.").

80. Id.at 449 (assuming that the "beliefs concerning war have roots that are 'religious' in
nature within the meaning of the Amendment").
81.
Id.at 454.
82.
Id.at 463 ("[1]n Gillette's case (No. 85) there was a basis in fact to support administrative
denial of exemption ....").
83.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
84.
Id. at 399 ("Appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church[,] ...would not

work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith.").
85.

Id. ("Appellant... was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she would

not work on Saturday ....
").
86.
Id.("[S]he was unable to obtain other employment because from conscientious scruples
she would not take Saturday work ....").
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benefits was denied because her refusal to work on Saturdays was
viewed as a disqualifying condition.
The United States Supreme Court noted that Sherbert was being
forced "to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts
of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand, 8 8 and held
that "South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions
respecting the day of rest.",89 The Sherbert Court qualified its holding,
expressly rejecting "the existence of a constitutional right to unemployment benefits on the part of all persons
whose religious convictions are
' 90
the cause of their unemployment. "
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Divi-

sion9 also involved the denial of unemployment benefits to someone
who could not work for religious reasons. Eddie Thomas quit when he
was transferred from a position in the roll foundry to a position making
tank turrets.92 Making war materials contravened his religious beliefs,93
although a friend of his who was also a Jehovah's Witness did not feel
similar compunctions about the work. 94 Thomas's application for unemployment benefits was denied, because he lacked the necessary "good
cause" for the loss of his job.95
The Court held that "Thomas cannot be denied the benefits due him
on the basis of the findings.., that he terminated his employment because of his religious convictions., 96 The fact that some Jehovah's Witnesses might have had a different view of which work requirements were
religiously proscribed did not invalidate Thomas's view. "Intrafaith differences ...are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed,

and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differ87. Id at 401 ("The appellee Employment Security Commission... found that appellant's
restriction upon her availability for Saturday work brought her within the provision disqualifying for
benefits insured workers who fail, without good cause, to accept 'suitable work when offered
.... '"1).

88.
Id.
at 404.
89. Id.
at 410.
90. Id.
at 409-10.
91.
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
92. Id.
at 709 ("Thomas terminated his employment in the Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machinery
Co. when he was transferred from the roll foundry to a department that produced turrets for military
tanks.").
93.
Id.("He claimed his religious beliefs prevented him from participating in the production
of war materials.").
94. Id.
at 711 ("[H]e consulted another Blaw-Knox employee-a friend and fellow Jehovah's
Witness [who] ...advised him that working on weapons parts at Blaw-Knox was not 'unscriptural.'").
95.
Id.at 712 ("The referee concluded nonetheless that Thomas' termination was not based
upon a 'good cause [arising] in connection with [his] work,' as required by the Indiana unemployment compensation statute." (alterations in original)).
96. Id.
at 720.
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ences in relation to the Religion Clauses." 97 While not ruling out that
98
certain claimed religious views might be considered beyond the pale,
the Court made clear both that the claim in the instant case was not one
of those" and that "the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs
which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect."' ° Where the
asserted beliefs are sincerely held"0 ' and are not "so bizarre"' 1 2 as to fail
to trigger First Amendment protection, the state is limited with respect to
the conditions it can place on people's actions based on religious faith.
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify103his behavior and to
violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.
Both Sherbert and Thomas suggest that the state cannot condition
unemployment benefits upon an individual's sacrificing his or her sincere religious beliefs by working.'°4 However, in Employment Division v.
Smith,10 5 the Court suggested that those cases do not provide robust protections to conscience-based action extending beyond the unemployment
benefits context. 1°6 The Smith Court noted that the "'exercise of religion'
often involves.., the performance of (or abstention from) physical
acts,"' 1 7 and explained that "a State would be 'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when
they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious
belief that they display."' 0 8 Thus, a state runs afoul of constitutional protections if it prohibits a practice because it is performed for religious
reasons. However, a practice that is prohibited whether or not performed9
for religious reasons does not violate those free exercise guarantees.'0
97. Id.at 715.
98. Id. ("One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in
motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause .....
99. Id.("[T]hat is not the case here .....
100. Id.at 716-17.
101.
Cf United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) ("Religious experiences which are as
real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.").
102.
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
103.
Id. at 717-18.
104.
See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990) ("we
have never invalidated any govemmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of
unemployment compensation."), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. (2014), as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S.Ct.
1651, 1655-56 (2011).
105.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
106.
See id.at 884 ("Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the
unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally
applicable criminal law.").
107.
Id.at 877.
108. Id.(alteration in original) (emphases added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
109. See id.
at 879 ("[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
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Thus, on the Court's interpretation, while regulations targeting religious
activity will be struck down absent compelling justification,"1 0 there is no
"constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability.""'
Smith has been roundly criticized, 1 2 although it has never been
overruled." 3 Yet, even without Smith, the Court has not afforded conscience great constitutional protection, as Gillette illustrates. 1 4 Conscience, then, does not seem likely to yield a generalized exemption to
the requirements of neutral laws in the commercial context. Nonetheless,
because it might be argued that the First Amendment protects conscience-based refusals to provide goods or services out of respect for the
freedom of association (and non-association), the Court's association
jurisprudence must also be examined.
D. Rights ofAssociation
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,"15 the Court explained that
there is "a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for
the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion."'" 16 At issue was
the refusal of the United States Jaycees to permit the local St. Paul and
Minneapolis chapters to admit women as regular members."17 After having been notified that their charters might be revoked, "both [local] chapters filed charges of discrimination with the Minnesota Department of
Human Rights [alleging] that the exclusion of women from full membership, required by the national organization's bylaws, violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (Act).""' 8 The national organization claimed that

(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."' (quoting United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
110.
See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) ("[I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious
motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to advance that interest." (citation omitted) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79)).
111.
City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997).
112.
Marci A. Hamilton, Political Responses to Supreme Court Decisions, 32 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 113, 121 (2009) ("Another broadly criticized Supreme Court decision is a religion case,
Employment Division v. Smith .... ").
113.
Maureen E. Markey, The Landlord/Tenant Free Exercise Conflict in a Post-RFRA World,
29 RUTGERS L.J. 487, 497 (1998) ("Employment Division v. Smith is still good law, despite its many
critics.").
114.
See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
115.
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
116.
/d.at 618.
117.
Id. at 614 ("In 1974 and 1975, respectively, the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the
Jaycees began admitting women as regular members. Currently, the memberships and boards of

directors of both chapters include a substantial proportion of women. As a result, the two chapters
have been in violation of the national organization's bylaws for about 10 years. The national organization has imposed a number of sanctions on the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters for violating the
bylaws, including denying their members eligibility for state or national office or awards programs,
and refusing to count their membership in computing votes at national conventions.").
118.

Id.
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the members' constitutionally
protected right to association was violated
9
by the Minnesota law."
The Roberts Court explained that although the national organization
and the local Jaycees chapters did distinguish on the basis of "age and
sex," 20 they were "large and basically unselective groups." 2' Lack of
selectivity notwithstanding, the Court nonetheless noted that there "can
be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs
of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire."'' 22 After all, a required modification of membership might "impair the ability of the original members to express only
those views that brought them together."'' 23 That said, however, there was
no claim that the Act was being applied against the Jaycees to modify
their message.124

The Roberts Court minimized the burden that would be placed on
25
the Jaycees were they forced to admit women as regular members.
While it was possible that some "women members might have a different
view or agenda"' 26 than would some men members, the Court was unwilling to credit such a claim absent more support in the record. 127 For
example, the Court was not confident that women would have a different
viewpoint "about such issues as the federal budget, school prayer, voting
rights, and foreign relations.' 28 Finally, even if the Act's enforcement
''causes some incidental abridgment of the Jaycees' protected speech,
that effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State's legitimate purposes."' 129 For this reason and because of the importance of the
state's interest, the Court rejected the Jaycees' association claims. 130

In her Roberts concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized an
aspect of the case that the Court did not explore. The Jaycees had been
construed as a business "in that it sells goods and extends privileges in

119.
Id.at 612 ("This case requires us to address a conflict between a State's efforts to eliminate gender-based discrimination against its citizens and the constitutional freedom of association
asserted by members of a private organization.").
120. Id.at 621.
121.

Id.

122. Id.at 623.
123. Id.
124. Id.at 624 ("Nor does the Jaycees contend that the Act has been applied in this case for the
purpose of hampering the organization's ability to express its views.").
125. See id.at 626 ("[T]he Jaycees has failed to demonstrate that the Act imposes any serious
burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association." (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984))).
126. Id. at 627.
127. Id. (noting that the change in view claim was not "supported by the record").
128.
Id.at 627-28.
129. Id.at 628.
130. See id.at 623 ("We are persuaded that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against its female citizens justifies the impact that application of the statute to the
Jaycees may have on the male members' associational freedoms.").
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exchange for annual membership dues."' 131 She questioned the Court's
apparent position that "the Jaycees' right of association depends on the
organization's making a 'substantial' showing that the admission of unwelcome members 'will change the message communicated by the
group's speech.""1 32 Her fear was that "certain commercial associations,
by engaging occasionally in certain kinds of expressive activities, might
improperly gain protection for discrimination."1' 33 Justice O'Connor believed that the Roberts majority opinion might be interpreted to grant
commercial entities more constitutional protection than they actually
have, because the "Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose employees, customers, suppliers, or those with whom one engages in simple
commercial transactions, without restraint from the State."', 34 Thus, in her
view, commercial organizations simply do not enjoy the same kinds of
associational freedoms as do noncommercial organizations, and the
Court having used the same approach in this commercial context as it
would have used in a noncommercial context might mislead lower courts
with respect to the proper approach to be taken in such cases, correct
result in this particular case notwithstanding.
Basically, Justice O'Connor linked the protections afforded by the
Constitution to the kind of entity seeking protection. When an entity "enters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it loses the
complete control over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it
confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.' 35 Entities primarily
engaged in commerce
simply do not enjoy the protections that other enti1 36
enjoy.
might
ties
In the aforementioned cases, the Court has spelled out First
Amendment protections against state-required speech. The state cannot
require individuals to affirm principles in which they do not believe.
Symbolic conduct is not afforded the same degree of protection as is pure
speech, however, and the Court has given mixed signals with respect to
the degree of protection afforded to conscience-based activity. The next
section examines Supreme Court cases that have explored the degree to
which the First Amendment affords protection when claims involving
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation are at issue.

131.

Id. at 616.

132. Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27 (majority opinion)).
133.
Id.
134. Id.at 634.
135. Id.at 636.
136. A separate issue involves the degree to which the First Amendment protects corporate
political speech. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010) ("No
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit
corporations.").
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DISCRIMINATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

First Amendment guarantees involving expression, association, and
free exercise have been implicated in cases involving discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. The Court has not been consistent with
respect to the proper approach when constitutional values come into conflict, although the cases do suggest that commercial entities cannot immunize discriminatory practices by asserting First Amendment guarantees.
A. Compelled Speech
The United States Supreme Court addressed the conflict between
First Amendment and equal protection values in Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). 137 At issue
was whether First Amendment guarantees permitted those organizing the
annual Saint Patrick's Day Parade, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, to preclude GLIB from marching in the parade. 38 GLIB
was formed so that its members could march "in order to celebrate its
members' identity as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of
the Irish immigrants."'' 39 The parade organizers did not want the group to
40
march in the parade, although the reason for the exclusion was unclear.1
Differing reasons for the exclusion were offered at different times during
the trial, 141 and the trial court found that the reasons proffered were not
the real reasons anyway.142
Perhaps because of the difficulty associated with determining the
organizers' actual reasons, the Court decided to discuss some of the reasons that might have motivated the parade organizers. The Court reasoned that a GLIB "contingent marching behind the organization's banner would at least bear witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual." 43 In addition, permitting GLIB to march might be perceived as lending support to GLIB's "view that people of their sexual
orientations have as much claim to unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as members of parade units organized around oth137.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
138.
Id. at 559-60.
139.
Id. at 570.
140.
For example, the trial court judge had found that the exclusion was based on the group
members' sexual orientation. See Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos. (GLIB) v.
City of Bos., 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (Mass. 1994) ("The judge found that GLIB was excluded from
the parade because of the sexual orientation of its members."), rev 'd, Hurley, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
There had been testimony that the group had been excluded because of the unsubstantiated belief
that the group's members were also members of Act-Up and Queer Nation and that they might
become disorderly. Id.at 1295 n.8.
141.
Id. at 1295 ("At trial, Hurley 'equivocated about his reasons for excluding GLIB' but
ultimately testified that he would never allow them to march in the parade.").
142.
Id. ("The judge concluded that the inconsistent and changing explanations for excluding
GLIB demonstrated the 'pretextual nature' of those explanations.").
143.
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574.
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er identifying characteristics."' 44 The march organizers might have had a
different view; for example, they "may not [have] believe[d] these facts
about Irish sexuality to be so.' 145 Or, even if the organizers realized that
some GLIB members were of Irish descent, the organizers might nonetheless have "object[ed] to unqualified social acceptance of gays and
lesbians or [might] have some other reason for wishing to keep GLIB's
message out of the parade."' 14 6 Perhaps the Council feared that permitting
GLIB to participate would be perceived as a Council endorsement that
GLIB's "message
was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of sup147
port as well."'

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had held that GLIB
must be included in the parade." 48 That holding was based in part on a
finding that the parade had no expressive purpose,149 both because so
many divergent viewpoints were represented in the parade 50 and because
of the Council's nonselectivity-"in essence, almost any individual or
group would be admitted to the parade if they either apply or show up at
the start of the parade and offer to make a contribution to the council.''
Indeed, the trial judge had found that "since 1947 the only groups that
have been excluded from the Parade besides GLIB have been the Ku
Klux Klan and ROAR (Restore our Alienated Rights) [an anti busing
group].' 52
The United States Supreme Court rejected the approach taken by
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, explaining that "the word
'parade'... indicate[s] marchers who are making some sort of collective

point, not just to each other but to bystanders along the way.' 53 In this
case, it was not entirely clear what that point was, since "the Council
[was] rather lenient in admitting participants. ' 54 Nonetheless, the lack of
a clearly defined message did not mean that there was no message at

144.

Id.

145.
Id
146. Id.
at 574-75.
147.
Id. at 575.
148. Id.
at 563-64.
149. See id. at 564 (discussing the Massachusetts court's view that "it was impossible to detect
an expressive purpose in the parade"); see also GLIB, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1300(Mass. 1994)
("[T]here was no error in his finding that the parade was not used by the council for expressive
purposes, and that, as a result, the defendants could not cloak their discriminatory acts in the mantle
of the First Amendment."), rev'd, Hurley, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
150. See GLIB, 636 N.E.2d at 1296 n.9.
151.
Id.
at 1298.
152. Id.at 1296. But see id. at 1296 n.10 (noting the council's claim that "the Massachusetts
Right to Life group and a truck carrying antihomosexual signs also were excluded").
153.

Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568.

154.
Id.at 569; see also GLIB, 636 N.E.2d at 1296 (noting the trial court's finding that there
were "no written procedures, criteria, or standards for selecting participants or sponsors of the parade").
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all.' 55 Further, even if there was no particular message that the Council
wished to express, there may have been messages that the Council
wished to refrain from expressing.156 The Court explained that "when
dissemination of a view contrary to one's own is forced upon a speaker
intimately connected with the communication advanced,
the speaker's
57
right to autonomy over the message is compromised."
Certainly, there are other ways for speakers to disassociate themselves from particular messages. For example, individuals may post signs
disavowing approval or disapproval of a particular position, 58 although
"such disclaimers would be quite curious in a moving parade.' 59 Not
only was there "no customary practice whereby private sponsors disavow
'any identity of viewpoint' between themselves and the selected participants" in a parade like this,16° but choosing to do this for one marcher in
the parade would raise questions about which other views were implicitly
being authorized or disavowed. Thus, if there were someone marching
immediately in front of GLIB disavowing the inference that the Council
agreed or disagreed with any particular group's message, then bystanders
might wonder whether that meant that the Council was implicitly endorsing all of the other groups or, perhaps, was also disavowing the messages
of those groups following GLIB.
The Council could instead have had someone marching at the head
of the parade holding a disclaimer sign indicating that the views expressed by individual marchers did not necessarily reflect those of the
organizers. That way, there would be no implication that the disclaimer
applied to one marching group in particular. However, such a disclaimer
might well be missed by parade watchers who arrived late or were momentarily
distracted, thereby undermining the disclaimer's intended ef61
fect.'

155.
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-70 ("But a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact
message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.").
156. See id. at 573 ("[T]his general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech,
applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact
the speaker would rather avoid .
(citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,
341-42 (1995))).
157.
Id. at 576.
158.
Cf Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) ("[A]ppellants can expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the
speakers or handbillers stand. Such signs, for example, could disclaim any sponsorship of the message and could explain that the persons are communicating their own messages by virtue of state
law.").
159. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576-77.
160. Id. at 576.
161.
Cf FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("Because the broadcast audience is
constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from
unexpected program content.").
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The Hurley Court emphasized that noncommercial speech was at issue,162 and treated the restriction as "amount[ing] to nothing less than a
proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression.' 63 Such a
proposal was incompatible with First Amendment protections. 164 Because parades are not only "a form of expression"'' 6 5 but also have "inherent expressiveness,"' 66 and because "the Council clearly decided to
exclude a message it did not like from the communication it chose to
make,"1 67 the First Amendment precluded Massachusetts from forcing a
private group to change its message by requiring GLIB's message to be
expressed.
While a straightforward reading of Hurley is that the First Amendment precludes the state from forcing private entities to modify their
message absent compelling justification, there are other ways to read the
opinion. For example, Hurley might be read as permitting or even endorsing orientation-based animus.168 Because virtually no other groups
had been excluded from marching in the parade, the Court's upholding
this exclusion might be read to suggest that the Court believed that there
69
was something peculiarly objectionable about this particular group.
Whether orientation was appropriately subject to disadvantageous
treat170
ment was one of the issues discussed in Romer v. Evans.
B. Orientationand Association
While Romer was decided on equal protection grounds, 71 the state
had asserted the protection of association rights as a justification for the
ballot measure. 72 At issue was a Colorado amendment designed to with-3
draw antidiscrimination protections on the basis of sexual orientation.1
162.
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579 ("The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used
to produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the

First Amendment ....
").
163.
Id.("The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce thoughts
and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the First Amendment ....").
164.
Id.("The Speech Clause has no more certain antithesis.").
165.
Id.at 568.
166.
Id.
167.
Id.at 574.
168.
See Catherine Connolly, Gay Rights in Wyoming. A Review of Federaland State Law, II
WYO. L, REV. 125, 135 n.57 (2011) (reading Hurley to "permit discriminatory animus regarding
LGBT individuals and groups"). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudenceof "Coming
Out ": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions ofLiberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106
YALE L.J. 2411, 2459 (1997) ("More realistically, there is no reason to believe the Council ever had
a message, and some reason to think they were simply excluding GLIB because of antihomosexual
animus ...").
169.
Cf Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000) ("[T]he purpose of the St. Pat-

tick's Day parade in Hurley was not to espouse any views about sexual orientation, but we held that
the parade organizers had a right to exclude certain participants nonetheless." (emphasis added)).
170. 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996).
171.
Id.
at 635-36 ("Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause . .
172. Id. at 635.
173.
The amendment was titled "No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation" and provided as follows:
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The Court noted that the "amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but
no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by
discrimi' 174
nation, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies."
When striking down the amendment, the Court reasoned that "laws
of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected." 175 The state had sought to justify the amendment by saying that it
represented "respect for other citizens' freedom of association, and in
particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or
religious objections to homosexuality."'' 76 In rejecting that this purpose
could justify the amendment's enactment, the Court reasoned that
"Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further
a proper legislative
' 177
end but to make them unequal to everyone else."
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that sexual orientation not only
could "be singled out for disfavorable treatment,"'' 7 8 but also that it already had been in Bowers v. Hardwick.179 Even worse in Justice Scalia's
eyes was the Court's implicit message that "opposition to homosexuality
is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias."' 80 Rather than contest that
the amendment was animus-based, Justice Scalia instead dissented from
the proposition that "'animosity' toward homosexuality is evil." 18, He
would have upheld the amendment precisely because
it was allegedly
' 82
based on "moral disapproval of homosexual conduct."'
Romer seems to stand for the proposition that orientation-based animus, whether understood as "a Kulturkampf" 83 or, instead, "a fit of
spite, ' 84 does not survive even rational basis review.' 85 However, such a
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the
basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. I, § 30b, held unconstitutionalby Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996)).
174.
Id. at 627.
175.
Id. at 634.
176.
Id. at 635.
177.
Id.
178.
Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179.
See id. ("[T]he Court contradicts a decision, unchallenged here, pronounced only 10 years
ago .... " (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539

U.S. 558, 578 (2003))).
180.
181.

Id.
Id.

182. Id. at 644.
183.
See id. at 636. For a brief definition of Kulturkampf, see Jeffrey M. Shaman, Justice
Scalia and the Art of Rhetoric, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 287, 290 n.19 (2012) (.'Kulturkampf' translates literally as 'culture struggle.' The phrase was originally used as a political slogan in reference
to the ongoing struggle that occurred in the 1870s between the Roman Catholic Church and the
German government for control over school and church appointments and civil marriage.").
184. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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6
conclusion
have v.been
thought
87
Boy
Scouts might
ofAmerica
Dale'
five premature
years later.1 after the Court issued

At issue in Dale was whether the Boy Scouts had violated New Jersey's public accommodation law188 when precluding James Dale from
being a scoutmaster once the organization had discovered that he was
gay. Is9 The Dale Court reasoned that the "forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's
ability to advocate public or private viewpoints."'' 90 After finding that
"the Boy Scouts [of America] engages in expressive activity,"' 91 the
Court set out to determine whether the inclusion of Dale would modify
the Scouts' message. The Court explained, "As we give deference to an
association's assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we must
also give deference to an association's view of what would impair its

expression."' 92 Yet, the Roberts Court had refused to defer to the Jaycees
about what would impair that organization's message, 193 so the Court's
commitment to deference was hardly as established as the Dale Court
had implied.

The Dale Court denied that "an expressive association can erect a
shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its message."' 194 Such a denial would seem to have disposed of the case, because
Monmouth Council Executive James Kay had expressly stated in writing

185.
See id. at 635 (majority opinion) ("We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any
identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective."); see also Anthony Michael Kreis, Lawrence
Meets Libel: Squaring Constitutional Norms with Sexual-Orientation Defamation, 122 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 125, 137 (2012) ("Romer v. Evans was the Supreme Court's first authoritative statement that
the entanglement of state action with anti-LGBT animus is constitutionally impermissible.").
186. -Todd Brower, Of Courts and Closets: A Doctrinaland EmpiricalAnalysis of Lesbian and
Gay Identity in the Courts, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 565, 610-11 (2001) ("Dale sanctioned the marginalization of gay people through the First Amendment .... Some have called anti-gay animus the
last socially acceptable form of prejudice existing today.").
187.
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
188.
Id. at 644 ("The New Jersey Supreme Court held that New Jersey's public accommodations law requires that the Boy Scouts readmit Dale.").
189.
Id. ("Respondent is James Dale, a former Eagle Scout whose adult membership in the Boy
Scouts was revoked when the Boy Scouts learned that he is an avowed homosexual .... "); see also
id. at 645 ("Dale received a letter from Monmouth Council Executive James Kay revoking his adult
membership. Dale wrote to Kay requesting the reason for Monmouth Council's decision. Kay responded by letter that the Boy Scouts 'specifically forbid membership to homosexuals."').
190.
Id. at 648 (citing N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)).
191.
Id. at 650.
192.
Id. at 653 (citing Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S.
107, 123-24 (1981)).
193.
See James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Democracy, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435,
1471 (2004) ("Nor did Brennan's opinion for the Court in Roberts do what Rehnquist's opinion for
the Court subsequently did in Boy Scouts: simply defer to the Jaycees' claims that being forced to
admit women would impair their expression or impede their ability to disseminate their views or
message.").
194.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
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1 95
that the Boy Scouts "specifically forbid membership to homosexuals."
This meant that Dale's orientation rather than the fact that he had been a
co-president of a gay and lesbian organization while at college 96 was the
decisive factor. For example, his Scouts membership presumably would
not have been revoked if he had been straight and a co-president of a
Gay-Straight Alliance. 197 Nonetheless, the Court held that the New Jersey public accommodations law 98violated the Boy Scouts' "rights to free'
dom of expressive association."'

The Court's position became even more confused and confusing
when it cited Hurley for support, explaining that the Saint Patrick's Day
Parade organizers "did not wish to exclude the GLIB members because
of their sexual orientations, but because they wanted to march behind a
GLIB banner."' 99 After distinguishing between an orientation-based and
a message-based exclusion, the Dale Court continued,
As the presence of GLIB in Boston's St. Patrick's Day [P]arade
would have interfered with the parade organizers' choice not to propound a particular point of view, the presence of Dale as an assistant
scoutmaster would just as surely interfere with the Boy 2 Scouts'
choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs. 00
But it was not as if Dale was carrying a banner saying that he was gay or
even saying that he supported gay rights. Rather, he was being rejected
because he was gay. Ironically, Dale could have marched in the Saint
Patrick's Day Parade (as long as he marched, say, with the ACLU rather
than with GLIB), but could not be an assistant scoutmaster.
Suppose that a straight man actively supported gay rights. He, too,
would not be permitted to be a scoutmaster if he expressed that position
to the youth in his troop. 20 ' Dale had not been accused of having said
anything inappropriate to the Scouts, however, so such a point was not
relevant to the case at hand.20 2
The Dale Court implied that because Dale was a gay rights activist
outside of the Scouts, 203 permitting him to be a scout leader would impair
the Boy Scouts' message. But suppose a straight scout leader advocated

195.
196.

Id. at 645 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 653.

197.

See Mark Strasser, Leaving the Dale to Be More FAIR: On CLS v. Martinez and First

Amendment Jurisprudence,II FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 235, 267 (2012) ("[H]ad Dale been President
of a Gay-Straight Alliance at Rutgers, he could have continued to be a Scout leader as long as he
self-identified as having a different-sex orientation.").
198. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
199. Id. at 653.
200. Id.at 654.
201. See id. at 655 n.l.
202. See id. at 689 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("BSA has not contended, nor does the record
support, that Dale had ever advocated a view on homosexuality to his troop ....).
203. Id.at 653 (majority opinion) ("Dale... remains a gay rights activist.").
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for gay rights outside of the Scouts. Permitting that person to be a Scout
would presumably impair the Boy Scout message as well, although the
Scouts would not have expelled such a person. 204
The Dale Court understood that the Boy Scouts' willingness to continue to employ a straight man dissenting from their sexual orientation
policy would seem to undercut their alleged worry about keeping employees on message. But the Court was unpersuaded that the Scout's
willingness to employ a straight supporter of gay rights established that
the organization was discriminating on the basis of orientation. "The
presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in an assistant
scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different message from the
presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy. ' 20 5 The Court conveniently ignored the
Boy Scouts' express admission that it would prohibit non-activists who
were gay from being scoutmasters 20 6 and that it would permit activists
who were not gay to be scoutmasters. The Court's emphasis on message
rather than orientation was both disingenuous 20 7 and unpersuasive.208
The Dale analysis is "disappointing, '' ° at least in part, because the
Court treated the Boy Scouts' policy as if it only precluded gay activists
from being members when it expressly discriminated on the basis of orientation. An additional noteworthy element of the Dale opinion is that
the Court deferred to the Boy Scouts' assessment of whether its message
would be altered by permitting a nondesired person to be a member when
the Court had not been at all deferential in Roberts. One explanation for
the differing degree of deference in the two cases is to say that the Court
disapproved of discrimination on the basis of sex 210 but approved of discrimination based on orientation, 2 11 although a different explanation emphasizes that the Jaycees were viewed as commercial and the Boy Scouts
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 691 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 655-56 (majority opinion).
See supra note 195 and accompanying text (noting that "homosexuals" could not be

Scouts).
207.

See Suzanna Sherry, Warning: Labeling Constitutions May Be Hazardous to Your Re-

gime, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 39 (2004) ("[T]here is the disingenuous way in which the
Court identified both the organization's message and the effect that retaining Dale as a scoutmaster
would have on that message.").
208.
Cf Strasser, supra note 197, at 268 ("Dale modifies right to association jurisprudence
while claiming to follow it.").
209. See Scott Kelly, Note, Scouts' (Dis)Honor:The Supreme Court Allows the Boy Scouts of
America to DiscriminateAgainst Homosexuals in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 39 HOUS. L. REV.

243, 244 (2002).
210.

Cf James A. Davids, Enforcinga TraditionalMoral Code Does Not Trigger a Religious

Institution'sLoss of Tax Exemption, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 440 (2012) ("Regarding the judicial
branch, someone arguing that prohibiting gender discrimination is a 'fundamental national public
policy' would undoubtedly start with Roberts v. UnitedStates Jaycees.").
211.
See Julie A. Nice, How Equality Constitutes Liberty: The Alignment ofCLS v. Martinez,
38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, 637 (2011) (describing Hurley and Dale as "recent First Amendment decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court that favored discrimination against gays over nondiscrimination").
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were not.

Yet another explanation is that the Court had a change of

heart and now believed that great deference was due to an organization's
judgment about when its own message might be altered. The deferenceto-the-organization's-judgment explanation was subsequently refuted in
Rumsfeld v. Forumfor Academic & InstitutionalRights, Inc. (FAIR)."'
At issue in FAIR was the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, 214 which specified that "if any part of an institution of higher education denies military recruiters access equal to that provided other recruiters, the entire institution would lose certain federal funds. 2,1 5 FAIR,
an association of law schools and law faculties, 216 "argued that this
forced inclusion and equal treatment of military recruiters violated217the
law schools' First Amendment freedoms of speech and association.,
At the time, the military banned gays from serving in the armed
forces.218 Because FAIR members had "adopted policies expressing their
opposition to discrimination based on, among other factors, sexual orientation,, 21 9 law schools were put in a bind. They had "to choose between
exercising their First Amendment right to decide whether to disseminate
or accommodate a military recruiter's message, and ensuring the availability of federal funding for their universities. 22 °
The Court suggested both that "Congress has broad authority to legislate on matters of military recruiting" 221 and that Congress could have
directly imposed access requirements had it so desired.222 The Court then
reasoned that because Congress could have imposed the requirement
directly, it obviously was permitted to adopt the indirect method that it in
fact chose. 2 23 But this reasoning is incorrect if only because the First
Amendment may be implicated in one method but not in the other. If
Congress had directly imposed such a requirement, then it would be unlikely that students would impute the discriminatory policy to the University. 224 If, however, a university chose to ignore its own policy so that
212.
See Fleming, supra note 193, at 1472 ("[O]ne might argue that there is a difference in the
character of the freedom of association: that the Jaycees were engaged in commercial association,
while the Boy Scouts were involved in civic association ... .
213.
547 U.S. 47 (2006).
214. Id. at 51 ("The law schools responded by suing, alleging that the Solomon Amendment
infringed their First Amendment freedoms of speech and association.").
215. Id.; see 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (West 2013).
216. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 52.
217. Id. at 53.
218. See id. at 52 n.1 ("[A] person generally may not serve in the Armed Forces if he has
engaged in homosexual acts, stated that he is a homosexual, or married a person of the same sex.").
219. Id. at 52.
220. Id at 53.
221. Id. at 58.
222. Id. at 60 ("[T]he First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the
Solomon Amendment's access requirement . .
223.

See id.

224. Ironically, the Court recognized this point but somehow believed that it cut the other way.
See id at 65 ("We have held that high school students can appreciate the difference between speech
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it would not lose federal funds, then the university would be more likely
to have a message imputed
S to
225it, e.g., that it did not take its own nondiscrimination
policy
seriously,
depending perhaps upon how much money was at stake.226
The FAIR Court was not at all deferential to the law schools' judgment that they were being forced to support a message with which they
disagreed-the Court simply announced that "accommodation of a military recruiter's message is not compelled speech because the accommodation does not sufficiently interfere with any message of the school. 227
The Court explained, "Nothing about recruiting suggests that law schools
agree with any speech by recruiters," 228 notwithstanding that nonmilitary
recruiters with a similar policy would not have been allowed to recruit on
campus. 229
To support the claim that law schools were not being forced by the
Solomon Amendment to modify their own messages, the FAIR Court
emphasized that "nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the
law schools may say about the military's policies.

'230

Thus, a school

could post a sign saying that the military's policy should not be attributed
to the school or, perhaps, that the school affirmatively disagreed with the
military's discriminatory policy. But suppose that the law school did not
believe that such signs would be effective.23 1 That did not matter, because the law schools were mistaken in thinking that they were being
forced to speak at all-"accommodating the military's message does not

a school sponsors and speech the school permits because legally required to do so .... " (citing Bd.
of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion))).
225.
Some commentators seem not to appreciate that the fact that a university has a choice
makes it more rather than less likely that a message will be imputed to it based on the choice made.
See James M. Gottry, Note, Just Shoot Me: Public Accommodation Anti-DiscriminationLaws Take
Aim at FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 64 VAND. L. REV. 961, 988 (2011) (reasoning that an
important distinction between FAIR and cases where public accommodations laws require compliance "is that schools had a choice to continue their educational mission without interference by
simply forfeiting federal funding").
226.
Cf Major Charles G. Kels, Free Speech and the Military Recruiter: Reaffirming the
Marketplace of Ideas, II NEV. L.J. 92, 127 (2010) ("FAIR called the amount of money at stake-an
estimated $400 million annually in the case of Harvard University-'a fiscal gun at the University's
head."' (footnote omitted)); John Curran, Vt. Law School to Accept Military Recruiters, TIMES
ARGuS (MONTPELIER-BARRE, VT.), Aug. 15, 2011 ("Vermont Law School and ... the William
Mitchell College of Law ...were the only ones in America that barred the recruiters despite a measure known as the Solomon Amendment ....Both are independent law schools unaffiliated with
larger universities or state institutions, which allowed them to stand on principle without costing
affiliated schools millions of federal dollars for scientific research and other academic pursuits.").
227.
FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64.
228.
Id.at 65.
229.
Cf id.at 58 ("It is insufficient for a law school to treat the military as it treats all other
employers who violate its nondiscrimination policy. Under the statute, military recruiters must be
given the same access as recruiters who comply with the policy.").
230.
Id.at 65.
231.
Cf supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text (discussing why a disavowal might not be
effective in the context of a parade).
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affect the law schools' speech, because the schools232 are not speaking
when they host interviews and recruiting receptions.,
The FAIR Court also addressed whether "the expressive nature of
the conduct regulated by the statute brings that conduct within the First
Amendment's protection., 233 Citing O'Brien, the Court noted that "some
forms of 'symbolic speech' [a]re deserving of First Amendment protection, 234 but then reaffirmed its rejection of "the view that 'conduct can
be labeled "speech" whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea.' ' 2 35 Instead, the "First Amendment
[extends]
' 236
protection only to conduct that is inherently expressive."
An important question, then, is which behaviors are inherently expressive. The Court explained why the conduct at issue did not qualify.
"An observer who sees military recruiters interviewing away from the
law school has no way of knowing whether the law school is expressing
its disapproval of the military, all the law school's interview rooms are
full, or the military recruiters decided for reasons of their own that they
would rather interview someplace else." 237 The observer would not know
that the law school was making a statement by having the recruiting
elsewhere unless the law school had made a statement about it. 238 "The
fact that such explanatory speech is necessary is strong evidence that the
conduct at issue here is not so inherently expressive that it warrants protection under O'Brien."239 Nor should it be thought that combining

speech with conduct would transform the conduct into expression. "If
combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into 'speech'
simply by talking about it."240 Furthermore, there would be undesirable
consequences if expressive conduct were viewed more expansively. For
example, "if an individual announces that he intends to express his disapproval of the Internal Revenue Service by refusing to pay his income
taxes, [the Court] would have to apply O'Brien to determine whether the
Tax Code violates the First Amendment." 241 Needless to say, the Court
would not treat such a protest as expressive conduct. 242 Nor for that matter has the Court been willing to recognize a constitutional right to avoid

232. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64.
233.
Id. at 65.
234. Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
235.
Id. at 65-66 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
236. Id. at 66.
237. Id.
238. Id. ("The expressive component of a law school's actions is not created by the conduct
itself but by the speech that accompanies it.").
239. Id.
240. Id.
241.
Id.
242. Id.
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paying taxes even if doing so violates sincerely held religious beliefs. 43
In United States v. Lee,244 the Court explained, "When followers of a
particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the
limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and
faith are not to be superimposed245on the statutory schemes which are
binding on others in that activity."
The FAIR Court also addressed whether the Solomon Amendment
"violates law schools' freedom of expressive association."' 246 Dispensing
with that challenge rather quickly, the Court noted that "[s]tudents and
faculty are free to associate to voice their disapproval of the military's
message. 247 Because that was so, a "military recruiter's mere presence
on campus does not violate a law school's right to associate, regardless
2 48
of how repugnant the law school considers the recruiter's message."
The Court's analysis of First Amendment freedoms in the orientation discrimination context is not free from interpretive difficulty. Sometimes the Court seems to weigh rights to expression and freedom of association more heavily than at other times. 249 Further, the Court has been
inconsistent with respect to the degree to which it would give deference
to an organization's judgment that unwanted association would change
that organization's message. Nonetheless, the Court has embraced at
least two principles applicable to the kind of conscience-based activity
envisioned in this Article: (1) commercial organizations do not have the
same association rights as do noncommercial organizations, and (2)
symbolic activity that requires explanation to be understood may well not
trigger the First Amendment protections for expressive conduct. The
current jurisprudence makes clear how a case like Elane Photography,
L.L.C. v. Willock25 should be decided.
C. Elane Photographyv. Willock
At issue in Willock was a refusal by Elane Photography to photograph the commitment ceremony of Vanessa Willock and her same-sex
partner, because the owners did not wish to "convey the message that
marriage can be defined to include combinations of people other than the
243.
See infra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
244.
455 U.S. 252 (1982).
245.
Id.at 261.
246.
FAIR, 547 U.S. at 68.
247.
Id. at 69-70.
248.
Id. at 70.
249.
See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (holding that the University
of California, Hastings College of Law could maintain a limited purpose public forum requiring that
all student clubs receiving official university recognition admit all students regardless of religion or
sexual orientation).
250.
284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
251.
Id.at 432 ("This appeal arose from the refusal of Elane Photography, LLC (Elane Photography), to photograph the commitment ceremony of Vanessa Willock (Willock) and her same-sex

partner (Partner).").
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union of one man and one woman. ' ' 252 The New Mexico appellate court
hearing the case affirmed the lower court decision that the refusal was in
violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act.253
Elane Photography is a commercial enterprise that "primarily photographs significant life events such as weddings and graduations. ' ' 2 54 It
advertises "its services through its website, advertisements on multiple
search engines, and in the Yellow Pages., 255 Nonetheless, Elane Photography argued that it is not a public accommodation for purposes of the
New Mexico law.256 The appellate court rejected that contention, at least
in part, because Elane Photography "advertises its services to the public
at large, and2 57anyone who wants to access Elane Photography's website
may do So.",
Elane Photography denied that it was discriminating on the basis of
orientation, arguing that it would have taken portrait photographs of
Willock 258 and would have been willing to photograph a different-sex
wedding even if one or both of the participants had a same-sex orientation. 9 So, too, Elane Photography might have noted that it would have
refused to photograph two straight men or two straight women who
wished to commission a commitment ceremony photograph.2 6 Yet, such
a policy of refusing to photograph two people of the same sex in a commitment ceremony is "directed toward gay persons as a class," 261 because
"the conduct targeted by this law [the NMHRA] is conduct that is closely
correlated with being homosexual., 262 Thus, it is unlikely that many
straight individuals would wish to participate in a commitment ceremony, 263 and the mere possibility that straight people might desire such a
photograph would not undermine that the policy was directed towards
those with a same-sex orientation. As a separate matter, the defense to
the orientation discrimination claim would be that Elane Photography's
refusal to photograph was based on the sexes of the parties, and discrim252. Id.
253.
Id.
254. Id.
255.
Id.
256. Id. at 433.
257.
Id.at 436.
at 437.
258.
See id.
See id. ("Elane Photography would photograph opposite-sex weddings between persons of
259.
any sexual orientation.").
260. See Gottry, supra note 225, at 984 ("Elane Photography would agree to photograph a
traditional wedding between a lesbian woman and gay man, and would refuse to photograph a samesex commitment ceremony between two straight men.").
Willock, 284 P.3d at 437 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003)
261.
(O'Connor, J., concurring)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
262. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Willock, 284 P.3d at 437
(quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583).
263.
See Scott Titshaw, The Reactionary Road to Free Love: How DOMA, State Marriage
Amendments, and Social Conservatives Undermine Traditional Marriage, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 205,

233 (2012) (noting that most "heterosexual men and women... would not be tempted to enter a
marriage with someone of the same sex").
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ination on the basis of sex was also precluded by the New Mexico public
accommodations law. 26
Once determining that the refusal to photograph Willock and her
partner was in violation of the law, the New Mexico court then examined
whether application of the public accommodations act "violate[d] Elane
Photography's freedom of expression protected by the federal and state
constitutions. 265 The court noted that "the mere fact that a business provides a good or service with a recognized expressive element does not
allow the business to engage in discriminatory practices." 266 Citing FAIR
for support, the Willock court explained that "Elane Photography's commercial business conduct, taking photographs for hire, is not
so inherent267
ly expressive as to warrant First Amendment protections."
When discussing the degree to which commercial business conduct
is expressive, one might focus on whether the good or service itself is
"'artistic' and 'personally expressive ' ,268 or on the degree to which the
refusal to provide the good or service is "inherently expressive." 269 These
differing possible points of focus suggest that at least three distinct issues
might be addressed when analyzing whether a conscience-exemption
policy for commercial entities must be afforded: (1) which goods or services qualify as artistic or personally expressive?; (2) in what ways can
conscience-based exemptions be limited without violating constitutional
guarantees?; and (3) under what conditions, if any, should the forced
provision of a good or service be thought to communicate a message of
which the provider disapproves?
1. Goods or Services that Qualify as Artistic or Personally Expressive
The difficulty in applying this criterion is not that commercial photographers fail to engage in artistic or personally expressive work but,
rather, that affording an exemption on that basis would be very difficult
to cabin. Many individuals (rightly) view their jobs as artistic or personally expressive, because those occupations require the use of judgment or

264.
265.
266.

See Willock, 284 P.3d at 433.
Id. at 438.
Id. at 439 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984)); cf Jennifer Ann

Abodeely, Comment, Thou Shall Not Discriminate: A Proposal for Limiting First Amendment Defenses to Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 12 SCHOLAR 585, 597 (2010) ("Hurley may be

distinguished from Elane Photography in that the Veterans Council was a private organization
engaged in an act of free speech and association, whereas Elane Photography is a business that offers
its services to the public.").
267.
Willock, 284 P.3d at 439.
268. See Gottry, supra note 225, at 979 ("Elaine is a trained professional photographer who
approaches her work with a photojournalist style, which she considers both 'artistic' and 'personally
expressive."').
269. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 66.
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creativity.270 Anyone who makes goods might be thought to engage in an
artistic endeavor.27 1 In addition, a vast array of individuals providing
services can plausibly claim that they are also engaged in providing artistic or expressive services. One commentator has suggested that such a
and factual analysis of what
policy might result in "endless litigation
272
types of businesses are expressive.,
Recognizing an exemption to public accommodations statutes for
individuals who perform artistic or expressive conduct would likely afford such a wide-ranging exemption that the central purpose behind public accommodation laws-the "elimination of discrimination" 273-would
be severely undermined, if not gutted. While one might believe such a
274
those supporting the purposes behind public accomresult welcome, 27
that the creation of such an "exception
well fear 275
laws
might
modation
rule.,
general
the
could swallow
2. What Counts as Offensive to Conscience
Suppose that an individual claims that her conscience is offended by
being forced to do something that she believes promotes a message of
which she disapproves. Must such a claim be accepted or are there some
claims of conscience that need not be given effect?
The Thomas Court suggested that certain religious beliefs are "so
bizarre" as not to be afforded constitutional protection. 276 Very few beliefs would fall into that category, however. 217 For example in United
States v. Ballard,278 the Court reviewed a mail fraud conviction.27 9 The
defendants had claimed to have "the ability and power to cure persons of
those diseases normally classified as curable and also of diseases which
are ordinarily classified by the medical profession as being incurable
270.

Cf Daniel E. Eaton, Writers Gone Wild: "The Muse Made Me Do It" as a Defense to a

Claim of Sexual Harassment, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 8 n.54 (2004) (discussing "the inherently
creative nature of many occupations not generally considered 'creative,' but require the same kind of
creative freedom considered indispensable in the arts"); Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional
Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S.CAL. L. REV. 119, 139 (2000) (noting that
"the line between expressive and nonexpressive organizations does not leap out").
271. See Nabet, supra note 51, at 1550 (discussing "the vast array of artistic businesses that are
potentially expressive").
272. Id.
273. Id.at 1535.
274.
Cf Karen L. Dayton, Note, Dale v. Boy Scouts of America: New Jersey's Law Against
DiscriminationWeighs the Balance Between the First Amendment and the State's Compelling Interest in EradicatingDiscrimination, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 387, 399 n.101 (1999) ("Tennessee and
South Carolina even went so far as to repeal their state public accommodation laws, which left

businesses with the complete freedom to choose their customers.").
Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1044(2013).
275.
276.
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).
277.
See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). For discussion of Ballard, see infra
notes 278-86 and accompanying text.
Ballard,322 U.S. 78 (1944).
278.
Id. at 79 ("Respondents were indicted and convicted for using, and conspiring to use, the
279.
mails to defraud.").
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diseases." 280 These "religious doctrines or beliefs" '28' were asserted to
convince others to contribute "money, property, and other things of value''282 to the defendants.
While members of the Ballard Court rejected that the defendants
actually had the powers in question, 283 the Court held that the Constitution precluded the jury from deciding that issue.284 The only question that
could be submitted to the jury without offending constitutional guarantees was the sincerity of the defendants' beliefs,285 i.e., whether the defendants sincerely believed that they had the asserted powers. Thus, even
the claims at issue in Ballard were not sufficiently "bizarre" to fail to
trigger First Amendment protection. 286 Further, as the Thomas Court
made clear, unanimity of belief among sect members is not required for
beliefs to qualify as religious and deserving protection. 287
Some commentators would permit exemptions for individuals for
whom providing a service would violate sincerely held religious beliefs
but not for individuals for whom providing a service would violate sincerely held moral beliefs.288 Seeger and Welch suggest that such a distinction might well be constitutionally problematic. 28 9 Further, given the
great latitude afforded to claims that certain actions contravene sincere
religious beliefs, distinguishing between religious and moral compunctions would likely do little if any work, even if constitutionally permissible. An objector could always claim (and might well sincerely believe)
that his or her compunctions were religious rather than "merely" moral.
Other commentators equate religious and moral compunctions and
suggest that to say that "the owners of Elane Photography can honor their
consciences by keeping their moral beliefs out of the marketplace ignores
the external orientation of conscience: conscientia refers to moral belief
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id.
at80.
Id.
at84.
Id.
at80.
Id. at 87 ("The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not

preposterous, to most people."); id at 92 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("I can see in their teachings

nothing but humbug, untainted by any trace of truth.").
284. See id at 86 (majority opinion) ("[W]e do not agree that the truth or verity of respondents'
religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury.").
285.
Id. at 91-92 ("[l]t was agreed at the outset of the trial, without objection from the defendants, that only the issue of respondents' good faith belief in the representations of religious experiences would be submitted to the jury.... On the issue submitted to the jury in this case it properly
rendered a verdict of guilty.").
286. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 575 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Some
have religious scruples against eating pork. Those scruples, no matter how bizarre they might seem
to some, are within the ambit of the First Amendment.") (citing Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87).
287. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981).
288. See Robin Fretwell Wilson & Jana Singer, Same-Sex Marriage and Conscience Exemptions, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC'Y PRAC. GROUPS 12, 17 (2011). Professor Wilson explained:

"[Olur proposed exemption is limited to religious objections for a reason. I think personally that if
we allow exemptions to the celebration of same-sex marriage for moral reasons, that would encompass people having moral objections tohomosexuality, which is not something I can support." Id.
289. See id.;
supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
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applied to conduct., 290 But adopting a principle affording a blanket exemption on matters of conscience would recognize a whole host of exemptions unless the principle could be limited in some non-questionbegging way. For example, such a justification would permit people to
object to a whole host of marriages-interreligious, intergenerational, or
interracial marriages-as long as the objectors sincerely believed that
291
such unions violated religious precepts.
Some commentators claim that the way to cabin the exemptions is
to refuse to give them effect if there is a moral consensus that the discrimination at issue, e.g., racial discrimination, is wrong.292 But that
means that if there is a moral consensus that orientation discrimination is

wrong, then such discrimination will also not be permitted.2 93
In any event, we should not be deciding which dictates of conscience to respect in light of whether there is general agreement with the
contents of those beliefs rather than in light of the secular state interests
implicated in affording protection to those beliefs.294 In School Districtof
Abington Township v. Schempp, 295 the Court suggested:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to... freedom
not be submitted to
of worship.., and other fundamental rights may296
elections.
no
of
outcome
the
on
depend
they
vote;

290. Robert K. Vischer, Commentary, How Necessary Is the Right ofAssembly?, 89 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1403, 1405 (2012).
291.
See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (school denied tax exemption
because of its refusal on religious grounds to permit students in interracial relationships to matriculate).
292. See Chad Flanders, Book Review, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 567, 570 (2009-2010) (reviewing
ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN
PERSON AND STATE (2009)) ("Vischer also says that we have reached a moral consensus that associations should not be able to discriminate on the basis of race but not on whether they should be able
to discriminate based on sexual orientation."); cf Abodeely, supra note 266, at 589 ("If the facts of
the case were different and Elane Photography refused to photograph a Jewish wedding or an interracial wedding, even if those unions were against Huguenin's faith, there would be no question that
the business could not legally discriminate based on customers' race or religion.").
293.
Cf Flanders, supra note 292, at 570-71 (noting that some will disagree with Vischer,
presumably with respect to whether a consensus has already been reached that orientation discrimination is unacceptable).
294. Cf McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 575 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("But it is
a strange Bill of Rights that makes it possible for the dominant religious group to bring the minority
to heel because the minority, in the doing of acts which intrinsically are wholesome and not antisocial, does not defer to the majority's religious beliefs.").
295. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
296. Id. at 226 (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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The right to act in accord with conscience is not absolute 297 But
the test for whether such conduct is permissible simply cannot be whether it happens to be in accord with majority preferences.298 It is precisely
for this reason that the Gillette Court discussed whether there were "valid
neutral [secular] reasons ' 299 for rejecting a claim of conscience rather
than whether there was some consensus about the relative justness of the
3
Vietnam War. 00
3. When Does the Provision of a Good or Service Constitute Acceptance or Endorsement?
Elane Photography refused to photograph Willock's commitment
ceremony because that business did not want to express approval of
same-sex marriage. 3° 1 An important issue for the Court has involved the
conditions under which particular conduct might be thought to express a
view contravening the actor's beliefs. Those cases have ranged from
saluting the flag, 3 02 to displaying something on a license plate, 30 3 to permitting individuals to be scoutmasters, 304 to permitting the military
to
interview on campus in contravention of a nondiscrimination policy.305
Consider the individual who sees a photographer refusing to photograph a particular couple. The observer would not know whether that
refusal was due to a scheduling conflict, an inability to agree about price,
306
or some other reason,
especially if there is a public accommodations
ordinance requiring commercial establishments not to discriminate. Because it would be unlikely for an observer to impute a particular view to
the photographer, the United States Supreme Court would reject that this
would be a case of compelled speech, just as the FAIR Court rejected that
law schools were being compelled to speak.30 7 Further, as was true in
FAIR, taking the photograph would in no way impede Elane Photog297.

See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) ("[Tlhe Amendment embraces

two concepts, [] freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.").
298. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990)
(O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("The history of our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh
impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups .....
"),
superseded by
statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2014),
as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1655-56 (2011).

299. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971).
300. For discussion of Gillette, see supranotes 76-82 and accompanying text.
301.
See Gottry, supra note 225, at 963-64 (arguing that she was being forced "to communicate a particular message about same-sex commitment ceremonies-was compelled to express a
viewpoint she disagreed with, in violation of her First Amendment free speech rights").
302. See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text.
303. See supranotes 26-51 and accompanying text.
304. See supranotes 187-212 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 213-49 and accompanying text.
306. Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 439-40 (N.M. Ct. App.
2012) ("[A]n observer who merely sees Elane Photography photographing a same-sex commitment
ceremony has no way of knowing if such conduct is an expression of Elane Photography's approval
of such ceremonies.") (citing FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006)).
307. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64.
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raphy from communicating its own views regarding whether same-sex
marriage should be permitted in New Mexico. 30 8 Thus, Elane Photography could post a note on its website that the contents of its photos
should not be construed as an endorsement of particular views, 309 although it seems doubtful that any views would be imputed to the photog3 10
raphers even absent such a disclaimer.
Willock had sought to have the commitment ceremony photographed when New Mexico did not recognize same-sex marriage or civil
unions. 311 Thus, it was not as if the photograph would be of a wedding.
Rather, the difficulty was that the photograph might be thought to represent approval of a same-sex wedding. But if photographing a commitment ceremony-something that was neither a marriage nor a civil union-nonetheless qualifies for an exemption because of what the professional thinks the photograph might symbolize, then any photograph that
the photographer believed would somehow communicate the wrong message would justify the photographer's telling the customers to take their
business elsewhere.
Professor Wilson suggests that it should be permissible for a variety
of individuals-e.g., the baker, the photographer, or the reception hall
owner-to refuse to provide wedding services if those individuals have
moral qualms about such unions , as long as others are available to
provide the service. 313 The same argument would presumably apply to
restaurants, hotels, 314 movie theaters, and a whole host of public establishments, because providing service might be construed as symbolic
approval. Those who provide flowers or sell clothing might also be in-

308. Id. at 65. It is for these reasons that the Court would be unlikely to view this as compelled
speech. Some commentators do not appreciate some of the implications of FAIR. See, e.g., Nabet,
supra note 51, at 1542-43 ("In Elane Photography,however, application of the New Mexico statute
would directly impede Huguenin's ability to disseminate her preferred views; it would force the
photographer to affirm and possibly even endorse an ideology that she claims she sincerely believes
is wrong.").
309. Gottry, supra note 225, at 991 ("Elane Photography would find it even more difficult to
distance itself from the message, short of posting a disclaimer on its website, or printing a disclaimer
on the photos themselves.").
310. See supra notes 301, 306-07 and accompanying text.
311.
Douglas Nejaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions,
and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination,100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1201 (2012)

("New Mexico does not offer any relationship recognition to same-sex couples, let alone marriage."); Wilson & Singer, supra note 288, at 12 ("New Mexico neither recognizes same-sex marriage nor same-sex civil unions.").
312. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, InsubstantialBurdens: The Case for Government Employee
Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 318, 328 (2010) ("[A]ssisting

with marriage ceremonies has a religious significance that commercial services that are subject to
non-discrimination bans, like ordering burgers and hailing taxis, simply do not.").
313. See Wilson & Singer, supra note 288, at 13.
314. A separate issue involves those who rent out a few rooms in their own homes. For a
discussion of those exemptions, see generally David M. Forman, A Room for "Adam and Steve " at
Mrs. Murphy's Bed and Breakfast: Avoiding the Sin of Inhospitality in Places of Public Accommodation, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 326 (2012).
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cluded.3 15 Presumably, dry cleaning establishments, barbershops, and
hairdressers might also want not to participate. Grocery stores might
wish not to provide goods to those who wish to have in-home celebrations. In short, most if not all businesses would seem permitted to refuse
to provide services so that they could avoid sending an undesired message.
Professor Wilson notes that for "many people, marriage itself is a
religious sacrament and the assistance of it may well be a religious act in
their minds., 31 6 Yet, those with religious objections to same-sex marriage
might also have religious objections to same-sex couples raising children
or living together. Or, they might have religious objections to assisting
anyone who appears to be undermining traditional gender roles. Presumably, the justification offered in the same-sex wedding context might be
used to refuse to provide any services at all to a vast array of individuals
for fear of promoting objectionable lifestyles or practices.317
IV. CONCLUSION

The Court's analysis of the conditions under which the First
Amendment trumps equal protection values has been far from clear.
While the Court has been clear that states cannot force individuals to
affirm principles contrary to belief, the Court has also been clear that
symbolic conduct is not given as much protection as is speech, and that
not all conduct that the actor believes is expressive counts as expressive
conduct for constitutional purposes. Further, the Court has vacillated
with respect to the deference due to an organization's judgment that following the law would alter its message.
Variations in the jurisprudence notwithstanding, some constitutional
principles have been articulated consistently. Commercial entities do not
have the same constitutional rights as do noncommercial entities, and
conduct that does not communicate a message without further explanation may well not even rise to the kind of activity afforded First Amendment protection.
Businesses do not have the constitutional right to choose their customers and should not be afforded that right as a matter of public policy.
If they could refuse to provide goods or services as a matter of conscience whenever providing those goods or services were thought to in315.
See Wilson & Singer, supra note 288, at 16. Professor Singer notes these implications of
Professor Wilson's position. Id.
316.
Id.at 17.
317. Professor Wilson notes that some object to same-sex marriage but not to providing other
services. See Wilson, supra note 312, at 328 ("Many of these people have no objection generally to
providing services to lesbians and gays, but they would object to directly facilitating a same-sex
marriage."). But for those who object to providing any services to gays or lesbians for religious
reasons, one presumes that Professor Wilson would say that should be respected as long as others are
available to provide the needed services.
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accurately communicate a message of endorsement or, perhaps, tolerance, then such
businesses would have been afforded a "carte blanche to
318
discriminate."
Certain kinds of organizations have associational rights that must be
respected. But those associational rights do not include the right to refuse
to provide commercial products or services to individuals about whom
one has religious reservations. Permitting businesses to engage in such
discrimination can only cause the country to become more balkanized
and individual groups more stigmatized-results that no one should
want.

318.
Cf Renee M. Williams, Comment, The MinisterialException and Disability Discrimination Claims, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 423, 424 (2011) (discussing a case that she interprets to "provide[] religious organizations carte blanche to discriminate").

CHAIDEZ V. UNITED STA TES: BREAKING OLD GROUND
ABSTRACT

In Padilla v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held that
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires defense
counsel to advise his or her noncitizen criminal client about the impact of
a guilty plea on the client's immigration status. When an attorney fails to
provide his or her client that advisement, that client is deprived the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. In
Chaidez v. United States, the Supreme Court held that Padillaannounced
a "new rule" and therefore relief based upon the holding of Padilla
would only be available prospectively. Defendants whose convictions
were final prior to Padilla, including Roselva Chaidez, could not bring
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under Padilla and were therefore denied justice.
This Comment argues that the holding of Padilla was not a new
rule. Specifically, changes to immigration law enacted in 1996, not Padilla, triggered the right of noncitizen criminal defendants to advisement
about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Because of these
changes, Padilla was a straightforward application of the existing Strickland v. Washington test for ineffective assistance of counsel, applied to
new circumstances created by the 1996 changes in immigration law. Because Padilla did not announce a new rule, but only applied an existing
rule to new circumstances, the holding should have applied retroactively,
and Roselva Chaidez should have had her conviction vacated pursuant to
Padilla.
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INTRODUCTION

On December 3, 2003, Roselva Chaidez and Jose Padilla faced the
same dilemma. Both were lawful permanent residents of the United
States.' Each had pleaded guilty to a charge without understanding that a
guilty plea would result in deportation, as required by United States immigration laws passed in 1996.2 Neither Chaidez's nor Padilla's attorney
had provided their client with
advisement about the immigration conse3
plea.
his
or
her
of
quences
Ten years later, Chaidez and Padilla are in dramatically different
situations. A court has vacated Jose Padilla's conviction; although he still
faces the underlying criminal charges, he is no longer facing automatic
deportation.4 Roselva Chaidez, on the other hand, is not as fortunate; the
Supreme Court refused to recognize her rights and prevent her deportation. 5 These very different results are not due to the factual differences in
the cases but rather the result of timing and inconsistent decisions by the
Supreme Court.
Three cases are critical to understanding the stories of Roselva
Chaidez and Jose Padilla. In Strickland v. Washington,6 the Court set
forth the test for determining what constitutes effective or ineffective
counsel in a criminal proceeding.7 Teague v. Lane8 provides the standard
I. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010); United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d
896, 898 (N.D. 111.2010), rev'd, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), affd, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
2.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359; Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
3.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359; Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 904; Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253
S.W.3d 482, 483-84 (Ky. 2008), rev'd and remanded, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
4. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 330-31 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
5. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 (2013).
6. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
7.
Id. at 687.
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for when a rule of criminal procedure applies retroactively. 9 Padilla v.
Kentucky'0 recognizes a noncitizen criminal defendant's right to advisement about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.'
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held that
after changes to immigration law enacted in 1996 expanded the number
of deportable offenses and nearly eliminated prosecutorial discretion, a
criminal defendant has the right to advisement about the immigration
consequences of a guilty plea. 12 When a defense attorney fails to provide
a criminal defendant accurate information about the deportation ramifications of a guilty plea, the defendant has not received the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.' 3 A lack of effective assistance of counsel satisfies the first prong of the two-prong Strickland test that courts use to determine whether to vacate a criminal conviction. 14
Following the Padilladecision, the federal appellate circuits split on
5
whether the Padilla holding retroactively applies to final convictions.
The Third Circuit held that the Padillarule applies retroactively, while
the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits held that it does not. 16 Although
the circuits split on whether Padilla should apply retroactively, there was
unanimity that Teague provided the correct standard to apply in making
the determination; all of the circuits applied the Teague standard regardless of whether deciding either in favor of or against retroactivity. 7 The
Teague standard appears straightforward: a decision that creates a new
rule is generally not retroactive; a decision that applies an old rule to new
circumstances is retroactive. 18
In Chaidez v. United States,'9 the Supreme Court resolved the dispute among the circuits by holding that Padilla announced a new rule
under Teague, and therefore did not apply retroactively. 20 The Court held
that while the result in Padilla came from an ordinary application of the
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Id. at 310.
559 U.S. 356 (2010).
Id. at 374.
Id. at 363-64, 374.
See INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 323 n.50 (2001); U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.

14.
See Padilla,559 U.S. at 366-67. The first prong is representation that falls below reasonable professional standards; the second is likelihood of a different outcome absent the deficient
representation. Id. at 366.
15.
Allison C. Callaghan, Comment, Padilla v. Kentucky: A Case for Retroactivity, 46 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 701, 703 (2012).
16.
Id.
17.
United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 212 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Chang Hong,
671 F.3d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir. 2011); Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir.
2011); United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 635 (3d Cir. 2011), abrogated by Chaidez v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
18.
SeeTeague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
19.
133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
20.
Id. at I113.
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established Strickland test, the decision to apply Strickland to any collateral consequence of a conviction broke new ground and created a new
rule. Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, noted that Padilla
"breach[ed] the previously chink-free wall between direct and collateral
consequences. 22 This perceived breach was the basis for the Chaidez
Court's decision that Padillaconstituted a new rule. The dissent, on the
other hand, argued the changes to immigration law in 1996 redefined
professional norms for defense counsel.23 The new professional norms
required defense counsel to advise noncitizen clients about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea under existing rules. These new professional norms, in the dissent's view, were new circumstances, not a
new rule, and dictated the outcome of the Stricklandtest in Padillamaking the decision retroactive under Teague.
This Comment argues that the dissent in Chaidez was correct in determining that the Padilla holding did not create a new rule. This Comment further argues that Justice Kagan's wall between direct and collateral consequences never existed in Supreme Court precedent prior to her
announcement of the distinction. To the extent it existed in lower court
precedent, the wall was not only chinked at the time of the Padilla decision but had a gaping hole regarding deportation. Finally, this Comment
will argue that Roselva Chaidez had the same right to advisement about
the immigration consequences of her guilty plea as Jose Padilla. When
the Supreme Court failed to recognize her right to advisement, Roselva
Chaidez suffered an injustice, and so did the Bill of Rights.
I.

BACKGROUND

Padilla held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to
advise his or her noncitizen criminal client about the impact of a guilty
plea on the client's immigration status.24 In Chaidez, the Court held that
this duty constituted a new rule as defined by the Teague test and therefore was not retroactive. 25 Chaidez, as a result, was not entitled to have
her conviction vacated.26 This ruling is peculiar because Chaidez's guilty
plea came over a year after Jose Padilla's conviction. If Jose Padilla had
a Sixth Amendment right to information about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea in 2002, how did Chaidez not have the same
right in 2003? To comprehend that determination, it is necessary to understand how the Court applied the Strickland test in Padilla and the
importance of the 1996 changes in immigration law.

21.
22.

Id. at I110-11.
Id.atI 110.

23.

Id.
at 1115 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).

24.
25.

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 11 10-11.

26.

See id.
at I113.
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A. 1996 Immigration Law Changes
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 27 (IIRIRA) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 28 (AEDPA), which increased the number of deportable offenses. 29 Among the changes brought by the 1996 laws was a
new definition of "aggravated felony, 3 ° specifically, reducing the qualifying sentence from five years to one year. The laws also "abolished
the Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief from removal for all but a small number of offenses. 32 This meant that noncitizen defendants sentenced to one year or longer of incarceration automatically qualified for deportation.
This new near certainty of deportation led the PadillaCourt to recognize defense counsel's obligation to advise clients about how a guilty
plea could affect their immigration statuses. 33 The Court held that because the new immigration laws made deportation an "integral part ...of
the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants," 34 the Sixth
Amendment applies to advisement about the deportation consequences of
a criminal conviction.35
The PadillaCourt noted that after the 1996 changes in immigration
law, it had become the prevailing professional norm for defense counsel
to inform a noncitizen client about the ramification of a guilty plea on his
or her deportation status.36 These professional norms are the measuring
stick of Strickland, and the change in professional norms dictated the
outcome of the Stricklandtest in Padilla.37
B. Strickland v. Washington: What ConstitutesIneffective Assistance of
Counsel?
The Strickland Court established a two-prong test for determining
whether to vacate a criminal conviction due to ineffective assistance of
27.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. & 18

U.S.c.).
28. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, & 42 U.S.C.).
29. Matthew A. Spahn, Comment, Padilla Retroactivity: A Critique of the Tenth Circuit's
Ruling That Padilla v. Kentucky Does Not Apply Retroactively to Cases on CollateralReview [Unit-

ed States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir.2011)], 51 WASHBURN L.J. 767, 767-68 (2012).
30. Adriane Meneses, Comment,The Deportationof Lawful Permanent Residentsfor Old and
Minor Crimes: Restoring Judicial Review, Ending Retroactivity, and Recognizing Deportation as

Punishment, 14 SCHOLAR 767, 782 (2012).
31.

Id.

32.
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1116 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363-64 (2010)).
33.
Padilla,559 U.S. at 363--64.
34. Id.at 364.
35. Id.at 364, 366.
36. See id.at 367.
37. Id.at 366-67.
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counsel. 38 The first prong examines whether the assistance counsel provided met current professional norms. 39 Assistance of counsel is ineffective when the attorney's performance "falls 'below an objective standard
40
of reasonableness,' as indicated by 'prevailing professional norms."'
The Strickland Court identified professional norms as "American Bar
Association standards and the like. '4 1 Strickland's second prong determines whether the deficiency in the assistance of counsel caused prejudice significant enough to make a different outcome likely.42 A petitioner
S- 43
must meet both prongs of the test to have a court vacate a conviction.
When changing professional norms dictate a decision under Strickland they establish a new duty for defense counsel without creating a
new rule under Teague.44 Over time, the Supreme Court has recognized
new standards for the effective assistance of counsel prong of the Strickland test.45 At the same time, the Court frequently holds that changes in
professional norms dictate the outcome of the Strickland test.' In Wiggins v. Smith,47 the Court held that Williams v. Taylor,48 which requires
defense counsel to conduct background investigations in certain cases,
5 °
did not create a new rule.4 9 In Roe v. Flores-Ortega,
the Court held that
performance by counsel is ineffective when it deprives a defendant of an
appeal.5' In Rompilla v. Beard,52 the Court found defense counsel to be
53
ineffective because he did not investigate a client's prior convictions.
Each time, the Court held that the decision was not a new rule.54 In each
of these cases, the Court held that the professional norms of the time
dictated the outcome of the Strickland test, 55that the rules were not new,
and therefore the rules applied retroactively.
C. Padilla v. Kentucky Establishesa New Duty
Jose Padilla had lived in the United States for over forty years when
he pleaded guilty in 2002 to transporting marijuana. 56 He was a Vietnam
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
482, 483

Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013).
Id.
Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
Id. at 687.
Id.
Id. at 784.
Spahn, supra note 29, at 782-84.
Id.
539 U.S. 510 (2003).
529 U.S. 362 (2000).
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1115 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
528 U.S. 470 (2000).
Id. at 477.
545 U.S. 374 (2005).
Id. at 389-90.
Spahn, supra note 29, at 784.
See id at 782-84.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010); Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d
(Ky. 2008), revd and remanded, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
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War veteran and lawful permanent resident of the United States. 57 Provisions of the 1996 immigration laws required his deportation as a result of
his decision to plead guilty to drug trafficking. 58 After learning he was
eligible for deportation, Padilla filed a motion in state court for postconviction relief based on a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 59 Padilla claimed his attorney had told him he "did not
have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country
so long."' 6 Initially, the state trial court denied Padilla's request for relief.6' Padilla appealed, and the state appellate court reversed the trial
court, vacating his conviction. 62 Ultimately, the Kentucky Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court order denying
63
relief.
Padilla appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 64 The
Court applied the Strickland test, found that Padilla had not received the
effective assistance of counsel, and held that a criminal defendant has a
Sixth Amendment right to advisement about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. 65 The Court held that current professional norms
required defense counsel to provide information about the immigration
consequences of a conviction.6 6
D. Teague v. Lane: Is a Rule Retroactive?
Courts use the Teague standard to determine when a rule of criminal
procedure is retroactive. 67 Teague holds that once a conviction is final, a
defendant cannot benefit from a subsequent ruling if that ruling announces a new rule. 6 8 However, if the ruling is merely an established principle
applied to new circumstances, it is not a new rule and the decision applies retroactively. 69 The central question faced by the Chaidez Court
was whether to apply Padilla retroactively to Roselva Chaidez's conviction. 70 Teague defines a new rule as a decision that "breaks new ground,"
"imposes a new obligation" on the government, or is "not dictated by
[existing] precedent.",71 In order to determine if Padilla applied retroactively, the Chaidez Court had to determine whether the Padilla decision

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Padilla,559 U.S. at 359.
Id. at 359, 363-4.
Padilla,253 S.W.3d at 483.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 485.
Padilla,253 S.W.3d at 485.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010).
Id. at 360, 366, 374.
Id. at 367.
Id. at H107.
Id.
Id.
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1105 (2013).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
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"broke new ground," "imposed a new obligation" on the government, or
was "dictated by precedent."
II.

CHAIDEZ V. UNITED STATES

A. Facts
Roselva Chaidez, originally from Mexico, obtained lawful permanent resident status in the United States in 1977.72 Approximately twenty
years later, she pleaded guilty to two counts of mail fraud for helping to
defraud an automobile insurance company. 73 Under the 1996 immigration laws, the two counts to which Chaidez pleaded guilty qualified as
"aggravated felonies" and, unbeknownst to Chaidez, triggered her deportation under the 1996 laws.74 In 2004, Chaidez's convictions became
final.75
Five years later, Chaidez applied for United States citizenship.76
Chaidez's application alerted immigration officials of her convictions,
and the government initiated deportation proceedings against her. 77 In an
attempt to avoid deportation, Chaidez sought to have her convictions
vacated by filing a writ of coram nobis with the Federal District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois. 78 Chaidez maintained that her attorney never informed her of the immigration consequences of pleading
guilty, and at the time of her plea she was unaware of the deportation
implications of her plea. 79 Chaidez claimed that her attorney's failure to
inform her of the deportation implications of her guilty pleas amounted
80
to ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
Chaidez filed an affidavit that she would not have accepted the plea bargain if she was aware that she could face deportation as a result.81 The
district court determined this affidavit satisfied the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test. 82 Chaidez filed her corrected petition for relief with the
district court just one week before the Supreme Court decided Padilla.3

72.
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1105.
73.
Id.
at 1105-06.
74.
Id. at 1106.
75.
Id.
76. Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80. Id.
81.
United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2010), rev'd, 655 F.3d 684
(7th Cir. 2011), affd, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
82.
Id.
83.
Id. at 898. Chaidez needed to submit a corrected petition explaining why she had waited
so long to file. Id. at 898, 904.
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B. ProceduralHistory
After learning she faced deportation, Chaidez petitioned the district
84
court to have her convictions vacated on Sixth Amendment grounds.
The district court ruled that the Padilladecision was an ordinary application of Strickland, did not break new ground, was not a new rule,85 and
therefore applied retroactively and applied to Chaidez's claim.86 The
district court granted Chaidez's motion and vacated her conviction, finding that Chaidez's attorney had not informed her of relevant deportation
issues and that Chaidez's lack of knowledge created prejudice sufficient
to believe that the outcome could have been different had the information
87
been provided to Chaidez.
The Government appealed and the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding
that Padilla did announce a new rule. 88 The Seventh Circuit reasoned
that the Supreme Court had never before required defense counsel to
advise a client about a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. 89 The Seventh Circuit held that Padilla violated the accepted "distinction between
direct and collateral consequences." ' 90 Judge Williams of the Seventh
Circuit dissented, arguing that Padilla only applied the established
Strickland test to an attorney's duty to inform a client about deportation
issues after the enactment of the 1996 changes in immigration law. 9'
C. Majority Opinion
Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion for the Court in which
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito
joined.92 In analyzing whether Padillahas retroactive effect, the majority
applied the Teague standard. 93 Justice Kagan acknowledged that under
Teague, garden-variety applications of Strickland to new circumstances
do not produce new rules and are therefore retroactive. 94 However, Justice Kagan determined that Padilla was more than a straightforward application of Strickland.95 Justice Kagan argued that before the Padilla
Court applied Strickland it first analyzed whether Strickland applied to
advisement about deportation, a collateral consequence of conviction. 96 It

84. Id.at 898, 904.
85.
Id. at 904.
86.
Id.
87.
United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *3-4 (N.D. 111.Oct. 6,
2010), rev'd, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), af'd, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
88.
Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 694.
89.
Id. at 693.
90. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1106 (2013) (quoting Chaidez, 655 F.3d at
691) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91.
Id.(citing Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 697-99 (Williams, J., dissenting)).

92.

Id.at H105.

93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1107.
Id.
Id.at 1108.

96.

Id.
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was this preliminary analysis that Justice Kagan pointed to as breaking
new ground under Teague, by applying
the Sixth Amendment to any
97
collateral consequence of conviction.
98
Justice Kagan began her analysis by discussing Hill v. Lockhart,
which extended the Sixth Amendment to the plea process. 99 In that case,
the petitioner sought to have his conviction, obtained through a guilty
plea, overturned because his counsel provided inaccurate information
about parole eligibility. 1°° Applying Strickland to the petitioner's claim,
the Hill Court determined that Hill did not meet the second prong of the
test; the inaccurate information did not cause him prejudice. °1 Because
the petitioner failed to show prejudice, the Court did not determine
whether inaccurate information about parole eligibility constituted a violation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee to effective assistance of counsel. 10 2 Because the Hill Court did not determine whether inaccurate advisement about a collateral consequence of conviction, parole eligibility,
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, Justice Kagan did not consider the divide between direct and collateral consequences to have been
breached.103
Justice Kagan went on to argue that when the Padilla Court went
through a separate analysis of whether to apply Stricklandto the issue of
advisement about immigration issues, the Court was acknowledging the
existence of the collateral distinction. 104 It was this decision to apply
Strickland to a collateral consequence of conviction-deportation-that
Kagan argued broke new ground and created a new rule. 10 5 The crux of
the majority's opinion in Chaidez is that prior to Padilla the Supreme
Court had never applied the Sixth Amendment to any collateral consequence of a guilty plea. 106 In deciding Padilla,Justice Kagan wrote, the
Court "breach[ed] the' previously
chink-free wall between direct and col10 7
consequences."
lateral
D. Justice Thomas's ConcurringOpinion
Justice Thomas joined in the dissent in Padilla.°8 He did not believe that the Sixth Amendment extended any requirements of counsel

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.at II10.
Id.at 1108 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)).
See Hill, 474 U.S. at 57.
See id.at 54-55.
Id.at 60.
See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1108.
Id.
Id.at 110.
Id.at 1110-1 .

106.

See id.

107.
108.

Id.at 1110.
Padilla v. Kentucky,559 U.S. 356, 388 (2010).
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beyond "defense against prosecution of the charged offense."' 1 9 Justice
Thomas argued that Padilla was wrongly decided. Justice Thomas believed there was no right to advisement about immigration issues for the
Court to apply "either prospectively or retrospectively.","0 Because he
believed the Court decided Padilla incorrectly, Justice Thomas argued
that a Teague analysis was unnecessary and concurred only in the judgment in Chaidez."'1
E. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Sotomayor authored the dissent in Chaidez, which Justice
Ginsburg joined." 2 The dissent attacked Justice Kagan's contention that
a distinction between direct and collateral consequence existed in Supreme Court precedent."13 Justice Sotomayor pointed out that many of
the lower court cases acknowledging a distinction between direct and
collateral consequences were decided prior the passage of IIRIRA in
1996.14 This is important, Justice Sotomayor argued, because the 1996
laws changed the professional norms regarding advisement about the
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction.' 15 Justice Sotomayor
considered the 2001 decision INS v. St. Cyr 116 to be a watershed decision
regarding advisement about immigration issues in the context of a criminal proceeding, and noted that after St. Cyr a majority of circuit courts
counsel's duty to inform clients about
began acknowledging
7 defense
deportation issues."
The dissent in Chaidez argued that applying Strickland to the immigration consequences of a conviction did not break new ground. 1 8 In St.
Cyr, a case unrelated to the Sixth Amendment, the Court noted that competent criminal defense counsel would advise a client about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. 1 9 Justice Sotomayor pointed to appellate court decisions in United States v. Kwan 20 and United States v. Couto,12 1 each of which cited St. Cyr in applying Strickland to counsel misstatements about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea.122 In
109.
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1114 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 389)
(internal quotation mark omitted).
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1114 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

113.

See id. at 1117-18.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1I18.
Id. at 1116.
533 U.S. 289 (2001).
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1118 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Seeid. atll20-21.

119. See id. at I Ill(majority opinion) (citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323 n.50 (dealing with the
retroactivity of IIRIRA and AEDPA)).
120. 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir.2005).
311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogatedby Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
121.
122. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1118 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Kwan, 407 F.3d at
1015; Couto, 311 F.3d at 188).
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Kwan and Couto, federal circuit courts held that defense counsel's misstatements about immigration issues could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.123 However, where the Chaidez majority saw Kwan and Couto as part of an established chain of precedent regarding attorney misstatements to a client,' 24 the dissent instead saw a
clear precedent of applying Strickland to advisement
about the immigra25
tion consequences of a criminal conviction. 1
Justice Sotomayor argued that the outcome of the Strickland test in
Padillawas dictated by the combination of precedent for applying Strickland to deportation issues and the change in prevailing professional
norms that requiring defense counsel to advise a client about deportation
after the 1996 changes in immigration law. With the outcome dictated by
the 1996 changes in immigration law and the change in prevailing professional norms in response to that legislation, Padilla did not announce
a new rule under Teague and therefore should have been retroactive.126
III. ANALYSIS
In arguing that a "chink-free" wall between the direct and collateral
consequences of a criminal conviction existed prior to Padilla, Justice
Kagan ignored three lines of precedent that rendered the wall either nonexistent or thoroughly breached. The failure to acknowledge these precedents led to the erroneous decision that Padilla does not apply retroactively. First, the language of Padillaboth denies the existence of Justice
Kagan's wall and indicates that the Court anticipated the Padilla decision
would be retroactive. 127 Second, the Hill Court had applied the Strickland
test to the issue of advisement about parole eligibility, a collateral conse28
quence of criminal conviction, clearly breaching Justice Kagan's wall.
Finally, St. Cyr, Kwan, and Couto each recognized a criminal defendant's right to information about the immigration consequences of a guilty
plea after 1996. 129 Individually, each line of precedent provides a significant challenge to Justice Kagan's reasoning; taken together, the challenge is insurmountable.
Without the incorrect distinction between direct and collateral consequences, the 1996 changes in immigration law clearly dictated the result of the Strickland analysis in Padilla. With the Padillaoutcome dictated, the Teague analysis in Chaidez should have resulted in the Padilla
ruling applying retroactively.
123.

Id. (citing Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1015; Coulo, 311 F.3d at 188).

124.

See id. at IIII n.12, 1112 (majority opinion).

125.
See id. at 1118 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
126.
See id. at 1120-21.
127.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365, 371-72 (2010).
128.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-60 (1985).
129.
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321-24 (2001); United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015
(9th Cir. 2005), abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. 356; United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d
Cir. 2002), abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. 356.
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A. Padilla Said What?
The language of Padilla refutes two key elements of Justice Kagan's reasoning. First, the Padilla Court flatly rejected the distinction
between collateral and direct consequences when it comes to Sixth
Amendment analysis.130 Second, the Padilla Court specifically acknowlthe door to future claims as a result of
edged the possibility of opening
131
granting Padilla's request.
1. Justice Stevens: What Wall?
When Justice Kagan argued that Padilla "breach[ed] the previously
chink-free wall between direct and collateral consequences," she quoted
the Padilla decision: "Strickland applies to Padilla's claim. ' 3 It is an
ironic choice of quotation because just two paragraphs earlier in the Padilla decision, Justice Stevens addressed the direct versus collateral distinction head-on: "We, however, have never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally 'reasonable professional assistance' required under Strickland."133 Justice Stevens discussed how, aside from the general issue of
collateral versus direct consequences of conviction, deportation has a
unique relationship to criminal conviction for the defendant. 134 Justice
Stevens also noted the century-long history of connecting immigration
status to criminal conviction.' 35 According to the Padilla Court, the wall
that is the basic underpinning of the Chaidez decision did not exist.
2. Floodgates?
The plain language of Padillaanticipated retroactivity. 36 Although
it is dicta, Justice Stevens addressed the Government's concern that Padilla would open the floodgates to new claims.' 37 Rather than arguing a
flood could not occur because Padillawould not be retroactive, the Court
pointed to the same concerns regarding the Hill decision.' Justice Stevens assured the Government that, in spite of Hill being applied retroactively, "[a] flood did not follow" because the prejudice prong of the
Strickland standard was such a high bar to overcome. 139 This discussion

130.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365.
Id. at 372-74.
131.
132.
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110(2013) (quoting Padilla,559 U.S. at 366)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Padilla,559 U.S. at 365 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
133.
134.
Id. at 365-66.
135.
Id.
136.
See id. at 371-72 (discussing the possibility of a flood of cases based on the ruling).
137.
Id.
Id.
138.
139.
Id. at 371.
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demonstrates that the Padilla Court anticipated its holding would be ret40
roactive.
B. Hill v. Lockhart: Breaching the Direct Versus CollateralDistinction
Even if Justice Kagan's contention that there was a distinction between direct and collateral consequence is accepted, Hill v. Lockhart
breached it in 1985.141 The central underpinning of Justice Kagan's argument in Chaidez is that the application of the Strickland standard to
any collateral consequence of conviction was a departure from precedent. 42 Justice Kagan noted that the Hill Court explicitly left open
whether Strickland applied to collateral consequences. 143 The plain language of Hill supports this proposition, and Hill declined to rule on the
issue of collateral consequences generally.' 44 What Justice Kagan ignored is that the Hill Court did perform a Stricklandanalysis on the issue
of advisement about parole eligibility. 145 Specifically, the Hill Court
found that the petitioner failed to meet the second prong of the Strickland
distest. 146 If Kagan's wall existed, the Hill Court could have simply
47
1
not.
did
basis-it
distinction
collateral
the
on
claim
the
missed
Justice Kagan pointed to Part II of Padilla, where the Court analyzed whether to apply Strickland, as an indication of breaking new
ground regarding collateral consequences. 48 However, this ignored that
the Hill Court, without analyzing whether to apply Strickland, did apply
Strickland to the collateral consequence of parole eligibility. 49 Justice
Kagan's central point, that Padilla was the first case to apply Strickland
to a collateral consequence of a conviction, is simply erroneous. The Hill
Court breached the distinction over a quarter of a century earlier.
C. St. Cyr, Kwan, and Couto Recognize a Defendant's Right to Be Informed About the Immigration Consequences of a Guilty Plea After
1996
The words of Justice William Brennan perfectly describe the error
Justice
Kagan
made
in
Chaidez:
"[T]he Framers of
the Bill of Rights did not purport to 'create' rights. Rather, they designed
140.
Spahn, supra note 29, at 796-97.
141.
See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-60 (1985) (applying the Strickland test to counsel's
advice about parole eligibility, a collateral consequence).
142.
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1110 (2013).
143.
Id.at 1108.
144.
Hill, 474 U.S. at 60 ("We find it unnecessary to determine whether.., erroneous advice
by counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.").
145.
Id.at 58-59.
146.
ld. at 60.
147.
See Hill, 474 U.S. 52.
148.
Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. at 1110.
149.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010) ("We confronted a similar 'floodgates'
concern in Hill, but nevertheless applied Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the
client regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty." (citation omitted)).
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from infringing rights and
the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government
150
liberties presumed to be pre-existing."'
The Padilla decision did not create a right to information about the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea; rather, it recognized that right
as a manifestation of the Sixth Amendment after the 1996 immigration
laws went into effect. Three cases illustrate the recognition of that right
prior to Padilla's conviction. In St. Cyr, the Court acknowledged that the
1996 changes in immigration law altered the professional norms for
criminal defense counsel. 151 Kwan and Couto each acknowledged this
right in relation to the Sixth Amendment. 15 Justice Kagan incorrectly
viewed these three cases as assigning an obligation on defense counsel,
rather than recognizing a right of criminal defendants.
1. The Court Recognizes the Impact of IIRIRA and AEDPA in St.

Cyr
St. Cyr is not a Sixth Amendment case; instead, it is a case about the
retroactivity of IIRIRA and AEDPA. 153 However, referring to IIRIRA
and AEDPA, Justice Stevens wrote in his majority opinion,
"[C]ompetent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides, would have advised [a client] concerning the provision's
importance." 1 54 While this quote is dicta, one can infer the Supreme
Court's recognition that after the 1996 immigration law changes, the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel includes
advisement about immigration consequences of criminal proceedings.
Even though St. Cyr is not a Sixth Amendment case, it is a clear
statement from the Court that 'effective assistance of counsel includes
advisement about the immigration ramifications of criminal proceedings
after the 1996 immigration laws became effective. Regardless of whether
this is an acknowledgment of a breach in Justice Kagan's wall or a
statement of the wall's nonexistence, it refutes the idea of a pristine distinction.
2. Kwan and Couto apply St. Cyr to the Sixth Amendment
While St. Cyr did not deal directly with the Sixth Amendment implications of the 1996 immigration law changes, Kwan and Couto did.' 55
Each decision noted that IIRIRA and AEDPA made deportation nearly
automatic following certain convictions.1 56 Because the consequence of
150. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151.
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321, 323 n.50 (2001).
152.
United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1016 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogated by Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogatedby Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
153.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 292-93.
154.
Id.at 323 n.50.
155.
Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1016; Couto, 311 F.3d at 187-88.
156.
Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1008-09; Couto, 311 F.3d at 189-90.
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deportation had become a nearly automatic result of certain criminal
convictions for noncitizen defendants, each decision held that Strickland
applies to defense counsel's misstatements about deportation. 57 Both
decisions cited St. Cyr as acknowledgment by the Supreme Court of a
defendant's right to advisement
about the immigration consequences of a
58
criminal conviction.'
When viewed in the light of Kwan and Couto, the announcement in
Padilla essentially expanded the existing prohibition against misstatements to include omissions: no misstatements (Kwan and Couto) or
omissions (Chaidez) about deportation. 59 Justice Kagan argued that this
distinction has meaning; she placed Kwan and Couto in a line of cases
that prohibit attorney misstatements in general and gave no weight to the
cases' importance in recognizing the right of a criminal defendant
to
60
information about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.'
Adding a prohibition against attorney omissions to an existing rule
prohibiting attorney misstatements about deportation, however, is only
significant if viewed from the attorney's side of the attorney-client equation. While there is admittedly a difference between requiring an attorney
to provide accurate information and prohibiting an attorney from providing inaccurate information, there is no difference from the point of view
of a criminal defendant: either way, the defendant lacks the necessary
information to make an informed decision. By viewing these obligations
from the vantage point of the attorney, Justice Kagan misinterpreted the
Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment does not confer obligations
16
upon attorneys; it recognizes the rights of criminal defendants. 1
St. Cyr did not create an obligation that attorneys provide accurate
information about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea after the
1996 changes in the law; rather, it recognized that after the 1996 changes
in the law defendants have a right to accurate information about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. This right is what ultimately
determines what information defense counsel has a duty to provide, not
the reverse. Jose Padilla had the right to advisement by counsel about the
immigration consequences of his guilty plea in 2002. The Supreme Court
recognized it and provided him the relief to which he was entitled.
157.
158.
159.

Kwan, 407F.3dat 1015-16; Couto, 311 F.3d at 188.
Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1016; Couto, 311 F.3d at 187-88.
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1118-19 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

160.
Id.at 1112 (majority opinion).
161.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assislance of Counselfor his defence.
Id. (emphases added).
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Roselva Chaidez had the exact same right in 2003, but the Supreme
Court failed to recognize it and denied her the relief to which she was
entitled.
D. Strickland Dictated the Outcome in Padilla
Writing for the majority in Padilla, Justice Stevens specifically
pointed to IIRIRA and AEDPA as critical factors in the decision:
"[I]mportantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders."' 162 The Court stated that because of the near automatic nature of the
to divorce the penalty from the conconsequence it was "'most difficult'
' 63
viction in the deportation context."'
With the wall between direct and collateral consequence either never having existed, or if it had, having been breached by the time of Padilla, the Court applied the first prong of the Strickland test: whether the
assistance of counsel was effective. 164 Using the professional norms of
the time as the measuring stick, Strickland dictated that the PadillaCourt
find counsel ineffective for failing to warn Padilla about the impact of a
guilty plea on his immigration status.' 65 Professional norms are the
measuring stick of Strickland; when the norms changed in response to
the 1996 immigration law changes, that change dictated the outcome of
the Strickland test in Padilla.
E. The Supreme Court Should Have Found Padilla Retroactive Under
Teague in Chaidez
If a wall ever existed between direct and collateral consequences,'66
it was far from chink-free by the time Padilla was decided. Justice Kagan emphasized the fact that the Padilla Court went through a separate
analysis to determine whether to apply Strickland.167 The point she ignored was that the Padilla Court decided Strickland did apply-and fur68
ther noted that the prevailing professional norms dictated the outcome.
Applying the Sixth Amendment to collateral consequences was not
breaking new ground.
Without the distinction of direct versus collateral consequences to
cloud the issue, nothing else about the Padilla case was anything other
than a garden-variety application of Strickland.169 Padillamerely applied
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010).
162.
Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982), abrogated by
163.
Padilla,559 U.S. 356).

164.

Id.

See id. at 366-67.
165.
See id. at 365 ("We, however, have never applied a distinction between direct and -collat166.
eral consequences ....).
167.
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 (2013).
168.
See id. at 1114-15 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
169.
Id. at 1114.
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the standard for effective counsel from Strickland to a new set of circumstances: the deportation consequences of a guilty plea-after the enactment of the 1996 immigration laws. 7 ° Under Teague, a rule that is the
result of applying established precedent to new circumstances is retroactive; 17 1 the Chaidez dissent correctly concluded that this was the case
with the Padilladecision.
CONCLUSION

The Chaidez decision was an injustice. Had circumstances alerted
Roselva Chaidez to her deportation status earlier than it did, perhaps she
would have beaten Jose Padilla to the Supreme Court and received the
relief to which she was entitled. The Chaidez Court ignored the Hill, St.
Cyr, Kwan, and Couto decisions-and the language of the Padilla decision itself-when it determined that Padilla announced a new rule. Hill,
St. Cyr, Kwan, and Couto had already established a defendant's right to
information about the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction. Precedent for applying Strickland to collateral consequences of a
criminal conviction, specifically immigration consequences, already existed. 172
If the chink-free wall between direct and collateral consequences
ever existed, it had gaping holes punched through it by the time of the
Padilla decision. The prevailing professional norms required criminal
defense counsel to advise a client about the deportation consequences of
a guilty plea. These two facts, when measured against Strickland, dictated the outcome in Padilla. Under Teague, a dictated outcome does not
establish a new rule. Because Padilla did not announce a new rule, its
holding should have applied retroactively to Roselva Chaidez.

Levi Price

170.

Id. at 1115.

171.
Id. at 1107 (majority opinion).
172. Id. at 1118 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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FLORIDA V. JARDINES: TRESPASSING ON THE REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
ABSTRACT

The Fourth Amendment affords an individual's home robust protections from unreasonable searches. After all, the home is a highly private
locus and deserves heightened protections because it is where our most
personal and intimate activities occur. By finding in favor of the individual in Floridav. Jardines,the United States Supreme Court did not question this critical principle; a majority of the Justices concluded that absent a warrant, the police cannot bring a drug-sniffing dog into a home's
curtilage to search for narcotics. The Jardines Court premised its decision on property and trespass law, determining that there had been a per
se violation of the Fourth Amendment because the police gathered evidence by physically intruding onto Mr. Jardines' front porch.
However, the majority's sole reliance on property law rendered its
ruling incomplete. As Justice Kagan aptly noted in her concurring opinion, it would have been equally as appropriate to use privacy doctrine to
resolve the case. The majority's purposeful disregard of that critical
analysis leaves important questions unanswered and threatens to diminish Fourth Amendment protections.
This Comment argues that the Court in Florida v. Jardines should
have included an analysis of privacy doctrine and then discusses some of
the implications that arise from its absence. Although the individual prevailed in Jardines,the majority's narrow focus on property and trespass
law ignored an opportunity to overrule questionable cases and failed to
create broadly applicable precedent. Furthermore, the decision threatens
to diminish the Fourth Amendment protections of individuals who do not
live in single-family detached homes with accompanying property rights.
Lastly, the majority's neglect of a privacy analysis may send the message
that it is unworthy of consideration, and may therefore limit the future
application of critical privacy doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment provides, in part, that citizens have a right
to be free from unreasonable searches.' A Fourth Amendment search
occurs when the government infringes on an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy2 or "[w]hen 'the [g]overnment obtains information
by physically intruding' on persons, houses, papers, or effects." 3 As a
check against abusive government power, a search generally "requires a
warrant that is based on probable cause.", 4 If, however, the subject of the
search does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and the government does not commit an intrusion, then no warrant is required and
for the "purposes of the Fourth Amendment ...no search occurs." 5 Such
a system naturally creates tension between governmental police power
and individual rights. 6 In attempting to balance these often competing
interests, the Supreme Court must walk a fine line that preserves both. 7
Florida v.Jardines,8 a 2013 Supreme Court decision, addressed
whether police use of a drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of a house
was a search subject to Fourth Amendment protections. 9 The majority
I. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2.
Michael Mayer, Keep Your Nose out of My Business-A Look at Dog Sniffs
in Public
Places Versus the Home, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2012).
3. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012)).
4. Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Use of Trained Dog to Detect Narcotics or Drugs as Unreasonable Search in Violation of FourthAmendment, 150 A.L.R. FED. 399 (2005).
5.
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-42 (1988); Mayer, supra note 2, at 1033.
6. See Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment
Protection,73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 584 (1989).
7. Id.
8.
133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
9. Id.
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concluded that a warrantless sniff search targeting the interior of the
home but conducted from the front porch violated the Fourth Amendment. 10 However, the majority utilized property and trespass law instead
of privacy-rights doctrine to reach its decision."l This property-based
approach for deciding a dog-sniff case departed from most modem precedent 12 that had relied on privacy doctrine.1 3 By purposefully neglecting
to address an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, the majority
in Jardines failed to clarify or address the critical privacy concerns present when dog sniff searches are aimed at residences. Consequently, the
Jardines decision threatens to diminish Fourth Amendment protections
for those citizens who do not live in single-family detached houses.
This Comment progresses in three parts. Part I addresses prior dogsniff and recent Fourth Amendment cases and provides context for the
Jardinesdecision. Part II summarizes Jardines' facts, procedural history,
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part III explores and critiques the majority's rationale. It examines whether Jardines effectively
overrules prior dog-sniff and Fourth Amendment search cases, and discusses Jardines' potential implications for Fourth Amendment privacy
rights. Finally, this Comment posits that although the Court's opinion
resulted in a victory for Mr. Jardines, the majority's sole reliance on
property rights rendered the analysis incomplete and thus threatens to
reduce the Fourth Amendment protections Jardines purportedly safeguards.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Modern Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
4
The Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Katz v. United States1 transformed Fourth Amendment doctrine and ushered it into the modem era."
Katz departed from a narrow and literal text-based interpretation of
search, defined the term more broadly,' 6 and suggested that future analysis proceed "on a case by case basis."' 17 Deciding it was no longer limited9
8
analysis,'
to a dictionary definition and an old property and trespass

10. Id.
11.
ld.at 1417.
12.
ContraUnited States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-52 (2012) (providing a recent example
of the Court relying on a property analysis to answer a Fourth Amendment search question).
Compare Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 (basing the majority opinion on only a property law
13.
analysis), with Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (using a privacy doctrine analysis to
determine that a sniff search of the outside of a lawfully stopped car did not violate the Fourth
Amendment), and United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (relying on privacy doctrine to
conclude that a dog sniff of luggage did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
14.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
15.

See Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV.

687, 704-05 (2011).
16.
Serr, supra note 6, at 588-89, 593.
17. Mayer, supranote 2, at 1033.
Serr, supra note 6, at 591.
18.
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the Katz Court liberally construed search to mean any action taken by the
government that breached a citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy.2 °
Justice Stewart, writing for Katz's majority, explained, "[T]he Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places," including "what[ever an individual] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public. '21 Using this analysis, the Court determined that the government's
warrantless monitoring of Mr. Katz's conversation in an enclosed telephone booth violated the Fourth Amendment because Mr. Katz sought to
keep his conversation private. 22 However, the majority also noted that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect activity voluntarily exposed to the
public, even if such activity occurs within a home or private area.23 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion helped clarify the Court's ruling. 24 Recognizing the predominantly subjective nature of the majority's new test
(i.e., "whether an individual has knowingly exposed something to the
public or sought to preserve it as private"),25 Justice Harlan established a
twofold requirement for determining if the government has violated an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights. 26 "[F]irst[,] that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that . . .is

. . .

'reasonable.' 27 This reasonable

expectation of privacy interpretation became the accepted and prevailing
view, and has served as the foundational analysis in almost all modem
Fourth Amendment search cases. 28 Katz and Justice Harlan's twopronged approach remain, to this day, good law.29
19.

Marceau, supra note 15, at 704. Prior to Katz, "the governing principle of Fourth

Amendment law ...was predicated on ...property rights." Id.at 702. The Court's infamous deci-

sion in Olmstead v. United States demonstrated how the Court exclusively protected physical property rights. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). The Court ruled in Olmstead
that federal agents' warrantless wiretaps on Mr. Olmstead's home and office telephones did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because the wiretaps were not invasions of physical material interests. Id. Rather, the Court concluded that phone conversations were intangible and therefore incapable of suffering physical invasions. Id.The Court has also historically held that there is a per se
violation of the Fourth Amendment when the police trespass to search and obtain information. See,
e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1961). The Court in Silverman found a
violation of the Fourth Amendment not because the police unreasonably invaded Silverman's privacy rights, but because their search "was accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by [Silverman]." Id. at 509.
20. Mayer, supra note 2, at 1033.
21.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
22.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 ("One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him,
and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world."); Serr, supranote 6, at 592.
23.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."); Serr, supra note 6, at 592.
24. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring); Serr,supra note 6, at 592.
25.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Serr, supranote 6, at 592.
26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001) ("In assessing [searches], the
Court has adapted a principle first enunciated in Katz v. United States ....");California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988) (explaining that there would be a Fourth Amendment violation "only
if respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy.., that society accepts as objectively
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Oliver v. United States,30 a prominent Fourth Amendment case decided in 1984, used Katz's exception for activity voluntarily exposed to
the public's view to limit protection from searches. 31 The Court concluded that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
privately owned but publicly accessible outdoor fields and open lands,
even if the owner of those lands took reasonable precautions to limit the
public's access. 32 Fences and no trespassing signs were, according to the
33
majority, not enough to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Open fields typically do not serve as a setting for private activities in the
way that a home or office does. Nonetheless, by limiting the definition
and application of what constituted a reasonable expectation of privacy,
the Court weakened Katz's subjective reasonableness standard.34
Soon after the Oliver decision, the Court rendered another significant opinion in Californiav. Ciraolo,35 which again narrowed the definition of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy. 36 The Court
held that aerial surveillance of curtilage-the home's immediate surrounding land and fixtures-does not infringe on Fourth Amendment
protections. 37 The majority employed Oliver's rationale and reasoned
that individuals who expose activities conducted within the curtilage to
public view, even if only from above, forfeit any reasonable expectation
of privacy. 38 Whereas Oliver dealt only with open fields far from the
home, 39 Ciraolo seized upon the Katz exception for "knowingly expos[ed] to the public" ' 40 to conclude that a visual search aimed at curtilage, a traditionally protected area,4 1 was permissible if that area was not
reasonable"); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) ("The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy
.. .' [supported by Katz's] two-part inquiry... " (citation omitted) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360
(Harlan, J., concurring))); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) ("[T]his Court uniformly
has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its
protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has
been invaded by government action. This inquiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan aptly noted in his Katz
concurrence, normally embraces two discrete questions." (citations omitted)).
29.
Serr, supra note 6, at 593. Katz remains good law notwithstanding the fact that Floridav.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013), and United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012), have
resuscitated the old property and trespass approach for examining Fourth Amendment searches.
30.
466 U.S. 170 (1984).
31.
Id. at 179.
32.
Id. at 182.
33.
Id.
34.
See Serr, supra note 6, at 597-98.
35.
476 U.S. 207 (1986).
36.
Id. at 213-14.
37.
Id.
38.
Id. at 215.

39. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
40.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
41.
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414-15 (2013). Because curtilage has "ancient and
durable roots" and is protected as a "branch[] and appurtenant[]" part of the house, Justice Scalia
concluded that "the officers' investigation took place in a constitutionally protected area." Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 225 (1769)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
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42
hidden from public view. Although the police conducted their search in
Ciraolo "in a physically nonintrusive manner" (so that no trespass occurred),43 the Court's upholding of their visual invasion of curtilage
nonetheless resulted in a move away from Katz's robust protections."
After all, it is most likely reasonable for average citizens to expect that
the police will not fly over their houses at low altitude and peer down
into their patios and backyards.45

Unlike Oliver and Ciraolo, two of the Supreme Court's more recent
and illustrative Fourth Amendment cases have found in favor of the individual and sustained protection from unreasonably invasive police
searches.46 Kyllo v. United States4 7 accomplished this by applying Katz's
49
48
reasonable expectation of privacy test, whereas United States v. Jones
upheld Fourth Amendment protections by returning to a property analysis. 50 In Kyllo, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the use of
"sense-enhancing technology"-in this instance thermal-imaging technology only available to the government-to gather otherwise private
information from the home constituted a search because it violated the
heightened privacy expectations associated with the home. 51 He wrote
that even if used from a public area, intrusive technology capable of
viewing the activity inside a home invaded privacy rights and required a
warrant and probable cause.52 Both Kyllo and Ciraolo occurred without a
physical trespass, 53 but Kyllo violated the Fourth Amendment because
the thermal-imager's visual invasion of activity within the home went
beyond Ciraolo'smere visual invasion of activity within the curtilage.54
In Jones, the Court determined that attaching a Global Positioning
System (GPS) tracking device to an automobile without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment because a search occurs "within the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment" when "the [g]overnment obtains
information by physically intruding" on persons or their property.55
42.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
43.
Id.at213.
44.
See Serr, supra note 6, at 611-13.
45.
See id.
46.
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 40 (2001).
47.
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
48.
Id.at 40.
49.
132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).
50.
Id.at 950. Although Jones was a victory for the individual, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, disconcertingly deviated from the well-established Katz standard. Id. This deviation from
the traditional privacy analysis was repeated again the following year in Justice Scalia's majority
opinion in Floridav. Jardines.See infra Parts I.C, lll.B-C.
51.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
52.
Id.
53.
See id.at 31-33; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
54.
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37-38. Justice Scalia noted, seemingly with disapproval, that the
thermal-imager might disclose the "intimate" detail of"at what hour each night the lady of the house
takes her daily sauna and bath." Id.at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 n.3, 964 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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However, Justice Scalia, again writing for the majority, declined to address whether such police action violated the Katz reasonable expectation
of privacy standard. 56 Instead, he decided the case solely based on trespass law.57 Although he noted that searches "remain[ed] subject to Katz
analysis, '58 Justice Scalia declined to "rush[] forward to resolve [Katz
issues] here" because he felt that a privacy analysis would needlessly
raise "thorny problems" given Jones' particular set of facts.59
However, Justice Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion specifically noting that in addition to the correctly applied property doctrine, the
60
Court should have at least considered the Katz standard. She questioned
whether the use of a GPS tracking device to monitor the movements of
an individual violated a citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy, and
impliedly answered that it most likely did.6' Yet, notwithstanding Justice
Sotomayor's desire to include a privacy-rights analysis, Jones helped lay
served
return to a trespass analysis, 62 6and
the foundation for the Court's
3
as important precedent for Justice Scalia's opinion in Jardines.
B. The Supreme Court's Dog-Sniff Cases
Prior to Jardines, the United States Supreme Court had never addressed the constitutionality of a drug-dog's warrantless sniff search performed within the curtilage of an individual's home. However, in United
States v. Place64 and Illinois v. Caballes65 the Court did address the
Fourth Amendment implications of when police dogs aimed their sniffs
at objects other than a home. In both cases, the Court found that dogs
sniffing for narcotics did not violate the Fourth Amendment.6 6 Place held
that use of a dog to sniff luggage at an airport was not a search because a
sniff was less intrusive than a physical search of the luggage's contents
and because the contents remained private. 67 Although the sniff disclosed
the presence of narcotics, such disclosure was limited and "did not con68
stitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Similarly, Caballes concluded that a dog sniff performed in the course of a
traffic stop did not implicate privacy concerns. 69 The majority held that a
dog sniff of the exterior of a car legally stopped on a public road did not

56.
57.

Id. at 950 (majority opinion).
Id.

58.

Id. at 953 (emphasis omitted).

59.
60.

Id. at 954.
Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

61.

See id. at 956.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 949-50 (majority opinion).
See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414, 1417 (2013).
462 U.S. 696 (1983).
543 U.S. 405 (2005).
Id. at 409-10; Place,462 U.S. at 707.
Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
Id.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408-09.
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breach an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. 7 The Court in
Place explained that reasonable expectations of privacy may be tied to
"the manner in which the information is obtained." 71 Because in both
cases the search occurred in a public area and did not constitute a physical intrusion (i.e., a trespass), the Court concluded that each search was
reasonable and "[did] not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable
' 72
infringement."
C. Lower Courts' Treatment ofDog Sniffs TargetingDwellings
Several of the nation's lower courts have considered whether the
Fourth Amendment protects against dog sniffs aimed at dwellings when
the sniffs are conducted from the hallways and common spaces of hotels,
apartments, and other multi-unit residences.73 Although the United States
Supreme Court has upheld certain Fourth Amendment protections for
those who do not own their residences, 74 the lower courts' near unanimous conclusions have been that neither property law nor privacy rights
protect residents living in multi-unit dwellings from dog sniff searches
targeting their home but conducted from hallways or common areas. 75
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, perhaps
unsurprisingly, did not afford an individual staying in a hotel room the
same heightened privacy protections granted to someone residing in a
single-family detached house.76 Although people renting hotel rooms are
entitled to privacy within the room,77 the Eighth Circuit concluded that
an expectation of privacy does not extend to the common hallway outside the room because it is open to the public and "traversed by many
people. 78 As a result, a drug-sniffing dog patrolling the hallway and

70. Id
71.
Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
72.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
73.
See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
canine's drug-sniff from the publicly accessible hallway of an apartment building was not an unreasonable violation of privacy expectations); United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1124 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding that a drug-dog sniffing into rooms from a hotel corridor did not violate Fourth
Amendment privacy rights); Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1017-18 (Md. 2004) (holding that a
drug-dog's sniff of the exterior of an apartment was not a search because the police and dog were
lawfully located in the apartment building's common areas).
74. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958) (holding that warrantless entry
into an apartment is a Fourth Amendment violation); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453,
456 (1948) (holding that a tenant in a rooming house had his Fourth Amendment rights violated
when the police entered his room without a warrant).
75. See supra note 73; contra United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding that a drug-dog sniffing from the hallway into an apartment violated the Fourth Amendment
because it infringed on the dweller's heightened expectation of privacy attached to his place of
residence).
76. See Roby, 122 F.3d at 124.
77. Id at 1125 (concluding that "Mr. Roby had an expectation of privacy in his ... hotel
room").
78.
Id.
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detecting odors emanating from the rooms "does not contravene the
Fourth Amendment" even though the dog is sniffing into private areas. 79
Additionally, state and federal courts, with rare exception, do not afford apartment dwellers the same level of Fourth Amendment protection
against dog sniffs80 as the Supreme Court now affords residents of single-family houses. 81 Residents of apartment buildings do not have property rights in the hallways-the closest thing to curtilage in a multi-unit
dwelling. Thus, unlike individuals living in detached single-family houses, apartment dwellers cannot grant or revoke licenses 82 to people or police dogs approaching their front doors. 83 Courts have also determined
that, similar to hotel corridors, the quasi-public nature of hallways and
common areas in apartment buildings diminishes or even eliminates a
resident's reasonable expectation of privacy in those locations. 84 The
rationale is that public access to hallways and common areas, even if
only to a limited extent, necessarily reduces the resident's privacy expectation because anyone could be passing through.85 The court in Fitzgerald v. State86 clearly articulated that because "the apartment building's
common area and hallways were accessible to the public," the dog sniff
was not a search because the police were not trespassing or violating
privacy rights. 87 United States v. Scott88 similarly held that a sniff search
of an apartment's front door was legal because the police and drugsniffing dog were lawfully present in the hallway outside of the apartment and engaged in the course of "[o]fficial conduct that [did] not
'compromise any legitimate interest in privacy."' 89

79.
Id.
80.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text; Leslie A. Lunney Has the Fourth Amendment
Gone to the Dogs?: UnreasonableExpansion of Canine Sniff Doctrineto Include Sniffs of the Home,

88 OR. L. REV. 829, 831 (2009) (noting that the Second Circuit is the only federal circuit court to
conclude that a dog sniff of a private residence is a search).
81.

Florida v.Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417-18 (2013).

82. Historically, residents of detached single-family houses have had the power to grant or
revoke licenses to others approaching their home, thereby controlling who can access their property.
See id. at 1415. "A license may be implied from the habits of the country," McKee v. Gratz, 260
U.S. 127, 136 (1922) (citing Marsh v. Colby, 39 Mich. 626, 627 (1878)), but there also exists an
"implicit license typically permit[ting] the visitor to approach the home." Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at
1415.

83.
See United States v. Cephas, 254 F.3d 488, 494 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 89, 92 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing United States v.
Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32 (1 st Cir. 1998)) ("It is now beyond cavil in this circuit that a tenant lacks a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building."); Mayer, supra
note 2, at 1043.
85.
See Mayer, supranote 2, at 1043-44.
86. 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004).
87.
Id.at 1017-18.
88.
610 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2010).
89. Id. at 1016 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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The only potential caveat in such cases, explained by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Heath,90 is that a heightened expectation of privacy may exist when apartment buildings are locked and only accessible to
tenants. 9' Nonetheless, the expectation of privacy may be diminished if
even just one resident of the building unlocks the doors and permits the
police to enter. 92 If that occurs, the police presence becomes lawful, and
they may search hallways and common areas and use dogs to sniff for
drugs. 93

II.

FLORIDA V. JARDINES

A. Facts
On November 3, 2006, Detective William Pedraja of the MiamiDade Police Department received an unverified tip that Joelis Jardines
was cultivating marijuana in his home. 94 One month later, Detective Pedraja and Detective Bartelt investigated the claim.95 Franky, a drugsniffing dog, accompanied Detectives Bartelt and Pedraja as they staked
out Mr. Jardines' home. 96 After observing the home for fifteen minutes
and not seeing any signs of activity, Detectives Pedraja and Bartelt,
along with Franky, approached Mr. Jardines' house.97 As Franky neared
the residence he became excited, having detected one of the odors he was
trained to recognize. 98 Seeing Franky agitated, Detective Pedraja "stood
back," and Detective Bartelt gave Franky the full benefit of the six-foot
leash so that the dog could freely ascertain the source of the odor. 99
Franky worked his way up onto Mr. Jardines' porch, ultimately settling
at the base of the home's front door and signaling that this was the odor's
origin and strongest point.1°° Detective Bartelt and Franky then retreated,
and Bartelt notified Pedraja that Franky had positively indicated that
narcotics were present. °0
Based on Franky's discovery, Detective Pedraja quickly moved for
and obtained a warrant to search Mr. Jardines' residence where, upon
execution, the police discovered marijuana plants growing inside. 102 The

90.

91.
92.
93.
94.
aff'd, 133

259 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2001).

Id. at 534.
See United States v. Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1193 (D. Colo. 2008).
See id.
Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 37 (Fla. 2011), rev'g 9 So. 3d I (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008),
S. Ct. 1409 (2013).

95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013).

98.
99.

Id.
Id.

100.
101.
102.

ld.
Id.
Id.
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police
arrested Mr. Jardines and charged him with marijuana traffick03
ing.1
B. ProceduralHistory
Mr. Jardines argued at his trial that the use of a drug-sniffing dog
positioned on his front porch was an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment. 104 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the
matter, 10 5 ruled in favor of Mr. Jardines, and granted his motion to suppress the discovery of the marijuana plants. 1' 6 The State appealed, and
the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed the suppression ruling. 1° 7 The court concluded that no illegal search occurred because a dog
sniff did not require a warrant, the police had probable cause, and the
discovery of the marijuana "was inevitable."' 0 8 The Florida Supreme
Court accepted a petition for discretionary review and overruled the
Third District Court of Appeal's decision. 10 9 The Florida Supreme Court
held that the use of Franky to investigate Mr. Jardines' house was a
Fourth Amendment search unsupported by probable cause," 0 reasoning
that the tip that Mr. Jardines was growing marijuana was unverified, uncorroborated, and from an unknown individual."' It therefore concluded
112
that the warrant obtained in light of Franky's sniff search was invalid.
Furthermore, Florida's Supreme Court determined that the "'sniff test'
... constitute[d] an intrusive procedure" and was a "'search' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."' " 3 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari, taking up the question of whether the officers'
and dog's behavior was a Fourth Amendment search. 114
C. Majority Opinion
In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court affirmed the
Florida Supreme Court, concluding that police use of a narcotics sniffing
dog "to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings" constituted
a Fourth Amendment search." 15 In his opinion, joined by Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice Scalia focused his analysis

103.
104.

Id.
Id.

105.
Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 38 (Fla. 2011), rev'g 9 So. 3d I (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008),
aff'd, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
106. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1413.
107.

108.
2008)).
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.

Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 38 (quoting State v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d 1, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1413.
Id.
Jardines,73 So. 3d at 54-55.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 49.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.
Id. at 1417-18.
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on property rights, not privacy rights.'l 6 He found that a trespass occurred because the police "physically intrud[ed] on Jardines' property to
gather evidence" without Mr. Jardines' consent. 117 Quoting UnitedStates
v. Jones, Justice Scalia concluded that because any information gathered
by warrantless physical intrusion was a per se violation of the Fourth
Amendment, Mr. Jardines had undoubtedly been the victim of an illegal
1 18
search.
The majority found that an individual's right "to retreat into his own
home and ... be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion" stood
at the "very core" of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee 1 9 that the "right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."'' 20 The
Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to all intrusions onto personal property,1 21 but concluded that it does protect against
physical invasions of "[t]he area 'immediately surrounding and associat22
ed with the home"' (i.e., the curtilage).
Because curtilage includes the front porch, the Court considered
whether the police committed "an unlicensed physical intrusion."1 23 The
majority decided that the police did commit such an intrusion because
they entered Mr. Jardines' porch without his consent and engaged in
something for which "[t]here [was] no customary invitation."' 24 According to Justice Scalia, the implicit license that homeowners grant to visitors such as "Girl Scouts [or] trick-or-treaters" does not extend to trained
narcotics dogs fishing for evidence. 125 He said that no customary license
grants the police an invitation "to explore the area around the home in
hopes of discovering incriminating evidence., 126 Therefore, the police
and drug-dog exceeded the scope of their license1 27 and unlawfully intruded onto Mr. Jardines' property. 28 The Court concluded that an illegal
search occurred because the government obtained information by intruding into a constitutionally protected area without permission.129 Acquir116.
Id. at 1414, 1417.
117.
Id. at 1417.
118.
Id. at 1414 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012)).
119.
Id. at 1412 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
120.
Id. at 1414 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121.
Id. (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)).
122.
Id. at 1412, 1414 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
123.
Id.at 1415.
124.
Id. at 1415-16.
125.
Id.
126.
Id. at 1416.
127.
Id. at 1415-16. Justice Scalia noted that the police are within the scope of their license if
they merely approach the home, but that action above and beyond what "any private citizen might
do" (such as bringing a dog onto your porch to sniff for drugs) exceeds the scope of their implied
license because such action breaches "background social norms." Id. (quoting Kentucky v. King,
131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
128.
Id at 1416.
129.
Id.at 1414.
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ing information by such means automatically triggers property and trespass-based Fourth Amendment protections.'
Consequently, Justice
Scalia concluded that there was no need to examine whether the police
violated Mr. Jardines' privacy rights under Katz v. United States.131
D. ConcurringOpinion

Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, wrote to
emphasize that the police violated both Mr. Jardines' property rights and
his privacy rights. 32 Mr. "Jardines' home was his property," but "it was
also his most intimate and familiar space" and was protected by heightened privacy expectations. 33 The concurring opinion determined that the
police infringed on Mr. Jardines' privacy because they employed "a super-sensitive instrument," i.e., Franky's nose, to detect what was not
otherwise noticeable. 134 Justice Kagan concluded that this violated the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" standard articulated in Katz because
the police (literally) "nos[ed] into intimacies [Mr. Jardines] sensibly
thought [were] protected from disclosure[.]', 135 Additionally, the concurring opinion reasoned that the use of such technology to see (or in this
case to smell) into Mr. Jardines' intimate and private space clearly constituted an invasion of privacy consistent with the decision in Kyllo v.
United States.36
1 Justice Kagan likened Franky's advanced olfactory abilities to Kyllo's thermal-imaging device. 137 She said that drug-sniffing
dogs, like advanced thermal-imagers, are technologically advanced instruments not available to the public.138 Therefore, their use to examine a
home without a warrant amounts to an invasion of privacy. 139 Justice
Kagan summed up her concurring opinion by reemphasizing that an inclusion of the Katz privacy analysis strengthened the majority's property
approach and easily resolved the case.'40
E. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Kennedy and Breyer, contended that the police neither violated Mr.
Jardines' property rights by approaching his front door, nor his privacy

130.

Id.

131.
Id.
at 1417.
132.
Id.
at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).
133. Id.at 1419.
134. Id.at 1418; see Kyllo v. United States, 533 US. 27, 34-35, 40 (2001). With this description of Franky's nose and what it could detect, Justice Kagan is no doubt drawing an analogy to the
thermal-imager from Kyllo. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
135.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
136.

Id.at 1418-19.

137.

Id.at 1419.

138.

Id.

139.
140.

Id.
Id.at 1420.
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rights by using a dog to sniff for narcotics. 14 1 Justice Alito found no evidence of trespass because he claimed the police officers' behavior did
not deviate from either the implied license to approach a home or Kentucky v. King's 42 "knock and talk" rule. 143 Justice Alito noted that the
rule from King granted police officers an implied license to approach
homes.' 4 He also noted that, according to King, the police do not engage
in a search when they walk up to front doors, even if they approach solely to gather evidence. 145 The dissenting opinion contended therefore that
Detective Bartelt and Franky "did not exceed the scope of the license to
approach" because they did not deviate from the license's established
"spatial and temporal limits." 46 By approaching Mr. Jardines' home
during the day, staying on the front yard's paved walkway, and only remaining on the property for a few minutes, the dissenting opinion found
that the police did not do anything forbidden under King's knock and talk
rule or limited by the common law license to approach. 147 Justice Alito
accused the majority of distorting the law to comport with its desired
result and claimed that Anglo-American common law lacked any support
48
whatsoever for their contentions. 1
The dissent also dismissed Justice Kagan's claim that Franky was a
unique technology whose use intruded on privacy rights. 149 Justice Alito
claimed that law enforcement has been using dogs and their sense of
smell for centuries.150 He asserted that such use in no way violated Mr.
Jardines' reasonable expectation of privacy because a reasonable person
would be aware that the police use drug-sniffing dogs, and would assume
that odors may emanate from a dwelling and spread to areas freely accessible to the public.' 5' Thus, Justice Alito found no infringement on reasonable expectations of
privacy and therefore no illegal search or Fourth
152
Amendment violation.
III. ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court decided Floridav. Jardinesby determining that
the police dog's sniff search on the front porch-an area well within established curtilage-constituted a trespass under property law and therefore an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 53 Although

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.at 1426 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849 (201 I).
Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1423;King, 131 S.Ct. at 1862.
Jardines,133 S. Ct.at 1423.
Id.
Id.at 1422-23.
Id.
Id. at1420-21.
Id.at1425.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1426.

153.

See id. at 1414-16 (majority opinion).
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Jardines' outcome differed from many of the Court's other dog-sniff
cases, it did not overrule those previous holdings. 154 Despite Jardines
finding in favor of the individual,155 its easily distinguishable facts and
distinct doctrinal approach ensure the continued viability of cases like
Place, Caballes, and Scott.1 56 Although Justice Kagan's analysis, if
adopted by the majority, would not have upset Place or Caballes, its
emphasis on privacy doctrine would have provided a broader examination of critical Fourth Amendment issues and probably overturned cases
like Scott. Therefore, in order to provide the most robust Fourth
Amendment search protections, the majority should have adopted Justice
Kagan's approach and supplemented its property analysis with privacy
considerations. Instead, the majority's decision to focus solely on property and trespass law raises concerns with the future application of privacy
rights in Fourth Amendment cases. Jardines' purposeful neglect of the
Katz standard leaves unanswered critical questions concerning what level
of privacy an individual can expect in his or her dwelling and jeopardizes
the Fourth Amendment rights of many of this country's citizens. Although the Court's decision was technically a victory for Mr. Jardines,
Jardines fails to overturn questionable prior decisions or apply and ensure that the longstanding privacy doctrine maintains its importance in
Fourth Amendment analysis.
A. Jardines Does Not Overrule Place, Caballes, Scott, or OtherSimilar
Dog-Sniff Cases
Contrary to Illinois v. Caballes and UnitedStates v. Scott, Floridav.
Jardines found in favor of the individual claiming a Fourth Amendment
violation.1 57 Jardines achieved this result by focusing on the fact that the
search occurred in a constitutionally protected location and by employing
property law instead of privacy doctrine. 158 However, Jardines did not
taken by Place, Caballes, and Scott, nor
invalidate the privacy approach
did it overrule their holdings. 5 9 Jardinesis therefore best understood as a

First, Jardines makes no mention in its opinion about overruling prior case law. Second,
154.
the facts and situation in Jardinesare not analogous to the facts from other cases because those cases
did not concern privately owned homes surrounded by curtilage. See, e.g., United States v. Scott,
610 F.3d 1009, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010) (concerning rented apartments without curtilage or property
rights).
See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417-18 (concluding that the police engaged in an illegal
155.
search and affirming Florida's Supreme Court ruling in favor of Mr. Jardines).
Compare Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414-15 (examining curtilage rights and private homes),
156.
with Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406-09 (2005) (looking at automobiles on public roads),
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 697-700 (1983) (involving luggage in airports), and Scott, 610

F.3d at 1012, 1016 (concerning apartments where the residents are not protected by property rights).
157. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; Scott, 610 F.3d at 1018. The Court in Place ruled in favor
of the individual, but absent an improper seizure-"the seizure of respondent's luggage was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment"--would not have done so. Place, 462 U.S. at 707, 710
("Therefore, we conclude that.., exposure ofrespondent's luggage ...to a trained canine [] did not
constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
158. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1417-18.
159. Id.at1414.
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location-specific refinement of the dog-sniff doctrine that Place and related cases advanced.
Place held that a warrantless dog sniff did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 60 The Court, using Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test, determined that the dog sniff in question was not an unreasonable
invasion of privacy because it occurred in the very public realm of an
airport and because the sniff search did not expose the private contents of
the suitcase for public display. 161 Jardines held that a dog sniff was unconstitutional, but the critical difference between the two cases is that in
Jardines the sniff occurred within the home's curtilage boundaries and
violated property rights. 162 The majority in Jardines determined that unlike a dog sniff of a suitcase in a public airport, which implicated privacy
doctrine, a sniff search occurring within the boundaries of curtilage im63
plicated property law and activated Fourth Amendment protections.1
However, Jardines' use of different doctrinal analysis does not void the
constitutionality of dog sniffs aimed at luggage or reverse Place's holding. Rather, it highlights the underlying factual differences between the
two cases and demonstrates the different possible outcomes when using
property law and privacy-rights analysis.
The Court in Caballes found that police use of a narcotics dog did
not violate Fourth Amendment protections when the dog sniffed the exterior of an automobile that had been lawfully pulled over on a public
road. 64 The public and exposed location was critical to the Court's conclusion, as was the fact that the dog sniff only revealed the presence of
contraband.1 65 Because open roads do not hide a vehicle or its occupant,
and because there is no right to possess contraband, the Court concluded
that a dog sniff of the exterior of a car did not violate the driver's reasonable expectation of privacy. 166 Caballes, like Place, relied on privacy
doctrine and remains good law because its facts do not align
with
67
Jardines' or allow for application of a similar property analysis. 1
Jardines does not upset the Supreme Court's general dog-sniff jurisprudence, epitomized by Place and Caballes, nor does it upset the
lower courts' decisions about dog sniffs aimed at multi-unit dwellings. 68
This is because the Court in Jardinesemphasized location and focused
on the fact that the police trespassed and illegally searched for drugs
from within the curtilage.169 The facts from the prior apartment cases are
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
Id. at 706-07.
Jardines,133 S. Ct. at 1414.
Id. at 1414-16.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005).
Id. at 409-10.
Id.
Id. at 408-09.
See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010).
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not analogous; the courts have held that the Fourth Amendment does not
protect hallways and common areas of multi-unit residences, and that the
police do not trespass or exceed the scope of their license to approach
when they enter those areas.170 Not only do apartments and similar dwellings lack protection from trespass, but also their openness and close
proximity diminish residents' privacy expectations both inside the dwelling and in hallways and common areas outside. 71 Jardines, with its different fact pattern, does not overrule prior apartment cases or question
their holdings. 72 However, Jardinesdid present the Court with an opportunity to reevaluate the dubious holdings and privacy analyses of those
older cases. The fact that the Court did not seize the opportunity to do so
is a serious oversight and shortcoming that leaves the Jardines ruling
lacking in critical analysis.
B. The Majority'sAnalysis Is Insufficiently Developed
Justice Scalia wrote that his use of trespass law "keeps easy cases
easy." 173 This sentiment might explain why the majority's opinion is
oversimplified and under-inclusive. Trespass law is only one way to decide Fourth Amendment cases174 and its tenets are often debatable. 75
Jardines' facts may arguably lend themselves to a straightforward,
"baseline[,] ... [and] easy" 176 application of trespass law, but contrary to
the majority's contention, the Court should have also engaged in a privacy analysis. 77 Privacy rights are crucial to a complete Fourth Amendment analysis.1 78 Especially because the home is an area of heightened
privacy protections, 79 the majority should have supplemented its property law analysis with an examination of privacy expectations. Justice
Scalia readily admits that "[a]t the Amendment's 'very core' stands 'the
right ... to retreat into [your] own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."' 1 80 To be free from intrusion is precisely what it means to have privacy, and therefore the home-the most

170.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
171.
Id.
172.
See supra notes 154, 156 and accompanying text.
173.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
174.
Id. at 1414. Justice Scalia noted that property and trespass law is one way-but not the
only way-to address Fourth Amendment violations. Id. He acknowledged that the Katz privacy
standard "add[s] to the baseline" of the Fourth Amendment's protections. Id.
175.
See, e.g., id. at 1420-24 (Alito, J., dissenting).
176.
Id. at 1417 (majority opinion).
177.
Id. ("[W]e need not decide whether the officers[] ... violated [Mr. Jardines'] expectation
of privacy under Katz.").
178.
See Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 649 (Cal. 1994) ("[T]he right to
privacy [is] 'an important American heritage and essential to the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the ... Fourth ... Amendment[] to the U.S. Constitution."'); see supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
179.
Serr, supra note 6, at 593.
180.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511

(1961)).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 91:2

highly private locus' 8'-is deserving of the greatest Fourth Amendment
protections and a thorough application of privacy doctrine.' 82 The majority's purposeful disregard of Katz and privacy renders its opinion incomplete and fails to extend search protections to all citizens. Had the majority employed a privacy analysis, the Court could have ensured equal
application of the Fourth Amendment for all citizens by reasserting that
the home, no matter what its physical or structural characteristics, receives the greatest Fourth Amendment protections.
Justice Kagan, noting that privacy interests would have just as easily decided this case, filled the majority's void. 183 She argued that the
Miami-Dade Police Department violated Mr. Jardines' reasonable expectation of privacy when it used a trained narcotics dog to "reveal within
84
the confines of a home what they could not otherwise" have observed.
To reach this conclusion, Justice Kagan appropriately based her privacy
analysis off the Court's decision in Kyllo. 85 She accurately compared
Jardines' narcotic-sniffing dog to Kyllo's thermal-imager, noting that
drug-sniffing dogs are highly specialized pieces of equipment unavailable to the public. 186 The concurring opinion concluded that the use of
such technology to smell into an individual's home violated a reasonable
expectation of privacy just like the use of a thermal-imager
to see into
87
the home violated reasonable privacy expectations. 1
Additionally, Justice Kagan's opinion impliedly acknowledged the
important distinction between the target of a search and the location of a
search. 88 Kyllo explained that the search's target ought to be examined
because it may have privacy rights associated with it.' 89 Contrarily, Jones
held that it was only necessary to determine if a trespass occurred at the
search's location, and concluded that there was no need to examine
whether the search's target was entitled to a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 19° Justice Kagan's concurring opinion in Jardines rightly applied Kyllo's approach. It considered the search's target and explained
that there is the presumption that when the police target a residence-or
even "the entrance to [a dwelling]"-privacy rights apply and the protections of the Fourth Amendment are in full force.' 9 1 By adopting Kyllo's
approach and rationale, Justice Kagan realized and emphasized the im-

181.

Id.

182.
183.
184.

See id.
Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).
Id. at 1419.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Seeid. at 1418.
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34, 40 (2001).

190. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
191.
Jardines,133 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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portance of including a privacy-rights analysis when deciding Fourth
Amendment search cases. 192

Jardines' majority should have examined the Katz doctrine and
Kyllo's privacy analysis because both are relevant when examining
Fourth Amendment protections for the home. Thankfully, Justice Kagan's concurring opinion picked up where the majority left off, managed
to provide a straightforward application of privacy doctrine, and made
"an 'easy cas[e] easy' twice over."' 9 3 Although the majority's property
and trespass approach upheld Fourth Amendment rights, the holding is
incomplete because of the failure to adequately address all of the critical
elements of a Fourth Amendment case. As a result, the majority runs the
risk that Jardines will eventually come to signify that the privacy analysis is of secondary importance or that its examination is only required if
the trespass standard is not met. 194
C. The Majority'sHolding Is ProblematicBecause It Raises Practical
and Social Concerns and PotentiallyLimits Critical Constitutional
Protections
Jardines held that the police conducted an illegal search, but the
opinion does not strengthen Fourth Amendment protections. The majority's decision to pursue only a property and trespass analysis threatens to
diminish Katz's longstanding and critical privacy doctrine. As a result,
Justice Scalia may have taken an "easy"1 95 case and "produce[d] inferior
law." 96 By refusing to examine whether Mr. Jardines had a reasonable
expectation of privacy at the doorstep of his home, the Court created two
problems. First, its narrow focus on property law produced uncertainty
and practical problems with future application of Fourth Amendment
protections for residences. Second, by failing to examine privacy rights
and address the implications and holdings of the lower courts' prior dogsniff cases, the Court perpetuated a troubling application of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that fails to apply constitutional protections
equally to all individuals.
1. Practical Questions Are Left Unanswered
The majority's singular focus on property and trespass law created a
narrow holding that will be difficult to apply in future cases when dog
sniffs are aimed at a home. For example, what if, instead of Franky sniffing from Mr. Jardines' front porch, he was an extraordinarily talented
192. Id. at 1419-20.
193. Id. at 1420 (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 1417 (majority opinion)).
194.
In fact, Jardinesis the second Supreme Court decision in as many years to ignore a privacy analysis in favor of the old property and trespass standard. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
949 (2012), is the other case decided using property rights. Therefore, Jardinescould be interpreted
as reinforcing this trend.
195. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 (majority opinion).
196. Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006).
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drug-sniffing dog and could detect odors from the street? Or, what if
technology advances to the point where it becomes possible to conduct
drug searches of homes from public areas? Kyllo might provide some
guidance,' 97 but Place and Caballes might contravene Kyllo. 198 Because
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband,' 99 and because a drug-dog's sniff search would only reveal drugs, those questions
become complicated. Regardless of what their answers might be, and
although the home would still be the target of the search, the change in
location from where the police conduct the search would render
Jardines' narrow focus on property and trespass law incapable of providing answers. Justice Kagan's privacy-rights framework would be much
better suited to tackling those complex questions and is certainly easier
to apply when the facts from other cases do not exactly align with those
from Jardines.2°
Another problem with the majority's opinion is that its analysis only
relied on the physical characteristics of Mr. Jardines' property. 201 Mr.
Jardines was only afforded Fourth Amendment protection in this case
because he lived in a single-family detached house with a front porch and
a surrounding yard.20 2 Consequently, the majority's fact-specific analysis
cannot answer what would have happened had Mr. Jardines been living
in an apartment when the police brought a drug-dog to his front door.
Certainly a curtilage analysis would be inapplicable, and a trespass analysis would fail to address the Fourth Amendment's critical privacy concerns and seemingly guarantee victory for the state. 203 However, a privacy analysis could resolve whether the police officers' search violated the
Fourth Amendment. Yet, the majority in Jardines purposely avoided
discussing privacy rights. 204 Would a dog sniff search of an apartment
from outside its door be permissible? Many older cases hold that it would
be. 20 5 But, even though Jardines emphasized a residence's special protected status, 2° 6 the majority's analysis cannot answer whether apartments-despite also being places of residence-would be afforded similar heightened protections.

197.
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). Kyllo's facts are similar to that hypothetical, and the Court held that a thermal-imager used from a public road to peer into a home was an

unconstitutional invasion of privacy rights. Id. at 40.
198. Both cases held that sniffs by drug-dogs in public areas did not violate reasonable expectations of privacy because they did not reveal intimate details otherwise hidden from public view.
See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
199. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408.
200. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418-20 (Kagan, J., concurring).
201.
Id. at 1414 (majority opinion).
202. Id.
203.
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Jardines' narrow and fact-specific decision is therefore only relevant to cases with nearly identical facts and does not adequately advance
Fourth Amendment interpretation. As a result, it produces no broadly
applicable rule and provides only limited guidance. Broader holdings and
definitions of search are generally better because they are "fairer, more
regular, [and] more constitutionally reasonable . . . [and because they]
reduce[] the opportunities for official arbitrariness, discretion, and discrimination. ' 20 7 By failing to provide a broadly applicable interpretation
of Fourth Amendment rights for when dog sniffs are aimed at dwellings,
Jardines leaves lower courts largely without guidance when faced with
similar but not easily comparable cases.
2. Social and Constitutional Concerns
The second major problem with the majority's analysis is that it did
not adequately address the privacy rights inherent to all places of residence 20 8 or consider their impact on a dwelling regardless of its physical
or economic nature. This lack of a privacy analysis allows for the perpetuation of troubling constitutional inequalities and threatens to limit application of Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy standard.
Although the majority recognized that at the "very core" of the
Fourth Amendment stands an individual's right to retreat into the home
and "there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion," 2° 9 its
opinion did not extend that protection to all citizens. Under Justice Scalia's property analysis, only citizens living in places with curtilage-i.e.,
most privately owned single-family homes-are afforded Fourth
Amendment protection from police dogs sniffing for narcotics. 210 Unlike
Kyllo, which was decided based on the target of the search,2" the Court
relied on the location of the search in Jardines.21 2 Justice Scalia reasoned
that the police violated Mr. Jardines' Fourth Amendment rights because
they searched from a specific location-his front porch.21 3 However, the
Court should have decided Jardines by examining the target of the

207.
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 809
(1994).
208.
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001); United States v. Thomas, 757
F.2d 1359, 1366 (2d Cir. 1985).
209.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511

(1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
210.
Id. at 1416.
211.
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. Kyllo was decided based on the target of the search. Id. Because
the target was the home, and the Fourth Amendment affords the greatest protection to the home, the
Court deemed the search illegal. Id. Because the police did not commit a trespass, the search's location was irrelevant, and it would not have made any difference had the police used the thermalimager from an airplane, satellite, or the neighbor's house next door. Id.
212.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416-17.
213.
Id. at 1417 ("Thus, we need not decide whether the officers' investigation of Jardines'

home violated his expectation of privacy under Katz.... That the officers learned what they learned
only by physically intruding on Jardines' property to gather evidence is enough to establish that a
search occurred.").
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search, which is what Justice Kagan's concurring opinion advocated.
That is, the Court should have decided the case based on the fact that the
police searched Mr. Jardines' home.
Justice Scalia's narrow focus on location instead of target risks diminishing the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who do not live in
stand-alone houses.2 1 4 When the police aim searches at the home, the
courts often determine the applicability of Fourth Amendment protections by looking at the dwelling's physical characteristics. 2 5 Because of
this, structure becomes a decisive factor in the level of protection afforded to individuals, and Fourth Amendment rights become highly correlated to economic class.216 This results in an application of the Fourth
Amendment that favors those who have the financial ability to afford
private homes.21 7 This, in turn, offers wealthier citizens greater protection
than poorer citizens. 2 18 "Privacy follows space . . . people with money
have more space than people without" and therefore are granted the
heightened privacy protections that go along with their additional space
and curtilage. 21 9 Poorer and younger people generally are unable to afford private homes and more often live in apartments. 2 2 As a result, they
do not have curtilage or property rights and the Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit the police from conducting searches at their front doors. 22
This ensuing disparity in Fourth Amendment protections is cause
for concern. The Fourth Amendment should not "protect[] only those
persons who can afford to live in a single-family residence with no surrounding common space. 222 Instead, the Fourth Amendment must protect all people from unwarranted governmental intrusion. 223 Failure to
provide such protection would grant greater Fourth Amendment protections to those "who are more financially successful, ' 224 those who are
older, those with a larger family, those who are less transient, and those
who do not live in a high-density urban environment. The text of the
Fourth Amendment does not differentiate between property owners and
renters or between single-family homes and multi-unit dwellings; it affords all people the same level of protection from governmental intru25
sion.2
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curtilage-improperly shifts the focus of Fourth Amendment protections
and threatens to greatly diminish the cherished, heightened, and longestablished privacy rights that accompany homes.226 At least in this and
similar contexts, the target of the search is more important than the location from which it occurs. After all, the Fourth Amendment does not
protect places; it protects people and objects.227
Jardines' failure to address privacy concerns and extend full Fourth
Amendment protections to all citizens regardless of what type of home
they live in has serious constitutional ramifications. It also creates bad
law and propagates the unfortunate precedent of limiting Fourth
Amendment privacy analysis. Although fluidity and flux often characterize the Fourth Amendment, 228 Jardines strays too far by totally neglecting privacy analysis. Trespass law, while certainly a traditional and valid
means of determining whether an illegal search has occurred, "need[s] to
be supplemented to deal with" the privacy concerns brought on by new
technology (such as drug-dogs) and changing social norms. 229 Justice
Scalia may contend that Katz is still good law, 230 but Jardines makes it
unclear whether he and several other Justices think it is important or applicable. What is clear is that a potential result of limiting privacy doctrine, and of propagating bad law in general, is that courts may simply
avoid addressing rights deemed unworthy of careful diagnosis.23 1
Jardines risks advancing "a rule that is unrepresentative" of how future
cases should be decided, and "distort[s] . . . the nature of [the] con,232
trovers[y]" concerning Fourth Amendment search analysis.
CONCLUSION

Florida v. Jardinesreached the right result but should have taken a
different approach to get there. The Court correctly concluded that the
police engaged in an unlawful search, but the opinion unfortunately relied on property and trespass law instead of Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy standard.233 The majority's specific and unapologetic
dismissal of Katz's critical privacy considerations234 resulted in a failure
to overrule questionable cases, did not create a clear and broadly applicable rule, and perpetuated a standard that allows for an unequal application of Fourth Amendment protections. Furthermore, by relegating
Katz's privacy analysis to a secondary position behind a property analy226.
See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
227.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches ... shall not be violated ....
); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
228.
See Amar, supra note 207, at 757-58.
229.
Id. at 798.
230.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
231.
Marceau, supranote 15, at 755.
232.
Schauer, supranote 196, at 900, 905.
233.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
234.
Id.
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sis, the Court is potentially signaling that privacy rights are of diminished
significance or that their analysis is unnecessary. Although Justice Kagan's concurring opinion reminds us that Katz and privacy rights are as
important as ever and could have easily decided Jardines,235 her opinion
does not set the legal standard.
Jardines' trespass analysis rightly reaffirms the home's unique and
highly protected status and ensures that residents are free from government searches that violate property interests.236 However, segregation of
property and privacy doctrine within the realm of the Fourth Amendment
237
"forecloses consideration of the totality of a police-citizen interaction."
Consequently, "the quality of the resultant constitutional rights" is negatively impacted. 238 Florida v. Jardines is an example of this phenomenon. The Fourth Amendment may have originally relied solely on property and trespass law, 2 39 but analysis today requires examination of the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard. 24 0 After all, as the Second
Circuit in United States v. Thomas 24 1 concluded, "[t]he very fact that a
person is in his own home raises a reasonable inference that he intends to
have privacy." 242 The Jardines decision may protect the home from trespass and inappropriate physical intrusions, but it does not include the
necessary analysis required to definitively address and answer Fourth
Amendment privacy concerns. More troubling still, the Jardines decision
does not ensure that the same rights are available to all citizens regardless o' the physical or structural nature of their residence.
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